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 On 5 November 1991, a relatively weak and slow-moving Typhoon 
Thelma—locally codenamed ‘Uring’—with maximum winds of 55 kph, 
triggered deadly flashfloods that left an estimated 4,000 to 8,000 people 
dead, over 2,000 missing, at least 3,000 injured, and massive devastation 
in infrastructure and agriculture valued at over 200 million pesos, or 
approximately US$7.3 million. Using ethnography, documentary research 
and interviews, this dissertation asks about the nature of social change 
and transformation in a calamitous situation. It assesses the causes of 
the 1991 flood, its impacts, and twenty-two years of recovery, focusing on 
the poorest and most vulnerable communities and families. It argues that, 
in the face of the systematic exploitation and privatization of land for cash 
crop agriculture since the turn of the twentieth century and the 
consequent creation of social vulnerability, it was not a ‘natural’ disaster. 
It is the first known study of its kind to document personal stories of 
continuing survival in the Philippines after a massive disaster, and as 
such challenges conventional wisdom that vulnerability for families and 
communities is resolved after the implementation of intervention 
programs by government agencies and well-meaning non-government 
organizations. Using case studies of three communities that survived the 
1991 flash floods, it provides a three-fold conclusion. First, poverty and 
vulnerability are twin situations that remain persistent even after twenty-
two years of intervention, with new forms of economic dependency being 
established in these new communities. Second, the lack of accountability 
and learning continue to predispose a large portion of Ormoc society to 
persistent poverty and vulnerability. Finally, the lack of a wide-ranging 
social memory of that disaster contributes to the lack of accountability 
and learning. 
 
Key words: 1991 Ormoc flash floods, vulnerability, poverty, disaster, 
natural hazards, recovery 
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PROLOGUE 
WRATH OF THE RIVERS 
 
As recalled by the author, the satellite imagery depicting Thelma was 
unimpressive, i.e., a forecaster might mistakenly expect no serious results 
from its passage. However, torrential rains dumped an estimated 6 inches of 
water in 24 hours, as the tropical storm passed over the island of Leyte. 
  
- F. Williams, G. Jung and R. Engelbretson, Forecasters Handbook for the 
Philippine Islands and Surrounding Waters (Monterey, California: Naval 
Research Laboratory, 1993), 3-26.  
It was eight in the morning of that rainy Tuesday of 5 November 1991 
and nine-year old Joan was ecstatic that she did not have to go to school. 
Like any child who discovers an unexpected holiday, she rejoiced for the 
typhoon because her mother allowed her to stay home. Quickly, she went 
down to the Anilao River just a few houses away, and frolicked in the rain 
with some of the neighborhood children, hardly aware of the river that had 
always been there since she was born. When she went home, tired and 
happy, it was about 9:30 a.m. and the rain was steadily pouring.1 
By quarter to eleven that morning, Buboy, who was twenty-one years 
old, was still busy checking test papers on the kitchen table, distracted 
occasionally by the constant sound of the torrential rain like pellets against 
the jalousies. He looked up now and then at his young wife who was 
preparing munggos2 for lunch. He was a teacher at Saint Peter’s College, 
only a bike ride away from Barangay Don Felipe where he lived with his 
family on the ground floor and his wife’s parents and sister-in-law at the 
second floor of the house. In a corner, Bangbang, his fourteen-month old 
son, slept fitfully. After a few minutes, Buboy detected a change in the tempo 
of the rain, subtle but disturbing, though not enough to truly alarm him as yet. 
The Anilao River occasionally flooded after all, but because the house was 
situated at the top-most end of the river slope hugging the perimeter wall of 
																																								 																				
1 Joan, interview with author, 24 April 2013, in Barangay Tambulilid, Ormoc City, original in 
Filipino. Interview occurred in the afternoon in Joan’s sari-sari store in Tambulilid. Her 
husband, young daughter and son were also present. The sari-sari store was packed full 
with merchandise, and when I arrived, with my interpreter Victor Arcuiño, the couple was 
busy measuring and packing white sugar. 
2 Bisaya, lit. mung beans sautéed in tomato, onion and garlic, and is popularly eaten with 
steamed rice. 
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the Serafica property, he was not unduly concerned. It was unheard of, at 
least among the residents of Barangay Don Felipe, that the Anilao had ever 
breached its banks. That day, there was no strong wind, but the rain had 
become more intense. Suddenly he felt something cold slap against his 
ankles. There was water pouring in from under the door. It was the color of 
mud and reeked of a strange, but unmistakable smell of the river.3   
Just down the Anilao River, also in Barangay Don Felipe, the 
meandering waters were hemmed in on both sides by a mass of tightly 
crammed rickety houses made from bamboo, nipa, and other light materials. 
Thirty-nine-year old Elizabeth was putting things away after an early lunch. It 
was around eleven a.m. A devout woman, she silently thanked God that her 
husband, a tricycle driver, and her three children, who she had not allowed to 
go to school that morning because of the typhoon warning, were all at home. 
She was not yet done with her washing up, when she noticed the Monobloc 
chairs teetering on the flowing water that had suddenly inundated her kitchen 
floor. Peering out the window, she was startled to see her ducks floating in a 
sea that had been their small backyard.4   
In another part of Ormoc City, in a small two-storey boarding house at 
the corner of Osmeña and Real Streets, forty-year old Apining, who was 
enjoying a day off as a saleslady at a popular shoe store called Footsteps, 
had just finished decorating the house for Christmas. Her husband was 
dozing inside their rented room, and she debated whether to continue waiting 
for another housemate who should have been sent home from work by now 
or go ahead and eat, as she had already finished cooking for lunch. She 
went to lie down beside her husband, deciding to wait till twelve o’clock. 
Suddenly, she heard the puzzling sound of surging water. She got up to 
																																								 																				
3 Buboy, interview with author, 4 April 2013, in Barangay Tambulilid, Ormoc City, original in 
mixed Filipino and English. This interview occurred in the GK Rotary provincial office in 
Tambulilid.  
4 Elizabeth, interview with author, 6 April 2013, at GK Rotary, Barangay Tambulilid, Ormoc 
City, original in Filipino. The interview occurred in her own home around lunchtime, and the 
author was accompanied by Victor Arcuiño as interpreter. Her house had a small receiving 
area in front, with grills on the main door.   
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investigate, and on opening the front door, was immediately drenched. 
Outside was a sea of water rushing towards her.5  
Along the Malbasag River running parallel to the Anilao, twenty-six-
year old Amparo hastily gathered her children’s rubber slippers and secured 
them atop the nipa roof. She shouted to her husband to hurry with his 
repairs. She was worried that the water was rising much too quickly. She 
went back inside, threw some clothes into a sack, and hushed the children, 
one who was almost two and another who was not yet one year old. When 
she went back outside a few minutes later, she was shocked to see some 
huge trees and houses tumbling in the floodwaters.6  
Then came the floods 
 At about eleven a.m. on 5 November, an hour after the peak of the 
intense downpour, a surge of floodwaters burst along the tributaries of the 
Anilao and Malbasag rivers. The bulk of it poured into the city proper and 
covered approximately a square kilometer of the commercial and residential 
areas. A flash flood also occurred in other areas like Barangay Nalunopan, 
which lay slightly above the city proper with an estimated elevation of 114 
meters above sea level and where a tributary of the Anilao River also flowed. 
The Panilahan River in Barangay Ipil also flooded, but it did not cause a flash 
flood the likes seen along the Anilao and Malbasag that day. In the business 
district where canals drained straight to Ormoc Bay, the rushing waters 
picked up velocity, carrying with it the houses lining the riverbanks of the 
Anilao and Malbasag.  
Ronaldo Boy, a nineteen-year old manunubo7 in the sugarcane 
hacienda of Barangay Nalunopan, struggled to pull his grandmother up the 
roof. The water had risen quickly, threatening to engulf the pawud8 house. In 
																																								 																				
5 Apining, interview with author, 6 April 2013, at GK Rotary, Barangay Tambulilid, Ormoc 
City, original in Bisaya. Interview occurred in Apining’s own house at about lunchtime. Victor 
Arcuiño accompanied the author as interpreter.  
6 Amparo, interview with author, 26 April 2013, at Block 7, Barangay Tambulilid, Ormoc City, 
original in Filipino. The interview was undertaken on the front porch of the house.   
7 Bisaya and Filipino, lit. sugarcane laborer. 
8 Bisaya, lit. thatched.  
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an unbelievable instant, the swirling waters of the Malinawon Creek9 
swallowed the hut, leaving them clinging desperately to the nipa10 roof. The 
hut was tugged and pulled by the raging waters before it collapsed and flung 
them into what he thought was a certain death. But he found himself clinging 
to a clump of nearby bamboo trees, but his grandmother was nowhere to be 
found.   
In Barangay Don Felipe, Buboy had clambered up to the second floor 
with his parents-in-law, sister-in-law, wife and young son. Soon they heard 
banging against the lawanit11 walls and voices begging to be let in. Stranded 
neighbors, some they did not even know or recognize, had crossed over 
from window to window, watching the same houses they had climbed 
through tumble into the raging waters like dominoes, until they reached 
Buboy’s house, which was the last one standing. Behind it was a high 
cement barrier they could not climb over. There were about fifty desperate 
souls who clambered into the second-floor of Buboy’s house. Then the 
house creaked and groaned against the relentless current of the floodwaters. 
In an instant Buboy felt it give way, breaking up like flimsy sticks. Amidst 
desperate prayers and helpless cries, they were all sucked into the surge of 
mud, debris, felled trees and logs, and animals both dead and alive. With the 
waters swirling around them, Buboy gripped his wife and son tightly to his 
chest and swam defiantly, refusing to surrender to the rampaging waters. In 
a few minutes, the swift-flowing current surprisingly subsided and he could 
miraculously touch solid ground again. Brimming with an overwhelming 
sense of thanksgiving, he looked down to set his wife and son on the ground. 
But he was shocked to find he was gripping tight not his infant son, but a 
piece of wood. Beside him, his bedraggled wife sobbed, “We have lost 
Bangbang.”12  
 Just a few meters away, also in Barangay Don Felipe, Merlita, a thirty-
one-year old housewife, and her husband quickly brought their three children 
to higher grounds as soon as she noticed water pouring into the house. After 
																																								 																				
9 Pseudonym.  
10 Filipino and Bisaya, lit. palm.  
11 Bisaya and Filipino, lit. plywood.  
12 Buboy, Ibid. 
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guiding his family to an elevated area, her husband said he would go back to 
fetch the day’s income amounting to 700 pesos from their sari-sari13 store, 
which they had left in a rush. Left alone with her three young children—a 
three-year old daughter who clung under her armpit, a five-year old son she 
held in her other hand, and a seven-year old boy she urged to hold on tight 
to her skirt because both her hands were occupied—she was unprepared 
when a sudden wave came and swept away her seven-year old without a 
whimper. She could only scream after him uselessly.14     
 In Isla Verde, thirty-eight-year old Solemnisa, who like Merlita had no 
idea there was a typhoon warning, was caught unawares by the rising Anilao 
River. She dragged her children to a coconut tree next to their house and 
secured them there with ropes, one by one, while the waters raged around 
them. She then climbed up the trunk, where four other people were clinging 
at the top. But a powerful surge uprooted the tree and flung them all into the 
brown water. She lost two children that day, one who is still missing today. 
Her husband, too, remains missing.15     
In the immediate aftermath 
The rain, at least in the mountain barangay of Tongonan, stopped 
immediately, with no additional rainfall added to the rain gauge. In the city, 
some local residents claimed that the sun crept out in the afternoon of 5 
November, noting that the flashflood itself only took thirty minutes to drain 
out to Ormoc Bay. Based on footage taken by JA Fotorama that day, a local 
photo and video shop located in the heart of Ormoc City across the old 
Philippine National Bank building, people began milling about the city streets 
immediately after the waters subsided. They exhibited no overweening panic, 
grief or other emotional outbursts. Yet there was a sense of the surreal as 
people began to take stock of the dead and the enormous destruction, 
																																								 																				
13 Filipino, lit. a small merchandise store selling miscellaneous items. 
14 Merlita, interview with author, 5 April 2013, at GK Rotary, Barangay Tambulilid, Ormoc 
City, original in Filipino.  
15 Solemnisa, interview with author, 5 April 2013, at GK Rotary, Barangay Tambulilid, Ormoc 
City, original in Bisaya. Interview occurred in the GK provincial office in Barangay Tambulilid. 
Victor Arcuiño, the author’s interpreter, was present. Solemnisa’s speech was difficult to 
understand, as she talked quickly.  
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including drowned babies, women and children, oftentimes stripped naked 
amidst the mud and flood debris.   
Laura, who was vacationing in the Philippines from Australia, lost her 
mother, sister, several nephews and nieces in a blink of an eye, as well as a 
three-storey house she had financed for renovations along the Anilao River 
just seven months before.16 She herself very nearly drowned. Her brother 
lost his entire family. Ben, who was in the Philippine Constabulary, was 
stationed that day in distant Barangay Liberty and had heard of the tragedy 
from colleagues. He immediately went down to the city, a trek that took him 
nearly eight hours, only to find his wife, two young children, and parents-in-
law missing and a desolate flatland where his house used to be in Barangay 
Cogon.17 They, too, all remain missing until today. Elizabeth and her family in 
what used to be Barangay Don Felipe had finally climbed up a caimito18 tree 
at the height of Anilao’s wrath, while their pawud house was swept away. 
She luckily lost no member of her family, but her cousins and their families 
who lived closer to the river all perished that day.  
Mayor Victoria Locsin was said to have mobilized local government, 
indeed what little remained of it at that time amidst the chaos, while some of 
her local officials were nowhere to be found. Unfortunately, no documents or 
photos exist that can testify to what the local government did, but an 
interview with a local journalist pointed out that mayor Locsin was already 
active in coordination efforts around the city. More visible, however, were the 
relief activities initiated by a private citizen by the name of Eufrocino Codilla 
Sr, who was a contractor with his own backhoes and trucks and whose 
daughter-in-law Gwen Garcia was able to successfully connect with Cebu 
City. In response, Governor Emilio Osmeña of Cebu, sent some food packs 
and accompanied these by plane to Ormoc in the following days. Another 
non-publicized personality who was said to be among the first responders, 
																																								 																				
16 Laura, interview with author, 7 June 2013, in downtown Ormoc City, original in mixed 
English and Filipino. Interview occurred in the funeral building that her family owned.  
17 Police Constabulary (Retired) Bienvenido Udtohan, interview with author, 8 October 2013 
in Barangay San Lorenzo, Ormoc City in Filipino. The interview occurred in the front porch of 
his house. 
18 Filipino, lit. star apple fruit of the family Sapotaceae native to the Greater Antilles and 
West Indies, but now grown throughout the tropics, including Southeast Asia.  
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according to a local journalist, was Baybay Municipality mayor Carmen L. 
Cari, who with her team gathered all the pusô19 and grilled chicken she could 
find in Baybay, Leyte, and arrived in Ormoc via pump boat by six p.m. to 
distribute food aid to city hall employees. Their group left by around eight 
p.m., motoring out of Ormoc Bay in a hurry. They feared that another small 
flood might come to cleanse the debris that the major flood had brought, a 
popular pamahiin or local superstitious belief in the aftermath of a flood. For 
many others, especially in what used to be Isla Verde and Barangays Don 
Felipe, Alegria, and Malbasag, many went to sleep hungry, terrified, cold, 
and wet, huddled together with what remained of their families under 
makeshift tents.  















19 Bisaya, lit. cooked rice inside a palm pouch woven into a triangle or square.  






PROBLEMATIQUE OF THE 1991 ORMOC TRAGEDY 
 
Experts now say that even before the flood, it should have been obvious 
that Ormoc was a natural disaster waiting to happen. 
 
- H. Severino, “Ormoc revisited,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 21-22 April 1992.20 
 
The ability to inject humor to an otherwise tragic event is but a glimpse 
of that distinct trait of Filipinos to laugh at themselves and breeze 
through adversity. 
 
- L. Jimenea, “Laughter eases pain of flood victims,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 11 
November 1999, 14. 
 
In the Philippines, disasters are continuing realities. Indeed, Bankoff 
(2003) counted 702 disasters between 1900 and 1991, leading him to note 
that the Philippines has a “history of hazard”.21 As such, death, too, is 
common. With a surging population rate amidst a proliferation of accidents, 
armed conflicts, landslides, typhoons, floods, volcanic eruptions, fires, 
earthquakes and senseless crimes, death and disasters are so common they 
are no longer shocking. They are a normal part of how life unfolds daily in 
this island world fraught with danger. Not surprisingly, there is a cavalier 
attitude among Filipinos towards disaster that may seem odd to an outsider 
who cannot understand how and why ordinary Filipinos can smile and laugh, 
signs commonly taken to mean ‘resilience.’ In the media, these outward 
signs of resilience and coping are often emphasized in the aftermath of 
natural hazards that commonly occur one after another.  
Nowhere were these thoughts more prevalent than when I started 
researching a twenty-two-year old flood in 2013. The story of the Ormoc 
tragedy is riddled with contradictions that defy a simple cause and effect 
explanation. Ormoc, relatively unknown to the rest of the country before 
1991, became an overnight phenomenon for all the wrong reasons. It has the 
																																								 																				
20 Re-published by the Philippine Center on Investigative Journalism (Online).  
21 G. Bankoff, Cultures of Disaster, Society and Natural Hazards in the Philippines (London 
and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), especially Chapter 3, “A history of hazard in the 
Philippines,” 31-60.  
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dubious distinction of being referred to as that city where thousands perished 
from a rogue typhoon that triggered deadly floods. In 1991, public discourse 
focused on why it happened at all. A meteorological explanation was 
adopted in the immediate flood aftermath by the Philippine government 
blaming nature, calling the tragedy “an unprecedented event which occurs 
only once in fifty (50) years.”22 
The common view of floods is that they are a ‘natural’ phenomenon, 
only one among many other hazards. Indeed, from the perspective of the 
World Bank, disasters are natural. They strike repeatedly and with frequent 
periodicity in some parts of the world. The World Bank also believes that it is 
now possible to predict “where an event will likely occur at some time in the 
near future (but not precisely when or its magnitude).”23 In another 
publication, while insisting that “[f]loods are natural phenomena,” it noted that 
the causes of flooding may be either natural or man-made. Commonly, it 
says, they are caused by a combination of “meteorological and hydrological 
extremes, such as extreme precipitation and flows.”24 But floods, the World 
Bank further adds, can also occur “as a result of human activities,” like 
“unplanned growth and development in floodplains, or from the breach of a 
dam or the overtopping of an embankment that fails to protect planned 
developments.”25 The foregoing arguments have important implications on 
what programs and policies can be funded. For the World Bank, the priority 
is clearly to ameliorate disaster impacts through post-disaster programs. On 
the downside, however, the argument that floods are ‘natural’ occurrences 
implicitly denies the need to identify underlying political and socio-economic 
issues that are central to sustainable and meaningful solutions. Mitigation 
programs that are commonly supported by major funding organizations, such 
as the World Bank, are those that deal with issues that are least politically 
																																								 																				
22 Ormoc Task Force Scientific Study Group, Scientific Assessment Report: Ormoc City 
flood on 5 November 1991, Unpublished report (Department of Science and Technology 
(DOST) 1991), 1.  
23 World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, Hazards of Nature, Risks to Development, An 
IEG Evaluation of World Bank Assistance for Natural Disasters (Washington D.C.: The 
World Bank 2006), 24. 
24 A. Jha and J. Lamond, Cities and Flooding: A Guide to Integrated Urban Flood Risk 
Management for the 21st Century (International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development/International Development Association or the Wold Bank, 2012), 55-56.  
25 Ibid. 
10	|	F L O O D W A T E R S 	 O F 	 D E A T H 	
	
sensitive, such as infrastructure development, relocation and housing of 
vulnerable communities, sanitation, etc. These programs do not need to 
delve too deeply into the prevailing socio-economic and political conditions 
that characterize society, such as elite politics, marginalization, poverty and 
vulnerability. As such, mitigation programs often espouse technocratic 
approaches that are measurable and deemed effective based on identified 
objectives that aim to return an area that has been devastated by a natural 
hazard to business-as-usual as soon as possible.  
However, in the context of developing countries, a discussion on 
floods does not only revolve around the impacts on people’s lives, livelihood 
and coping mechanisms. More importantly, it asks why disasters happen, 
which go beyond the meteorological and hydrological explanations into more 
problematic economic and socio-political issues that obviously cannot be 
resolved quickly, if at all. Unlike earthquakes, storm surges, tsunamis and 
typhoons that have clear origins in ‘nature’ and as such are often mitigated 
technocratically, floods are a clear consequence of society. If disasters are 
‘products of a society than of a specific nature,’26 floods are particularly true 
of this statement. Forest denudation, river and waterway siltation, 
construction of settlements both legal and illegal along major waterways, 
conversion of land from forest to residential, industrial and commercial areas, 
agricultural over-cultivation in the hinterlands to meet increasing urban 
demand—in short a country’s pursuit of economic growth—all these factors 
contribute to the increasing occurrence and magnitude of the impacts of 
floods.  
In urban settings, the problem becomes more acute. Floods and the 
catastrophe they bring about expose festering social, economic and political 
inequalities. In an instant, these inequalities that had taken many decades to 
crystallize are brought to the fore in the event of major hazards that 
transform into disasters. Pelling (2003) argues that “cities [are] sites of 
disaster” firstly because, in countries with colonial pasts, they had been 
																																								 																				
26 A. Oliver-Smith, “Theorizing vulnerability in a globalized world: A political ecological 
perspective,” in Mapping Vulnerability, Disasters, Development and People, ed. G. Bankoff, 
G. Frerks and D. Hilhorst (London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan, 2004), 11.  
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established on coasts that are increasingly exposed to hazards.27 Secondly, 
urbanization is itself a self-reflexive process with cities increasingly adopting 
policies that often lead to their own possible destruction. One such policy is 
land-use programs converting forest areas for industrial and residential 
purposes. Thirdly, the lack of regulation among “peripheral settlements at 
risk” “is often a symptom of piecemeal urban development and a lack of 
strategic planning.”28 As such, subpar housing patterns in urban slums, for 
example, are the norm, which are highly susceptible to the effects of natural 
hazards. Lastly, poverty in urban areas is commonly not prioritized, which 
has resulted in the exclusion of the urban poor from sustainable 
development. For many urban poor dwellers in the Philippines, life has 
become “cheap” because of routinized risks they are forced to accept in 
everyday life. Certainly in Ormoc City in 1991, Isla Verde—that illegal 
settlement established in the mouth of the Anilao River and which had been 
totally “washed out”29—became the quintessential example of political and 
socio-economic inequalities. That some 2,500 residents over the years were 
able to construct semi- and permanent homes in a high risk area without 
effective government regulation before the flood raises serious questions 
about the nature of landlessness, urban poverty, and failed governance. The 
increasing urbanization process with its attendant developmental concerns, 
coupled with the geographic character of Ormoc City as a water basin, 
predisposed it to unnatural disasters30, notably widespread floods. A tragedy 
was simply waiting to happen. From this perspective of the unnatural nature 
of floods of the late twentieth century, the 1991 Ormoc flood could not have 
been an act of God. Yet why should the Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources (DENR) in 1991 insist on the imposition of the ‘nature’ 
argument, only to retract it weeks later by issuing a statement that the flash 
																																								 																				
27 M. Pelling, The Vulnerability of Cities, Natural Disasters and Social Resilience (London 
and Sterling VA: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 2003), Chapter 2.  
28 Ibid., 29.  
29 Term commonly used to refer to Isla Verde and the Ormoc flood survivors, denoting the 
act of having been stripped to zero, both figuratively and physically. 
30 See discussion on “unnatural disasters” by J. Abramovitz, “Unnatural disasters,” in 
Worldwatch Paper 158, ed. L. Starke (Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, October 
2001).  
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flood was caused by illegal logging?31 If the illegal logging argument 
espoused by local officials and Ormoc victim-survivors was the leading public 
discourse at the time, why had there been no lasting policies from that 
phenomenon?  
Flooding in rural agricultural areas also touches upon other key areas 
of development. These include food security, agricultural losses, land tenure, 
and, in the case of the Philippines where 30 per cent of the labor force is in 
the agricultural sector,32 crucial livelihood issues. The concerns of sugarcane 
laborers prior to, during and after the 1991 flood, especially in Barangay 
Nalunopan33 in Ormoc City where a disproportionate number of deaths also 
occurred, highlight similarities in the concerns of urban flood survivors, such 
as land tenure, employment insecurity, poverty and marginalization, and 
persistent vulnerability. Contrary to the urban poor communities that had 
been adversely affected in 1991, however, sugarcane laborer communities 
have historically experienced higher rates of poverty and vulnerability 
because of the fact that their employment in plantations places them in 
patron-client relationships with their employers that necessarily limit 
involvement by the national and local government. It is notable, for example, 
that plantation owners primarily facilitate the construction of roads in 
community clusters of laborer families within plantations. Again, in the matter 
of combating child labor in sugarcane plantations in general, government 
intervention programs remain a challenge of implementation, as parents 
bring their children to the plantations to help augment family income while 
plantation owners themselves do not enforce anti-child labor laws.34 Yet, 
what is surprising is the historical lack of overt resistance in Ormoc among 
sugarcane laborers against plantation owners. Indeed, armed insurgencies 
had been few—those acts that demand a change in the status quo that 
privileged only a handful of families, similar to what occurred in Negros 
																																								 																				
31 See, for example, “DENR admits: Ormoc tragedy caused by forest denudation,” The 
Philippine Free Press 83:48, 30 November 1991, 42. 
32 Philippine Statistics Authority. Technical notes on the labor force survey (LFS). Republic 
of the Philippines, accessed 4 May 2012 (Online). 
33 Nalunopan is a pseudonym. In Bisaya, it means an area that was flooded.  
34 See, for example, C. Lim, “Special report: Beyond the fields (Second of Three Parts),” 
SunStar Cebu, 24 June 2015 (Online); and, Kyung Lah, “Life not sweet for Philippines’ sugar 
cane child workers,” CNN, 2 May 2012 (Online).  
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Occidental in the late 1980s during the fall of sugar prices. Why have there 
been no apparent resistance in post-1991 Ormoc? Surely, a disaster such as 
the 1991 tragedy could have served as a powerful catalyst for social and 
political change against oppressive economic and socio-political conditions.    
Vulnerability and disaster 
The discourse on floods in Ormoc is intimately linked to vulnerability. 
For Cannon (1994), vulnerability is “a characteristic of individuals and groups 
of people who inhabit a given natural, social and economic space, within 
which they are differentiated according to their varying position in society into 
more or less vulnerable individuals and groups.”35 Wisner et al (2004) add 
that, “This vulnerability [of different groups of people] is determined by social 
systems and power, not by natural forces.”36 Key markers that influence the 
level of vulnerability experienced by individuals, families or communities 
encompass “class (which includes differences in wealth), occupation, caste, 
ethnicity, gender, disability and health status, age and discrimination status 
(whether ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’), and the nature and extent of social network.”37 As 
such, a combination of these factors result in varying levels of vulnerability, 
with some individuals and families rendered more vulnerable than others.  
Yet vulnerability is not static. Nor is it a one-off condition that 
characterizes only present life situations. The role that history plays in 
shaping vulnerability has been shown to be vital: “Vulnerability is not just 
concerned with the present or the future but is equally, and intimately, a 
product of the past.”38 Historical factors have resulted not only in the 
marginalization of particular groups in a society, but also in the adoption and 
implementation of “environmentally unsustainable development projects over 
time.”39 Vulnerability has been primarily conceived as political in character 
																																								 																				
35 T. Cannon, “Vulnerability and the explanation of ‘natural’ disasters,” in Disasters, 
Development and Environment, ed. A. Varley (Chichester, New York, Brisbane, Toronto and 
Singapore: John Wiley and Sons, 1994), 19.  
36 B. Wisner, P. Blaikie, T. Cannon and I. Davis, At Risk, Natural Hazards, People’s 
Vulnerability and Disasters, Second Edition (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 7.  
37 Ibid.  
38 G. Bankoff and D. Hilhorst, “Introduction: Mapping Vulnerability,” in Mapping Vulnerability, 
Disasters, Development and People, ed. G. Bankoff, G. Frerks, and D. Hilhorst (London and 
Sterling, VA: Earthscan, 2004), 8-9.  
39 Ibid.  
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because it can best be understood as a lack of development.40 It shares the 
same weakness with other Western approaches that adopt a particularly 
’top-down’ approach to disaster management which tends to 
disempower communities by characterizing them as ‘victims’ and 
‘passive recipients’ from a paternalistic and authoritative perspective.41  
It has also been argued to be political-ecological in nature because of 
its material and social constructions, often conflicting, that define societal risk 
according to the dictates of social, political and economic practices and 
institutions.42 Indeed, “[a]sking why disasters happen is a political question; 
but understanding how they occur is a social and historical one.”43 Given the 
close interlinking of the past and present in the construction of systemic 
vulnerability, who were these vulnerable individuals and families in Ormoc 
prior to 1991 and how did they manage their lives amidst such 
marginalization? If, as Susman, O’Keefe and Wisner (1983) argue, the 
condition of marginality is not a consequence of the marginal group itself but 
of the relationship it has with other classes and interest groups in society,44 
where is the human agency of the marginalized group in these 
circumstances?    
Vulnerability, unfortunately, is a difficult and cumbersome concept to 
use. This despite being recognized and applied by such humanitarian 
institutions as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies (IFRC and RCS), which notes that “[t]he concept is relative and 
																																								 																				
40 O. Cardona, “The need for rethinking the concepts of vulnerability and risk from a holistic 
perspective: A necessary review and criticism for effective risk management,” in Mapping 
Vulnerability, Disasters, Development and People, ed. G. Bankoff, G. Frerks and D. Hilhorst 
(London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan, 2004), 49. 
41 Sharma and Palakuyidil do not specifically equate this statement with the vulnerability 
approach, but the description of this “top-down” approach is apt for how vulnerability has 
been understood in disaster management practice. A. Sharma and T. Palakuyidil, “The 
lessons in Gujarat,” in Facing Up to the Storm, How Local Communities Can Cope From 
Disaster: Lessons from Orissa and Gujarat, ed. T. Palakuyidil and M. Todd (New Delhi: 
Christian Aid 2003), 27. 
42 A. Oliver-Smith, “Theorizing vulnerability in a globalized world: A political ecological 
perspective,” in Mapping Vulnerability, Disasters, Development and People, ed. G. Bankoff, 
G. Frerks and D. Hilhorst (London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan 2004), 10-11.  
43 G. Bankoff and D. Hilhorst, “Introduction: Mapping Vulnerability,” 4.  
44 P. Susman, P. O’Keefe and B. Wisner, “Global disasters, a radical interpretation,” in 
Interpretations of Calamity from the Viewpoint of Human Ecology, ed. K. Hewitt (Boston, 
London and Sydney: Allen and Unwin, Inc. 1983), 276-280.  
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dynamic.”45 The difficulty stems from its blurring with the concept of poverty. 
While not all poor people are deemed vulnerable, the most vulnerable are 
often the poorest in a community. During the intervention stage in a major 
humanitarian crisis, is it even practical or necessary to delineate between the 
vulnerable and the poor for strategic planning? Vulnerability is also a term 
appropriated and assigned mainly by experts and specialists. Thus, there is 
the danger of imposing knowledge and expertise based on best practices 
distilled from other emergency cases that may actually be insensitive to the 
sensibilities and needs of local culture. These concerns prompted me in the 
beginning of my work to adopt a more limited definition of vulnerability using 
the livelihood perspective proposed by Wisner et al (2004). They define 
livelihood as “the command an individual, family or other social groups has 
over an income and/or bundles of resources that can be used or exchanged 
to satisfy its needs.”46 Following this definition, five types of capital were 
looked at: “human capital or skills, knowledge, health and energy; social 
capital or networks, groups, and institutions; physical capital or infrastructure, 
technology and equipment; financial or savings and credit; and, natural 
capital or natural resources, land, water, fauna and flora.”47 This more 
inclusive definition of vulnerability was certainly an attempt to accommodate 
individual idealization of what constituted personal, familial and communal 
security cognizant of people’s free will and initiative. Yet, once intervention 
programs such as resettlement housing had been accomplished in the 
aftermath of a disaster, as had happened in post-1991 Ormoc, do previously 
‘vulnerable’ individuals, families and communities automatically transition to 
‘security’ as opposed to vulnerability, even though they technically remain 
poor? Is there then a real distinction between vulnerability and poverty? 
Interestingly, most respondents after the 1991 Ormoc tragedy did not view 
themselves as vulnerable, even after twenty-two years since 1991. In an era 
where local knowledge and cultural nuances have attained primary 
importance in identifying mitigation and development programs and policies 
																																								 																				
45 “What is vulnerability?” International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
(IFRC and RCS) (Online, accessed 2 May 2013).  
46 B. Wisner, P. Blaikie, T. Cannon and I. Davis, At Risk, Natural Hazards, People’s 
Vulnerability and Disasters, 96. 
47 Ibid. 
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that work, these considerations have implications on how victim-survivors 
themselves imagine and shape their lives and destinies vis-à-vis political-
economic and cultural institutions. Indeed, contrary to the image of 
helplessness and powerlessness that the notion of vulnerability projects, 
victim-survivors of the 1991 Ormoc tragedy have exercised to varying 
degrees active involvement in their own future survival, in ways that were 
both creative and rational. They had utilized even those acts, such as 
rumors, stories, jokes, gestures, etc., common in any community that could 
be labelled as covert acts of resistance and discontent, or what Scott (1985) 
refers to as ‘weapons of the weak.’48  
What accountability? 
In the aftermath of disasters, the quest to investigate its causes and 
assign accountability quickly follows the relief and rehabilitation stage. The 
objective is to advocate reforms to improve policies and institutions of 
governance. Politically, this stage is the most unstable, as political rivals and 
other competing institutions commonly use the opportunity to blame others 
and shape the discourse according to their interests. Criticism and blame are 
common issues in the media in the aftermath of a crisis, with questions 
revolving around why it happened, what the government is doing, and what 
could have prevented it from happening, questions that appear factual but 
have deeper implications on apportioning blame. It is no surprise then that 
during disaster situations, winners and losers as well as heroes and villains 
are created not only among direct and peripheral victim-survivors, but also 
more importantly among political actors. Accountability, according to Boin et 
al (2008) “is mainly about looking back and judging the performance of 
people.”49 It is not often a “routine, ritualistic exercise”, but rather involves a 
variety of mechanisms imbued with formal or informal power to “interrogate, 
debate with and sanction political decision makers.”50 This is where forums, 
																																								 																				
48 J. Scott, Weapons of the Weak, Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1985).  
49 A. Boin, A. McConnell and P. t’Hart, “Governing After Crisis,” in Governing After Crisis, 
The Poliltics of Investigation, Accountability and Learning, ed. A. Boin, A. MCConnell and P. 
t’Hart (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo, Delhi: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 9.  
50 Ibid., 11.  
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including the courts, media, parliaments and auditors can make political 
decision makers accountable for their actions, a process common to 
developed countries where the society itself expects an inward-looking 
mechanism to ensure that a crisis does not re-occur. But it is not necessarily 
true for developing countries such as the Philippines, where the quest for 
accountability of public institutions and officials is often the least priority, and 
often a non-priority, in disaster aftermath. 
It must also be noted here that the November 1991 Ormoc tragedy 
occurred at a time so nearing Christmas, which may partly explain why there 
was no sense of sustained public outrage despite the disturbing images of 
horror published in major dailies at that time. Grisly footage of bloated 
corpses was shown floating in Ormoc Bay or fished out as far as the 
Camotes Islands and Bohol. While the images were highly unnerving, 
national consciousness was preoccupied with other pressing matters. It is 
indicative that, on 6 November 1991, when the country had not yet woken to 
the awful reality of the disaster in Ormoc City, the newspaper Malaya ran a 
story on the “[r]ise in illegal logging cases [being] blamed on pols”51. The 
political climate in 1991 was already highly volatile. Emerging from the 
martial law dictatorship of President Ferdinand Marcos, government 
agencies including the DENR were yet in 1991 unable to shed their 
reputation as instruments of massive corruption. The Aquino administration 
was also battling armed challenges to her presidency, as attempted military 
coups became a way of life for military opportunists and adventurers. Just 
over a year before, on 16 July 1990, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake rocked 
northern Luzon, killing at least 1300 people, injuring at least 3,000 and 
causing an estimated 12.2 to 16 billion pesos in infrastructure damages 
($488 to 640 million).52 Then on 15 June 1991, the long-dormant Mount 
																																								 																				
51 C. Pablo, “Rise in illegal logging cases blamed on pols,” Malaya 10:293, 6 November 
1991, 6.  
52 R.L. Sharpe, “July 14, 1990 Luzon (Philippines) earthquake,” in Proceedings of the Tenth 
World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Madrid, Spain, 19-24 July 1992, Vol. 11, ed. 
A. Bernal (Rotterdam: A.A. Balkema, 1994), 7027-7031 (Online); G. Rantucci, Geological 
Disasters in the Philippines: The July 1990 Earthquake and the June 1991 Eruption of Mount 
Pinatubo, Description, Effects and Lessons Learned (Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Directorate General for Development Cooperation, and Presidenza Del Consiglio Dei 
Ministri, Dipartemento Per L’Informazione E L’Editoria 1994); and, G. Bankoff, Cultures of 
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Pinatubo erupted in what would become the second largest volcanic eruption 
of the twentieth century. Eight hundred people were killed with more than 
one million others displaced from their homes. Agricultural, infrastructural 
and personal property damages were estimated at 10.1 billion pesos 
(approximately $374 million) in 1991, and an additional 1.9 billion pesos ($69 
million) in 1992.53 
While an exceptional, albeit trying, human drama was playing out in 
that small Leyte city in the weeks following the deluge in November 1991, a 
more politically critical event was unfolding in Manila. In the halls of power 
and diplomacy in Malacañang, the United States received its marching 
orders on 6 December 1991 to vacate Clark Air Base and the Subic Bay 
Naval Complex, with a provision to complete the withdrawal in one year. No 
wonder that President Cory Aquino lamented after the Ormoc tragedy that 
there was a “surfeit of calamities.”54 
Locally, the debate on who was to blame for the Ormoc tragedy in 
1991 took two clear sides. On one side was the government (notably the 
Department of Science and Technology (DOST) and the DENR) in a 
defensive mode, espousing a scientific approach. On the other side were the 
media and local government, which blamed illegal logging. Predictably, 
though public outrage had been palpable in the month following the flood and 
the ‘blame game’ had dragged several personalities into the heated 
discussions played out in the media, no lasting and direct impact upon 
policies had come out of that tragedy. Despite the blame game that ran its 
course in November 1991, the quest for accountability had been superficial 
and no one was prosecuted at the national level. It is clear though that in 
November 1991, the media was the most powerful entity to shape public 
opinion. When it diverted its attention to the politically explosive US Bases 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 											
Disaster, Society and Natural Hazard in the Philippines (London and New York: 
RoutledgeCurzon 2003), 63-66.    
53 See, for example, J.-C. Gaillard, “Alternative paradigms of volcanic risk perception: The 
case of Mt. Pinatubo in the Philippines,” ScienceDirect, Journal of Volcanology and 
Geothermal Research Vol. 172 (Elsevier B.V., 2008), 315-328; E. De Guzman, “Eruption of 
Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines in June 1991” (Kobe, Japan: Asian Disaster Reduction 
Center, 2017) (Online).	 
54 C. Estrella, “Why this surfeit of calamities,” Malaya 10:296, 9 November 1991, 1 and 6.  
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issue that was still hot until its complete closure on 24 November 1992, the 
plight of Ormoc and its people began to lose appeal. The year 1992 was also 
election season. Thus, despite the sharply analytical series of articles written 
by the investigative journalist Howie Severino for the Philippine Daily 
Inquirer, for example, which uncovered for the first time the culpability of 
sugarcane planters in the November 1991 flood,55 nothing substantial in way 
of legislation or even token resignations by primary characters in this 
unnatural disaster came out of the exposés and inquiries pursued in the 
media. By 1994, news articles would go so far as to claim that the “[w]ounds 
of [the] Ormoc disaster was heal[ing] after 3 years,”56 and that “Ormoc after 3 
years [had] ‘[n]o other way to go but up.”57 By 1995, the tone had shifted 
perceptibly: “Memories of killer flood start to fade,”58 and “Ormoc disaster [is] 
[a] city rising from tragedy.”59 From then onwards, post-disaster Ormoc 
issues were published only intermittently, signalling a waning national 
interest in the face of other and more urgent issues about Ormoc, such as 
illegal logging,60 land tenure,61 insurgency,62 agrarian reform policies,63 flood 
																																								 																				
55 See H. Severino, “Ormoc revisited,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 21-22 April 1992, re-
published in Philippine Center on Investigative Journalism (Online); H. Severino, “Ormoc 
tragedy: Gov’t hands tied on reforestation,” Malaya 11:95, 20 April 1992, 1 and 12; and, H. 
Severino, “Ormoc tragedy: Stage set for a repeat,” Malaya 11:94, 20 April 1992, 1 and 2.   
56 A. Canturias, “Wounds of Ormoc disaster heal after 3 years,” The Manila Times 36: 306, 5 
November 1994, 1 and 6.  
57 E. Benedicto, “Ormoc after 3 years: ‘No other way to go but up,” Philippine Daily Inquirer 
9:332, 4 November 1994, 1 and 7.  
58 E. Benedicto, “Ormoc City revisited: Memories of killer flood start to fade,” Philippine Daily 
Inquirer 10:331, 5 November 1995, 19.  
59 E. Benedicto, “Ormoc disaster: A city rising from tragedy,” Philippine Daily Inquirer 10:332, 
6 November 1995, 18. 
60 E. Justimbaste, “Court drops illegal logging case vs Ormoc mayor,” Philippine News and 
Features 12 (Quezon City: Crossroads Publication 20 January 1996), 18; and, E. 
Justimbaste, “Ormoc mayor’s son hiding more hot lumber?” Philippine News and Features 
12 (Quezon City: Crossroads Publications 15 June 1996), 13.   
61 E. Justimbaste  “Ormoc farmers put up barricades vs PNOC,” Philippine News and 
Features 12 (Quezon City: Crossroads Publications 26 January 1996), 13; and, E. 
Justimbaste, “Farmers, landowners fight over hilly Ormoc farms,” Philippine News and 
Features 12 (Quezon City: Crossroads Publications 27 January 1996), 14.  
62 L. Jimenea, “NPA courier nabbed in Ormoc City,” Philippine Daily Inquirer 13:148, 7 May 
1998, 13; and, “Five killed in NPA ambush in Ormoc,” Philippine Star 18:243, 27 March 
2004, 1 and 2.  
63 L. Jimenea, “War of beneficiaries: Tension grips Ormoc land put under CARP,” Philippine 
Daily Inquirer 15:80, 26 February 2000, 12; “CARP no threat to sugar industry, says DAR,” 
Philippine Daily Inquirer 15:72, 18 February 2000, 16.  
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infrastructure projects,64 and agricultural issues.65 Today, the 1991 Ormoc 
tragedy is a small footnote whenever a new disaster occurs, and there have 
been numerous.66 Surprisingly, however, no political family in Ormoc bore 
the responsibility or mark of that tragedy. The same elite families jockeyed 
for positions at subsequent local and regional elections.  
Boin et al (2008) argue that public leaders and agencies face three 
distinct challenges in the aftermath of a disaster (or crisis, as they refer to 
it).67 First, the issue that has attracted the most academic and practical 
attention is the “actual emergency response” that aims to address logistical, 
institutional and psychosocial needs. Second, the ability to control the 
“definition of the situation” becomes paramount for the government to 
undertake public information and dissemination about what it is doing and 
what people might expect. Third and the most challenging for public policy 
makers, managing the ‘fallout’ of the crisis implies “searching for resources 
to pay for damages, fighting judicial battles, coping with the onslaught of 
criticism that it has evoked, but also exploiting the possibilities a crisis 
offers.”68 In Ormoc after the deluge, the actual emergency response did invite 
public censure, as rumours of hoarding and inefficient aid distribution and 
delivery began to surface days after the disaster.69 Criticism became serious 
enough for President Aquino to admit the lack of coordination among 
government agencies, but deny the diversion of goods to local government 
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68 Ibid. 
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units (or LGUs).70 In regard to the second instance, discourse about the 
disaster in Ormoc had been appropriated from the very beginning by the 
national government so that, at least from the media’s perspective, it was a 
problem of the national government. This was logical, as the Local 
Government Code,71 so newly enacted that year was not yet fully 
implemented by November 1991, and all executive functions including relief 
were still in national hands. As a result, the local government headed by 
mayor Victoria Locsin of the powerful Larrazabal clan was not as visible in 
the media as national government agencies and personalities. Lastly, at the 
local level, it would appear that the fallout of the disaster was the defeat of 
mayor Locsin during the May 1992 elections to a neophyte, Eufrocino Codilla 
Sr, who was a businessman with interests in timber and construction. But 
she was able to make a comeback after winning as representative of the 
fourth district of Ormoc City and sitting at the Eleventh Congress from 1998 
to 2001. She had simply exchanged places with her husband, Carmelo 
Locsin, who became mayor from July 2001 to June 2004. In a subsequent 
hotly contested election, Victoria Locsin was pushed out of a second term in 
Congress in 2001 when the Supreme Court ruled en banc in favor of Codilla 
in an election disqualification case.72 For many Ormocanons, this electoral 
upset was a direct consequence of the November tragedy, which greatly 
benefited Codilla while becoming Locsin’s political disadvantage. Codilla’s 
winning streak buoyed him through three terms as mayor followed by 
another three terms as congressman, an impressive total of eighteen years 
in an elected capacity from 1992 to 2010. His son Eric Codilla continued this 
trend by taking the helm from Carmelo Locsin in 2004 and sitting as mayor of 
Ormoc City for a total of nine years or three terms. He failed to duplicate his 
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71 The Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted “to provide for a more responsive and 
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with 
effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different 
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the 
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and 
duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of 
local units.” 
72 Eufrocino Codilla, Sr. garnered 71,350 votes during the 14 May 2001 elections against 
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father’s success, however, when a neophyte by the name of Lucy Torres-
Gomez of the hacendero family the Torreses triumphed in the May 2013 
congressional elections. Her husband, the Philippine actor Richard Gomez 
who was running for mayor against another Codilla scion, Edward “Ondo”, 
however, lost even with support from the Locsins/Larrazabals.73 At the vice 
mayor level, the Locsins scored a political victory when a neophyte, their son 
Leo Carmelo ‘Toto’ Locsin Jr., won against two other candidates in 2013.  
Boin et al (2008) further argue that there are three possible but distinct 
outcomes for leaders in the aftermath of crisis-induced accountability. First, 
elite reinvigoration may occur when leaders are able to enhance their 
general stature in the public eye, “because they accept, in a timely and 
graceful fashion, responsibility for mistakes made.”74 Second, a crisis may 
result in elite damage when incumbent leaders suffer from political credibility, 
which may cause their public ratings to take a downturn or even a downfall in 
some cases. Third, elite escape occurs when the crisis is not perceived as 
having made any difference and is instead absorbed into other and more 
urgent issues. It is interesting that other local officials in post-1991 Ormoc 
had also been largely saved from the process of blaming, in part because of 
the inordinate media attention focused upon illegal logging that later 
expanded to include other areas of the Philippines and other personalities 
that did not have a connection with the Ormoc flood. In fact, as the example 
of Nepomuceno Aparis I shows, who was vice mayor in 1991, but who had 
also been largely unremarkable during the relief and rehabilitation stages, 
there was no political stigma in the aftermath of the 1991 tragedy. Aparis was 
able to triumph in two different elected capacities, when he ran and won as a 
popular city councillor, a post he held in the interim years when he wasn’t 
sitting as vice mayor.75  
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As confusing as these events appear, how does disaster impact local 
politics, if indeed it does? The more disturbing question is this: If political 
leadership can be the most visible sign of change in a post-disaster setting, 
but the political actors remain the same as before a major disaster, what 
does this say about the voters who were also to varying levels the victim-
survivors? Indeed, as local politics show in the case of Ormoc after 
November 1991, elite politics is insulated from the political effects of disaster. 
In an autonomous city like Ormoc—characterized by elite families that had 
consolidated their power through a monopoly of land and resources for over 
a century—a disaster even at the scale of the 1991 flash flood had not been 
able to change the socio-economic and political status quo.   
“Crisis-induced learning” and the infrastructural response 
Boin et al (2008) differentiate learning from accountability by defining 
the former as “more about looking forward and improving the performance of 
structures and arrangements.”76 Both accountability and learning can propel 
“social catharsis” if the post-recovery momentum—triggered by the process 
of collective introspection through sustained media coverage and deepened 
through formal and legal discussions involving government institutions—is 
maximized by political actors and institutions. The ideal in learning from 
major crises is to identify what went wrong and how to ensure that it won’t 
happen again or if it does recur, that it won’t be as bad as the last one. In 
post-1991 Ormoc, crisis-induced learning was most visible through the 
construction of two impressive levees financed by the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA). Mechanisms to contain the Anilao and 
Malbasag Rivers in the event of another fifty-year flood had been touted as 
highly successful in withstanding the flood impacts of stronger Typhoon Koni 
(locally codenamed Gilas) that struck Ormoc on 17 July 2003.77 Typhoon 
Koni had brought higher rainfall levels than Typhoon Thelma in 1991. Yet, 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 											
again. However, Aparis suddently succumbed to liver cancer on 30 September 2013 at the 
age of 64. Available newspaper accounts do not mention Aparis during the relief and 
rehabilitation process. 
76 Boin, McConnell and t’Hart, “Governing After Crisis,” 9.  
77 I. Antonio, “Community commitment for sustained efficiency of infrastructures: Ormoc City, 
Philippines.” Paper presented at the International Conference on Disaster and Management 
Systems (ICISDM2005), Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 3-5 August 2005.   
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infrastructures such as dams and levees are only effective insofar as they do 
not fail at the moment of flood impact. This is the major weakness of any 
infrastructural response to flooding, which can be undermined when the 
same ecological issues prior to a disaster prevail, such as the persistence of 
illegal logging, squatting along major waterways, inefficient water collection 
and management, etc. To what extent were these cultural-ecological issues 
managed properly in post-1991 Ormoc? More importantly, how has 
infrastructural solutions, in this case the construction of the JICA dam, 
influenced new forms of governance in Ormoc, if these indeed occurred? 
How did learning occur in post-1991 Ormoc, beyond the more obvious 
mechanism adopted by the local government through infrastructure 
construction? At the social-cultural level, which determines how 
communities, families and individuals reflect and remember a massive crisis 
such as the 1991 Ormoc tragedy, what learning did occur, especially in the 
absence of any sustained collective initiative to create social memory?  
Disaster as social catharsis?  
Questions on social memory and learning are relevant because the 
process of remembering a disaster and sharing memories is not only a 
cathartic experience for survivors.78 It is, more importantly, a process of 
creating a shared identity and past, reflected in songs, myths, plays, art, etc. 
The social narratives that emerge from disaster remembrance, organized 
and coordinated formally by museums, memorials, archives and anniversary 
events,79 provide a valuable venue for understanding why and how a society 
persists despite a massive crisis. The evolution of the social construction of a 
disaster is crucial not only to determine the facts of a crisis as it was 
experienced, but more importantly to analyse societal lessons for more 
effective programs for mitigation and adaptation.   
The contradictions in the 1991 Ormoc tragedy case are puzzling. The 
scale of the 1991 Ormoc tragedy could have provided space for political, 
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Boulder, September 2015) (Online).  
79 Ibid., 3.  
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cultural and socio-economic catharsis and transformation, but there appears 
to have been no substantial change at all. In which areas of society can any 
perceived change be observed? Poverty in Ormoc City today remains 
widespread, with an incidence of 28.3 per cent in 2009.80 Total population 
was estimated at 191,200 in 2013,81 with 31.04 per cent living in urban areas 
and the majority 68.96 per cent in rural areas.82 The dominant land use 
pattern remains agriculture, which in 2004 comprised 56.64 per cent of the 
total land area compared to only 32.38 per cent of forest.83 For many 
manunubo or sugarcane laborers in the haciendas of Ormoc City, the daily 
minimum wage has been stuck in the range of 70 to 140 pesos, when the 
mandated daily minimum wage in the sugar industry range from 220.50 
pesos to 262 pesos for the Eastern Visayas region in 2013, while piecemeal 
(or pakyaw) workers were also entitled to new wage increases.84 Local 
politics show the same leading families with undiminished influence 
economically and politically as before 1991. In a learning resource material 
titled “Mithi og Bahandi sa Dakbayan sa Ormoc” compiled by the Department 
of Education (DepEd)-Region VIII that aims to “create a local history, a 
collection of data from the context of its parts in the regional and the division 
level,” it notes that the local government has established and developed 18.4 
hectares accommodating 3,233 housing units in ten resettlement areas.85 
Originally meant for victim-survivors of the 1991 flash flood, these areas 
today commonly comprise only 60 per cent victim-survivor families and 40 
per cent recent migrants, with the latter having no shared memory of the 
flood. Such a situation leads one to ask where the other forty per cent of 
victim-survivors have gone. For young people born after 1991, the tragedy 
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that unfolded in 1991 is simply a story, a myth, something unreal. It does not 
help that there are wide estimates of the number who died and went missing 
in November 1991 depending on who is making the estimates. From a high 
of 8,000 deaths,86 the lowest estimate is about 3,900,87 with a range of 
figures to be found in between. Indeed, this has contributed to the mythical 
ominous aura of the flood, something that grandparents regale their 
grandchildren about during unusually rainy days.  
Confronted with these paradoxes and doubly aware that the 1991 
Ormoc tragedy is just one in a multiplicity of disasters that have struck the 
Philippines, I go back to my first question at the very beginning of this 
chapter: What can a twenty-two-year old flood event teach about the nature 
of social change and transformation in a calamitous situation? The question 
is highly relevant in a country deemed to be one of the most disaster-prone 
in the world. This was highlighted recently, after the humanitarian crisis 
triggered by Supertyphoon Haiyan (locally codenamed Yolanda) on 8 
November 2013 that also devastated Ormoc City for a second tragic time 
after just over two decades. As an attempt to document for the first time the 
Ormoc disaster that unfolded after a typhoon and flash floods in November 
1991, this research argues that it is crucial and apt to undertake an 
evaluation and assessment of that disaster, with the endview of 
understanding why it happened at all and how to move forward as a society 
that has learned from its mistakes. While disasters have been numerous in 
the country prior to and after 1991, the Ormoc disaster remains a turning 
point in the history of the Philippines for reasons beyond the fact that the loss 
of lives and properties had been enormous. For the first time, it arguably 
brought to the fore the discourse on two issues that had not been 
emphasized as expected consequences of massive disasters: accountability 
and learning as twin aspects in recovery, and vulnerability, and the link 
between the two. Accountability—that process of assessing the performance 
of political leaders—and learning—improving existing structures and 
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arrangements—had not been undertaken at a sustained and systematic 
manner that would have resulted in political changes in governance. Further, 
the 1991 Ormoc flood proved that vulnerability and poverty—often delineated 
in disaster discourse but in reality intrinsically inseparable—are never 
homogeneous conditions for many communities and families. Indeed, the 
most vulnerable and poorest communities and families in society suffer the 
most persistent risks to lives and livelihoods. These risks remain even after 
the intervention of government agencies and non-government organizations 
that implement well-intentioned programs of relocation and community 
rebuilding in resettlement areas. As the case studies in the last three 
chapters of this research will show, in many instances vulnerability and 
poverty are not resolved for many families.  
Chapter organization 
Ormoc is undoubtedly a microcosm of twentieth century Philippine 
politics and society. At the most basic level, the question of social change 
and transformation in post-disaster Ormoc City will need to be explored. If 
there is one thing that defines Ormoc, it is that its history and fate are 
inextricably linked to that of a few elite families that have shaped and 
continue to influence its landscape, culture, economy and politics. That 
Filipino elite families have been able to successfully transition from economic 
to political realms is far from surprising; it has been the subject of avid 
scholarly attention in the past. Sidel (1993), for example, argues that the 
availability of elected positions has allowed many hacenderos throughout the 
archipelago to claim proprietary entitlement by passing on to their scions 
positions as mayors, congressmen and provincial governors.88 He goes 
further: “Economic might and political power have often proved to be 
mutually reinforcing, spinning an upward spiral of dynastic success.”89 
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McCoy (1993) calls these political families “working coalition[s] drawn from a 
larger group related by blood, marriage and ritual.”90 The potency of political 
families, adds Fegan (1993), is that they are “a more efficient political unit 
than an individual because it has a permanent identity as a named unit, 
making its reputation, loyalties, and alliances transferable from members 
who die or retire to its new standard bearer.”91 This is especially true in 
compact provincial towns and cities where electoral votes are seen as 
fiefdoms. At its core, says McCoy, “[t]he theory of rent seeking best explains 
the economic relations between the Filipino elite and the Philippine state.”92 
Defined as a political process that advantages elite families with monopolies 
of wealth and resources, rent-seeking is characterized by the use of effort, 
time and other productive resources to shift favor from authorities toward a 
rent-seeker’s cause, translated into economic activities such as licenses. 
McCoy cites the economist James Buchanan, who defined rents as the 
artificial advantage enjoyed by an entrepreneur that the state favors, when 
the latter restricts “freedom of entry” into the market. The result for the 
economy is negative because “[n]o value is created in the process; indeed 
the monopolization involves a net destruction of value. The rents secured 
reflect a diversion of value from consumers generally to the favoured rent-
seeker with a net loss of value in the process.”93 Certainly, this appears to be 
the case in Ormoc City, where elite families have monopolized land 
ownership including those that are by law ineligible for private ownership like 
forestlands, and have successfully used this economic monopoly to put them 
into positions of power at the local, provincial, regional and even national 
levels.  
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Yet such political and economic developments did not come about 
overnight. Chapter 2 traces the history of Ormoc at the turn of the century, 
by looking at how the dominant elite families, notably the Aboitizes, 
Larrazabals, Seraficas, Tans, Torreses and, later, Codillas linked their 
fortunes with that of the city. Excluding the Codillas, all five families are 
considered hacendero families. With the exception of the Aboitizes, all have 
successfully transitioned into politics. All of them have been able to 
accumulate vast landholdings and converted large tracts of forests in the 
process of cultivating cash crops for export, first in abaca and later in sugar. 
While the Aboitiz family has not pursued political ambitions and eventually 
withdrew from Ormoc to focus on consolidating its wealth from Cebu, the 
Larrazabals have become powerful political actors starting in the post-World 
War II era. To what extent did the configurations of power elite relationships 
change over the course of a century as a direct consequence of two major 
disruptions or turning points in Ormoc’s history, namely, its devastation 
towards the end of the Second World War in 1945 and again in 1991 due to 
a typhoon and flood?   
 Writing about the epistemology of disaster from the standpoint of 
social order, Stallings (1998) offers an interesting conception of disaster as 
an “exception” to routine.94 He defines routines as the actions and 
interactions that are repeated regularly, and in the process provide the 
structure for people’s lives. Taken in the aggregate, routines constitute the 
structure of social systems. An exception occurs when an event triggers a 
“breakdown, interruption, or disruption of a routine.”95 Following this 
conception of calamity, two major ‘exceptions’ occurred in Ormoc’s social 
cultural trajectory, namely, World War II that saw the destruction of the city 
due to widespread bombings by Japanese and American forces, and the 
tragedy brought about by the 1991 flash flood.  
The focus of Chapter 2 is on the impact of the cash crop economy on 
the environment. State-building during the decolonization period was only 
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just picking up speed and the elite families in Ormoc were just starting to 
consolidate their fortunes in landholding, a process that had begun for the 
Aboitizes in the late nineteenth century, but for others in the 1920s. It is 
indicative that in 1934, the Tans, who would later field a son to the Senate 
and another to the Congress were only among many sugar planters and 
owners identified in the Sugar Plantation Audit undertaken by the American 
colonial government to allocate sugar quotas.96 By the 1940s, they would 
become more powerful as it would be through the efforts of Congressman 
Dominador Tan that Ormoc was inaugurated as a city in 1947.97 To be sure, 
why a small provincial town in the backwaters of Leyte could even capture 
the attention of President Manuel Roxas in order to inaugurate it suggests 
the rising political ascendancy of the Tans during this time. The Larrazabals, 
on the other hand, were not mentioned in the Sugar Allocation list at all.  
Nagano-Kano (1981) defines the years 1946-1962 as a “period of 
reconstruction” in the Philippine sugar industry vis-à-vis the changing US 
sugar policy, and 1962-1974 as a “period of expansion of sugar production” 
through the haciendas.98 The sugar crisis started in the late 1970s and 
dragged on into the 1980s. The collapse of the sugar industry in 1985 
resulted in 250,000 sugar workers across the country becoming unemployed 
or underemployed, which triggered the rise of insurgency in areas like 
Negros Occidental, where sugarcane production was concentrated.99 In 
1986, President Ferdinand Marcos was deposed through a popular uprising. 
President Corazon Aquino in the following years until she stepped down in 
1992 was hounded by military coups. Given the above political and socio-
economic situation, Chapter 3 discusses deforestation in Ormoc City, a 
process that began in the 1900s, but with commercial logging starting only in 
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97 Republic Act 179, “An Act Creating Ormoc City,” was subsequently repealed by Republic 
Act 6388, “Election Code of 1971.”  
98 Y. Nagano-Kano, “The structure of the Philippine Sugar Industry at the end of the 
American colonial period and after 1974,” in Commodity Studies No. 3, Research and 
Working Papers (Quezon City:  Third World Studies, College of Arts and Sciences, 
University of the Philippines, 1981), 27-28.  
99 M. Satake, Sugar Industry Workers and Insurgency: The Case of Victoria-Manapla 
(Bacolod City: Southeast Asia Centre for Resource Studies, Consultancy and Training 
(SEACREST) 2001), 3.  
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the 1930s. The systematic clearing of forestlands in Ormoc, as in other parts 
of the country, was reflective of the wave of development policies pursued by 
the Philippine government in expanding homestead agriculture, logging for 
export, and later on, land redistribution. Similar to the involvement of elite 
families in the cultivation of abaca and sugarcane discussed in Chapter 2, 
the same families became intricately linked to the logging industry in Ormoc. 
While large areas of forestlands have not characterized Ormoc, forest 
reserves in the highlands of the city had been systematically reduced since 
the beginning of the twentieth century in the cultivation of sugarcane.   
The preceding two chapters provide a backdrop for a discussion in 
Chapter 4 of the typhoon and its impacts in Ormoc. The policies prioritizing 
economic development through systematic deforestation, logging (both legal 
and illegal), and the cultivation of commercial crops like abaca and sugar 
have predisposed Ormoc City, already susceptible to floods due to its unique 
geography and topography, to a massive disaster. Chapter 4, therefore, 
begins with the argument that what occurred in 1991 in Ormoc was not and 
could not be argued as a ‘natural’ phenomenon. 
Chapter 5 documents the immediate effects of the flood and asks 
how and in what ways it had disrupted individual, familial and community 
lives and routines in Ormoc. It will be seen as paving the way for an 
examination of cases in three subsequent chapters that deal with three 
longer term recovery and resettlement areas with their own particular sets of 
concerns related to the history of Ormoc’s development. Particular attention 
in these subsequent chapters will be given to new configurations and 
perceptions of community, as victim-survivors were resettled in relocation 
areas that did not always take into account the need to preserve pre-existing 
communities in one area.  
Evaluating change in post-disaster areas is complex. Theoretically, 
the economic and social disruption that a disaster brings provides valuable 
space for policy changes that could potentially benefit those who had been 
affected by it, in particular the most vulnerable communities. The homeless 
are provided homes in theoretically safer areas, while the unemployed are 
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given jobs. At the economic level, the pump priming of the economy using 
aid funds allow for the creation of new jobs, the circulation of much needed 
money, and the opportunity for the victim-survivors to start new lives. 
However, practice shows that this is seldom the case. In Haiti after the 12 
January 2010 earthquake, for example, “three new crises” characterized the 
economic and political landscape, namely that “nearly a million people still 
homeless; political riots fuelled by frustration over the stalled reconstruction; 
and the worst cholera epidemic in recent history, likely caused by the very 
UN soldiers sent to Haiti to protect its people.”100 The failure of reconstruction 
in Haiti was blamed on the abject failure of foreign aid donors to fulfil their aid 
pledges, to fully include the Haitian people in their own reconstruction, and 
ultimately to practice honesty and transparency within their own ranks.101 In 
Rio de Janiero after the flood disaster of 1988, politics—in the form of federal 
squabbles over the budget and political party competitions—took primacy 
over disaster mitigation. “The disaster,” says Allen, “had come, and gone, 
and little, it seemed, had been improved.”102 Again in the case of the 
Johnstown flood of 1889 in the United States, not one of the wealthy owners 
of the mountain resort, where the failed dam was located, were ever found 
culpable for the trauma of death and destruction that a massive flood brought 
to Johnstown.103 Bearing these examples in mind, the analysis of the flood in 
Ormoc City in 1991 is looked at from two different levels. At the first instance, 
the nature and reliability of statistics—poverty incidence, unemployment, 
underemployment, agrarian reform, crime, etc.—provide a picture of Ormoc 
City prior to, during and after the 1991 flood, with the end-view of analysing 
the creation of vulnerability that pre-dates the crisis. Vulnerability is, thus, a 
process that does not occur overnight, but over many years with a multiplicity 
of factors that determine how and why groups of people are placed in 
situations that render them vulnerable to natural hazards. In Ormoc City, 
																																								 																				
100 J. Katz, The Big Truck that Went By, How the World Came to Save Haiti and Left Behind 
a Disaster (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2013), 2.  
101 Ibid. 
102 E. Allen, “Political responses to flood disaster: The example of Rio de Janeiro,” in 
Disasters, Development and Environment, ed. A. Varley (Chichester, New York, Brisbane, 
Toronto and Singapore: John Wiley and Sons, 1994), 102.  
103 D. McCullough, The Johnstown Flood (New York, London, Toronto and Sydney: Simon 
and Schuster Paperbacks, 1968).   
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factors such as landlessness, lack of viable employment opportunities 
outside the sugarcane plantations, and even the topography that is naturally 
susceptible to flooding, all these contribute to the creation and persistence of 
systemic vulnerability. Such an approach is cognizant of the fact that, while 
vulnerability is also about individual choices (e.g., where to build a house, 
what materials to use, when to relocate, etc.), these choices are undeniably 
shaped by the policies that are already in place (e.g., private ownership of 
land, employment patterns, minimum wage by law vis-à-vis real wages, etc.). 
At the second instance, vulnerability as experienced by families and 
communities on a daily basis is analysed through ethnography. The focus, 
however, is on the most vulnerable families, identified as such by 
government agencies and non-government organizations, those who had 
become recipients of various types of assistance in the aftermath of the 1991 
flood. This second level of analysis aims to understand the nature of 
vulnerability, especially after an infusion of material and financial help.  
Chapter 6 examines the case of Barangay Tambulilid, the largest 
resettlement area in Ormoc City, with ten puroks or districts from a total of 
thirteen considered as relocation or resettlement sites. It is a first class 
barangay with a total population of 9,477 in 2012.104 Another barangay, Lao, 
was established by the city government for those affected by the construction 
of the JICA levees along the Anilao and Malbasag rivers. While three other 
barangays had been designated by the Ormoc City government as 
resettlement areas for the 1991 Ormoc flood victim-survivors—namely, Alta 
Vista, Curva and Bagong-Buhay—there were other such areas established 
by non-government organizations. These include San Lorenzo Village 
originally managed by the Archdiocese of Palo in Barangay Luna, the Saint 
Philippine Duchesne Ormoc Workers Foundation, Inc. (SPDOWFI) 
established by the order of the Religious of the Sacred Heart of Jesus 
(RSCJ) also in Barangay Luna, the Saint Benedictine Village provided by the 
Order of Benedictine Sisters (OSB) in Barangay Ipil, and two communities 
established by the international NGO, World Vision, in Barangays Ipil and 
																																								 																				
104 Barangay Captain Ronaldo Roca, interview with the author, 28 May 2013 in the Barangay 
Tambulilid Hall, Ormoc City, original in Filipino. The interview occurred in the barangay city 
hall.   
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Linao. The centrality of community building during the post-recovery stage 
has been the subject of many empirical researches in the past, and there is a 
wealth of insights about the need to preserve pre-existing communities in 
new sites in order to maximize coping and resiliency by strengthening social 
capital among survivors themselves.105 Tambulilid for a time after the 1991 
flood had a reputation for petty criminality. Residents attribute this to the fact 
that Tambulilid became a melting pot of individuals and families whose only 
claim to a shared experience was having been illegal settlers along the 
Anilao or Malbasag rivers, and of their houses having been totally washed 
away by the flood. To what extent then was a ‘community’ actually 
established here when there existed a common negative perception of this 
resettlement area as crime-ridden, crowded, and unsafe? This chapter will 
attempt to uncover these issues with a focus on social vulnerability, revolving 
around land ownership.    
Chapter 7 looks at the case of Barangay Nalunopan,106 a rural 
agricultural barangay just five kilometres from the city center. Its total 
population in 2011 was 861.107 Meanwhile, Chapter 8 is a case study of 
Barangay Luna Purok II-B, a community established and headed until today 
by the order of the Religious of the Sacred Heart of Jesus (RSCJ). Barangay 
Nalunopan and Luna II-B, the latter officially named the Saint Philippine 
Duchesne Ormoc Workers Foundation, Inc. (SPDOWFI), share strong links, 
with many residents in SPDOWFI originally sugar laborers in Barangay 
Nalunopan. Several families in Luna II-B also have relatives still residing in 
Barangay Nalunopan. Until today, however, no sustained intervention to 
improve the lives of residents has been pursued in Nalunopan. The RSCJ 
sisters had initially offered Purok Uno families, where the majority of the 
deaths in Nalunopan in November 1991 occurred, lots at Barangay Luna II-B 
in order to give them a new life outside the sugarcane plantation. Some of 
these residents readily transferred in 1998, but later returned to Nalunopan 
																																								 																				
105 See, for example, K. Erikson, Everything in its Path, Destruction of Community in the 
Buffalo Creek Flood (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976); M. Underhill, “Katrina’s 
displacement: The untold consequences of disaster resettlement in Colorado” (Master of 
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107 Liga ng mga Barangay, Barangay Management Information System. Ormoc City, 2013.   
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due to lack of livelihood in Luna II-B. Government authority in Nalunopan is 
weak; it is privately-owned land after all by one of the richest families in 
Ormoc with interests in such diverse areas as hotels, resorts, pineapple 
plantations, and recently a proposed exclusive residential subdivision that 
will transform a large tract of Nalunopan land. This chapter will explore the 
question of land tenure and poverty within the plantation system of 
sugarcane production and the persistence of vulnerability among one of the 
most vulnerable communities in Ormoc City—the sugarcane laborers.  
Roth (1974), in his historical study of friar estates in the Philippines 
argues that “[t]he commercial orientation of the landowning class, the type of 
market outlets for agricultural produce, and the local ecology influence the 
nature of the agricultural regime employed on a particular hacienda.”108 
Geertz’s conception of “agricultural involution” on nineteenth and early 
twentieth century Java under Dutch rule is particularly relevant, especially 
when considered within the context of the dynamic process of contestation, 
transition and negotiation between culture and society when largely 
influenced by a highly specialized ecology, in his case, of complementary 
cultivation of paddy and sugar in Indonesia.109 In Barangay Nalunopan and in 
other Larrazabal plantations, a peculiar term strikingly captures the context of 
a predominantly feudal relationship. The landowner is referred to as agalon 
or agawn, which is a term that means “lord” or “big boss”. Yet when I asked if 
this term was used to refer to other hacenderos, the answer was “no”. It was 
a name that had been appropriated in the beginning by the “big man” Iñaki 
Larrazabal in the 1970s, who was the prototypical hacendero sporting a 
rakish hat, brash manner and a big voice.110  
The SPDOWFI in Ormoc, a foundation headed by the RSCJ 
congregation, but in reality managed by a lone nun, Sister Iraida Sua-an, 
who has immersed herself in the community since its establishment in 1998, 
was originally meant to provide a safe haven to Barangay Nalunopan 
																																								 																				
108 D. Roth, “The friar estates of the Philippines” (PhD diss., Department of Anthropology 
and the Graduate School, University of Oregon, 1974), 10.  
109 C. Geertz, Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1963).   
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landowners, as some of the respondents show.  
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plantation workers who had been expelled for suspicion of fomenting dissent 
over wage increases in the aftermath of the 1991 flood. However, newer 
residents were accepted from urban poor communities when a number of 
residents moved back to Nalunopan in search of new livelihood 
opportunities. In many respects, the community in Luna II-B is a closed one, 
as the RSCJ maintains complete legal and religious authority over it and in 
the process is seen as the new agawn. To what extent residents of this 
community are able to negotiate rights with the RSCJ, especially in relation 
to land tenure is something that remains to be seen, as the process of land 
titling will only commence after June 2014. Although the RSCJ is 
organizationally under the authority of the Archdiocese of Palo, Leyte, it has 
largely managed the community without the interference and involvement of 
the Catholic Church. Nonetheless, as Catholic values are actively promoted 
in this community, the role of the Catholic Church in post-disaster community 
building is also explored in this chapter.  
The concluding chapter attempts to link all three cases in order to see 
the bigger picture of post-disaster Ormoc, with focus on the issue of 
accountability, vulnerability and the long and tedious process of moving 
forward from disaster. Using personal narratives and primary sources—
documents and photographs—to explore notions of vulnerability, 
accountability, coping and community building, it hopes to provide insights 
about the social construction of disaster and post-disaster recovery.    
Getting into the field 
I must note here that I had never been to Leyte, much less to Ormoc, 
prior to my ethnography, which began in February 2013 and ended in 
October 2013. Before this, I had spent five months doing library research at 
various libraries in the Philippines as well as online, in particular undertaking 
a newspaper review about Ormoc in general and the 1991 flood in particular. 
Newspapers reviewed were primarily with national circulation, namely, 
Philippine Daily Inquirer, Philippine Star, Malaya, Manila Times, Manila 
Bulletin, Philippine Times Journal, and Philippine Free Press. While there 
had been a provincial newspaper called The Reporter that had local 
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circulation in Ormoc City and other Leyte municipalities, no copies could be 
found at the National Library, city public or university libraries in Tacloban, 
Ormoc or Baybay in Leyte. The Reporter went bankrupt in 2003, by which 
time copies were also lost due to neglect and the vagaries of nature in the 
case of the archives of the Visayas State University library in Baybay, Leyte. 
It is a shame that no copy of The Reporter survives today, undoubtedly a real 
loss for local history research, such as this study.   
A three-sided methodological approach was adopted comprising of 
documentary research, interviews and ethnography. Documentary research 
was undertaken in various libraries in Manila, Cebu and Leyte. In Manila, 
research was undertaken at the National Library, Manila Observatory 
archives, University of the Philippines library, Ateneo de Manila University 
Rizal Library, the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical 
Administration (PAGASA), DENR, and the National Disaster Risk Reduction 
and Management Council (NDRRMC). In Cebu, visits to the University of 
San Carlos library yielded some results. It was more challenging in Ormoc as 
a cursory inquiry at the City Public Library was met with blank stares. 
However, a visit to the Eastern Visayas State University library resulted in a 
fruitful conversation with its librarian, Ann Pardales, who graciously provided 
a copy of the learning resource material “Mithi og Bahandi”, which was 
compiled under the auspices of the Department of Education (DepEd), but 
which did not have a copy itself. It was also with the help of the Benedictine 
sisters and staff of Saint Peter’s College that a copy of JA Fotorama’s 
November 1991 video recording of the flood and its impacts was obtained, 
which JA Fotorama was reluctant to re-copy for me, as well as several 
pictures that the nuns took to document the devastation wrought by the flood 
in their school and convent grounds. After another flooding brought about by 
Supertyphoon Haiyan in 2013, from which the cities of Ormoc and Tacloban 
were heavily affected, it is possible that the copies of documents, maps and 
photos I had obtained during my research remain the sole surviving copies 
today.   
Interviews using semi-structured questions had been undertaken face-
to-face or electronically. A list had been generated from the newspaper 
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review that became the basis for identifying who among the government 
officials, priests, representatives of NGOs, and journalists could be 
approached to verify facts as well as elicit personal memories about the 
event. Some of those who had been contacted declined to speak to me, 
noting that it was such a long time ago and that they had already forgotten it. 
Some who did consent to be interviewed did not provide new information that 
the newspaper articles had not already mentioned at that time. In Tacloban, 
research at the regional offices of the DENR, Department of Agrarian Reform 
(DAR), National Statistics Office (NSO), and National Statistical Coordination 
Board (NSCB)111 all generated important data. The DENR-Region VIII, in 
particular, kept a box of reports about its investigations in the aftermath of 
the November 1991 flood, which included photos, a list of cadastre lots, and 
maps. It was an unexpected but welcome find since records keeping in 
Philippine government offices is rudimentary at best, with government 
documents commonly discarded after five years. In fact, it was only the 
DENR-Region VIII among other agencies and offices that kept these reports, 
un-digitized but remarkably well preserved. In Ormoc, meanwhile, the Ormoc 
City Hall, in particular the offices of the City Planning and Development 
(CPDO), Environment (CE), and the Social Welfare and Development 
(CSWD), the Liga ng mga Barangay, and the district office of the Department 
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) provided maps and data upon 
request. It is indicative that an inquiry with the Philippine Armed Forces, both 
in Manila and Ormoc City, proved futile; I was told that no records at all 
existed of the Armed Forces’ involvement in the 1991 disaster response. No 
officers who had been assigned in Ormoc at that time were also available to 
talk to me as it was routine for them to be regularly transferred to other 
localities and so there was no one who had stayed long enough in Ormoc 
who could supply any information. Interviews with police officers, an 
academic,	Muslims, representatives of religious organizations, members of 
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the Chinese community, and Ormoc local officials and municipal staff met 
with a higher rate of success. Requests for interview with Mr. Sabin 
Larrazabal and Mr. Eufrocino Codilla Sr. were declined, while another 
request for interview with Mrs. Victoria Locsin did not materialize.    
The ethnography, as expected, yielded the richest and most 
meaningful collection of stories from survivors who, in many instances, had 
recounted their experiences for the first time since 1991. Indeed, because 
the questions in the interview requested specific details, there were some 
individuals who expressed strong emotions, which prompted me to ask if the 
interview should be terminated. However, no one asked to stop the interview. 
These structured interviews using a prepared form were all audio-recorded 
with the permission of every respondent and usually took from thirty minutes 
to an hour and a half. It must be said that the search for respondents was not 
at all difficult because any Ormocanon who had experienced the flood 
usually needed no prodding to share their stories. There were instances 
when I only had to ask tricycle drivers with whom I had a ride if they had 
been around that November in 1991 for them to launch into a long tale. In the 
beginning, an interpreter was used, a young man by the name of Victor 
Arcuiño strongly recommended by Sister Iraida Sua-an of the RSCJ where I 
stayed for the duration of my fieldwork. He acted more as a bodyguard than 
an interpreter to a female researcher who appeared unnecessarily impetuous 
to some in positions of authority and so needed a “protector” to deter any 
untoward incidences. His services were later discarded when I felt confident 
enough in the Visayan language and the presence of locals to venture out on 
my own. It must be noted here that it was crucial that I linked up with 
development organizations already actively working in the communities, 
notably the RSCJ in Barangays Luna II-B and Nalunopan, and Gawad 
Kalinga in Tambulilid. The assistance of these organizations was 
instrumental in gaining trust among possible respondents who would 
otherwise not been as open had I been alone. It must be noted that in many 
agricultural areas in the Philippines, townsfolk often consider strangers 
suspiciously especially if they introduce themselves as undertaking 
“research.” The suspicion is due mainly from the fact that “researchers” are 
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perceived as communists, who are out in the rural areas to recruit for the 
New People’s Army (NPA) and to incite unrest. As such, it was imperative 
that I had prior introduction from local organizations that had already been 
working in the area for several years. In other areas, I had coordinated 
closely with and asked prior permission from barangay captains, who were 
usually very helpful, with one providing a “protector” as I did my rounds in the 
locality. This “guide” stayed outside and spent time talking to the male 
members of the family, who were reticent to talk to me, while I conducted the 
interviews with the female members of the family. Again, based on 
observations during numerous site visits to various rural areas of Ormoc City, 
men were hesitant to talk to a single woman who is introduced as an 
intellectual. Women were more open for conversations, however informal. 
But to enter into discussions with men, I needed to be introduced by 
someone who was known in the community. Indeed, Lummis, in his book 
Listening to History (1987), aptly notes that “[g]ender cannot be a neutral 
social factor” in social science research and that  
[t]here are conventions which affect the relationships between men 
and women, particularly between strangers where role expectations 
are the strongest.112 
A word must also be said about the strengths and weaknesses of oral 
history, especially as a methodology used in the determination of past 
events. In the case of the 1991 Ormoc flood, there is a twenty-two year 
difference from the event itself and the articulation of personal experience in 
2013 when the ethnography was undertaken. While a disaster the likes of the 
1991 Ormoc flood was undoubtedly something that cannot be easily 
forgotten by those who had personally experienced it and time, as Lummis 
(1987) argues, “is the most obvious required provenance for any historical 
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information,”113 memory is fallible and frail. It is notable, for instance, that two 
“official” biographers of the American President Abraham Lincoln noted 
strongly that “after such a very short experience…no confidence whatever 
could be placed in the memories of even the most intelligent and honourable 
men” and that reminiscences as such were “worthless to history.”114 
Nonetheless, oral history has a valuable place in historical research, as it is a 
source of oral tradition or, more aptly, national tradition.115 In many ways, the 
stories of the 1991 Ormoc floods, though these had not been previously 
collected and documented, remain in the general consciousness of Ormoc 
society and form part of Ormoc history. Oral history, as such, far from being 
without value to historical research, in fact “provides a source quite similar in 
character to published autobiography, but much wider in scope,”116 thereby 
“allow[ing] evidence from a new direction.”117 Indeed, the primary contribution 
of oral history is that it allows for the recreation of a multiplicity of 
standpoints, not just from printed documents. In particular, its inclusion of the 
experiences of the “under-classes, unprivileged, and the defeated,”118 often 
the sectors of society that are marginalized and rendered silent by 
mainstream sources of dominant history, permits all voices to be heard. Oral 
history, thus, refocuses and successfully penetrates the questions that 
emerge on how memories are processed and changed. These questions, as 
experienced in this particular research, are the heart of oral history: “What 
happens to experience on the way to becoming memory? What happens to 
experience on the way to becoming history? As an era of intense collective 
																																								 																				
113 Ibid., 46. 
114 The first statement is attributed to John Hay and the second to John Nicolay, Abraham 
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1880-1939” (PhD diss., Department of History, Indiana University). UMI Microform 3315924 
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“…which remained generally scattered in the mouths of the people, which everybody said 
and repeated, peasants, townsfolk, old men, women and even children; which you can hear 
when you enter of an evening into a village tavern; which you may gather if, finding on the 
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Perks and A. Thomson (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 28. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid. 
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experience recedes into the past, what is the relationship of memory to 
historical generalization?”119 Nonetheless, the research is cognizant of the 
fact that the twenty-two year gap from the unfolding of the disaster in 1991 
and its retelling in 2013 has implications on the realities of “selective amnesia 
and artificial distance”120 that Frisch argues can result in, “far from 
coincidentally, …a present that seems to float in time—unencumbered, 
unconstrained, and uninstructed by any active sense of how it came to 
be.”121 The challenge had been to situate these stories squarely in the 
timeframe supported by the documentary evidences supplied by both 
government and other generally accepted sources of information. Both oral 
history and documentary sources, therefore, are equally significant and not 
necessarily contradictory or inferior to the other. Finally, it is hoped that the 
attempt to document some of the stories of the 1991 Ormoc flood from the 
perspective of the most vulnerable and poorest communities and families, as 
Frisch convincingly argues, will create a “shared authority” in the 
interpretation of that disaster. As a consequence, history will be able to 
“provide the basis for shared reimagination[s] of how the past connects to the 
present, and the possibilities this vantage suggests for the future.”122   
Ethnographic sites 
Several field sites were visited with the purpose of undertaking 
interviews, namely, Barangays Luna II-B, Tambulilid (which included the 
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current ‘digestion’ of the Vietnam War show to be well-advanced politically, culturally, and 
intellectually” (17-18). 
122 Ibid., xxiii. The shared authority refers to the relationship between the historian and the 
interviewed person, and scholarship and public history. See also A. Shuman, “Oral history,” 
in Oral Tradition Vol. 18 No. 1 (Center for Studies in Oral Tradition, March 2003), 130-131 
(Online).  
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DSWD Core Shelter where majority of residents were Muslims, the two 
communities under Gawad Kalinga, Block 7 and GK Rotary), Nalunopan, Ipil 
(which included the illegal settlement along Panilahan river, the Benedictine 
Village and the World Vision community), Isla Verde (both former and current 
residents), and Ormoc City proper. In total, there are fifty-nine (59) interviews 
involving seventy-seven (77) individuals, which means that there were 
several cases with two respondents interviewed at the same time, who may 
not be related by marriage or blood, but who happened to be together at the 
time and agreed to be interviewed simultaneously. There were both 
advantages and disadvantages to this approach. On the positive side, the 
two respondents were able to jog each other’s memories and in the process 
provided richer detail because, more often than not, they had already known 
each other prior to the flood. On the negative side, one usually dominated 
the conversation and it took considerable skills to manage these interviews 
properly. Indeed, the majority of the interviews were done in public spaces 
often in front of sari-sari stores or on the respondent’s porch or receiving 
area where privacy was virtually non-existent. Several of the neighbors, 
usually women, frequently and enthusiastically interjected during the 
interview, and there was often much laughter and joking when this 
happened. Exceptions to this were those interviews undertaken at the GK 
Rotary Provincial Office in Tambulilid, where respondents were first identified 
by a point person from GK and ushered into the room where my interpreter 
and I waited. This approach was later abandoned when I realized how 
limiting it was when I could not see how the respondents acted in their own 
homes.  
In subsequent chapters, reference to respondents is made using only 
their first names in order to protect their identities. In some cases their full 
names had been completely changed, unless specified otherwise. Efforts 
were made to ensure gender balance, but with limited success as the men 
were usually at work during weekdays, leaving their wives and children 
behind at home. There were in total twenty-four males out of seventy-seven 
(77) individual respondents. While the majority of the respondents identified 
themselves as Roman Catholics (many only nominally), three were Muslims, 
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while I had no success interviewing members of other denominations, 
including those from the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC). A legal officer of the INC, 
however, did provide written answers to questions I was asked to submit. 
Visits to other places were also undertaken, such as Lake Danao where the 
geothermal plants were located, Barangay Domonar where I found a 
religious cult, Barangay Milagro where numerous religious organizations had 
an established presence, Green Valley where the city currently disposes its 
solid waste, Barangay Simangan where the Ondo Codilla farm and barracks 
were located, Barangay Nueva Vista where the rolling hills of the pineapple 
haciendas of the Larrazabals provided overwhelming panoramic views, the 
sprawling urban poor village in Simangan that was home to numerous large 
families, and Sudlun, a small community of desperately poor families at the 
edge of the derelict Tan hacienda in Barangay Luna. These sites could not 
emphasize more the yawning gap between rich and poor in Ormoc. Several 
visits were also made to the fascinating Anilao and Malbasag rivers, those 
two rivers that went on a rampage that day in November 1991, visits that 
were made during ordinary ‘normal’ days when the rivers were calm, and 
during unusually rainy days when the waters became uncommonly turbid 
and frighteningly turbulent.  
A small note on translations 
 Majority of the interviews undertaken in Ormoc had been in Bisaya (or 
Cebuano), which is the local language. Translations to English were 
undertaken as carefully as possible, to reflect the particular nuances of 
chosen words and sentence structures. In the beginning, the transcription of 
the interviews was made with the assistance of Mr. Victor Arcuiño, who had 
been my official translator and interpreter around Ormoc City in the first few 
weeks of the fieldwork. In many interviews in Barangay Nalunopan, two 
women residents from Barangay Luna II-B, Ate Nita and Nang Perlita, who 
were given the task of accompanying me by Sister Iraida Sua-an, provided 
unofficial translation. These latter interviews occurred in very informal 
settings, with neighbors often freely interjecting in the discussions. The 
unique circumstances of all the interviews are detailed in the Bibliography as 
much as possible to provide as much context to the interview process. When 
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a particular Bisaya word or phrase proved difficult to translate, Sister Ayds, 
as she is popularly known, was a veritable source of clarification and 
enlightenment. However, despite all the help from so many kind people, all 











































ABACA, SUGAR AND  
THE NEW ELITE 
 
[Tacloban’s] population is poor and miserable, like that of all the rest of the province, 
which is sparsely populated. If it were better cultivated, it could yield all the products 
of its neighbour; it has several notable rivers; in its very wooded mountains, volcano 
craters are found…The forests nourish the same animals as the rest of the 
archipelago…The mountains contain numberless quantities of land shells shining 
with the brightest colors. There are very abundant quarries of sulphur, mines of iron, 
lodestone and asbestos in quantity. 
- J. Mallat, The Philippines, History, Geography, Customs, Agriculture, Industry and 
Commerce of the Spanish Colonies in Oceania (Manila: National Historical Institute 
,1864), 189 
 
Two lasting colonial legacies are central to understanding the 
ecological changes that shaped Ormoc a century prior to 1991. The rest of 
Leyte, with Tacloban as the island’s center, was economically 
underdeveloped in the nineteenth century, but it was teeming with natural 
resources waiting to be exploited. First of these legacies was the increasing 
integration of its local economy to global trade through the export of abaca, 
followed by sugar. The entrenchment of an indigenous principalia, already 
established as a homegrown municipal elite in many organized municipalities 
in the Philippines starting from the late sixteenth century,123 further spurred 
local economic growth. The second legacy was the legalization of 
landholding,124 which reached its peak in the post-World War II period and 
																																								 																				
123 N. Owen, “The principalia in Philippine history: Kabikolan, 1790-1898,” Philippine Studies 
Vol. 22 No. 3-4 (Ateneo de Manila University, 1974), 297-324. 
124 May argues that the wide aceptance of the notion of land tenure in colonial Philippines, 
particularly among historians, as having been introduced by the Spanish regime, is a myth. 
See G.A. May, “The making of a myth: John Leddy Phelan and the “Hispanization” of land 
tenure in the Philippines,” Philippine Studies Vol. No. 3 (Ateneo de Manila University, 2004), 
275-307. Subsequent comments, however, both refute and support to varying degrees 
May’s assertion. Veneracion, for instance, argue that, “May’s claim that there is no such 
thing as “European (much more, Spanish) concept of land ownership” at the time of their 
colonial rule in the Philippines, therefore, sits on fragile ground” because “he had relied 
almost entirely on written materials” (312-313). On the other hand, Schumacher notes that 
“May [is] too modest in his final assertions, since I am convinced that he has clearly 
established as far as that can be done, several major key points.” These points are (1) the 
existence of both individual private and communal barangay land property, at least in Luzon; 
(2) the majority of historians have taken to Phelan’s conclusions on land tenure on The 
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paved the way for the establishment of large haciendas. While little had been 
accomplished in terms of land titling during the Spanish colonial period,125 
there was increased emphasis in sugar production at the turn of the twentieth 
century. The development of large-scale sugar cultivation accelerated the 
trend toward the legalization of the ownership of public lands. In particular, 
the introduction of the Torrens title system126 in 1902 and homesteading127 in 
1903 under the American colonial administration was instrumental in this 
process, as were policies in the post-World War II era aimed at converting 
public lands into alienable and disposable properties.  
This chapter traces the social, political and economic transition and 
transformation of Ormoc, highlighting the primacy of abaca and sugar 
production in the late nineteenth century and its impact on Ormoc’s ecology 
and society. It delves into the historical role played by local elites, those 
social and economic entrepreneurs of the Spanish era, in shaping the origins 
of what would become Ormoc in 1991 and thereafter. The last quarter of the 
nineteenth century was a time of limitless opportunities on a “new frontier” 
that resulted in newfound wealth being held by a small group of risk-taking 
individuals, who were primarily Spaniards and later included mestizos. The 
history of Ormoc is, thus, undeniably, the history of pioneering elite families. 
These twin colonial legacies have led to a cultural-ecological condition in 
Ormoc aptly described as an agricultural involution128, which resulted in a 
society characterized by persistent poverty, social inequality, and 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 											
Hispanization of the Philippines (1959), which was not focused on land tenure at all; (3) 
there are a multiplicity of land tenure systems in sixteenth-century Europe and Spain itself, 
rather than just one; and, (4) the dominant assumption of Phelan’s time is a “linear 
development of tribal societies from primitive communal ownership to a system based on 
private ownership” (316). See F. Zialcita, J. Veneracion, and J. Schumacher, S.J., 
“Comments on Glenn May’s article,” Philippine Studies Vol. 52 No. 3 (Ateneo de Manila 
Univeristy, 2004), 308-319.    
125 For a succinct background on the land settlement systems in the Philippines, see C. 
Paderanga Jr., “A review of land settlement systems in the Philippines, 1900-1975,” 
Philippine Review of Economics and Business Vol. 24 No. 1 & 2 (Quezon City: College of 
Economics, University of the Philippines, March & June 1987), 1-54. 
126 The Torrens title system is a system of land registration where ownership of land is 
rendered indefeasible through registration of a certificate or title of ownership. See M. Raff, 
“Toward an ecologically sustainable property concept,” in Modern Studies in Property Law 
Vol. III, ed. E. Cooke (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2005), 77-90.   
127 See L. Iyer and N. Maurer, “The cost of property rights: Establishing institutions on the 
Philippine frontier under American rule, 1898-1918,” Working Paper 09-023 (Harvard 
Business School, 2009) (Online).  
128 See C. Geertz, Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia.  
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accelerating environmental degradation, setting the stage for the massive 
devastation of November 1991.  
From informal settlement to pueblo (town) 
The name Ormoc is thought to derive from Ogmok or Ugmok.129 
These terms refer both to lowland or depressed plain and the spring located 
between the present barangays of Donghol and Mahayag.130 It is not 
impossible to suppose that a variation of the name may already have existed 
among indigenous settlers,131 prior to the coming of the Spaniards in the 
early part of the sixteenth century, to refer to that fertile place between the 
two rivers, present-day Anilao and Malbasag. This area, because of its 
unique topography, provided fresh water for drinking, bathing and fishing, a 
safe anchorage for small boats, and arable land for planting crops. Trade 
with other communities may already have flourished in Ormoc during the pre-
Spanish period.132 
																																								 																				
129 Pastells, in 1571, mention an Omok in the island of Leite as one of the villages assigned 
as encomienda to twelve individuals, namely, Juan Martin, Juan Vexarano, Lazaro Bruzo, 
Alonso de Henao, Francisco de Sepulveda, Pedro Sedeño, Juan de Trujillo, Juan 
Fernandez de Leon, Lorenzo de Villafaña, Gaspar de los Reyes, Martin de Aguirre, and 
Francisco de Quiros (The Philippine Islands 1493-1898, Vol. 34, edited by E. Blair and J. 
Robertson, 308). However, Leyte appears to have been identified as several locales in the 
Visayas. In 1588, Bishop Salazar of Manila wrote to the Spanish King describing “Leyte”, 
which is “thirty leagues south of Cubu,” as “one of the most excellent islands of this 
bishopric” (“Relation of the Philipina Islands”, in The Philippine Islands 1493-1898). By 1591, 
several variations of “Leyte” had been identified and assigned as different encomiendas, 
namely “Leite” to Don Pedro de Oseguera; “Leyte” to Pedro Sedeño; and another “Leyte,” 
which was lumped together with Masbate and Ybabao to Francisco Moral (“Account of the 
encomiendas in the Philipinas Islands” in The Philippine Islands 1493-1898, Vol 8—1591-
1593, 96-131). In 1604, Chirino refers to an Ogmuc and Ogmuk, as one of three additional 
missions opened in Leite (Chirino, Relacion de las Islas Filipinas, 1604). All in The Philippine 
Islands, 1493-1898, Explorations by Early Navigators, Descriptions of the Islands and their 
Peoples, their History and Records of the Catholic Missions, as related in contemporaneous 
Books and Manuscripts, showing the Political, Economic, Commercial and Religious 
Conditions of those Islands from their earliest relations with European Nations to the close of 
the Nineteenth Century, ed. and annot. E.H. Blair and J.A. Robertson. 
130 Ormoc City Local Government, “Ormoc City Tourism Brochure.” Ormoc City, 2013.  
131 Tantuico believes that these first settlers were “primitive Malayans” who “had some well-
developed trade and commerce with the Chinese, Javanese and Indonesians who 
frequented the island with their junks, vintas and sailboats.” F. Tantuico, Leyte Towns, 
Histories/Legends (Tacloban City, 1980), 82. 
132 Justimbaste refers to an unpublished manuscript by a Father Vicente Braganza entitled 
“Story of Leyte” at the Divine World University Museum in Tacloban, which notes that 
ancient gold ornaments and ceramic pieces had been excavated in Leyte. Professor Otley 
Beyer allegedly identified these ornaments and ceramic as being similar to “Japanese [sic; 
Javanese] gold work of the pre-Majapahit period” “resembl[ing] certain ancient jewelry of the 
pre-Spanish inhabitants of the Batanes Islands and Central Luzon.” E. Justimbaste, “A brief 
49	|	F L O O D W A T E R S 	 O F 	 D E A T H 	
	
Jesuit Father Diego Garcia, who arrived in the Philippines in 1599 to 
undertake a visitation of the Philippine vice-province, wrote to the Reverend 
Claudio Acquaviva about the plight of the missionaries to illustrate the 
difficulties posed by Ormoc’s geography and weather: 
The climate of this land is excessively hot and oppressive…Travel is 
mostly by water, with the usual attendant perils. Where one can go by 
land it must be on foot, because up to now there are no mounts to be 
had in the Visayan islands. And even if there were, the roads are so 
steep in places that there is no going on horseback; one must 
clamber. Where the ground is level the mire is so deep, especially 
during the rainy season, which is the greater part of the year, that 
horses would simply get stuck without being able to move. In fact, our 
missionaries must do their travelling not only on foot but barefoot.133 
Between 1596 and 1597, Jesuit missionaries led by Father Ramon 
Prat found the settlements to be small and composed of a few families that 
revolved around whoever was powerful enough to command authority. 
During this time, early settlers did not reside in the poblacion, where 
churches had been built, but preferred to live in the countryside near forests 
where their families hunted and their tilled fields and orchards. By January 
1600, three towns were established in Ormoc, three churches built, and 646 
people baptized out of a total population of 4,000.134 However, because 
Ormoc was situated close to the bay, its residents were continually exposed 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 											
history of Ormoc” in Mithi og Bahandi sa Dakbayan sa Ormoc, Department of Education 
(DepEd)-Region VIII (Undated), 13.  
133 H. De La Costa, The Jesuits in the Philippines, 1581-1768 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1967), 182. E. Justimbaste, however, believes it was the 
Augustinians rather than the Jesuits, who were first to set foot in Ugmok when Miguel Lopez 
de Legaspi gave it as part of an encomienda to one of his soldiers, Francisco de Quiros, in 
1577. It was probable, according to Justimbaste, that the five Augustinians who 
accompanied the mission and led by Father Andres de Urdaneta also came to Ugmok. E. 
Justimbaste, “Brief history of the Catholic Church in Ormoc,” Sts. Peter and Paul Parish. 
Ormoc City, Leyte, June 2009 (Online).  
134 De La Costa, The Jesuits in the Philippines 1581-1768, 187. By 1600, the Jesuit missions 
in the Philippines totalled 40, namely, in Antipolo, Tinagon, Ormoc, Palo, Dulag, Carigara, 
Alangalang, Bohol, Tanay and Mandaue. There were a total of 43 churches constructed with 
12,696 baptized Christians out of a total population of 54,330. In addition, according to De 
La Costa, there were an estimated 25,000 or 30,000 “within the confines of the Jesuit 
missionary district” to whom evangelization had not yet been preached. Nonetheless, there 
were only fifteen priests and an unnamed number of lay brothers who were responsible for 
the entire evangelization project.   
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to the threat posed by Muslim slave raiders. Between 1626 and 1627, for 
example, Raja Bungsu, successor to Raja Batara Shah Tangah of the 
Tausug in the Sulu archipelago, pillaged the Jesuit mission in Ormoc and 
carried off 300 captives.135 Another attack on Ormoc occurred in 1634, when 
Cachil Corralat,136 a Maguindanao lord, burned the church along with fifty 
warriors and beheaded the resident missionary, Father Juan del Carpio. Very 
early on, it was clear the rivers and bay of Ormoc were both a boon and 
bane to its early residents. The experience of the Kabikolan provides an 
indication of the impact of Moro raids to pre-colonial Philippine communities, 
where fortifications were built and coastal defence measures were initiated to 
protect towns.137 Early Ormoc, however, did not appear to have promoted 
any concerted resistance to Moro raiding despite its apparent devastating 
effects on demography, settlement patterns, trade, and capital accumulation. 
In Bicol and in many parts of the Visayas, the Moro raids had partially 
explained why economic growth and commerce had been slow despite the 
introduction of the Bourbon Reforms138 in the latter half of the eighteenth 
century. The tapering off of the Moro attacks in certain parts of the Visayas in 
																																								 																				
135 Ibid., 322-323. 
136 Known among the Spaniards, according to De La Costa, as Cachil Corralat or, according 
to Tantuico, as Katsil Kulanat, or as Dapitwan Kudrat. The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898, 
Explorations by Early Navigators, Descriptions of the Islands and their Peoples, their History 
and Records of the Catholic Missions, as related in contemporaneous Books and 
Manuscripts, showing the Political, Economic, Commercial and Religious Conditions of 
those Islands from their earliest relations with European Nations to the close of the 
Nineteenth Century, Vol 22 – 1625-1629, edited and annotated by E.H. Blair and J.A. 
Robertson, 117. Slavery in pre- and post-1565 Philippines has a sizeable literature. See, for 
instance, A. Reid (ed.), Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia Sixth Ed. (St. 
Lucia: University of Queensland, 1983); and, W.H. Scott, Slavery in the Spanish Philippines 
(Manila: De La Salle University Press, 1991).  
137 See N. Owen, Prosperity without Progress, Manila Hemp and Material Life in the Colonial 
Philippines (University of California Berkeley, Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies, 
1984), 28-30. 
138 Ibid., 34. Some of these reforms, occurring between 1750 and 1799, include the gradual 
opening up of the local economy to international trade through the establishment of the 
Economic Society of Friends of the Country and the Royal Philippine Company, both of 
which aimed at trade promotion and production of export goods; creation of the tobacco 
monopoly; institutionalization of new bureaucratic structures and fiscal controls, thereby 
resulting in the gradual reform of abuses; expulsion of the Chinese, which allowed the 
Chinese mestizo community to emerge; expulsion of the Jesuits, which among others led to 
the growth of the Filipino secular clergy; and the introduction of various policies and 
programs designed to increase production of cash crops such as sugar, cotton and indigo. 
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the mid-nineteenth century meant that, theoretically, economic growth could 
be pursued unimpeded.139  
With the expulsion of the Jesuits from the Philippines in 1768 after 
187 years, the Augustinians took over the missions in Leyte, with Father 
Francisco Martinez leading the Ormoc mission, while the Franciscans were 
placed in northern and western Samar.140 Of the Jesuit administration of 
cabeceras, the Franciscan fathers had this to say, which indicates at least 
during the eighteenth century, that those areas where there were Jesuit 
missions may have retained their dispersed character and did not 
dramatically change since the advent of Spanish rule including in Ormoc:  
The Jesuits did only one thing well and efficiently. This was commerce 
and for greater profits. They allowed the indios to live in the hills and 
along the coasts so that they could gather wax, medicinal plants and 
others which they bought and sold dearly in Manila [emphasis 
supplied].141 
Changing social and economic landscape of Ormoc 
Like other early Philippine settlements in areas such as Pampanga in 
1571,142 private ownership of agricultural lands in Leyte and, in particular, 
Ormoc did not exist. In addition, while there was a stratified society 
composed of chiefs or datus, freemen or timagua, and slaves, a code of 
customary law did prevail to preserve social order, a system that drew its 
rationale from the communal notion of shared benefits. Chirino writing about 
Ugmok in 1604, for example, noted a man from the chiefly class who initially 
																																								 																				
139 See J. Warren, The Sulu Zone, 1768-1898, Second Ed. (National University of 
Singapore, NUS Press, 2007).  
140 H. De la Costa, The Jesuits in the Philippines, 592. However, Imperial notes that it was 
the Franciscans who took over administration of Jesuit missions in Leyte. Justimbaste, on 
the other hand, writes it was the Augustinians who succeeded the Jesuits in Leyte. R. 
Imperial, Leyte (1898-1902), The Philippine-American War (Office of Research Coordination, 
University of the Philippines, 1996), 18; and, E. Justimbaste, “Brief history of the Catholic 
Church in Ormoc,” (Online). 
141 R. Imperial, Ibid. 
142 See J. Larkin, The Pampangans, Colonial Society in a Philippine Province (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1972); and, J. Larkin,  “The causes of an 
involuted society: A theoretical approach to rural Southeast Asian history,” in The Journal of 
Asian Studies Vol. 30 No. 4 (Ann Arbor: Association for Asian Studies August, 1971), 783-
795. 
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had difficulty reconciling with the notion of baptism on account of having 
three wives, all of them of high rank, and the difficulty posed by giving up 
dowries if he divorced any of his wives.143 The chiefs were also denounced 
for imposing fines on the common people, which sometimes became so 
oppressive that the debtor became a slave along with his wife, children and 
relatives.144 Thus, the existing social structure in pre-colonial Leyte, including 
Ormoc, was composed of the following three classes: the chiefs or datus, the 
freemen, and the slaves. Of the last, there were sub-categories: “those who 
are slaves of long standing or from their birth; those by captivity; those for 
crimes; and those for loans.”145 However, life was not extraordinarily 
onerous, as people were generally “sure of being welcomed, sheltered, and 
offered food” when they travelled anywhere in the island of [Leite], and that 
“whether their harvests be good or bad, [the residents] never raise or lower 
the price of rice among themselves, which they always set to one another at 
a fixed price.”146 By 1768, Ormoc boasted four rural schools.147 By 1866, the 
Augustinians had succeeded in constructing a total of forty more schools in 
Leyte, with a total student population of 8,263, both males and females.148 By 
1893, an additional 49 schools were built across the province. Aside from 
schools, the Augustinians also built roads and revolutionized agriculture 
through the use of work animals and the plow.149 
 In terms of population, Ormoc in 1846 had a total of 4,975 taxpayers 
paying 995 tributes, while the total population of Leyte in the same year was 
87,175.150 Also, Ormoc was slowly becoming a pueblo with a growing 
																																								 																				
143 The story had a happy ending, when he divorced his wives and married his favorite, who 
had also asked to be baptized. See P. Chirino, Relacion de las Islas Filipinas. The 
Philippines in 1600, Historical Conservation Society (Series) 15 (Manila: National Historical 
Society, 1969), 290-292. 
144 See “Letter from Martin de Rada to Viceroy Martin Enriquez,” in The Philippine Islands 
1493-1898 34 (1519-1522; 1280-1405), edited and annotated by E. Blair and J. Robertson, 
292-293. 
145 Martin de Rada refers specifically to “Visayans or Pintados, who are more quarrelsome 
than the Lussones or Moros.” 
146 P. Chirino, Relacion de las Islas Filipinas, 280-282. 
147 M. Artigas y Cuerva, The Colonial Odyssey of Leyte (1521-1914): A Translation of 
Reseña de la Provincia de Leyte, ed. R. Borrinaga and C. Kobak (Philippines: New Day 
Publishers, 2006), 93-94. 
148 Ibid., 96. 
149 E. Justimbaste, “A brief history of Ormoc,” 28. 
150 J. Mallat, The Philippines, History, Geography, Customs, Agriculture, Industry and 
Commerce of the Spanish Colonies in Oceania, 189.  
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number of permanent residents. In 1839, the first year that a gobernadorcillo, 
principales and cabezas were ever mentioned in an official record, town 
residents led by the gobernadorcillo Juan Simon, eight members of the 
principalia, twenty-two cabezas de barangay, five tenientes nombrados 
(incumbent barangay heads), and two testigos (witnesses), petitioned the 
office of the alcalde mayor (governor) in Tacloban, Victoriano Lopez 
Llanoses, for Ormoc to be recognized as a parish.151 Until then, it had 
retained the status of a visita attached to the parish of Palompon, a situation 
that persisted from 1778 to 1850. The petition argued that the number of 
tributos (tax payers) in Ormoc totalling 1,907, undoubtedly larger when 
compared to Palompon with only 626 tributos, should justify the 
establishment of an independent parish.152 In addition, there was the 
distance to Palompon, the unpredictable weather that affected regular visits 
by assigned priests, and the disagreeable attitudes of Fathers Don Mateo 
Samson and his coadjutor Don Florentino Antonio that prompted Ormoc 
residents to clamor for their own parish. It is clear here that these early 
Ormoc residents headed by the principalia were learning how to assert 
themselves collectively, particularly about matters that appeared most 
important to their way of life. It was on 13 November 1850, eleven years after 
the petition, when the Governor Captain General of the Philippines, the 
highest colonial official in Manila, finally signed the declaration.153 Father 
Luciano Babiano, then parish priest of Palompon, became the first parish 
priest of Ormoc, while the parish itself was formally installed on 21 December 
1850.154 
Numerous industries in Leyte flourished in the last three decades of 
the nineteenth century. In particular, coconut oil production (which was often 
disrupted by hurricanes), tobacco and abaca cultivation, fishing, gathering of 
wax and honey from surrounding forests, and textile production similar to 
																																								 																				
151 E. Justimbaste, “A brief history of Ormoc,” 29. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid. Mojares, however, writes that Ormoc became a town and parish in 1834 when it 
separated from the town of Palompon. R. Mojares, Aboitiz: Family & Firm in the Philippines 
(Cebu City: Aboitiz & Co., 1998), 21. 
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Samar were among the primary industries in the Leyte province.155 In the 
succeeding two and a half centuries of Spanish rule, the story of Ormoc 
would be inextricably linked with elite families, starting with the Aboitizes, 
whose fortunes began in that small backwater of Leyte. These pioneering 
families responded to the demands of the global capitalist system and the 
promise of wealth for those who had control of assets and labor to join the 
bandwagon of emerging monocrop industries.  
The saga of abaca wealth  
For more than fifty years before the twentieth century, the production 
of abaca was the most important industry of the Philippine islands. Its huge 
demand was due to twin developments in the United States, the Philippines’ 
main abaca export market. There was the rise in maritime trade, which 
entailed increased demand for maritime cordage, and the deepening of the 
industrial revolution, which resulted in greater demand for binder twine, 
transmission rope, Manila drilling cables and lariats for machines.156 Abaca 
exports in 1903 were more than two million piculs, valued at $21,701,575, 
and representing 66 per cent of the total exports of the Philippines.157 While 
exports of abaca began in 1818, it wasn’t until about 1840 that it became 





155 J. Mallat, The Philippines, History, Geography, Customs, Agriculture, Industry and 
Commerce of the Spanish Colonies in Oceania, 189. Miguel de Loarca in his “Relation of the 
Filipinas Islands” referred to the island of Baybay or Leyte as a “large and well-provisioned 
island, although the people dress in medriñaque. Medriñaque, he said, “resembles calico, 
and is made from a kind of wild banana,” most certainly abaca. De Loarca, “Relation of the 
Filipinas Islands,” in The Philippine Islands 1493-1898 34 (1519-1522; 1280-1405), edited 
and annotated by E. Blair and J. Robertson, 49 & 50.  
156 N. Owen, Prosperity without Progress, 48.  
157 H.T. Edwards, “Abaca (Manila Hemp),” in Farmers’ Bulletin No. 12 (Manila: Bureau of 
Agriculture, 1904), 1. 
158 N. Owen, Prosperity without Progress, 5. Owen notes the confusion over the first 
shipment of abaca to the United States. The year 1818 is commonly given, while some 
sources claim that the first shipment was made by Lt. White. However, White arrived in 
Manila only in the summer of 1819 so that it would appear improbable that he would be 
credited for jumpstarting the first shipment to the United States.  
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Table 2.1 











Source: H.T. Edwards, “Abaca (Manila Hemp)”, 534. 
 
 The Philippine islands enjoyed a virtual monopoly in abaca 
production, as other countries like India, Andaman Islands, Borneo, Florida, 
and the West Indies failed to replicate its success in the nineteenth century. 
This comparative advantage was fully exploited by entrepreneurs who 
expanded its cultivation and production with great success in several 
regions, namely, Camarines, Albay, Sorsogon, Masbate, Mindoro, 
Marinduque, Samar, Leyte, Panay, Negros, and Mindanao.159 Some of the 
best fibers from Leyte were produced in southern towns around Malitbog 
Bay. Indeed, because a distinctive alluvial type of soil composed of heavy silt 
loam characterized Leyte, the quality of the abaca produced here was nearly, 
if not quite, the equal of Albay, which was then the leading abaca-producing 
province in the islands.160 In terms of value, abaca’s price quotations 
reached a minimum of $6.75 in 1885 to a maximum of $17 in 1888 per 
picul.161  
Leyte abaca was further graded according to quality, which indicates 
an incentive for entrepreneurs to become involved in the enterprise 
considering the high promise of returns, as shown in the table of quotations 
below: 
																																								 																				
159 H.T. Edwards, “Abaca (Manila Hemp),” 535. 
160 The excellent soil conditions of Leyte are briefly discussed in C. Dorsey, “Soil conditions 
in the Philippines,” 7th Annual Report of the Philippine Commission 1906 (Manila: Bureau of 
Printing 1906), 369. 
161 H.T. Edwards, “Abaca (Manila Hemp),” 543. 




Manila quotations of Leyte abaca, as of 17 March 1904 
Grade Quotes (in $) 
Good current 27.00 
X current 26.00 
Superior 23.50 
Second 1 21.75 
Second 2 18.5 
Second 3 16.75 
Source: H.T. Edwards, “Abaca (Manila Hemp),” 543. 
 
 By 1901, abaca (or hemp) would be the primary export commodity of 
the Philippines: 
Table 2.3 
Relative value of abaca vis-à-vis other Philippine Export Products,  
Fiscal Year 1901 
Product item Amount 
(in $) 
Per cent of total 
exports 
Manila hemp 14,453,110 62.30 
Copra and cocoanuts 2,663,340 11.47 
Sugar 2,293,075 9.88 
Tobacco, cigars and cigarettes 2,217,728 9.56 
Coffee 6,616 0.02 
Source: H.T. Edwards, “Abaca (Manila Hemp), 543. 
  
Abaca prospered in any type of soil, but was most successfully 
cultivated in slopes, which provided natural protection against strong winds. 
It did not compete with rice farming since abaca did not thrive in paddies. As 
such, rice continued to be cultivated in the lowlands, an arrangement that 
proved beneficial to planters who could profit from the development of two 
income streams, and to laborers and the local population who were 
guaranteed continued food security. Abaca cultivation proved highly popular 
because it did not entail much production cost in machinery, fertilizer, 
knowledge, or trained labor. It could be harvested at any time and had no 
particular “seasons”. Edwards, an American fiber expert who wrote a 
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manuscript on abaca production in 1904 for the Philippine Bureau of 
Agriculture, argued that the “most difficult problem which the tropical planter 
has to face, and that which more than any other one thing will determine his 
ultimate success or failure, is the manner in which he controls and directs his 
labor.”162 Labor needed to be available at all times, and would require “a 
thorough knowledge of the native character and an infinite amount of tact 
and patience.”163  
Ormoc imported its labor including entire families from Cebu and 
Bohol, which numbered 6,000 during the months of May and June.164 For 
laborers, the heavy manual demand of abaca harvesting also meant that 
they could work only an estimated sixteen days per month to produce one 
arroba (25 pounds) per team of two or three laborers.165 The common 
practice in the industry was a combination of a wage and share basis, 
wherein laborers were contracted to clear the forest and plant a hundred 
abaca seedlings at a fixed rate per pisoson (or 3.4 hectares).166  
A layer of middlemen linked the producers of abaca found all over the 
archipelago to the merchant houses in Manila that acted both as exporters of 
Philippine products and importers of textiles and other commodities. Both 
ends of the production and marketing spheres were, however, fraught with 
uncertainty, as the producers were not always certain of the availability of 
international ships at the port of Manila, and merchant houses were not 
always sure of the availability of supply from the provinces. In the middle of 
this commodity circuit were the middlemen, predominantly Spaniards in the 
beginning and later included Chinese, who were in the enviable position of 
intermediating and brokering the industry between the provinces and Manila, 
and later, Cebu and Iloilo, through the control of interisland trade. These 
middlemen, best exemplified by the Yrastorza and Aboitiz families and 
prominent Spanish entrepreneurs in the Visayas, usually owned the boats 
																																								 																				
162 Ibid., 537. 
163 Ibid. 
164 P. Borseth, “Report of the Governor, Province of Leyte,” in Appendix H, Annual reports of 
provincial governors, Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of 
War (Without Exhibits) (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1905), 311. 
165 N. Owen, Prosperity without Progress, 76-77. 
166 H.T. Edwards, “Abaca (Manila Hemp),” 537. 
58	|	F L O O D W A T E R S 	 O F 	 D E A T H 	
	
that shipped the abaca to Manila. In Ormoc, early elite expatriate families 
first established themselves as abaca middlemen and later transitioned into 
landowning, correctly assessing that real wealth and power on an agricultural 
frontier could lie only in the ownership of vast tracts of land.  
The makings of the Aboitiz fortunes 
 Few know that the Aboitiz family and corporation, which have 
extensive interests in many spheres of the Philippine economy today, started 
in the small town of Ormoc. The beginnings of the family fortune can be 
traced to a young Basque mariner, Paulino Martin Aboitiz y Mendazona, who 
was born in 1851 to a farmer near Lequeitio, Vizcaya in northern Spain. He 
arrived in the Philippines in the 1870s and found work piloting a sailboat for a 
Leyte shipowner named Gregorio Yrastorza.  
Gregorio himself (ca. 1820-1890) was born at sea en route to the 
Philippines where his Basque parents were going to live as immigrants. He 
grew up in the small town of Ormoc and married a Spanish mestiza named 
Ana Torres whose own family originated from either Binondo in Manila or the 
Camiguin island.167 The Yrastorzas had seven children, whom Gregorio 
supported through the operation of sailboats and the buying and selling of 
abaca. Although rumored to possess “vats of fine butter from Australia and 
china sets number[ing] ‘over a thousand pieces,’”168 he was not considered 
the wealthiest individual in Leyte at this time. Archival records, however, 
mention him as a don and comerciante in Ormoc as early as 1873.169  
Paulino Aboitiz later married one of Gregorio’s daughters, Emilia (ca. 
1859-1918), around 1880, while a younger daughter, Guadalupe (ca. 1861-
1929), married another Basque, Angel Moraza, who would become Aboitiz’s 
close business associate. Moraza (ca. 1848-1920) had migrated from Ea, 
Spain, to the Philippines in 1868 as an alferez cuadrillero with the Spanish 
																																								 																				
167 Mojares writes that the origin of the Torres family was in Binondo, although they may 
have lived for some time in Camiguin. However, according to The Story of Aboitiz & 
Company, Ana Torres’ family moved to Ormoc from Camiguin. R. Mojares, Aboitiz: Family & 
Firm in the Philippines. (Cebu City: Aboitiz & Co., 1998), 21; and Aboitiz & Company, The 
Story of Aboitiz & Company, Inc. and the Men Behind It (Cebu City, 1973), 7.  
168 R. Mojares, Aboitiz: Family & Firm in the Philippines, 21.  
169 Ibid. 
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army.170 Both the Aboitiz and Moraza families settled in Leyte, each keeping 
a tienda and dealing in abaca, common occupations for Spaniards in the 
Eastern Visayas at that time. These apparently were excellent livelihoods 
that allowed many immigrant Spaniards to return to Spain once or twice in 
their lifetimes or to finance their children’s education in that country. Like 
many who had a monopoly in the economy of a poblacion by virtue of 
running the lone general merchandise store, the two families bought abaca 
from native farmers and then sold it to agents in the commercial centers in 
Cebu from whom they received a small commission. The tienda in turn sold 
commodities such as candles, salt, soap, sardines, rice, liquor and textiles 
imported from Cebu or Manila to local farmers who brought in their abaca to 
sell in the towns. Thus, by the 1870s, most of the big merchants in Leyte 
were Spaniards. The most prominent of these included Don Ramon Arlegui 
in Tacloban, Don Manuel Lopez in Maasin, Don Manuel Caraballo in 
Tanauan, Don Eusebio Martinez in Cabalian, and Don Francisco Gonzales 
and Don Gregorio Yrastorza in Ormoc.171 By 1890, this group expanded to 
include the Urrutias in Tacloban, Larrazabals and Uriartes in Ormoc, and the 
Muerteguis in Palompon.172 
In 1870, Ormoc was the most important coastal town in Leyte. With a 
population of 11,200 largely devoted to agriculture, commerce and 
navigation, Ormoc boasted of a growing rural prosperity. Population in Leyte 
between 1860 and 1900 tripled from 134,493 to 357,641,173 while Ormoc’s 
population in 1884 likewise rose, albeit more modestly, from 11,967 to 
13,315.174 The surge in abaca demand led to the opening of five main 
collection areas in the province, namely, Tacloban, Carigara, Malitbog, 
Ormoc and Palompon. The majority of the abaca produced in the east coast 
of the province including south Cabalian was sent to Tacloban en route to 
Manila, while the crop from the west coast including the island of Biliran 
																																								 																				
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid., 24. 
172 Ibid., 21. 
173 Ibid., 23. 
174 E. Justimbaste, “A brief history of Ormoc,” 32. He notes that footnotes 41 and 42 state 
that the data taken were from Erecciones de los Pueblos, Leyte, 1921-1891, Bk. 1, “Estado 
por pueblos que determina la extension superficial que comprende el distrito judicial actual 
de Leyte…” and Gazetter of the Philippine Islands (Undated), 593. 
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(which was still under the province of Leyte until 1992) was shipped to Cebu. 
The annual production of hemp rose in the 1870s to between 70,000 and 
80,000 piculs.175 From 1903 to 1904, a total of 119,352 piculs of hemp were 
shipped to Tacloban, of which 70,000 piculs came from Carigara, and 
211,500 piculs from collecting points on the west coast.176 By 1905, the 
surge in demand for abaca resulted in about 22,638 hectares of land in Leyte 
to be allocated for hemp cultivation, producing over 11 million kilos of 
abaca.177  
Ormoc, as the secondary port in Leyte after Tacloban, was linked to 
the rest of the archipelago through a network of government-commissioned 
mail boats (vapores correos) and cargo-and-passenger vessels operated by 
the likes of Peele, Hubbel & Co., and Smith, Bell & Co.178  
Paulino Aboitiz concentrated his business interests in Ormoc, while 
the Morazas flourished in Baybay, Leyte. Prosperity, however, did not take 
long for Aboitiz to achieve. In a span of a decade, he was listed as a don, 
comerciante, and juez de paz, with interests in landowning. He was actively 
engaged in the acquisition of two parcels of coconut land and a seven-
hectare abaca farm in sitio Donghol in 1894 in Ormoc; a lot in the Ormoc 
poblacion in 1897; and, in partnership with Don Nicolas Larrazabal, a large 
tract of land in sitio Binataran in the neighboring municipality of Albuera.179 
Some Chinese mestizos also began to be commercially active in 
Leyte. One of these was a man called Pablo Tan, who got himself baptized 
as a Christian with Gregorio Yrastorza as sponsor.180 Tan, however, was not 
yet a landed man in the late nineteenth century. He was a blacksmith, whose 
business made bolos, plows, and other agricultural implements.181 He 
apparently made his fortune selling ironmongery and joined those pioneering 
entrepreneurs buying agricultural lands in Macabug, a barangay in Ormoc, 
and eventually setting up his own animal-driven sugar mill.  
																																								 																				
175 R. Mojares, Aboitiz: Family & Firm in the Philippines, 23.  
176 E. Justimbaste, “A brief history of Ormoc,” 32. 
177 R. Mojares, Aboitiz: Family & Firm in the Philippines, 23. 
178 Ibid., 27. 
179 Ibid., 24. 
180 E. Justimbaste, “A brief history of Ormoc,” 32. 
181 Ibid., 33. 
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Sugar production and the consolidation of wealth 
 Developing almost simultaneously with the abaca industry was the far 
more sophisticated and technologically advanced sugar industry. The 
Philippine archipelago had exported sugar since the eighteenth century, 
even achieving the title of being the largest sugar exporter in Asia between 
1775 and 1779.182 But the industry remained small and technologically 
backward. Its rapid expansion began only in the 1850s, through the 
intervention of Nicholas Loney, a British vice consul appointed to Iloilo. The 
economic boom in the Philippine sugar industry was the result of great 
economic, social and political developments at the national and global 
levels.183 The port of Manila was gradually opened to world commerce after 
1815 in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars. It was also the advent of an 
era of increased international shipping, as well as the unprecedented growth 
in demand for sugar in the United States and Great Britain.184 
In the Philippines, the sugar industry reacted positively by expanding 
cultivation and export in a way never before observed, in large part 
supported by foreign capital. The major sugar producing regions in the 
archipelago were in Negros Oriental, Pampanga, Bulacan, Pangasinan, 
Tondo and Iloilo, where the establishment of large plantations began to occur 
following the establishment of the Torrens land titling system in 1902. Prior to 
the introduction of this system, there were only a few owners who had clear 
titles to their lands. In a bid to force all landowners to obtain Torrens titles, 
the American colonial government inaugurated in 1913 an extensive 
cadastral survey of the archipelago, a process that would drag on for two 
decades before the Second World War.185 The result of this state-based 
exercise was the displacement of many indigenous tribes from their 
traditional lands in many parts of the archipelago and the consolidation of 
																																								 																				
182 C. Quirino, History of the Philippine Sugar Industry (Manila, Philippines: Kalayaan, 1974), 
11-12. 
183 See J. Larkin, “The international face of the Philippine sugar industry, 1836-1920,” in 
Philippine Review of Economics and Business Vol. 21 Nos. 1&2 (Quezon City: University of 
the Philippines, March & June 1984), 39-58.  
184 J. Larkin, Sugar and the Origins of Modern Philippine Society (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 
London:  University of California Press, 1993), 21-43. 
185 Ibid., 68-69. 
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vast tracts of now public lands under the ownership of a few powerful 
families.  
These developments in the sugar industry, however, did not 
immediately gain ground in Ormoc. The advent of the Philippine-American 
War in 1899 saw both the Moraza and Aboitiz families evacuating to Spain in 
1901. They returned to Ormoc only later that year. Ormoc, unlike Samar that 
was plagued by Pulahanism in the 1900s, achieved relative peace and order 
due to the large contingent of American forces sent to enforce social order in 
Leyte, with twenty of the 253 soldiers assigned full time in Ormoc. By virtue 
of law enforcement guaranteed by the American government, four 
mechanized, animal-driven hemp presses were successfully operated in 
Leyte, Carigara, Ormoc and Baybay by 1907, ensuring the expansion of the 
hemp industry. 
It was only in 1916 when Ramon Aboitiz, a son of Paulino Aboitiz, 
introduced commercial sugar production in Ormoc after the purchase of 
Hacienda Boroc, which was later renamed Hacienda Maria Teresa. This 
purchase marked the official entry of Ormoc into the sugar industry. The 
Aboitiz family, while keeping the core of its business in abaca and copra, had 
already diversified its interests in shipping, ice production, and sugar mill 
production.  
In the rest of the archipelago, sugar centrals began to be constructed 
in 1910, when American capitalists erected the first modern factory in San 
Jose, Mindoro, in response to the establishment of free trade between the 
Philippines and the United States the previous year.186 By 1909, the United 
States had passed the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Law that imposed a duty free 
quota of 300,000 long tons of Philippine sugar into the United States. The 
limitation was subsequently removed in 1913 through the enactment of the 
Underwood Tariff Law. In 1912, Hawaiian venture capitalists constructed the 
first cooperative sugar central in the Philippines in San Carlos, Negros. The 
cooperative arrangement imposed a milling contract between the central, 
																																								 																				
186 G.G. Gordon, “Sugar centrals in the Philippines,” in Philippine Sugar Yearbook 1950, ed. 
J. Mirasol (Escolta, Manila, Philippines: Ildefonso T. Runes, 1950), 152. 
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which provided the sugar mill and installed a railway system for the 
transportation of the cane, and the planter, who had to set aside a certain 
portion of his land to sugarcane and to harvest and deliver these to the 
central’s loading station.187 This arrangement proved highly successful and 
was copied in other centrals in Luzon, Negros and Ormoc.  
In the context of these developments, something must be said about 
the entrepreneurial character of Don Ramon Aboitiz. Rising from the ranks, 
first as clerk, bookkeeper, bodeguero and jack-of-all-trades, he was 
business-savvy and quick thinking. His criterion for buying new businesses 
was simple: “Any business where we can make money, we will go into.”188 
With this philosophy in mind, the Aboitizes opened an office in Cebu, kept 
agencies in Ormoc and Palompon in Leyte, Catarman, Laoang and 
Catbalogan in Samar, and kept diverse interests in Manila, Cotabato and 
Madridejos. The sugar mill that the Aboitiz & Co bought in 1916 was located 
in front of Hacienda Aboitiz in barangay Ipil in Ormoc, and had a rated 
capacity of only 250 tons daily.189 In 1929, the mill had an infusion of capital 
amounting to 300,000 pesos put up by the Aboitizes themselves through the 
sale of cattle from the family’s cattle ranch in Masbate, a venture that had 
been consolidated in 1922. The incorporators in the mill, aside from Don 
Ramon, were foreign and Chinese and Spanish mestizo investors, namely, 
the American sugar expert Renton Hind, E.B. Ford, S.H. Deebel, Martin 
Geary, Tiburcio Tancinco, Bernardo Torres, Jose Sy Hong Chuy, and 
Arsenio Luz.190 In the first year, the Ormoc Sugar Central produced 8,000 
piculs, doubled this in the second year of operation, made a profit in the third 
year, and was able to declare dividends the following year.191 However, Don 
Ramon and his brothers, keeping faith with the business philosophy of 
ensuring profit above all else, judged that the sugar central did not guaranty 
stable, long-term returns. It was sold to Gil Montilla in 1936, who was then 
Speaker of the National Assembly and a sugarman from Negros with 
																																								 																				
187 Ibid. 
188 Aboitiz & Company, The Story of Aboitiz and Company, 19. 
189 C. Quirino, History of the Philippine Sugar Industry, 60 
190 Ibid., 60. 
191 Aboitiz & Company, The Story of the Aboitiz and Company, 22. 
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substantial holdings in the Isabela Sugar Co. in Occidental Negros.192 
Montilla had already eliminated competition in sugar production in Leyte a 
year before when he bought the only other sugar mill on the island, Rosario 
Sugar Mill, including its quota of 80,000 piculs of “B” sugar.193 He installed 
his nephew, Carlos Rivilla, to whom he also sold the central in 1949 when 
the latter successfully increased its quota of 66,000 piculs before the war to 
180,000 piculs in 1957.194 
With the advent of sugar centrals, small planters proliferated and 
production increased. In Ormoc during the pre-World War II period, there 
were more small planters than in other sugar producing areas in the 
Philippines. Only forty-five out of 222 planters working with the Ormoc and 
Rosario mills enjoyed quotas of 1000 piculs or above (133,000 pounds).195 
With small quotas that permitted these planters to deliver only one or two 
truckloads of cane every week, many of them complained as it forced them 
to have higher per unit labor costs.196 The actual percentage sharing in the 
Ormoc-Rosario sugar mills during the 1936-37 crop year was fifty-five per 
cent for the planter and forty-five per cent for the miller.197 The Ormoc-
Rosario Sugar Mills had 570 plantations between them, with a total of 599 
planters. In the 1935 list of plantation owners and planters affiliated with the 
Rosario Sugar Mill, the more prominent included Hacienda Rosario, Hijos de 
Escaño, Inc., Pablo Tan, and Rosalia de Tan as owners, and Hermenegildo 
Serafica and Antonio Tan as planters. Those affiliated with the Ormoc Sugar 
Company included, among others as plantation owners, the Government of 
the United States (Department of War), the Provincial Government of Leyte, 
Hacienda Casilda, Inc., Hijos de Escaño, Inc., Felipe Larrazabal, Andresa de 
Cerilles Larrazabal, Ormoc Sugar Co., Codillas (Basilio, Jose, and Lucio), 
																																								 																				
192 Mojares identifies the buyer as Gil Montinola of Negros Occidental, who “paid P1,500,000 
for a company with assets of only P360,000.” Quirino, however, notes that it was Gil Montilla 
who bought out Don Ramon for 750,000 pesos. On a background on Montilla, see I. Runes, 
“Montilla: Captain of Industry,” in Philippine Sugar Yearbook, ed. J. Mirasol (Escolta, Manila, 
Philippines: Ildefonso T. Runes), Supplement T-X.  
193 C. Quirino, History of the Philippine Sugar Industry, 60. 
194 Ibid. 
195 R. Middleton, “Causes of the Ormoc flash flood disaster in Leyte, Philippines,” 14. 
196 Ibid. 
197 Quoted in Y. Nagano-Kano, “The structure of the Philippine Sugar Industry at the end of 
the American colonial period and after 1974,” 13. 
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Fortunata Carillo (identified as the widow of Yrastorza), Tans (Angel, 
Antonio, Felixberto, Filomeno, heirs of Francisco, Manuel, Mariano, Meliton, 
Nicolas, Pablo, Pedro and Lucia Carillo, Pilar, Rosalia, and Vicenta), and 
Nicolas Torres,198 with the exception of the Torrevillas who were not in the 
list at all. It is notable that among the names were those identified in 1991 as 
owning nearly one hundred per cent of the immediate watershed of 
Ormoc.199 The dispute between planters and centrals prompted the 
establishment of the National Sugar Board, which was created on 17 August 
1938. In addition, problems at this time were also raised about the 
appropriate wages and conditions for laborers. However, the onset of World 
War II stalled any plans for labor reform before they even took shape.  
The Japanese military administration occupied Ormoc from May 1942 
to October 1944. In the early part of the occupation, the Nagano Detachment 
forces implemented an Ormoc cultivation plan designed to allow the Ormoc 
Sugar Refinery Company, set up by Daido Trading Company in Tacloban, to 
continue large-scale production of refined sugar and alcohol.200 However, the 
factory closed, creating unemployment and causing the deterioration of law 
and order.201 This closure was blamed on constant guerrilla attacks and the 
decreased population that could be utilized for labor. Of the elites, some of 
the Tan and Larrazabal families began collaborating with the guerrillas, while 
others, including the incumbent mayor Catalino Hermosilla (who traced his 
lineage to the Yrastorza family and had married a Larrazabal prior to the 
war)202 and Dominador Tan according to local folklore, were labelled as 
Japanese collaborators.  
																																								 																				
198 Executive Orders Relative to Sugar Allocation Issued by the Governor-General during the 
Year 1935 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1936).  
199 According to Severino, the families owning most of the land comprising Ormoc’s 
watershed based on real estate records in Ormoc obtained by the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) were the Larrazabals, the Seraficas, the 
Torreses, Torrevillases, Pongos and the Tans. See H. Severino, “Ormoc revisited,” 
Philippine Daily Inquirer, 21-22 April 1992.  
200 A. Satoshi, “Food supply problem in Leyte, Philippines, during the Japanese occupation 
(1942-44),” in Journal of Southeast Asian Studies Vol. 39 No. 1 (Cambridge University Press 
on behalf of Department of History, National University of Singapore, February 2008), 59-82. 
201 Ibid., 66. 
202 A. Satoshi, “Collaboration and resistance, Catalino Hermosilla and the Japanese 
occupation of Ormoc, Leyte (1942-1945),” in Philippine Studies Vol. 60 No. 1 (Quezon City: 
Ateneo de Manila University 2012), 33-68. 
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The end of World War II saw the rehabilitation of sugar centrals. The 
newly established Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, with a capitalization of 
300,000 pesos, extended loans to restore damaged local industries, 
businesses, and homes. In total, there were forty-five operational centrals in 
the archipelago before the war, and by the 1950-51-crop year twenty-eight 
had been reconstructed and were operational.203 Total capital investment by 
centrals was estimated at 178 million pesos, of which forty-two per cent was 
Filipino, thirty-two per cent American, and twenty-six per cent Spanish, while 
planters’ investments were estimated at 38 million pesos.204 During that crop 
year, there were 18,000 registered planters cultivating a total area of 160,000 
hectares in the country to sugarcane and supporting thousands of people 
directly or indirectly dependent on the industry.205 
In 1952, Republic Act 809 authored by Carlos Hilado, a three-term 
representative from the second district of Negros Occidental from 1946-
1957, opened the rift between millers (or capitalists) and planters (composed 
of both small planters and hacenderos) over sugar crop sharing, the same 
issue that had been sidelined at the onset of World War II. Republic Act 809 
prescribed the crop sharing at sixty per cent for the planters and forty per 
cent for the millers.206 Another major difference between central owners and 
planters is that while the latter hacenderos were ninety-one per cent 
Filipinos, only fifty per cent of the former were non-Filipinos.207 The 
disagreement between centrals and planters manifested itself in the 1957 
presidential elections, where central owners supported Elpidio Quirino, but it 
was the planters who brought Ramon Magsaysay to power.208 Yet who were 
these planters and how were they able to mobilize themselves to influence 
national politics? Before centrals, planters had simply milled their cane in 
their own mills. The creation of centrals naturally led to a specialization of 
																																								 																				




206 V. Gonzaga, assisted by M. Decena, The Socio-politics of Sugar: Wealth, Power 
Formation and Change in Negros (Bacolod City, Philippines: Social Research Center-
Negrense Studies’ Program, University of St. La Salle, 1989), Chapter 8.  
207 Larkin, Sugar and the Origins of Philippine Modern Society, 169-170. 
208 Ibid. 
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work and obligations and resulted in the formation of planter associations 
composed of planters specific to a mill district. Each milling district had its 
own Planter’s Association, and eventually these disparate groups were able 
to organize themselves into a Federation, which, according to Ambassador 
Oscar Ledesma of the powerful Ledesma clan of Silay, Occidental Negros 
during an interview in 1986, essentially spoke for all the planters.209 This 
Federation became the beginning of the so-called sugar bloc. Meanwhile, 
Ormoc elite families during the pre- and post-World War II period did not 
venture into elected national politics, like other politically powerful 
hacenderos in other parts of the country notably Negros, and therefore had 
not been politically visible on the national stage. Ormoc’s contribution to the 
country’s sugar production has historically been small (see below), which 
indicates a weak influence in national politics, unlike Negros, which produced 
fifty per cent of the total sugar in pre-World War II Philippines.  
Table 2.4 
Centrifugal Sugar Mill Production in Ormoc, 1926-1950 
























1926-27 - - -   
1927-28 - - -   
1928-29 - - -   
1929-30 1,324 - 1,324   
1930-31 2,757 - 2,757   
1931-32 6,039 - 6,039   
1932-33 13,247 - 13,247   
1933-34 12,266 281c 12,547   
1934-35 4,740 - 4,740   
1935-36 6,948 2,440 9,388   
1936-37 7,570 3,792 11,262   
1937-38 6,653 3,233 9,886   
1938-39 6,210 3,438 9,648   




13,590  1,413,731d 
1940-41 14,439 14,439   
1941-42 713 713   
1945-46 -  - 12,914 
																																								 																				
209 Interview by Gonzaga with Ambassador Oscar Ledesma in 1986. V. Gonzaga, The 
Socio-politics of Sugar, 81-82. 
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1946-47 1,148  42,115 84,576 
1947-48 6,240  312,575 398,118 
1948-49 9,554  597,197 728,596 
1949-50 
(Estimated) 
12,328e  662,232 797,878f 
Notes:  
a Ormoc Sugar Company was first listed in 1930. 
b Rosario Sugar Mills was first listed in 1934. 
c Gordon (1950) lists this as 282 with a total of 12,548 in Leyte. 
dGordon (1950), 154-156. 
e Gordon (1950) lists this at 11,155.39 
f Gordon (1950) lists this at 742,535.69 
Source: J. Mirasol (ed), Philippine Sugar Yearbook 1950 (Escolta, Manila, Philippines: 
Ildefonso T. Runes, 1950).  
 
Patterns of agricultural involution in Ormoc prior to 1991 
This overview of the agricultural history of Ormoc enables us to 
investigate what patterns were present in human-environment interactions 
over several centuries that provide evidence of Ormoc’s ecological 
conditions prior to 1991. I start by asking whether or not the type of 
agricultural resources that characterise a society results in the 
institutionalization of particular forms of social relations. This question allows 
an analysis that highlights the active involvement of people in their 
environment and on why systems that may appear to be socially unjust 
continue to persist. In particular, Clifford Geertz’s (1963) conception of 
“agricultural involution” is crucial here. Defined as that “self-defeating 
process” he had observed in Java, it was a condition where a traditional 
peasant society, confronted by demands for economies of scale and 
propelled by rising external trade but unsupported by capital, changes or 
transforms as a consequence. This ecological change is accomplished 
through the forced introduction of plantation crops in an increasingly limited 
area of cultivation and the use of ever more labor through work 
elaboration.210 In the end, though hunger and famine are constant 
possibilities for the majority of the population, no one really dies of poverty in 
this system, as everyone can be accommodated. But no one also prospers. 
In a Malthusian context, the dilemma is presented as an image of “a large 
and fast growing population scrambling ever more desperately for seemingly 
																																								 																				
210 C. Geertz, Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia.			
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static supplies of food.”211 Looking at the case of Pampanga in central Luzon 
in the Philippines, John Larkin (1971) takes the discourse further by 
proposing several hypotheses in support of agricultural involution, which is 
relevant in an analysis of the transformation of Ormoc society and ecology 
prior to 1991. First, complex social and economic arrangements and 
mechanisms develop when an agricultural society with a large peasant base 
experiences a shortage in an important resource, be it land, cash or 
something else. The human response of society is often to spread the benefit 
of that limited resource to as many people as possible. Second, the more 
shortages in resources, the more complex social and economic patterns 
become, resulting in the eventual decline of the economic progress of 
individual families in favour of collective survival. Finally, varying 
insufficiencies produce different types of social response, as seen in the 
experience of Java where a shortage in land led to elaborate social and ritual 
behaviour while the lack of capital in Pampanga resulted in complicated 
contractual schemes governing land transferal and harvest splitting.212 
Bringing these hypotheses together, to what extent then can past limitations 
in agricultural resources and their resulting social relations explain more 
recent environmental degradation and disaster in Ormoc?  
Ormoc, while it had been declared as a chartered city as early as 
1947, remained predominantly comprised of a rural population (124,812), 
accounting for 68.96 per cent of the total population, and only 31.04 per cent 
defined as urban population (56,177).213 Its level of urbanization is 
significantly lower than the national average of 45.3 per cent in 2010, where 
41.9 million of the total national population of 92.3 million lived in areas 
classified as urban while 50.4 million were classified as rural dwellers.214 Of 
																																								 																				
211 J. Larkin, “The causes of an involuted society: A theoretical approach to rural Southeast 
Asian history,” 785. 
212 Ibid., 795. 
213 Department of Education-Region VIII, Mithi og Bahandi sa Dakbayan sa Ormoc, 76. 
214 Philippine Statistics Authority, “Urban barangays in the Philippines (Based on 2010 
CPH),” (Manila, Philippines, 7 June 2013) (Online). The Technical Notes on the Labor Force 
Survey (LFS) use the following guidelines to classify urban vis-à-vis rural areas: (a) 
Population density in all cities and municipalities of at least 1,000 persons per square 
kilometer; (b) Population density in poblaciones or central districts of municipalities of at 
least 500 persons per square kilometer; (c) Poblaciones or central districts not included in 
(a) or (b) regardless of population size, which have the following: (i) Street pattern or 
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the total land area of Ormoc amounting to 61,360 hectares, 26,298.28 
hectares are devoted to agriculture.215 Of this figure, 4,600 hectares are 
identified as irrigated, 600 hectares as rain-fed lowland, 400 hectares as 
rain-fed upland, 200 hectares as aquaculture, and 600 hectares as 
mariculture.216 
It must be noted that land ownership in the Philippine archipelago was 
liberalized only in the latter half of the nineteenth century, although with 
limited success under the Spanish colonial government. In Manila, the Head 
Office of Woodlands (Direccion General de Montes) was established in 1863 
with the mandate of privatizing unclaimed lands and forests based on basic 
provisions of Spanish land law.217 At the provincial and municipal levels, the 
offices of public scribes (escribano public) and registrars of property were 
opened, along with the assignment of salaried surveyors and property 
assessors, although this state-based agenda and project had not been fully 
implemented prior to the twentieth century in many parts of the Philippines. 
The customary practice in the past had been to simply cultivate public lands, 
which theoretically belonged to the crown but was generally perceived as a 
common good. In Ormoc, as in the rest of the country, lands were either in 
the public domain (state-owned) or privately-owned. The governing land law 
for more than seventy years had been Commonwealth Act 141 or the Public 
Land Act of 1936, which provided a system for legalizing undocumented 
private land rights of Filipinos found to be occupying and cultivating such 
lands for a certain period of time. In a 1950s survey, it was found that 221 
landholdings exceeded 1,000 hectares in size, while the majority of 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 											
networks, with either parallel or right angle orientation; (ii) At least six establishments 
(commercial, manufacturing, recreational, and/or personal services at least once a month); 
(iii) At least three of the following: (1) A town hall, church, or chapel with religious services at 
least once a month; (2) A public plaza or cemetery; (3) A public plaza or building where 
trading activities are carried on at least once a month; and (4) A public building like school, 
hospital, puericulture and health center or library; (d) Barangays with at least 1,000 
inhabitants meeting the conditions set forth in (c) above, and where the occupation of the 
inhabitants is predominantly non-farming or non-fishing. All other areas are considered rural.  
215 Department of Education-Region VIII, Mithi og Bahandi sa Dakbayan sa Ormoc, 88. 
216 Ibid. 
217  For a discussion on the context of Kabikolan, see N. Owen, Prosperity without Progress, 
82-87.  
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landholdings (14,000 holdings) were fifty hectares or more, which was about 
42 per cent of all farmlands in the country.218  
Republic Act 782 was promulgated in 1952 to grant free patents or the 
voluntary administrative legalization of imperfect titles to those who had 
continuously occupied and cultivated tracts of agricultural public lands since 
or prior to 4 July 1945.219 By 1954, approximately four million hectares of 
arable public land were estimated open for settlement in the country.220 
Contrasting these developments in Ormoc, only 150 hectares or about 3.33 
per cent of the total watershed area by 1962 had been classified as 
timberland and the rest or 4,350 hectares were classified as alienable and 
disposable,221 with large portions allocated to cash crop agriculture notably 
sugarcane. According to the 1991 investigative report by the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Region VIII office, these lands 
that were classified as alienable and disposable were located within 
Barangays Patag, Donghol, Biliboy, Bagong, Dolores, Mahayag and Milagro 
in Ormoc, upland barangays sometimes with slopes of more than eighteen 
degrees, which by law were classified as forest areas.222 Most of these lands 






218  Quoted from A.P. Sorongan, A Special Study of Landed Estates in the Philippines (USA, 
Operations Mission to the Philippines Manila, 1955).   
219 Titled “An Act to Grant Free Patents to Occupants of Public Agricultural Land since or 
Prior to July Fourth 1945,” with a limitation for the issuance of a free patent for tracts of lands 
not to exceed 24 hectares.  
220 Quoted from “Country Review of the Philippines”, Paper presented at the FAO Center on 
Land Problems in Asia and the Far East (1954), in J.R. Motheral, “Land Tenure in the 
Philippines,” in Journal of Farm Economics Vol. 38 No. 2 (Oxford University Press, May 
1956), 469. 
221 By virtue of LC Map 2510 dated February 16, 1962. Quoted in the “Investigation Report 
of the Ormoc City Disaster,” Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Region VIII, 
9. 
222 Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as The Forestry Reform Code of the 
Philippines, had been approved only on 19 May 1975, when most upland areas had already 
been cultivated for decades with some declared as alienable and disposable prior to this 
law’s promulgation. See Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), 
“Investigation Report of the Ormoc City Disaster.” Tacloban City, 14-30 November 1991. 
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Table 2.5 
Family Holdings with more than 5% ownership by 1991 
Owner Sub-total 
Holdings by Family  
(In square meters) 
Per cent of total 
Larrazabala 4,127,598 15.9 
Serafica, H & Sons 2,577,804 9.9 
Suan, Francisco 1,941,564 7.5 
Torresb 1,718,017 6.6 
Sumaling, Catalino 1,481,726 5.7 
Tanb 1,354,886 5.2 




a  Separate entries for Benita Larrazabal, Cora Larrazabal, Esperanza Larrazabal, Iñaki 
Larrazabal, Potenciano Larrazabal and Sabin Larrazabal.  
b Separate entries for Vicente Tores [?], Sr., Cecelia [?] Torres, Cecilia vda. de Torres, 
Vicente Torres, and Vicente Torres Sr. 
c Separate entries for Antonio Tan, Eduardo Tan, Gerardo Tan et al, Jorge Tan, Oscar Tan, 
Reynaldo Tan, and Tan et al.  
Source: Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Region VIII, “List of Cadastral 
Lots, Ormoc Cadastre,” accessed 25 February 2013. 
 The tenancy system did not characterize abaca and sugarcane 
cultivation, especially in the Visayas. The prevalent mode of land ownership 
and labor management for large-scale abaca and sugarcane plantation had 
been the hacienda system. In this system, ownership and management were 
controlled within families. Indeed, Don Ramon Aboitiz drew almost 
exclusively from within family ranks to fill managerial positions in the Aboitiz 
companies as he “found family members more loyal to the company and 
trustworthy than outsiders.”223 The administrative structure of haciendas 
usually employed encargados and cabos, who acted as intermediaries 
between hacenderos and dumaans or regular workers, and sacadas or 
contractual workers.224 In Ormoc, labor had been imported from nearby 
provinces during harvest seasons. The idea behind sacadas, which had 
been prevalent in Negros haciendas, was that contractual laborers returned 
to their hometowns after the harvest season and went back to the haciendas 
or plantations during the harvest period. In practice, most of these laborers 
																																								 																				
223 R. Mojares, The Story of Aboitiz and Company, 28. 
224 Y. Nagano-Kano, “The structure of the Philippine sugar industry at the end of the 
American colonial period and after 1974,” 20. 
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decided to build more permanent houses in the areas within the hacienda 
that the hacendero had allowed for temporary barracks or on plots that 
worker-families erected on their own. In Barangay Nalunopan, one of the 
plantations owned by Sabin Larrazabal in Ormoc, most of the laborers and 
their families resided in Purok Uno, the lowest area in the barangay in terms 
of elevation traversed by a creek. These laborers lived in houses made of 
light materials, which were totally destroyed by the raging Matutugnao Creek 
on 5 November 1991, leaving only the sugarcane fields atop the hill virtually 
unscathed by the floodwaters. 
 Wages in haciendas in Ormoc had historically been lower than 
average or that mandated by law. Several wage increases from 1951 in the 
sugar industry, for example, had been undertaken nationally (shown below), 
but this had not been followed in many sugarcane plantations around the 
country, including in Ormoc.225 
Table 2.6 
Minimum wage rates in sugar and other industries, 1951-88 (in pesos 
per day)  










1951 4.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 
1964 5.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.50 3.50 
1965 6.00 4.00 4.00 6.00 3.50 3.50 
1970 8.00 4.75 4.75 8.00 4.75 4.75 
1972 11.00 8.00 6.00 8.00 4.75 4.75 
1973 11.00 8.00 6.00 8.00 4.75 4.75 
1974 11.00 8.00 6.00 9.98 6.73 6.73 
1975 11.00 8.00 6.00 9.98 6.73 6.73 
1976 11.00 8.00 6.00 10.98 8.98 7.98 
1977 11.00 8.00 6.00 13.36 11.36 10.36 
1978 11.00 8.00 6.00 14.36 12.36 11.36 
1979 13.00 10.00 9.00 21.12 18.32 14.15 
1980 24.67 14.00 13.50 27.68 23.78 17.84 
																																								 																				
225 Personal interviews with thirteen respondents, with ages ranging from seven (7) to 
seventy-four (74) years. Interviews were conducted between April and July 2013 at 
Barangay Nalunopan (pseudonym), Ormoc City, with the assistance of two former residents.  
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1981 28.663 18.33 17.17 29.32 24.93 18.48 
1982 30.66 19.83 18.17 29.32 24.93 24.48 
1983 34.16 22.33 20.67 39.32 32.92 33.50 
1984 55.33 32.00 28.50 53.00 44.00 33.50 
1985 55.33 32.00 28.50 53.00 44.00 33.50 
1986 55.33 32.00 28.50 53.00 44.00 43.50 
1987 66.33 42.00 38.50 64.00 54.00 43.50 
19884 66.33 48.50 43.5 64.00 54.00  
Notes 
1 Highest rate prevailing for the year. Includes basic wage and COLA (cost-of-living 
allowance).  
2 In the sugar industry, “agriculture” refers to farming of all types, including the cultivation 
and tillage of the soil, dairying, the production, cultivation, growing and harvesting of any 
agricultural or horticultural commodities, the raising of livestock or poultry, and any 
activities performed by a farmer or on a farm incidental to or in conjunction with such 
farming operations, but does not include the manufacturing or processing of sugar, 
coconut, abaca (spice) [?], tobacco, pineapple or other farm products. “Plantation 
agricultural” workers are those employed in any plantation or agricultural establishment 
with an area of more than 24 hectares in a locality or which employs at least twenty (20) 
workers. All other agricultural workers shall be considered as non-plantation agricultural 
workers.  
3 Includes 10.00 peso per month allowance under LOI 1016.  
4 Effectively from 1 March 1988 the Department of Labor and Employment issued on 16 
February 1988 Order No. 2S 1988, implementing Wage Order No. 5 of the National 
Wages Council.  
Source: National Wages Council of the Department of Labor and Employment, cited in J. 
Guisti, The National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines (NACUSIP) 
(Geneva: International Labour Office, 1989), 7.  
 
 In a 1938 random survey involving 173 families from thirty-four 
haciendas in the provinces of Occidental Negros, Iloilo, Laguna, Tarlac and 
Pampanga, it was found that a laborer was paid 0.50 pesos a day.226 This 
wage was for a variety of work including “fencing, improving the ditches, 
cutting tall grasses around the plantation, preparing seed beds, fixing 
houses, etc.”227 The average family earning from July to mid-September 
1937 was 3.62 pesos, which were pre-milling months. As the milling season 
drew near there was less work for the laborers, thus the average family 
earning for fifteen days was 2.25 pesos. Laborers during the 1937 milling 
season were employed on a paquiao (or piece-work or pakyaw) system 
where from 15 November to 27 November 1937 a laborer earned 10.071 
																																								 																				
226 T. Runes, General Standards of Living and Wages of Workers in the Philippine Sugar 
Industry, International Research Series (Philippines: Philippine Council Institute of Pacific 
Relations, 1939).  
227 Ibid., 10 
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pesos or an average of 0.839 pesos a day.228 The survey also found that 
different job descriptions in the hacienda received different wages, with the 
highest for cutters paid at 0.28 peso for every ton of cane cut; 0.40 pesos for 
haulers of the cane from the field to the railroad line; and 0.05 pesos per ton 
for the loader of cane onto wagons.229 Based on these findings, the study 
debunked the allegations of the Confederacion de Asociaciones y 
Plantadores de Caña Dulce, Inc. in its July 1937 report to Judge Francisco 
Zulueta of the Court of Industrial Relations that the “diligent and efficient one 
gets his reward as much as P1.50 a day.”230 In another study undertaken in 
1981-82 on the Hacienda Milagros in Occidental Negros, workers received 
“the legal minimum wage of P7 a day.”231 This wage was already below that 
prescribed by the government as shown in Table 2.6. In Barangay 
Nalunopan in Ormoc, wages for hurnal work232 in 1984 were between eight 
and ten pesos.233  
 Population increase in Ormoc from 1939 to 1990 show that the 
average growth was about 2.31, higher than the growth rate in Region 8 and 
Leyte province, but lower than that of the capital Tacloban City (see Table 
2.7). During the 1980s, Ormoc’s urban population was estimated at 14,100, 
while rural population was estimated at 90,900.234 By 1990, urban population 
had risen to 38,500, while the rural population remained the same at 
90,800.235 
																																								 																				
228 Ibid., 8. Runes here notes that some pertinent objections had been raised as to the 
accuracy of the study on the ground because it was not undertaken “during the time when 
the milling season had not yet begun.” He also added that “[t]his objection was properly 
raised, but when the field study was being done the point was duly taken into consideration 
by the investigator.”  
229 Ibid., 12. 
230 Ibid. 
231 R. Rutten, Women Workers of Hacienda Milagros, Wage Labor and Household 
Subsistence on a Philippine Sugarcane Plantation, 38. No. 30 Publikatieserie Zuid- en 
Zuidoost-Azie (Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1982).   
232 Hurnal is the most manual and unskilled type of job in the sugarcane plantation and as 
such receive the lowest daily wage. It entails clearing up the fields prior to planting, weeding, 
and after harvest. 
233 Personal interviews in Barangay Nalunopan, Ormoc City, between April and July 2013.  
234 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Department of Public Works and 
Highways, “Table 1.2, Census Population and Labor Force in Selected Four Cities: 1970, 
1980 and 1990,” in Study on the Flood Control for Rivers in the Selected Urban Centers,” 
Final Report Vol. 3 Supporting Report (February 1995), T-2. 
235 Ibid.  
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Table 2.7 
 Population and Average Annual Rate of Increase, Ormoc City vis-à-vis 
Region VIII, Leyte and Tacloban City, 1939-2010 



















1939a       77,349  
1948b 1,765,003 2.11 751,649 0.97 45,421 4.25 72,733 (0.68) 
1960b 2,041,011 1.22 876,079 1.28 53,551 1.38 62,764 (1.22) 
1970b 2,381,409 1.55 1,020,128 1.53 76,531 3.64 84,563 3.03 
1975b 2,599,728 1.77 1,099,848 1.52 80,707 1.07 89,466 1.13 
1980b 2,799,534 1.49 1,191,227 1.61 102,523 4.90 104,978 3.25 
1990b 3.054,490 0.88 1,367,816 1.39 136,891 2.93 129,456 2.12 
1995b 3,366,917 1.84 1,511,251 1.89 167,310 3.84 144,003 2.02 
2000c       154,297  
2001c       161,442  
2002c       164,967  
2003c       168,569  
2004c       172,159  
2007d 3,912,936  1,722,036  217,199 1.8 177,524  
2010e 4,101,322 4.8 1,567,984 (8.9) 221,174 1.8 191,200 7.7 
Sources: 
a The United States High Commission to the Philippine Islands, Census of the Philippines 
1939, Table 1 Population of Municipalities by Barrios (1940-43).  
b National Statistical Coordination Board, 1990 Regional Social and Economic Trends, 
Eastern Visayas Region (Tacloban City, 1990). 
c Ormoc City Planning and Development Office, “Ormoc City Profile” (Ormoc City, 18 April1 
2005). 
d National Statistical Coordination Board, 2012 Regional Social and Economic Trends, 
Eastern Visayas Region as of 1 August 2007 (Tacloban City: Regional Division VII, 
November 2012). 
e As of 1 May 2010;  Ibid. 
 
 With a total land area of 46,430 hectares, population density in Ormoc 
in 1990 was estimated at 2.8 persons per hectare, with 113 persons per 
hectare in urban areas, and 154 persons per hectare in the city proper 
alone.236 Thirty-eight barangays of the total 110 were located in urbanized 
areas of Ormoc, while twenty-nine of these were classified within the city 
proper, namely, Barangays Alegria, Bagong Buhay, Batuan, Can-adjieng, 
Cogon, Doña Feliza Mejia, Don Felipe Larrazabal, Punta, and San Isidro. 
Nine other barangays were contiguous to the city proper and considered as 
outlying urban areas. The remaining seventy-two barangays were classified 
as rural areas, with seven reported as urbanized barangays in the 1990 
																																								 																				
236 Ibid., SE-2. 
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census.237 The number of households in the urban areas in Ormoc in 1990 
was estimated at 8,053, broken down into 2,850 in the city proper and 5,203 
in the outskirts of the urban areas of Ormoc. The bulk of households (16,842) 
were found in rural areas.238 Average family size in urban areas in Ormoc in 
the same year was 5.29, while it was not much different in rural areas at 
5.14. The picture that emerges is that Ormoc prior to November 1991 hosted 
a swelling urban center teeming with population, notably in informal 
settlements such as along the two major rivers of Anilao and Malbasag. Of 
the twenty-nine barangays identified within the city proper, three 
barangays—Alegria, Cogon, and Don Felipe Larrazabal—were devastated in 
November 1991.  
Ormoc’s unemployment rate in 1990 was 6.5 per cent of the 
population, which was lower than the 9.2 per cent rate for Leyte province.239 
A profile of Ormoc urban residents based on a 1993 survey among ninety 
respondents—with thirty of whom had been resettled outside the city proper, 
thirty who had returned to houses along the riversides, and another thirty 
who lived in safer parts of the city away from the rivers—provide a picture of 
Ormoc’s urban population immediately prior to and after the 1991 flood, with 
majority belonging to the informal sector.240 About forty-two (42) per cent had 
been engaged in small-scale retail businesses, twenty-seven (27) per cent 
were undertaking service jobs, and twenty-five (25) per cent were 
unemployed. Only seven (7) per cent of those surveyed were employed in 
the private and government sectors.241 In terms of education, forty-two (42) 
per cent of respondents had dropped out of school prior to high school.242 
About eighteen (18) per cent earned less than 20,000 pesos ($741) per year; 
forty-two (42) per cent between 20,000-40,000 pesos ($741-1481); 
																																								 																				
237 Ibid., SE-1.  
238 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Department of Public Works and 
Highways, “Table 1.3, Population Density and Average Family Size at 1990 Census,” in 
Study on the Flood Control for Rivers in the Selected Urban Centers, T-3. 
239 Ibid. SE-3.  
240  Quoted in Middleton, Ibid., 16. 
241 Ibid. 
242 Ibid. 
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seventeen (17) per cent between 40,000-60,000 pesos ($1481-2222); and 
twenty-three (23) per cent above 60,000 pesos ($2222).243  
Conditions in the rural areas, however, were the opposite from what 
was occurring in the city proper. With a population growth rate that was 
declining in the 1980s to 1990s (-0.02), overcrowding in the rural hinterlands 
was not a problem despite the initial demographic impact of the abaca and 
sugar cash crop economies at the turn of the twentieth century. Expansion in 
rural areas in Ormoc had simply occurred through the clearing of forests and 
the conversion of these lands into more agricultural areas. In the decades 
prior to 1991, Ormoc’s cultivated areas in the watershed were allocated for 
various crops such as sugar and pineapple.  
Aside from agriculture, there were three large-scale industries that 
contributed substantially to Ormoc’s income in 1991. The Tongonan 
Geothermal Power Plant was located in Barangay Tongonan, and the Ormoc 
Sugar Company and AA Alcohol244 were both in Barangay Ipil. There were 
also small and cottage industries, numbering 107 and employing less than 
ten (10) laborers each. Seventy-eight (78) of these establishments was 
located within the city proper and immediate environs.245 
 Both in rural and urban areas, land tenure was a problem. Rumors of 
land grabbing perpetuated by elite families in the rural hinterlands abound. 
Farmers who had previously cultivated lands without evidence of titles 
suddenly found themselves no longer owners and thus had to either vacate 
the land or work as tenants in lands owned by elite families. Another method 
that divested farmers of their land concerned plots sandwiched between 
those owned by an elite family, who, by threat, intimidation and coercion cut 
off entry into their lands and as such pressured the farmers to sell at a lower 
																																								 																				
243 Ibid. 
244 AA Alcohol is called the Leyte Agri Corporation today, which is the “first bioethanol 
producer and manufacturer in the Philippines with a capacity of 25,000 liters per day.” It 
supplies bioethanol to Pilipinas Shell, Petron, TWA Flying V and Jetti Petroleum. It maintains 
a distillery in Ormoc City, which also engages in the manufacture of food grade (beverage 
and denatured) alcohol, with an annual capacity of 8 million liters. See Leyte Agri 
Corporation, “About Leyte Agri Corp.,” last modified 2011 (Online).  
245 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Department of Public Works and 
Highways, “Study on the flood control for rivers in the selected urban centers,” SE-6.  
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market price.246 These stories may partly explain why no small landowners 
owned tracts of land located in areas in Ormoc where elite families 
predominated. Through at least three decades, vast tracts of contiguous 
lands had been brought under the control of only a few families.247  
In urban areas, where lands had also been fully appropriated as 
private lots, the riverbanks provided rare areas where migrants could claim a 
bit of earth to construct their houses and raise families. In the same 1993 
survey undertaken by the Japan Development Institute through the 
Development Management, Inc., of the Philippines, involving ninety (90) 
respondents, ninety-seven (97) per cent owned their houses prior to the 
flood, but only ten (10) per cent owned the lots on which their houses 
stood.248 Of the remaining, twenty-seven (27) per cent rented the lots, and 
sixty-three (63) per cent were illegally occupying lots as squatters or informal 
settlers.249 About eighty-five (85) per cent of all respondents had houses 
constructed using light materials, such as nipa or plywood, while eighty-
seven (87) per cent had roofs made of similarly light materials.250  
Ormoc had very much been a frontier for many pioneering families in 
the early twentieth century. Although tracts of land had not been as extensive 
or abundant as Negros where sugarcane haciendas and plantations 
flourished, thereby creating a new but ostentatious group of fabulously 
wealthy families, Ormoc did manage to establish and sustain a small elite 
group of families of its own despite the constraints of its topography and 
geography. Ormoc was, after all, a small strip of land in eastern Visayas 
characterized by mountainous areas with slopes that in places were at least 
eighteen degrees. But by 1991, the majority of the lands in Ormoc were 
privately owned, including those classified as forestlands. These lands were 
concentrated in the hands of elite families, while rural and urban 
																																								 																				
246 Based on informal discussions with Ormoc residents in Ormoc City from March to 
October 2013.  
247 See M. Mclennan, “Land and tenancy in the Central Luzon Plain,” Philippine Studies Vol. 
17 No. 4 (Ateneo de Manila University, 1969), 651-682.  
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communities were both characterized by socio-economic vulnerability 
brought about by land insecurity and increasing marginalization.  
Chapter 3 brings the discussion about agricultural involution and its 
impact on the environment into sharp focus by analysing the gradual but 

























IN THE MIDST OF A SHRINKING FOREST 
 
Those palms, as well as other trees which the whole island produces in 
abundance, shade the roads to a great extent—providing a comfort and 
refreshing coolness indispensable for those of us who must travel on foot for 
lack of any other convenience; throughout the island the roads traverse 
groves and forests, with foliage so cool and abundant that even at high noon 
the sun caused us no annoyance. Many of the trees have trunks more than 
twelve brazes in circumference, which are sawed into excellent planks. 
- P. Chirino, “Relacion de las Islas Filipinas,” in The Philippine Islands 1493-1898, 
translated from the original, edited and annotated by E. Blair and J. Robertson 
10-12, 280-282, referring to the island of Leite 
In the aftermath of the November 1991 tragedy in Ormoc, when the 
country was searching for answers and government agencies offered 
explanations, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources 
(DENR) pointed out that had there been adequate forest cover in the Ormoc 
watershed, floodwaters would not have been more than four feet deep.251 
Experts blamed the conversion of forestlands into sugarcane plantations, a 
process beginning in 1952, as the root cause of the flash flood.  
The rhetoric of blaming illegal logging in the wake of massive 
disasters in the Philippines reflects the fundamental recurring dilemma in the 
governance of natural resources. These dilemmas revolve around questions 
of law enforcement versus policy, the jurisdiction of national versus local 
governments, and the demands of development versus conservation. The 
1975 Revised Forestry Code explicitly mandated that “[o]nly the utilization, 
exploitation, occupation or possession of any forest lands and grazing lands, 
or any activity therein, involving one or more of its resources, which will 
produce the optimum benefits to the development and progress of the 
country, and the public welfare, without impairment or with the least injury to 
its resources, shall be allowed” (emphasis supplied). It further stated that 
“[a]ll measures shall be taken to achieve an appropriate balance between 
growth and harvest or use of forest products in forest lands.” But it also 
																																								 																				
251 Cited in H. Severino, “Ormoc revisited”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 21-22 April 1992. 
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provided for the President to “amend, modify, replace, or rescind any 
contract, concession, permit, license or any other form of privilege granted 
herein” in the name of national security. Furthermore, although “[a]ll 
measures shall be taken to protect the forest resources from destruction, 
impairment and depletion,” “[t]he privilege to harvest timber in alienable and 
disposable lands and civil reservations shall be given to those who can best 
help in the delineation and development of such areas in accordance with 
the management plan of the appropriate government exercising jurisdiction 
over the same” (emphasis added). These provisions leave no doubt as to the 
priority of the government in the exploitation of natural resources for 
economic development. The task of policing forest utilization rests squarely 
with the DENR, in particular the Forest Management Bureau (renamed from 
the Bureau of Forest Management of 1973). These government offices, 
however, were commonly perceived after the Martial Law era as highly 
corrupt, inefficient and ineffective.252 
In the case of the Ormoc 1991 tragedy, public sentiment had been 
quick to put the blame on illegal logging. The Aquino government at that 
time, besieged by public criticism, argued that illegal logging could not have 
been the culprit as there were no trees left to log in Ormoc anyway!253 DENR 
Secretary Fulgencio Factoran reasoned that Ormoc City had no forest cover 
for the last forty years since the area had been classified as alienable and 
disposable starting in 1952.254 However, public outcry against illegal logging 
																																								 																				
252 See J. van der Ploeg, M. van Weerd, A. Masipiqueña, and G. Peerson, “Illegal logging in 
the Northern Sierra Madre Natural Park The Philippines,” in Conservat Soc (serial online) 
2011 Vol. 9 No. 3, 202-215 (Online); and, J. Teehankee, “The state, illegal logging, and 
environmental NGOs in the Philippines,” in Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World 
Studies Vol 9 No.1 (University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, 1993), 19-34.   
253 See, for example, C. Pablo, “Illegal logging caused floods,” Malaya, 8 November 1991, 
1&3; “Killer flood blamed on denuded forests,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 9 November 1991, 
1&9; F. Lobo, “Illegal loggers blamed,” Manila Bulletin, 12 November 1991, 1&22; R. 
Villadiego, “4 mayors tagged Leyte illegal loggers,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 November 
1991, 1&14; A. Andrade, “Leyte declares war vs illegal loggers,” Philippine Times Journal, 
14 November 1991, 16; “Aquino on Leyte flood: What illegal logging?” Philippine Daily 
Inquirer, 15 November 1991, 1&12; N. Castro, “National indignation against illegal loggers,” 
Philippine Times Journal, 18 November 1991, 5; T. Valderrama, “Plant trees to avert another 
tragedy—Cory,” Philippine Times Journal, 18 November 1991, 1&3. 
254 P. Arias, “Ormoc: Freak disaster,” Manila Bulletin, 12 November 1991, 1&15.  
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became so pronounced that President Corazon Aquino ordered an 
investigation into illegal logging a week after the tragedy.255  
 Section 68 of Presidential Decree No 705, as amended by Executive 
Order No. 277 (1987), defines illegal logging in the Philippines as: 
Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest 
products without license. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect or 
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber 
from any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public 
land or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or 
other forest products without the legal documents as required under 
existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the 
penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal 
Code: Provided, that in case of partnerships, associations, or 
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, 
collection, or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, 
they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further 
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and 
Deportation (emphasis supplied).  
 Both the national government, through the DENR by virtue of 
Executive Order No. 192,256 and local government units (LGUs) through 
Republic Act 7160,257 are responsible for safeguarding the country’s 
ecological balance.258 With the DENR’s statement that the conversion of 
forestlands in Ormoc had been responsible for the disaster, the tension 
between national and local governments vis-à-vis environmental 
management and protection was highlighted as a key factor in the 
management of the unfolding disaster. Deforestation is not only illegal 
																																								 																				
255 A. Pamintuan and F. Verga, “Cory orders probe of illegal logging; Factoran says 4 Leyte 
Mayors involved,” Philippine Star, 12 November 1991, 1&5. 
256 Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192, “Providing for the Reorganization of the Department of 
Environment, Energy and Natural Resources; Renaming it as the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources and for other purposes,” 10 June 1987.  
257 Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, “An Act Providing for a Local Government Code of 1991,” 
10 October 1991.  
258 See R. Oliva, “Philippine Forest and Wildlife Law Enforcement: Situationer and Core 
Issues,” Philippine Environmental Governance 2 Project (ECOGOV 2) (Manila: USAID, 12 
March 2007).  
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logging, but also a systematic process of clearing forests often sanctioned by 
government policies and programs over many decades.259    
Deforestation and forest degradation in the Philippines 
Data on Philippine forest cover is notoriously scant. A noted scholar 
once remarked that “many records are incomplete, lost, of dubious quality, or 
may have been deliberately manipulated or destroyed by government 
officials.”260 Nevertheless, when Spanish colonizers first arrived in 1521, 
there was approximately twenty-seven (27) million hectares of forest across 
the archipelago.261 By the end of the nineteenth century, forest cover shrank 
to twenty-one (21) million hectares or seventy (70) per cent of the total land 
area.262 By the late 1990s, rapid deforestation occurred resulting in only 
about 6 million hectares or 20 per cent of the land area remaining forested, 
with less than one million hectares of primary forests.263 In the last century 
alone, the Philippines lost about fifteen (15) million hectares of tropical forest, 
with the average deforestation rate from 1969 to 1973 of 170,000 hectares 
per year.264 
 Deforestation is defined as “the complete removal of existing forests 
and their replacement by other forms of land use.”265 Differentiated from 
forest degradation, which is defined as a gradual process of decline in forest 
production potential due to logging, grazing or fuel wood collection, 
deforestation is considered as a measurable process. It can occur through 
																																								 																				
259 Indeed, Pulhin and Dizon go further by stating that forest policies enacted by the 
Philippine government had been highly regulatory, centrally-controlled and industry-biased. 
See J. Pulhin and J. Dizon, “Politics of Tenure Reform in the Philippine Forest Land,” (No 
publication place and date), accessed 26 December 2016 (Online).  
260 D. Kummer, Deforestation in Postwar Philippines, Geography Research Paper No. 234 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 39-43.  
261 J. Pulhin, “Trends in forest policy of the Philippines,” in IGES Forest Conservation 
Project, Policy Trend Report 2001/2002, accessed 14 August 2015, 29 (Online). 
262 R.D. Lasco, R.G. Visco and J.M. Pulhin, “Secondary forests in the Philippines: Formation 
and transformation in the 20th century,” in Journal of Tropical Forest Science Vol. 13 No. 4  
(Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Forest Research Institute Malaysia, 2001), 653; also J. Pulhin, J. 
Dizon, R.V. Cruz, D. Gevaña, and G. R. Dahal, “Tenure Reform on Philippine Forest Lands: 
Assessment of Socio-economic and Environmental Impacts,” Center for International 
Forestry Research (CIFOR), accessed 26 December 2016) (Online).  
263 Ibid.  
264 Ibid. 
265 D. Kummer, Deforestation in Post-War Philippines, 2.  
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clear-cutting and selective logging followed by agriculture.266 Analysis of 
digitized land-use maps for 1934 and 1988, as well as a 1941 road map of 
the Philippines, showed that the country lost a total of 9.8 million hectares of 
forests in that period.267 The average annual deforestation rate was 
estimated at 180,959 hectares, with more than half (57.2%) of forests in 
1934 disappearing by 1988.268  
During World War II, logging production in the country declined. 
However, a sizeable number of Filipinos took refuge in dense forests and 
practiced farming with unknown consequences to the forest cover.269 After 
1945, with the Philippines undergoing rapid economic reconstruction, forest 
harvesting and log exportation were allowed unrestricted.270 In addition, 
farming in forests during the immediate post-war period increased due to the 
continued shortage in food production. The overall effect of these activities 
on forest cover is also unknown.271 It was estimated that by 1950, forest 
cover comprised fifty-five (55) per cent of total land area.272 The only forest 
management control imposed at that time was the requirement that the 
diameter of trees to be cut had to be fifty (50) centimeters.273 Indiscriminate 
forest destruction continued unabated until the 1950s, when the first 
selective logging system was implemented. Indeed, a now missing report by 
the National Economic Council (NEC), which was based on reports 
submitted by district foresters and the Bureau of Forestry central office in 
1959, show that commercial forests or forests of commercial species, where 
the volume of trees greater than thirty (30) centimeters at diameter, breadth 
and height is greater than forty (40) cubic hectares, had decreased to 
alarming levels by approximately 2.1 million hectares.274 Non-commercial 
																																								 																				
266 Ibid., 3.  
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forests, on the other hand, had also decreased by 0.6 million hectares.275 
These developments indicated the rapid conversion of both commercial and 
non-commercial forests to brushland, a new category identified in the NEC 
report, which had been defined as open land dominated primarily by brush 
and shrub.276 As such, between 1953 and 1957, forest cover was estimated 
at 13,173,000 hectares or 44.3 per cent of total land area. Annual rates of 
deforestation in the major islands of the Philippines had been estimated as 
follows (in hectares): Mindanao (-91,564 for the years 1952-1963), Palawan 
(-4,191 for the years 1948-1964), Visayas (-31,839 for 1968), Luzon (-76,311 
for 1967), and nationwide (-203,905).277 Estimates of forest cover in the 
Philippines range between 25 and 30 per cent of total land area between 
1974 and 1980.278 Region VIII (Eastern Visayas) in particular, where the 
island of Leyte belonged, had 12,854 square kilometers of forest in 1934, but 
only 5,434 square kilometers of forest in 1988, with forest loss estimated at 
57.7 per cent.279  
Several factors have been attributed as the main causes of 
deforestation and the degradation of forests in the Philippines. The “system 
of shifting agriculture by ignorant, irresponsible persons,” or kaingin, was 
noted as one of the most devastating causes of “forest damage,” particularly 
in the northern boundary of Negros Occidental.280 Other causes identified 
include the various unorganized human activities in forest areas, such as 
squatting, encroachment and migration of landless lowlanders into upland 
forests as well as government-sponsored settlement schemes.281 However, 
studies have shown that deforestation in the country is caused mainly by 
logging (both legal and illegal) followed by the expansion of ‘frontier’ 
agriculture.282 The building up of roads and the opening up of forests have 
																																								 																				
275 Ibid., 47. 
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been shown to result in deforestation. A geographic information system 
analysis of land-use maps for 1934 and 1988 and a 1941 road map of the 
country support the finding that the presence of major roads was an 
important factor affecting deforestation.283 Indeed, the closer a forest was to 
roads, the higher the rate of deforestation, so that nearly seventy-eight (78) 
per cent of the 2.1 million hectares of forests within 1.5 kilometer of roads in 
1934 was removed by 1988.284 Concomitant to the loss of forest cover and 
the increase in the construction of roads, the number of farms grew from 1.6 
million in 1948, occupying 57,266 square kilometers, to 3.4 million in 1980 
with 97,252 square kilometers.285  
The legal regime governing forests in the Philippines 
During the Spanish era, there were already a few small sawmills 
mostly in Manila and run by steam or water. Logging was not yet an industry, 
but deforestation was already emerging as a problem, with provinces around 
Manila such as Cavite, Morong and the Isla de Corregidor reportedly having 
been extensively deforested by the 1870s.286 Abra and Laguna were also 
already extensively logged, while Cebu and Bohol in the same period only 
had an estimated 6.6 and eleven (11) per cent forest cover, respectively.287 
In the Visayas, areas such as Siquijor, Negros, Samar and Leyte were 
among those still with primary forests, although these forests were smaller in 
scale and were not identified as main timber-producing areas. Bulacan, 
Masbate, Mindoro, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Romblon, Zambales and 
Tayabas had the distinction of being sources of commercial timber.288 The 
free use of timber during this era was still authorized under a gratuitous 
license.289 Spanish forest laws in fact were based on the (Recopilacion de 
las) Leyes de Indias promulgated in 1594, which had a twofold objective: to 
protect indigenous people’s right to cut timber from forests and to limit all 
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activities detrimental to the growth of forests.290 By 1863, the Inspeccion 
General de Montes was established under the Direccion General de 
Administracion Civil, the first official forestry service in the archipelago, to 
ensure that logging was monitored in terms of species of trees cut and areas 
of logging.291 The discharge of its mandate fell on one (1) inspector and four 
(4) assistants.292 At its height in 1881, the agency was comprised of a team 
of nine (9) foresters, fifty-six (56) assistants, six (6) senior and fifty (50) minor 
guards plus a number of clerks, porters and orderlies, with senior personnel 
commonly recruited from Spain and assistant foresters who were “natives as 
a rule.”293 By 1893, the Spanish government declared that all public lands 
without official titles were properties of the crown, following the feudal 
concept of jura regalia, where the king was the head of state who assumed 
power over all land and water in a territory under jurisdiction. The primary 
legislation that guided the exploitation of forests in the country and thus the 
work of the Inspeccion General de Montes was the provisional forestry 
regulations of 8 February 1873, which classified all forestlands either as 
being utilized for agricultural development and those that cannot be logged 
for reasons of environmental sensitivity.294 It was only on 13 November 1884, 
however, when a royal decree imposed fees of ten (10) per cent on the 
assessed value of cut timber, introduced other fees for logging due to other 
purposes and on minor forest produce, limited the amount that could be cut 
for personal use, and mandated that all future laws conform to these 
provisions.295  
American colonization brought about the institutionalization of state-
controlled forest governance. By 1900, the first forest legislation enacted by 
the United States government decreed the need to regulate the cutting, 
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transportation and payment of forest charges on forest products. Timber cut 
for personal use continued to be free of charge, with the provision that it be 
cut using a license secured through a certificate from Municipal 
Presidents.296 Philippine Act No. 222 in September 1901 placed the Bureau 
of Forestry under the supervision of the newly established Department of 
Interior, which was mandated to oversee a wide range of public functions 
including security, counter-insurgency, community development, 
rehabilitation, and the protection of natural resources. The Philippine Organic 
Act of 1902, which essentially established an elected Philippine Assembly, 
also included among its key provisions the conservation of natural resources. 
For the first time, the notion of public domains297 as a property of the state 
was emphasized in the prohibition against the sale or lease of public lands. 
The exemption, however, was for agricultural areas that were “unoccupied, 
unreserved unappropriated agricultural public land,” which did not exceed 
sixteen (16) hectares. Indeed, this exception is important to consider: “no 
timber lands forming part of the public domain shall be sold, leased, or 
entered until the Government of said Islands, upon certification of the 
Forestry Bureau that said lands are more valuable for agriculture than for 
forest uses, shall declare such lands so certified to be agricultural in 
character.”298  
The priority given to agriculture was again emphasized in the 
Homestead Act of 1903 when it identified what lands could be applied for: 
“non-mineral, does not contain valuable deposits of coal or salts, is more 
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valuable for agricultural than forestry purposes” [emphasis supplied].299 In 
1904, the Philippine Forest Act declared all forest lands as government land, 
and mandated the Bureau of Forestry as the primary agency responsible in 
managing the country’s forests and issuing licenses for commercial logging. 
That same year, the American colonial government introduced commercial 
logging in the Philippines, with the Insular Lumber Company as one of the 
first to be granted a twenty-year 300-square kilometer renewable logging 
concession in Northern Negros.300 Dipterocarp lumber, also known as 
Philippine mahogany, was introduced to the world market.301 
The issue of kaingin or swidden agriculture, an old practice by 
farmers, remained an anathema to the emerging concept of public domains 
under the control of the state. In June 1874, in a bid to formalize the system 
of ownership of forestlands and resources, the Spanish government first 
banned and prohibited its practice. By June of that same year, a Royal 
Decree made it a crime to “cut any timber for commercial purposes in left 
over deforested areas of Cebu and Bohol.”302 In effect, the forests especially 
those found in low-lying areas that had been communally used in the past, 
were no longer free-access resources.303  
As early as 1906, the weakness of existing land laws began to 
emerge, notably in the creative manipulation of these laws to determine 
ownership of “public domains,” a practice best put to use not by small 
kaingiñeros, but by large agriculturalists who owned bigger tracts of land. 
The latter obviously had more to gain by converting forestlands into 
agricultural lands. The “system of shifting agriculture by ignorant, 
irresponsible persons” in the northern boundary of Negros Occidental, noted 
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and H.N. Whitford, A Preliminary Working Plan for the Public Tract of the Insular Lumber 
Company, Negros Occidental, P.I. 
301 J. Pulhin et al, “Chapter II, Historical overview,” 10.  
302 Forest Management Bureau, Historical Background Slider. Manila: Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources, accessed 28 December 2016 (Online).  
303 Ooi Jin Bee, Depletion of the Forest Resources in the Philippines, 28. 
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as one of the most devastating causes of “forest damage”, was blamed on 
kaingiñeros, who were more visible.304 Areas of timber or brushland about 
twenty-give (25) acres305 or less were cleared with fire during the months of 
January, February and March, just prior to April when the rains started. 
These areas were then utilized for the cultivation of corn, camote or sweet 
potato, and sometimes tobacco for one to three years.306 The small 
kaingiñero would then abandon the area to find another spot in the forest 
where he could repeat the process. In reality, however, it would be the sugar 
landowners who benefited most from kaingin as they “evidently encourage[d] 
and inspire[d] many of the clearings in the public forest, with the object of 
securing the land after it was abandoned by the authors of the caingins”.307 A 
report further observed that large sugar landholders then attempted to 
“secure the land through homesteads made by persons dependent upon 
them”.308 Land acquisition by landowners thus resulted in a forested area first 
being cleared immediately after an application for homesteading or even 
prior to making such an application, but before its approval or disapproval. 
By 1936, “The Public Land Act” explicitly prioritized the disposition of public 
lands suitable for agricultural purposes for homestead purposes, sale, lease, 
or confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. More importantly, the law 
increased the maximum allowable application for homestead to twenty-four 
(24) hectares.309  
In the 1900s, total public forests covered an area of more than 
40,000,000 acres310 with less than half a million acres held by private 
																																								 																				
304 H.D. Everett and H.N. Whitford, A Preliminary Working Plan for the Public Tract of the 
Insular Lumber Company, Negros Occidental, P.I., 665. 
305 About 10.1171 hectares. 
306 H.D. Everett and H.N. Whitford, A Preliminary Working Plan for the Public Tract of the 
Insular Lumber Company, Negros Occidental, P.I., 665. 
307 Ibid. Kummer, however, argues that kaingin as commonly equated with shifting 
cultivation, is problematic. The agricultural practices in the uplands can consist of “traditional 
shifting cultivation (long fallow periods), permanent/intensive agriculture, backyard gardens, 
grazing, or any combination of these,” which unfortunately he says, does not have reliable 
data on how extensive the practices are, where they are taking place (whether grassland, 
brushland or secondary or primary forests), or how often farmers do shift plots. As such, the 
practice of kaingin is difficult to substantiate. See D. Kummer, Deforestation in the 
Philippines, 88. 
308 H.D. Everett and H.N. Whitford, A Preliminary Working Plan for the Public Tract of the 
Insular Lumber Company, Negros Occidental, P.I., Ibid. 
309 Commonwealth Act No. 141, Chapter 3 Section 19. 
310 Approximately 16 million hectares. 
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owners.311 Manila was the principal lumber market with five of the most 
important mills in the country situated there and with timber being shipped 
regularly from the provinces. These five mills had a combined total capacity 
of 100,000 board-feet per day.312 By virtue of an act of Congress in 1902, 
free exclusive licenses for logging were granted for terms up to twenty years. 
These licenses gave license holders the right to exploit certain forest 
products.313 Only stumpage charges were imposed ranging from 0.50 pesos 
to 2.50 pesos per cubic meter, equivalent to $1 to $2. However, the 
imposition of these charges made land purchasing a more attractive option 
because land taxes were non-existent at that time.314 There were also no 
export duties on timber or manufactured products. Logs from the Philippines 
imported into the United States were admitted tax-free, while the import of 
sawmill and logging machineries in Manila incurred only a five (5) per cent ad 
valorem tax. In addition to these outright incentives provided by the American 
colonial government to encourage investments in the country’s lumber 
industry, the Bureau of Forestry also acted, not as regulator of the forests, 
but as a crucial support to ensure the financial success of aspiring 
lumbermen.315 
Labor for the timber industry was plentiful, especially in areas where 
there was already a population employed on large sugar estates.316 Indeed, 
the problem was not so much concerned with native labor, but rather 
American labor that had to be secured from the United States. In the 1900s, 
an American logging superintendent was paid an annual wage of 4,200 
																																								 																				
311 G. Ahern, “Opportunities for lumbering in the Philippine Islands,” Circular No. 1 
(Philippine Islands: Bureau of Forestry, 1 December 1906), 709.  
312 In addition, according to Ahern, the leading lumber dealers were John Gibson, Insular 
Lumber Company, Cadwaller & Co., Philippine Lumber and Development Company, Tuason 
& Sampedro, and California-Manila Lumber and Commercial Company (710). G. Ahern, 
“Opportunities for lumbering in the Philippine Islands,” 647 and 710. 
313 Ibid. 
314 Ibid. However, in areas where large stands of timber were found, stumpage fees were in 
the range of US$1 and $6 gold per 1,000 board feet.  
315 Ibid., 711. Ahern further wrote, that “[A] study of Bulletins Nos. 5 and 6 of this bureau will 
indicate to the lumbermen what the bureau will do for them. Forest offices will use every 
effort to make such propositions succeed financially.” 
316 This observation was made in relation to Negros Occidental. More importantly, daily 
wage in the lumber industry in Negros Occidental was P0.50 per day, while those on the 
sugar estates was 1 to 1.50 pesos per week with food, thus providing the former with the 
advantage in attracting labor. See H.D. Everett and H.N. Whitford, A Preliminary Working 
Plan for the Public Tract of the Insular Lumber Company, Negros Occidental, P.I., 666-667. 
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pesos, while Filipino workers were employed in various capacities as logging 
assistant, foreman, engineer, firemen, sub-foreman, fellers, buckers, cable 
men, sled tenders, woodcutters, road builders and water carriers. These 
Filipino personnel were paid as high as four pesos to as low as 0.50 pesos 
daily, wages that were considerably higher than those paid in plantations and 
haciendas.317 However, the relative infancy of the timber industry at the turn 
of the century meant that demand was not high and as such, supply was also 
correspondingly low. Indeed, most of the timber used in the country was 
imported, which were commonly Oregon Pine and California Redwood.318 
According to a report by the Bureau of Forestry, between 1 July 1904 to 30 
June 1905, total imported lumber amounted to 29,679,644 board feet and 
9,261 pieces of timber (dimensions unknown), compared with only 
139,148.77 cubic meters of timber produced locally.319 As such, the price of 
logs was not at all stable and fluctuated daily.320 In a span of three decades, 
however, 163 sawmills and logging companies were operational nationwide, 
with total investments amounting to 30,116,550 pesos by 1940.321 Majority of 
these investments (40 per cent) was American, thirty-three (33) per cent 
Filipino, and the remaining shared among Chinese, British and Japanese 
investors.322 Tamesis estimates that total annual timber production grew 
																																								 																				
317 The corresponding work and their wages were detailed as follows: 1 American logging 
superintendent = 4,200.00 pesos per year; 1 American logging assistant = 4.00 pesos per 
day; 1 Filipino foreman = 1.50 pesos per day; 1 Filipino engineer = 3.00 pesos per day; 1 
Filipino engineer = 1.50 pesos per day; 2 Filipino firemen = 0.50 peso per day each; 1 
Filipino sub-foreman = 0.60 peso per day; 4 Filipino fellers = 0.65 peso per day each; 6 
Filipino buckers = 0.50 peso per day each; 7 Filipino cable men = 0.50 peso per day each; 1 
Filipino sled tender = 0.50 peso per day each; 4 Filipino woodcutters for the engines = 0.50 
peso per day each; 4 Filipino road builders = 0.50 peso per day each; and 10 Filipino water 
carriers for the engines = 0.50 peso per day each. H.D. Everett and H.N. Whitford, A 
Preliminary Working Plan for the Public Tract of the Insular Lumber Company, Negros 
Occidental, P.I., 668. 
318 G. Ahern, “Opportunities for lumbering in the Philippine Islands,” 648. 
319 According to Gardner, 139,147.77 cubic meters if all sawn into lumber would make about 
400,000,000 board feet. R. Gardner. “I. Mechanical tests, properties and uses of thirty 
Philippine woods; II. Philippine sawmills, lumber markets, and prices,” Bulletin No. 4 
(Philippine Islands: Bureau of Forestry, 7 September 1906) (Online).  
320 Ibid. The most valuable timber were Molave, yellow Narra, Red Narra, Dungon, Tindalo, 
Acle and Betis, all hard woods, with market prices in Manila on 1 August 1906 ranging from 
a low of 215 pesos to a high of 300 pesos per 1,000 English board feet. 
321 50 pesos was approximately $1 at that time. See J. Pulhin et al, “Chapter II, Historical 
Overview,” 10. 
322 Ibid.,10. 
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exponentially from 94,000 cubic meters (40 million board-feet) in 1901 to 2 ¼ 
million cubic meters (1,000 million board-feet) in 1940.323  
As local timber production increased, the import of lumber principally 
from the United States correspondingly decreased. Again, Tamesis 
estimates that in 1941, 520,000 cubic meters (114,900,000 board-feet) and 
175,000 cubic meters (74,100,000 board-feet) of timber, or a total of 446,000 
cubic meters (189 million board-feet) valued at 8,041,389 pesos were 
exported from the Philippines, while only 4,935 cubic meters (or 2,091,000 
board-feet) of lumber valued at 256,936 pesos was imported.324 Japan 
became the biggest recipient of Philippine lumber between the 1960s and 
70s.325 
In terms of deforestation, forest cover declined from seventy (70) per 
cent in 1900 to just below sixty (60) per cent in the late 1930s.326 After 1945, 
however, logging increased dramatically. Deforestation rates were back to 
pre-war levels of production by 1949. There was a rapid and continuous 
decrease in forest cover from 1950 to 1988, with the highest rates occurring 
between 1976 and 1980.327 It was in the Visayas, where sugarcane 
plantations proliferated, and not in Mindanao, Palawan or Luzon, where the 
highest deforestation rates were recorded since 1950.  The total deforested 
area from 1957 to 1987 in the Visayas region amounted to 12,743 square 
kilometers or a total of 15.84 per cent forest loss.328 For Kummer (1991), 
these figures appeared to contradict the notion that Mindanao was the 
primary destination for rural migrants and the leading area for commercial 
logging.329  
Yet while these facts pointed to the rapid depletion of forests, for 
Kummer (1991), the simultaneous increases in agriculture by area and 
population in the uplands, as well as the lack of data on these individual 
																																								 																				
323 F. Tamesis, Philippine Forests and Forestry.  
324 Ibid. 
325 Statement made by DENR Undersecretary Victor Ramos in “Ormoc floods prick Japan’s 
conscience,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 22 November 1991, 6. 
326 D. Kummer, Deforestation in the Philippines, 45. 
327 Ibid.,58. 
328 Ibid., based on Table 10, Superregional deforestation rates, 1950-87.  
329 Ibid. 
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processes had contributed to a “seemingly endless controversy” on who 
should be blamed for deforestation in the country, be it agriculturalists or 
loggers.330 However, agriculturalists were often loggers too, as seen in the 
case of Ormoc. In addition, more often than not, they were also politicians 
with legislative and discretionary powers over many aspects of government. 
Historically, politicians with timber interests had thrived in Philippine politics 
and some had engaged in rent-seeking and “rent-seizing”331 behaviors that 
had already been well documented in the past.332  
The lasting legacy of President Ferdinand Marcos in forestry was the 
consolidation by state apparatuses of the power to decide how resources 
were managed and allocated. No timber license during the martial law 
period, for instance, was approved without Marcos’ authorization. But Marcos 
was not necessarily all-powerful vis-à-vis an increasingly potent logging bloc 
that was not ashamed to exercise its clout in influencing legislation to its 
advantage. By the 1960s, the timber industry’s contribution of as much as 
twenty-nine (29) per cent to total export earnings made loggers a powerful 
club of like-minded men. The Philippines was listed in 1965 as the “biggest, 
single log producer in the world” supplying at least thirty (30) per cent of the 
world’s requirements.333 The industry’s earnings peaked in 1973 at $472 
million and accounted for five (5) per cent of the country’s gross national 
																																								 																				
330 Ibid.,64.  
331 Ross defines rent-seizing as “efforts by state actors to gain the right to allocate rents” 
[original emphasis] in contradistinction to rent creation, which occurs when firms seek rents 
by bribing politicians and bureaucrats, and rent extraction, when politicians and bureaucrats 
seek rents by threatening firms with regulations. M. Ross, Timber Booms and Institutional 
Breakdown in Southeast Asia (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2012), 3-4. 
332 See, for example, M. Vitug, The Politics of Logging, Power from the Forest (Quezon City: 
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 1993); and, J. Van der Ploeg et al, “Illegal 
logging in the Northern Sierra Madre Natural Park,” 202-215; S. Coronel, Y. Chua, B. Cruz, 
and L. Rimban, The Rulemakers: How the Wealthy and Well-Born Dominate the Congress 
(Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2004); and, S. Coronel (ed), 
Patrimony: 6 Case Studies on Local Politics and the Environment in the Philippines (Pasig, 
Metro Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 1996). On rent-seeking 
behaviors of Philippine politicians and the political economy of the Philippines, see S. 
Coronel (ed.), Pork and Other Perks: Corruption and Governance in the Philippines (Pasig, 
Metro Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 1998); E. Gutierrez, I. Torrente, 
and N. Narca, All in the Family: A Study of Elites and Power Relations in the Philippines 
(Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 1992); E. Gutierrez, I. Torrente, and N. 
Narca, The Ties that Bind: A Guide to Family, Business and Other Interests in the Ninth 
House of Representatives (Pasig, Metro Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative 
Journalism, 1994); J. Lacaba (ed.), Boss: 5 Case Studies of Local Politics in the Philippines 
(Pasig, Metro Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 1995).  
333 Vitug, The Politics of Logging, 25. 
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product.334 This informal bloc of new millionaires whose wealth was based on 
timber did not only log in the Philippines, but expanded operations to 
Indonesia and Malaysia as well.335  
When President Corazon Aquino assumed leadership in 1986, 
systemic corruption was characteristic of the forestry sector. From the House 
of Representatives where congressmen held logging concessions or actively 
lobbied for the timber industry, to the Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources (DENR) that was often emasculated in its role as forest 
protector by a lack of manpower and political clout vis-à-vis politicians and 
powerful timber barons, to adventurist military personnel and insurgent 
groups involved in illegal logging or the coddling of illegal loggers, the 
Philippine forestry sector by 1991 was widely perceived as one of the most 
corrupt institutions in a country just emerging from the effects of martial law.   
More central to the discussion on systematic deforestation were the 
series of government policies in land redistribution that began as early as 
1939 in the quest for social justice. President Manuel Quezon, aiming to 
contain the increasing unrest in central Luzon, enacted the Rural Program 
Administration that provided for the purchase and lease of haciendas for 
redistribution to tenants. President Elpidio Quirino, meanwhile, enacted 
Executive Order No. 355 in October 1950 to redistribute public agricultural 
lands through the Land Settlement and Development Corporation 
(LASEDECO). This was intensified under President Ramon Magsaysay, 
when he replaced LASEDECO with the National Resettlement and 
Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) aimed at resettling rebel returnees by 
providing them with home lots and farmlands in Palawan and Mindanao. 
These policies were in fact reflective of decolonizing administrations that 
prioritized short-term socio-economic solutions to social ills at the expense of 
the environment, often considered only as an expendable resource to exploit.  




335 Ibid., 26-27. 
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• Public forest [which] is the mass of lands of the public domain which 
has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the 
determination of which lands are needed for forest purposes and 
which are not; 
• Permanent forest or forest reserves refer to those lands of the public 
domain which have been the subject of the present system of 
classification and determined to be needed for forest purposes;  
• Forest lands include public forest, the permanent forest or forest 
reserves, and forest reservations; and,  
• Forest reservations refer to forestlands, which have been reserved by 
the President of the Philippines for any specific purpose or purposes.     
Indeed, the conservation of forests in the country had not been 
considered a priority over development programs. For example, considering 
the low charges imposed for forest harvesting from the 1950s to the mid-
1990s consisting of an ad valorem rate ranging from only two per cent to 6.3 
per cent of the wholesale log value, the Philippine government charged a 
little more than $1 per cubic meter. Indonesia, on the other hand, charged 
more than $15 per cubic meter during the same period.337 
Ormoc’s topography, geology, climate and forestlands 
Against this backdrop of the Philippines’ legal regime on forests vis-à-
vis the history of deforestation in the country, a consideration of Ormoc’s 
unique topography and geology is made below, particularly as these relate to 
its forests, which have some immutable consequences for people’s lives and 
livelihoods.  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 											
336 Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, as Amended by P.D. No 1559, P.D. No. 865, P.D. 
No. 1775, Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg 701, B.P. Blg 83, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7161, 
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277 and 83 O.G. No. 31, Revised Forestry Code, Revising 
Presidential Decree No. 389, Otherwise known as the Forestry Reform Code of the 
Philippines.  
337 E. Guiang, “Impacts and effectiveness of logging bans in natural forests: Philippines,” in 
Forest out of Bounds: Impacts and Effectiveness of Logging Bans in Natural Forests in Asia-
Pacific, Asia-Pacific Forestry Commission (Bangkok, Thailand: Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, 2001), 105 
(Online).  
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Leyte island itself comprises about 6,200 square kilometers between 
124o17’ and 125o18’ east longitude and between 9o55’ and 11o48’ north 
latitude.338 Geographically, it is bounded on the east by Leyte Gulf and the 
Pacific Ocean, to the west by the Visayas and Camotes seas, and to the 
north by the San Juanico Strait, which separates it from the island of Samar. 
In the south, the Surigao Strait separates it from Mindanao. Leyte is 
classified as a volcanic terrain, “with most volcanic centers concentrated in 
the north-central portion of the island and consisting of strato volcanoes, 
dome complexes, pyroclastic/tephra cones, calderas and compound 
volcanoes.”339 A central cordillera dominates Leyte, which forms a link from 
the Bondoc peninsula of southern Luzon, through Masbate, and finally 
passing into eastern Mindanao, extending in a northwest-southeasterly 
direction from coast to coast of the main island, including Panaon at the 
south and Biliran and Maripipi at the north.340 Thus, floods are not 
uncommon during the wet season, as all streams have headwaters in the 
east slope watershed of the central cordillera. This side of the mountains 
receive more precipitation than the west due to the northeasterly winds of 
what McIntyre (1951) calls the winter monsoon.341 Leyte is furthermore 
composed of two large lowlands: the northern Leyte and the west coast of 
the Ormoc-Bao river plain.  
The presence of the Philippine Fault, which transects Leyte on a 
northwest-southeast track from northwestern Luzon down to Eastern 
Mindanao, has resulted in the characterization of all rocks in the general area 
as “highly sheared and intensely fractured” due to the presence of volcanic 
landforms.342 Ormoc itself hosts a geothermal plant in Barangay Tongonan, 
belying its volcanic origins. Ormoc City has a total land area of 613.6 square 
																																								 																				
338 E. Eller and V. Asio, “The flash flood tragedy of Ormoc: A short analysis from a physio-
geographical view,” Unpublished article (Visayas State College of Agriculture, Undated).  
339 Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS), “Scientific assessment 
report: Ormoc City flood on 5 November 1991,” Unpublished report (Department of Science 
and Technology (DOST), 1991).  
340 M. McIntyre, “Leyte and Samar: A Geographical Analysis of the Rural Economies of the 
Eastern Visayas”(PhD diss. in Geography, Ohio State University, 1951), 10-12.   
341 Ibid., 25.  
342 Ormoc Task Force Scientific Study Group, "Scientific Assessment Report: Ormoc City 
flood on 5 November 1991," Unpublished report (Department of Science and Technology 
(DOST), 1991), 4-5. 
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kilometers343 and is bounded on the northwest by the municipalities of 
Matag-ob and Merida, in the north by Kananga, in the northeast by Jaro, 
Pastrana and Dagami, and in the south by Albuera. Ormoc Bay bounds the 
city in the west, while numerous rivers traverse the city plain, notably the Bao 
River in the north, Pagsangahan in the east, Panilahan and Bagongbong in 
the south, and the Anilao and Malbasag rivers cutting through the city proper 
on its eastern and western flanks. The general drainage pattern of these 
rivers and streams is dendritic, with a drainage density at least 100 meters 
per hectare while stream frequency is about 0.6 per square kilometer.344 
These features indicate that the watershed is highly erodible. The Bao River 
and its associated streams flow south from the low mountain divide of Leyte 
Bay and drain slowly into a broad deltaic plain in the lower fifteen (15) miles 
(or 24 kilometers) of their courses. This means that flooding is a common 
occurrence due to poor natural drainage and swampy conditions.345 Like 
other Philippine cities established during the Spanish colonial period, Ormoc 
City occupies a location within the mouths of two major rivers draining out to 
Ormoc Bay. To compound its geographical and topographical susceptibility 
to flooding, it has historically been the catchment area of the Anilao and 
Biten-Malbasag rivers. Topographically, Ormoc is bounded by ridges, with a 
width of 4.6 kilometers and length of 12.0 kilometers.  
The slopes of the Ormoc watershed range from three per cent in 
relatively flat areas to higher than sixty (60) per cent in steeply sloping areas. 
Approximately two-thirds of the area has a slope of less than eighteen (18) 
per cent, while one-third has at least eighteen (18) per cent and above, with 
the highest elevation approximately 830 meters. Both Anilao and Malbasag 
Rivers exhibit similar slopes, as they gently rise upward between two (2) per 
cent to ten (10) per cent up to an elevation of 500 meters (or 0.5 kilometers) 
above sea level and then rise up to twenty (20) to forty (40) per cent in its 
highest reaches at about 840 meters (0.840 kilometers) above sea level. The 
																																								 																				
343 National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB), City StatWatch Eastern Visayas, 31 
January 2013. Tacloban City, National Statistical Information Center/National Statistical 
Coordination Board: Comparative data across Eastern Visayas on land area; number of 
barangays; population statistics; revenue statistics; exports and imports; infrastructure; 
poverty incidence; education; health services; and crime statistics.  
344 Ormoc Task Force Scientific Study Group, “Scientific Assessment Report,” 4.  
345 M. McIntyre, “Leyte and Samar,” 28-29.  
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Anilao River has a length of 13.8 kilometers, while Malbasag has 10.42 
kilometers. According to the consolidated report prepared by the five 
technical services of the DENR Region VIII (Eastern Visayas) in the 
aftermath of the 1991 flood, the aggregate length of all the rivers and their 
respective tributaries is 64.38 kilometers.346 While Anilao and Malbasag 
rivers were the most heavily affected watershed areas in 1991, other areas 
likewise affected were the Naliwatan, Marabong, Barogo, Malitbog and 
Daguitan rivers to the west. The sweeping floodwaters in Ormoc City in 1991 
also converged and coincided with the high tide of Ormoc Bay that day.  
Ormoc’s watershed areas even during normal periods were notable 
for the presence of thick accumulations of lahar, which is typically poorly 
sorted or what the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) 
described as boulder- to pebble- sized andesitic clasts mixed with matrix or 
sand. Combine this with the weathering of volcanic rocks due to intense 
fracturing, and it is not surprising that the area is highly susceptible to 
landslides. In fact, while the 1991 tragedy had been described as “an 
unprecedented event which occurs only once in fifty (50) years,” Ormoc’s 
topographic characteristics show that natural hazards such as landslides and 
flooding are ‘normal’ occurrences.  
McIntyre (1951) observed that the soils of Leyte, similar to Samar, is 
primarily yellow to reddish colored, indicating the presence of iron oxide in 
the surface and possible leaching. This type of soil, similar to those found in 
Africa and Cuba, is abundant in well-drained lowland regions, or even in flat-
lying cogon lands in the mountains where forest vegetation is lacking. 
Consequently, it is acid in reaction, “generally infertile although can respond 
well to fertilization, and moderately erodible.”347 In contrast, the upland soils 
of Leyte and Samar are more fertile than the leached soils of the plains, and 
indeed this is where the sugarcane plantations in Ormoc can be found, on 
																																								 																				
346 Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)-VIII, “Assessment of the 
causes of the flooding of Ormoc City, Leyte Island, Philippines: Consolidated Technical 
Findings of the 5 Technical Services of the DENR Region 8 (Eastern Visayas).” Eastern 
Visayas, Forest Management; Mines and Geosciences; Environmental Management and 
Protected Areas; Lands Management; and, Ecosystems Research and Development.  
347 McIntyre, “Leyte and Samar,” 106-107. 
101	|	F L O O D W A T E R S 	 O F 	 D E A T H 	
	
slopes of 25 to 30 degrees, as these areas are more productive for 
cultivating sugarcane.  
Three types of soils characterize Ormoc. The first, typically found in 
the lowland near the coast and generally utilized for cultivation, has a mean 
texture varying from loamy sand (45-90 per cent sand, 5-40 per cent silt, and 
5-17 per cent clay) to sandy loam (35-55 per cent sand, 28-40 per cent silt, 
and 15-25 per cent clay), and is “generally deep with medium to high 
permeability.”348 The second type, found in quaternary volcano clastics, has 
mean texture ranges between clay loam (5-35 per cent sand, 30-50 per cent 
silt, and 35-45 per cent clay) and silty clay (0-25 per cent sand, 40-65 per 
cent silt, and 35-45 per cent clay). Highly eroded in most cases, there is also 
little vegetation in this soil type. The last type, those developed from the 
quaternary volcanic rocks, is clay (0-25 per cent sand, 30-55 per cent silt, 
and 45-65 per cent clay) found in higher altitudes where the average 
inclination is very high and vegetation cover is also missing. As a low 
permeable type, “surface water is predictably predominant.”349 In the 
scientific assessment report of the Department of Science and Technology 
(DOST) Ormoc Task Force in November 1991, eighty-five (85) per cent of 
the Ormoc watershed was classified as agricultural areas given primarily to 
sugarcane and coconut, while fourteen (14) per cent was grassland and 
shrubs, and one (1) per cent was built-up areas.350   
Table 3.1 
Land use/vegetation by watershed area, Ormoc City351 






PER CENT  
(%) 
Sugarcane  0-3 14 2,912 66.7 
3-8 2,183   
8-18 92   
18-30 186   
30-50 437   
Coconut 3-8 533 803 18.4 
																																								 																				
348 E. Eller and V. Asio, “The flash flood tragedy of Ormoc.”  
349 Ibid.  
350 Ormoc Task Force Scientific Study Group, “Scientific Assessment Report.”  
351 The original report lists figures in this table totalling 4,500 hectares. However, as the 
numbers did not add up, the correct totals are reflected above. 
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8-18 40   
18-30 80   
30-50 150   
Grassland 18-30 404 425 9.7 
30-50 21   
Shrubland 18-30 173 173 4 
Built-up areas 3-8 52 52 1.2 
TOTAL 4,365  100 
Source: Land Resource Evaluation Project (LREP), Leyte Province, BSWM (1986) as 
quoted in Ormoc Task Force Scientific Study Group, ”Scientific Assessment Report: Ormoc 
City flood on 5 November 1991,” 8. 
 
Growth of the timber industry in Ormoc 
At the turn of the twentieth century, Leyte’s forests were abundant 
with such timber as Lauan, Molave, Guijo, Malasantol, Maacasin and 
Betis.352 Lumbering in the province only began to emerge as an important 
industry in the 1900s. Sawmills were recorded in the municipalities of 
Palompon and Tacloban, which shipped timber to all parts of Leyte.353  
In Ormoc, it was Dr. Hermeneghildo Serafica, a government district 
health officer from Pangasinan with a salary of seventy-five (75) pesos per 
month, who introduced commercial logging in the 1930s. He later quit his job 
in 1931 and commenced life as a sugar planter.354 In 1936, he built his first 
sawmill and operated a 5,000-hectare concession. Within five years, Serafica 
became the wealthiest individual sugar planter in Ormoc, with 500 hectares 
of sugar lands to his name and an annual income of 30,000 pesos.355 He 
invested 50,000 pesos to build another sawmill in the municipality of 
Kananga in the same year, in partnership with Gregorio Mania, a former 
																																								 																				
352 G. Ahern, Opportunities for Lumbering in the Philippine Islands, Circular No. 1 (Philippine 
Islands: Bureau of Forestry, 1 December 1906), 637-643. According to Ahern, Lauan was a 
light and soft wood used for light and temporary construction, cabinet-making, inferior 
furniture, and small boats. Molave, on the other hand, was a hard wood most highly valued 
for general building purposes, shipbuilding, cabinetmaking and turnery. Guijo was 
moderately hard and is used for general construction and shipbuilding, for carriage wheels 
and shafts, and inferior furniture. Malasantol was a moderately heavy wood used in general 
construction, while Macaasin was also a moderately hard wood generally used as flooring, 
joists, and rafters of houses, and in cabinetwork. Finally, Betis was a high grade structural 
timber used in general high-grade construction and shipbuilding.  
353 P. Borseth, “Report of the Governor, Province of Leyte,” in Appendix H, Annual reports of 
provincial governors, Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of 
War, 310.  
354 R. Middleton, “Causes of the Ormoc flash flood disaster in Leyte, Philippines,” 9. 
355 Ibid.,10. 
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supervisor in the Bureau of Education.356 In addition to his lumber business, 
Serafica continued to cultivate his increasingly vast sugar lands. By 1937, he 
was described in the Sugar News, the official organ of the Philippine Sugar 
Association (PSA), as a “prominent sugar and lumber man.”357  
During the Japanese occupation of Ormoc beginning 25 May 1942, 
the logging industry, as with other industries, was brought to a virtual 
standstill. Most of the large landholders opted to remain within towns directly 
supervised by the Japanese forces or went to live in the provincial capital, 
Tacloban, thus leaving the sugarcane estates as well as their forest 
concessions under the care of tenants.358 An Administrator of Abandoned 
Estates, Ramon Advincula, was appointed under the Western Leyte Guerrilla 
Warfare Forces (WLGF) to recruit laborers during the wartime period to 
undertake unpaid labor on the sugarcane estates, including forest 
concessions and sawmills. Forests all over the country were ravaged for the 
war effort under the Japanese occupation, but the overall extent of 
deforestation immediately after World War II is unknown.359 By 1948, other 
large sugar landholders became loggers too. Feliciano Larrazabal, 
Potenciano Larrazabal, and Agapito Pongos, all from Basque mestizo 
bloodlines, became important sawmill operators in addition to being sugar 
planters by this time.360 Between 1950 and 1960, a total of twenty-two (22) 
Ordinary Timber Licenses (OTL)361 was awarded for operation in two Leyte 
provinces, with five of these in the Ormoc area.362 Each OTL covered an 
area of almost 1400 hectares and an annual allowable cut of a little over 




358 E. Lear, “The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines, Leyte, 1941-1945,” Data Paper 
No. 42, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies (New York: Cornell 
University, 1961), 115-117. 
359 D. Kummer, Deforestation in the Philippines, 45-46. 
360 R. Middleton, “Causes of the Ormoc flash flood in Leyte, Philippines,” 10. 
361 Ordinary Timber License (OTL) is a short-term commercial license for timber, i.e. for a 
period of four years and renewable upon expiration. It was later abolished by virtue of 
Presidential Decree 389, known as the Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines enacted on 
5 February 1974, in favor of longer-term licenses of ten (10) and twenty-five (25) years.  
362 R. Middleton, “Causes of the Ormoc flash flood in Leyte, Philippines,” Ibid. 
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cancelled during the Marcos years, and a total log ban imposed in northern 
Leyte since 1967.363  
By the 1970s, Serafica had become one of the wealthiest families in 
Ormoc with interests in neighboring municipalities in Leyte. Between 1965 
and 1970, its logging concession in Barangay Tongonan paved the way for 
the construction of logging roads.364 H&Sons Serafica owned 9.9 per cent or 
2,577,804 square meters of the total 25,945,890 square-meter lands 
surveyed within the watershed.365 The Serafica family then expanded its 
interests in Ormoc immediately afterwards. By 1979, the Hermeneghildo 
Serafica and Sons Corporation (HSSC) was managing a 290-hectare farm in 
Barangay Sambulawan in the municipality of Leyte in Leyte province, first 
utilizing the land for sugarcane, then sorghum, mung bean, and finally cattle-
raising.366 As a ranch, it employed fifteen personnel with responsibility over 
more than 64 heads of Brahman and Indo-Brazil breeds of cattle purchased 
from the Larrazabal Farm in Taglawigan, San Isidro, Leyte, and the rest from 
the Muertegui Farm in Masbate.  
A 1987 forest resources inventory undertaken by a Philippine-German 
group found that by 1989 there was only 96,300 hectares of forest in Leyte, 
down from the 171,600 hectares recorded in 1969.367 However, DENR 
Secretary Ernesto Maceda allowed one firm, Timber Producers and 
Marketing Corporation (TPMC), to operate in Leyte in November 1986. 
TPMC began operations in 1987, with a license expiration date in November 
																																								 																				
363 Cited in R. Villadiego, “Factoran bares list of DENR men linked to illegal logging,” 
Philippine Daily Inquirer, 15 November 1991, 1 &12.  
364 Local Government of Barangay Tongonan Ormoc City website, “Home.” Copyright 2016, 
accessed 20 June 2016 (Online).  
365 Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), “List of Cadastral Lots, 
Ormoc Cadastre,” Annex in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)-
Region VIII, Investigative Report of the Ormoc City Disaster.  
366 The hacienda stopped the cultivation of sugarcane when the market value of sugar 
dropped. It then shifted to sorghum, but was later stopped again due to pest and disease 
outbreak in sorghum. It then shifted to mung bean, but this was besieged by the same 
problems as sugarcane. See H. Napoles, “Animal production and management practices of 
Hacienda Serafica and Sons Corporation (HSSC) Ranch at Sambulawan, Leyte, Leyte” 
(Bachelor of Animal Science thesis, Visayas State College of Agriculture, 1986).  
367 Cited in C. Pablo, “Illegal logging caused floods,” Malaya, 8 November 1991, 1&3. 
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2011.368 Its total concession area was 26,600 hectares or 27.5 per cent of 
the remaining forest cover.  
Timber and the Codillas 
 The story of the Codilla family, the most recent political dynasty in 
Ormoc, is central to the story of Visayan timber. Theirs is testament to the 
relative openness of the local economy to recent economic upstarts despite 
the early monopoly of land and resources by old elite families. The Codilla 
family will attain political influence only after the November 1991 flood, when 
the patriarch, Eufrocino Codilla Sr., wrestled political power from the ruling 
Larrazabal family for the first time. However, the roots of the Codillas in 
Ormoc date back to the nineteenth century.369 There had been Codillas 
serving in public offices very early in Ormoc’s history. Reverend Father Lino 
Codilla, a Cebuano, was assigned as parish priest at the Ormoc Parish from 
1892-1910,370 and Jose Codilla371 was appointed mayor by the Japanese 
forces in 1943. In addition, far from being impoverished farmers, the Codillas 
had also been identified as plantation owners under the Ormoc Sugar 
Company in 1935.372 
																																								 																				
368 Rene de Rueda, a consultant with the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources (DENR), who was interviewed in the aftermath of the 1991 Ormoc tragedy. 
Quoted in C. Pablo, “Illegal logging caused floods,” 1&3. Timber Producers and Marketing 
Corporation (TPMC) was allegedly owned by Department of Interior and Local Government 
(DILG) Secretary Luis T. Santos. TPMC was also allowed by the DENR to cut some 80,000 
cubic meters of logs in the towns of Hinatungan, Hinunangan, Saint Bernard, Silago and 
Sogod in southern Leyte, and in Baybay, Leyte. In addition, it had also been alleged that 
TPMC maintained payola for police, military, local officials and the NPA through the so-
called revolutionary tax. This payola was managed by a Jimmy Uraya, the TPMC president’s 
brother. See D. Petilla, “Cory exec tagged big illegal logger,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 9 
December 1991, 1&9. 
369 A cursory survey of the Codilla family name in Ormoc, Leyte, in the “Philippine Deaths 
and Burials, 1726-1957” yield numerous entries. Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Family 
Search. Copyright 2016, accessed 18 February 2014 (Online). In the “History and Cultural 
Life of Maticaa,” compiled in the “History and Cultural Life of the People of the Communities 
of Ormoc II District, Ormoc City”, in Historical Data Papers, a Basilio Codilla was listed as 
one among fifteen original settler families in the barrio. The barrio of Maticaa was 
established in 1907.   
370 Ormoc City Public Library, “Briefing Folder, Ormoc City 1989,” Unpublished article. 
371 Ibid. 
372 Listed as separate entries: Basilio Codilla, Jose Codilla, and Lucio Codilla. Executive 
Orders Relative to Sugar Allocation Issued by the Governor-General during the Year 1935, 
Part 3 Nos. 675-795 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, Government of the Philippine Islands, 
1936).  
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 Eufrocino Codilla Sr. himself was a successful lumber middleman and 
had achieved financial success even prior to entering politics in 1992. Born in 
Barangay Valencia in 1933,373 Dodong, as he was called, could not afford to 
go to university due to poverty. However, he was an extraordinarily 
resourceful man who entered cycling contests for monetary rewards and sold 
a variety of merchandise like clothes, rice and, later, lumber, GI sheets and 
nails.374 It was in selling lumber and construction materials where he built his 
fortune. But, like all other elites in Ormoc, he soon diversified his business 
interests. By 1992, he was reported to own a 100-hectare sugar plantation, a 
cockpit and gasoline station.375 It is notable that the family already 
possessed a 90-hectare sugarcane plantation in Barangay Maticaa by 1984, 
which had expanded from the original six hectares in 1978.376 Managed by a 
son, Eduardo Codilla, the plantation employed a total of eighty-five (85) 
personnel, composed of one farm administrator, three (3) capatazes, and 
twenty-seven (27) laborers per capataz paid on an hourly or contractual 
basis.377 By the 1990s, another son, Eric Codilla who would become Ormoc 
mayor for three consecutive terms from July 2004 to June 2013, managed a 
thriving piggery farm in Barangay Valencia also in Ormoc. The Eric Codilla 
piggery farm was listed as a sole proprietor medium-scale enterprise 
operating on a one-half hectare area. In 1991, it had 115 hogs managed by a 
caretaker and two aides paid on a daily wage basis.378 Almost by sheer luck, 
																																								 																				
373 C. Pedong, “Eufrocino ‘Mejares’ Codilla: Businessman turned Politician,” in Mithi og 
Bahandi sa Dakbayan sa Ormoc, Unpublished learning resource material, compiled by the 
Department of Education Region VIII-Eastern Visayas (Undated), 140-142.  
374 M. Vitug, Power from the Forest, 6. 
375 Ibid. 
376 R. Agbisit II, “Codilla Farm” (Bachelor of Science thesis in Agricultural Business 
(Business Management. Baybay, Leyte: Visayas State College of Agriculture, 1984). 
377 Ibid., 6-11. A farm administrator, in this case Claro Arguilles who started out as personal 
driver to the Codillas, supervised the three capatazes and reported to the farm manager, 
Eduardo Codilla. A capataz, on the other hand, supervised the laborers assigned under 
him/her and reported to the farm administrator. The harvested sugarcane was milled at the 
nearby Hilongos Development Corporation (HIDECO), which was only five (5) km away. In 
1984, the Codilla plantation was not yet mechanized, but used carabaos instead. In the 
fiscal year ending December 1980, it incurred a loss of 13,862.54 pesos, but enjoyed a profit 
of 5,667.00 pesos in 1981 and 8,214.67 pesos in 1982. The sharing basis between the 
Codilla plantation and the HIDECO sugar central was on a 65-35 percent basis, with 65 
percent of the sugar and molasses produced going to the owner and the 35 percent to the 
sugar central.  
378 F. Gabor and E. Mantua, “Production management practices in Eric Codilla Piggery 
Farm,” (Bachelor of Science thesis in Animal Science (Animal Production Major). Baybay, 
Leyte: Visayas State College of Agriculture, 1992). 
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therefore, the November 1991 tragedy created the perfect opportunity for the 
family to transition into the political sphere, with Dodong Codilla’s backhoes 
and construction trucks becoming the instruments of a family’s enduring 
political clout. However, it would be their close links to timber that would 
come to haunt them again and again in post-November 1991 Ormoc.379 
Ramon Larrazabal, mayor of the municipality of San Isidro in Leyte, even 
went as far as accusing Dodong Codilla as being among the illegal loggers in 
Ormoc, an allegation denied by another son, Eufrocino “Wennie” Codilla, 
who stressed that the family’s logging business was legal and “duly 
accredited” by the DENR.380 
Illegal logging 
 Surprisingly, given the highly political nature of illegal logging and 
extensive media coverage, there is no universal definition of what it is.381 In 
the Philippines, the basic provision of law on illegal logging prior to 1991 was 
section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Forestry 
Reform Code. Here, the crime of illegal logging was committed when “[a]ny 
person…cut[s], gather[s], collect[s], remove[s] timber or other forest products 
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or 
from private land without any authority, or possess timber or other forest 
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws 
and regulations.”382 Historically, illegal logging had been difficult to document 
or measure. In a study on illegal logging in the northern Sierra Madre Natural 
Park in Luzon, the biggest island of the Philippines, based on field 
observations and informal interviews from 1992 to 2008, it was found to be 
undertaken, not as small-scale livelihood activities by rural poor farmers, but 
																																								 																				
379 See, for example, E. Justimbaste, “NBI accuses Ormoc mayor of forging logging papers,” 
Philippine News and Features 10:28, 8 January 1994, 12; and, E. Justimbaste, “Ormoc 
mayor’s son hiding more hot lumber?” Philippine News and Features 12:70, 15 June 1996, 
13. 
380 C. Pablo and R. Puaben, “Factoran spurns solon on seized narra logs; Isabela’s 
Domingo says shipment is legal,” Malaya, 19 November 1991, 1&7.  
381 M. Nilsson Rosander, “Illegal Logging, Current issues and opportunities for Sida/SENSE 
Engagement in Southeast Asia” (Bangkok, Thailand: Regional Community Forestry Training 
Center for Asia and the Pacific (RECOFTC) & Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (SIDA), 2008), 4 (Online).  
382This was amended by Executive Order No.277 (1987). Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources, Primer on Illegal Logging. Manila: Legal Affairs Office (Undated), 
accessed 17 February 2014, 4 (Online).  
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comparable to commercial scale activities.383 Middlemen and financiers, who 
spearheaded these activities, commonly paid bribes fixed at one peso per 
board feet to DENR officials in Isabela, another peso per board feet to the 
insurgent National People’s Army (NPA) contingent in the area, and 1,500 
pesos (or $30) per truck to pass through at least eleven checkpoints set up 
by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National 
Police (PNP) along the national highway from Isabela to central Luzon.384 
The discourse on illegal logging in Leyte also invariably involved 
politicians and the police. Representative Manuel Horca, Jr. of the second 
district of Leyte385 for the Eighth Congress (1987-1992) had been identified 
as “one of the major illegal loggers in Leyte,” who openly conspired with 
corrupt DENR officials and “syndicates” in logging.386 Also implicated in the 
allegations were DENR regional technical director in Eastern Visayas for 
forestry, Vicente Paragas; DENR deputy and chief of forest resource 
conservation, Christopher Kuizon; Elpidio Simon; Danilo Javier; Robin 
Tumolva; and Rizalido Casco, all technical assistants; and lawyer Antonio 
Oliva of the legal department. Paragas, Kuizon and Simon all denied 
involvement in the alleged syndicate.387 Two top police constabulary officials 
																																								 																				
383 Van der Ploeg et al, “Illegal logging in the Northern Sierra Madre Natural Park The 
Philippines.”  
384 Cited in Van der Ploeg, Ibid. 
385 The second district of Leyte includes the municipalities of Barugo, Burauen, Capoocan, 
Carigara, Dagami, Dulag, Jaro, Julita, La Paz, MacArthur, Mayorga, Pastrana, Tabontabon, 
and Tunga. On the other hand, Ormoc is part of the fourth district of Leyte, together with 
Albuera, Kananga, Merida, Palompon and Isabel.  
386 According to Thompson, Horca was fired from his position as an engineer for forgery in 
the late 1970s, but later appointed as provincial engineer in Leyte. In 1987, he ran under the 
banner of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino and won the congressional seat for the 
second district of Leyte after receiving monetary funding from his brother-in-law, Pedro Go 
Porciuncula, one of the biggest gambling lords in Metro Manila as well as an illegal logger 
himself. H. Thompson, “The economic, political and biological degradation of the 
Philippines,” Working Paper No. 184, Journal of Economic Literature (Australia: Murdoch 
University, School of Economics, 2001) (Online). Also see, N. Abrimatea, “Two suspected 
illegal loggers charged,” Philippine Star, 30 November 1991, 6; and, D. Petilla, “Leyte solon, 
gambling lord in illegal logging,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 3 December 1991, 1&9. 
387 It should be noted here that illegal logging is a highly political issue, with real dangers to 
those who expose its activities. Danny Petilla, who was then a 28-year old multi-awarded 
journalist for the Philippine Daily Inquirer in 1991, wrote a series of investigative news 
articles on illegal logging in Leyte in the aftermath of the 1991 Ormoc tragedy. After 
publishing these articles, he “fled the Philippines in December 1991 to escape death threats 
and harassment from criminals and politicians alike.” Settling down in the United States with 
his family, he only came back to the Philippines after the devastation of Supertyphoon 
Haiyan in November 2013. See D. Petilla, “DENR logging ring unmasked,” Philippine Daily 
Inquirer, 6 December 1991, 1&12; D. Petilla, “Reporter gets death threats for expose,” 
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in Eastern Visayas were also tagged as coddlers of illegal loggers in Leyte 
and Samar. Identified were Police General Vicente S. Garcia, Jr., 
superintendent for Eastern Visayas, and Colonel Reynaldo Acop, director for 
Leyte.388 Both Garcia and Horca before him insisted that these allegations 
were “politically motivated.”389 Retired Brigadier General Lorenzo Mateo of 
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and Philippine National Police (PNP) Colonel 
Wilfredo Reotutar were also identified for their past involvements in illegal 
logging in Leyte.390 
In Ormoc, forested areas susceptible to illegal logging could be found 
only in the top reaches of the watershed. These areas occupied about 150 
hectares within the geothermal reservation of the Philippine National Oil 
Company (PNOC), or about 3.33 per cent of the entire Ormoc watershed 
area.391 The remaining 96.66 per cent of the watershed was classified as 
alienable and disposable, utilized primarily for the cultivation of sugarcane, 
coconut and rice. Agricultural areas reached as far as 600 meters elevation, 
with sugarcane and coconut plantations cultivated in areas with slopes 
ranging beyond eight (8) per cent. 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 											
Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10 December 1991, 1&11; D. Petilla, “’Yolanda’ disaster calls 
native son home,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 28 November 2013 (Online). The same threats 
to life had been experienced by another multi-awarded investigative journalist, Marites Vitug, 
especially after the publication of her book The Politics of Logging, Power from the Forest 
(1993). 
388 In relation to illegal logging in Ormoc, the Larrazabal clan had accused General Garcia of 
coddling big-time illegal loggers in Leyte, including Eufrocino Codilla Sr. Garcia was 
godfather to Codilla’s son, Eufrocino Jr., who was then councillor in Ormoc. On the other 
hand, documents from a joint environmental management group of the DENR and the 
PNOC showed that Colonel Acop had intervened several times in favour of the release of 
‘hot’ lumber to Filipino-Chinese businessmen in Tacloban and Ormoc. Acop allegedly 
personally wrote to Inspector Elmer Madriaga, PNP Police Chief in Kananga on 30 
September 1991, to release a truck owned by Charlie Uy Kim, a businessman from 
Tacloban City. The truck in question was seized by PNP and DENR operatives on 
September 28, 1991, for the transportation of illegal logs in Kananga. In addition to this 
incident, Acop allegedly also interceded for the release of two truckloads of hot logs owned 
by Codilla on 16 September 1991 in Capoocan, Leyte. See D. Petilla, “2 top Visayas cops 
coddling illegal loggers,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 4 December 1991, 1&8.      
389 D. Petilla, “Leyte solon, gambling lord in illegal logging,” Ibid.; and, D. Petilla, “2 top 
Visayas cops coddling illegal loggers,” Ibid. 
390 D. Petilla, “Reporter gets death threats for expose,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10 
December 1991, 1&11. 
391 LC Map No. 2510, FAO 4-1028 dated 16 February 1962, in “Assessment of the causes of 
the flooding of Ormoc City, Leyte Island, Philippines,” Consolidated technical findings of 
Forest Management, Mines and Geosciences, Environmental Management and Protected 
Areas, Lands Management, and Ecosystems Research and Development, DENR Region 
VIII (Eastern Visayas: Undated), 1.  
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Table 3.2 
Land Use/Vegetation by Slope Ranges, Ormoc City 
Slope Ranges 
(%) 
Area (ha) Per cent (%) Dominant Land 
Use/Vegetation 
0-3 15,593 34 Mainly for agricultural use 
(sugarcane, coconut and 
rice), built-up 
3-8 4,142 9 
8-18 8,626 19 
18-30 8,485 18 Open grassland, shrubland 
30-50 8,027 17 Woodland/shrubland 
>50 1,557 3  
TOTAL 46,430 100  
Source: Land Resources Evaluation Project (LREP), Leyte Province, BSWM (1986), cited in 
Ormoc Task Force Scientific Study Group,392 “Ormoc assessment report”.  
 
Within the Ormoc watershed itself, cadastral and survey records in 
1991 showed that there were more than 700 lot claimants, who were 
predominantly big landholders rather than small lot owners. The Laurente 
family, who originated from Sitio Cabaon-an, also in Ormoc, was the first to 
settle at Sitio Bagtic (renamed Camp Site) in 1920.393 The Alao, Taneo and 
Bañez families followed in 1953, and other families such as the Ronquese, 
Quilasadio, Betose, Hermoso, Cabalejo, and Jose also set up settlements in 
the following years.394 Of the total 25,945 square meters watershed surveyed 
by the DENR in 1991, the following families owned at least one per cent 
landholding: Aparis (1.1 per cent); Baclayon (1.8 per cent); Bañez (1.7 per 
cent); Daffon (3 per cent); Espina (1.3 per cent); Hermoso (1.7 per cent); 
Orillano (1.1 per cent); Pongos (3.1 per cent); Puray (1.1 per cent); Teves 
(1.7 per cent); Torrevillas (2.0 per cent); and Villa (2.4 per cent). The major 
landholders in the Ormoc watershed, as discussed in Chapter 2, included 
the Larrazabals (15.9 per cent); Seraficas (9.9 per cent); Suans (7.5 per 
																																								 																				
392 The Ormoc Task Force Scientific Study Group was organized by the Department of 
Science and Technology (DOST) in the immediate aftermath of the November 1991 Ormoc 
tragedy, with Undersecretary Ricardo Gloria as chair. Members of the study group included 
representatives from the DOST Region VIII; the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and 
Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) and Bureau of Soils and Water 
Management (BSWM) Region VIII, agencies under the supervision of the DOST; University 
of the Philippines College of Forestry in Los Baños; University of the Philippine Diliman; 
Visayas State College of Agriculture (VISCA); and the Department of Public Works and 
Highways Region VIII.  
393 Local Government of Barangay Tongonan Ormoc City website, Ibid.  
394 Ibid. 
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cent); Sumalings (5.7 per cent); Tans (5.2 per cent); and the Torreses (6.6 
per cent).  
The creation of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) in 1973, 
enacted through Presidential Decree No. 334 to “promote industrial and 
over-all economic development through the effective and efficient utilization 
of energy sources, including oil and oil-based resources,”395 further opened 
the forest reserve in Ormoc City to human settlement and natural resource 
exploitation. Notably, the PNOC commissioned the three-megawatt 
geothermal power plant in Barangay Tongonan by 1977.396 The geothermal 
reservation area itself had a total of 107,625 hectares, straddling Ormoc City 
and the municipality of Kananga. By 1987, a nine-kilometer concrete road 
was constructed from Barangay Milagro to Sitio Welcome in Barangay 
Tongonan. In 1991, PNOC had a forest cover of thirty-six (36) per cent, 
higher than the national average of twenty-five (25) per cent, and certainly 
better than the fifty (50) per cent decrease in forest cover experienced by 
Leyte province in the previous eighteen years mainly due to illegal logging.397 
Legally, in 1991, the area within the geothermal reservation in Barangay 
Tongonan, formerly under the jurisdiction of the Philippine National Oil 
Corporation (PNOC)—which was later privatized in 2007 when the Lopez 
group of companies bought and renamed it the Energy Development 
Corporation (EDC)—totalled 1,516 hectares. Of these, 1,366 hectares were 
classified as alienable or disposable and 150 hectares as forestland located 
within headwaters or creeks. The area outside the geothermal reservation, or 
3,135 hectares in total, was classified alienable and disposable primarily for 
agricultural use as early as 1962.398 The watershed is situated within the 
barangays of Patag, Donghol, Biliboy, Bagong, Dolores, Mahayag and 
																																								 																				
395 Presidential Decree 334, otherwise known as the “Charter of the Philippine National Oil 
Company,” sec. 2. 
396 Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC). “Milestones.” Copyright 2007, accessed 18 
February 2014 (Online). According to Agnes de Jesus, PNOC spokesperson in November 
1991, and reiterated by DENR Secretary Factoran in subsequent interviews, the Ormoc 
reservation was turned over to PNOC in 1984. See C. Pablo, “Illegal logging caused floods,” 
Malaya, 8 November 1991, 1&3.   
397 C. Pablo, “Illegal logging caused floods,” Ibid., 1&3; “DENR rules out deforestation as 
main cause of flashflood,” Philippine Times Journal, 11 November 1991, 16; and, A.M. 
Pamintuan and F. Verga, “Cory orders probe of illegal logging; Factoran says 4 Leyte 
Mayors involved,” Philippine Star, 12 November 1991, 1&5.  
398  Implemented by virtue of the LC Map No. 2501 FAO 4-1028. 
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Milagro. The PNOC, however, was far from a popular public institution. It is 
notable that in the immediate aftermath of the November 1991 tragedy, 
negative public perception centered on the PNOC’s ability to protect the 
reservation area given its limited manpower. This perception was further 
complicated by public distrust of its development agenda, particularly energy 
generation dependent on the exploitation of natural resources.399 As a result, 
the PNOC had to issue a statement in the aftermath of the 1991 Ormoc 
tragedy re-affirming its commitment to protect and preserve the forest within 
its jurisdiction, while ensuring a reliable supply of geothermal energy.400 
Yet to what extent was illegal logging a prevalent practice in the 
reservation area? In 1987, the PNOC filed an illegal logging case against a 
Colonel Romeo Arsenio, when timber from the municipality of Albuera was 
found in his fishing boat.401 While this case was eventually dismissed, 
another case was pursued by the Department of National Defense (DND) 
against Arsenio for alleged illegal cutting of rattan palms.402 According to 
Agnes de Jesus in November 1991, chief of the PNOC environmental 
management division, illegal loggers blatantly operated in the reservation 
area managed by the PNOC.403 Since the PNOC began operations in Leyte 
in 1988, it had undertaken 236 confiscations of illegally cut timber from the 
area, but only forty-four (44) cases had been filed resulting in convictions 
while the rest were dismissed.404 Nationwide, 755 cases were pending in 
																																								 																				
399 Leyte Vice Governor Aurelio Menzon wanted to file a case against PNOC to force it to 
stop drilling in Mount Alto Peak, which according to him was affecting the operations of the 
Leyte Metropolitan Water District. DENR Provincial head Edgardo Galeon accused the 
PNOC of not heading his call to stop operations within the Binahaan Catchment. Regional 
Director Victor Domingo of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) said he will support a 
class suit against PNOC for dumping chemical wastes into the river.  See “Leyte officials 
threatening to sue state-owned PNOC,” Philippine Star, 18 November 1991, 1&2.  
400 “PNOC denies charges of Leyte officials,” Philippine Star, 20 November 1991, 1&9. 
401 F. Verga and R. Reyes, “68 top DENR men in illegal logging; only 39 convictions in 755 
cases noted,” Philippine Star, 15 November 1991, 1&6.  
402 Cited in Verga and Reyes, Ibid. 
403 “Leyte forests ravaged, gov’t exec confirms,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8 December 1991, 
1&10. 
404 The DENR regional executive director at that time, Rosalio Goze, however, denies de 
Jesus’ testimony during a probe of the committee on environment and natural resources at 
the House of Representatives that there was massive illegal logging in Leyte. Ibid. 
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courts for illegal logging, but there were only thirty-nine (39) convictions while 
seventy-nine (79) were acquitted.405 
The problem of successfully prosecuting illegal loggers points to the 
glaring weakness of law enforcement in forest protection. Most cases filed 
against timber poachers and illegal loggers were commonly dismissed for 
lack of sufficient evidence, problems due to technicalities, or because those 
charged were able to influence corrupt government officials to drop the cases 
filed against them.406 In a separate inquiry by the Philippine National Police 
(PNP) led by Deputy Director General Manuel Roxas, both General Garcia 
and Colonel Acop were cleared of any involvement in illegal logging 
activities, despite the observation raised by the environmental group, SOS 
Earth, of the probe’s apparent haste in closing the cases.407 Indeed, the 
refusal of the military in 1991 to even acknowledge some of its members’ 
complicity in illegal logging, despite evidence,408 indicates the complexity of 
apprehending and prosecuting violators.409 
Violations against Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 or the 
Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines were governed in 1991 by Articles 
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, which equate illegal logging with 
theft.410 As such, the punishment for the crime of illegal logging as theft 
																																								 																				
405 F. Verga, “DENR officials call for imposition of death penalty on illegal loggers,” Philippine 
Star, 16 November 1991, 1&9. 
406 O. Embido, “Forest law enforcement and investigation techniques in the Philippines,” in 
Summary Report of the Forest Law Enforcement and Governance East Asia Ministerial 
Conference, 11-13 September 2001, written and ed. L. Ivers and L. Mead. International 
Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). Copyright 1992-2016 (Online).  
407 Ibid. 
408 See, for example, M. Vitug, Chapter 3, “Soldiers in the woods,” in The Politics of Logging, 
Power from the Forest (1993), which traces the connivance of numerous military officials in 
deforestation activities as early as the 1970s in northern Mindanao and in the mid-1980s in 
other parts of the country. 
409 General Lisandro Abadia, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff, stated 
that allegations pertaining to military officials’ involvement in illegal logging “have been put to 
rest.” See F. Verga, “DENR to name mayor, others in illegal logging; solon seeks release of 
seized P9-m narra,” Philippine Star, 19 November 1991, 1&5.  
410 Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Primer on Illegal Logging, 4-
7. The Philippine Revised Penal Code defines theft in Art. 308 as an act “committed by any 
person who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor 
force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.” Theft 
is also the finding of lost property but failing to deliver it to local authorities or its owner; 
maliciously damaging the property of another, or removing or making use of the fruits or 
object that the damage caused; and trespassing a property of another person without the 
consent of the owner to hunt, fish or gather cereals or other forest or farm products.   
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imposed imprisonment not exceeding twenty years, depending on the value 
of the timber that was stolen. The common penalty for conviction of illegal 
logging was a maximum sentence of six years imprisonment and a fine of not 
more than 6,000 pesos. In most cases, convictions resulted in sentences of 
only one-month imprisonment and a 200-peso fine.411 However, 
consideration in the law was made for the offender’s extenuating 
circumstances, particularly if theft was proven as caused by “hunger, 
poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of himself or 
his family.”412 Illegal logging was deemed to have been committed if a person 
is found to possess timber or other forest products without legal documents. 
Thus, the onus of proof was with the DENR, which issued the appropriate 
licenses. This conundrum was succinctly stated by acting Secretary of the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), Silvestre Bello III, in the great flood of 
November 1991 in relation to the identification of at least 3,000 illegal logging 
cases pending at that time in the courts and prosecutors’ offices nationwide: 
“We cannot engage in fact finding,” he said, “We have to wait for the 
complaints to be forwarded to us.”413 After the November 1991 tragedy, 
DENR Secretary Factoran linked two environment regional officials and 66 
personnel to illegal logging. Most of the cases involved conniving with illegal 
loggers, receiving bribes, allowing illegal logging of trees, releasing logs 
without licenses, illegally issuing certificates for non-existent logs, extortion 
and issuing permits on illegally sourced logs.414 The DENR’s vulnerability to 
both corruption and harassment indicate the systemic weakness in forest 
protection.415 In a report released to the media in November 1991, the DENR 
stated that there were 147 cases of harassment against its officials and 
personnel by illegal loggers themselves, political leaders and military 
																																								 																				
411 R. Villadiego, “Factoran bares list of DENR men linked to illegal logging,” 1&12. 
412 Revised Penal Code, Art.309, No. 8. A more specific law was promulgated in 2002 to 
address the problem of illegal logging through Republic Act No. 9175, “An Act Regulating 
the Ownership, Possession, Sale, Importation and Use of Chainsaws, Penalizing Violations 
thereof and for Other Purposes.” 
413 F. Verga and R. Reyes, “68 top DENR men in illegal logging: Only 39 convictions in 755 
cases noted,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 15 November 1991, 1&6.  
414 R. Villadiego, “Factoran bares list of DENR men linked to illegal logging.”  
415 See P. Utting (ed.), Forest Policy and Politics in the Philippines, The Dynamics of 
Participatory Conservation (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University and the United 
Research Institute for Social Development, 2000), especially M. Vitug, “Forest policy and 
national politics,” 11-39; and, B. Malayang III, “The changing role of government in forest 
protection,” 40-66.  
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officials.416 Secretary Factoran further pointed out that in addition to 
harassments and threats to life rendering DENR personnel virtually useless 
in protecting forests, the agency itself was incapable of sending “big fish” to 
jail because of the lack of witnesses willing to testify in court, lack of 
evidence admissible in court, and lack of legal assistance and logistics, in 
some cases.417 The Department of Justice (DOJ) sent a team on 15 
November 1991 to conduct an inventory of illegal logging cases pending with 
the prosecutor’s office and the courts in Ormoc, and discovered that the 
records of illegal logging cases filed there prior to 1988 could not be found.418 
Only nine cases of illegal logging were found filed in Leyte, with five each in 
Tacloban City and Ormoc.419 
Illegal logging had accelerated the disaster that occurred on 5 
November 1991. But legal logging was as much, indeed more so, to blame 
for deforestation in Ormoc prior to 1991. As this chapter has shown, the 
occurrence of environmental changes to forests on Leyte that had occurred 
nearly over a century prior to 1991—namely illegal logging perpetrated by 
timber poachers and illegal loggers in collusion with corrupt government 
officials, police and military personnel, and legal logging sanctioned under 
numerous government policies and programs—not only led to the 
catastrophe of the November 1991 flash flood. It also highlighted the fragility 
of national institutions notably the DENR, mandated not only to protect the 







416 “Factoran blames military, politicians for bald forests,” Philippine Times Journal, 21 
November 1992, 15. 
417Ibid. The term “big fish” is commonly used in Philippine media to refer to wealthy 
financiers and corrupt politicians and bureaucrats who finance or protect illegal operations.   
418Justice Undersecretary Alejandro Urro, in a report to DOJ Secretary Silvestre Bello III, 
said, “No record of cases filed prior to 1988 could be found.” See P. Arias, “Death penalty 
proposed for illegal loggers,” Manila Bulletin, 16 November 1991, 1&24. 
419Cited in the DOJ report in F. Verga, “DENR officials call for imposition of death penalty on 
illegal loggers,” Philippine Star, 16 November 1991, 1&9.  





TYPHOON, FLASH FLOOD AND DISASTER 
 
…when we went upstairs, I said, it is like the story of the Ark of Noah. It was like 
that. There was nothing. I was really trembling. Then I cried. Our prayer was that 
nothing, nothing [Victor Arcuiño: Comes after] yes! If nothing came after we will be 
okay. It was the end of the world! We cried, my husband and I.420 
    - Apining, Interview with author, 6 April 2013 in Ormoc City, original in Bisaya 
So afterwards the water subsided and the river went back to normal. It was like only 
thirty minutes. Everything was lined up. The place was really like a piece of hell. 
There were no more trees, everything was dead, animals, people, everything. In the 
streets everything was dead. In the sea, the dead were floating. Things were 
scattered all about the city. So the only thing that remained with me was my 
underwear. I was only in my underwear though the back was torn because there 
was a child who wanted to grab hold of me.421 
- Buboy, Interview with author, 4 April 2013 in Ormoc City, original in mixed Filipino and 
English 
 In the morning of 5 November 1991, a “relatively small and weak 
storm system”422 resulted in the worst flooding in the Philippines in seven 
years. Municipalities along the foot of the Alto peak mountain ranges, where 
residual forests423 could be found, were utterly devastated. The death toll, 
second only to the massive destruction wrought by the Moro Gulf earthquake 
and tsunami near the islands of Mindanao and Sulu in 1976,424 was so 
extraordinary that in Ormoc City alone, at least 4,000 people were estimated 
to have been killed outright, with thousands more injured and reported 
																																								 																				
420 Apining, interview with author, 6 April 2013 in Ormoc City, original in Filipino, transcribed 
and translated by author. Victor Arcuino, the author’s interpreter, was present during this 
interview.  
421 Buboy, interview with author, April 4, 2013 in Ormoc City, original in Filipino, transcribed 
and translated by author. 
422 M. Pearson and J. Oliver, Reconnaissance Report: Flooding resulting from Typhoon 
Uring in Ormoc City, Leyte Province, the Philippines, Miscellaneous Paper GL-92-12 
(Washington D.C.: US Army Corps of Engineers 1992), 12. 
423A residual forest is defined as “The status or condition of a forest subsequent to 
commercial logging and which there is more or less sufficient or adequate volume of 
residuals or the desired species of trees of future harvest.” It is differentiated from a natural 
forest, which is defined as “Forest composed of indigenous trees, not planted by man.” 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), “Philippine official reference for 
forest-related terms and definitions.” Manila, Bureau of Forestry (Undated), accessed 3 
March 2014 (Online). 
424 See V. Badillo, “The Moro Gulf Tidal Wave of 17 August 1976,” in Philippine Studies Vol. 
26 No. 4 (Ateneo de Manila University, Fourth Quarter 1978), 426-436. 
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missing. Politically and economically, the 1991 Ormoc tragedy could not 
have come at a worse time. More perplexing was that although Typhoon 
Uring affected a number of municipalities not only in Leyte but in other parts 
of the Visayas as well, why was it only in Ormoc that a catastrophe of biblical 
proportions occurred? If Typhoon Uring was a weak weather disturbance, 
why did it trigger such a deadly flood? This chapter looks at the social 
anatomy of the Ormoc disaster in 1991. It also explores the competing 
discourses that emerged in its aftermath, with the objective of understanding 
how the disaster was experienced by particular communities and individuals. 
Weather and Climate of Ormoc 
Several theories had been forwarded to explain the heavy rainfall on 5 
November and its extraordinary effect in terms of a deadly flood. One, the 
“orographic effect” hypothesized that when Typhoon Uring came in contact 
with the mountains of Samar and Leyte, it rose to a higher altitude thereby 
cooling and condensing huge quantities of water vapor which then formed 
into cumulonimbus capillatus rain clouds. Second, because Uring was a slow 
moving typhoon with a speed of only about eleven (11) kilometers per hour 
(kph), its rains were concentrated over the Leyte mountain range, including 
the Ormoc watershed as well as the eastern towns of Jaro, Burauen, Dagami 
and Pastrana, which all have watersheds in the same area and were 
similarly flooded. Third, the habagat or the monsoon blew against Uring 
resulting in a convergence that could have occurred in the mountain ranges 
around Alto Peak. Ormoc victim-survivors insist on hearing explosions just 
before the deluge, which many believed to be thunder (with superstitions 
saying that thunder signified the end of rain), but may have been several 
buhawi425 (with some respondents stating as many as a thousand occurring 
that morning) or waterspouts. Another common theory, particularly in the 
immediate aftermath of the flood, was the failure of Lake Danao in the 
watershed area, which breached its banks and flooded the city.  
Leyte is situated in an area highly conducive not only to the genesis, 
but most importantly the path of tropical cyclones, which can occur during 
																																								 																				
425 Filipino, lit. water spouts.  
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almost any month. It is relevant here to note briefly the findings from a study 
of tropical cyclones that hit the Philippine islands during a 45-year period 
from 1945-1989,426 as a starting point in understanding the extraordinary 
development of Typhoon Uring in Ormoc City in November 1991. First, the 
Philippines commonly experiences tropical cyclones between September 
and November, with a peak in November. Second and more importantly, the 
nature of tropical cyclones crossing the Philippines tend to weaken, but those 
with intensity of less than fifty (50) knots (kt or 92.60 kph) at landfall do not 
weaken significantly. As such, the amount of weakening is proportional to 
intensity, although weakening is less for those passing south of 14.5o. Third, 
tropical cyclones moving faster than fifteen (15) knots (or about 28 kph) tend 
to slow down after making landfall, while those moving 15 knots or less have 
little velocity change. Fourth, tropical cyclones moving south or west tend to 
curve more westward after landfall, but those moving west-northwestward 
show little change of direction. Fifth, the average time over land is twenty 
hours south of 14.5o N, but only eleven hours north of 14.5o N due to the 
narrow E-W dimension of Luzon. Sixth, the average intensity at landfall for 
cyclones hitting the Philippines, or “just before landfall,” is 66.9 knots (or 
123.89 kph). Thus, even those tropical cyclones that miss the Philippines are 
still significant because preparations must still be made and therefore these 
cyclones must still be closely monitored. Finally, tropical depressions (25-30 
knots or 46-56 kph) do not have wind threat, but can still cause heavy 
rainfall. Tropical storms (35-62 knots or 65-115 kph), both those categorized 
as weak (35-45 knots or 65-83 kph) and strong ((≥50-60 knots or ≥93-111 
kph), may weaken but weak ones generally do not weaken significantly 
compared with strong storms. The more intense the typhoon, the more its 
intensity can decrease while passing through the islands.  
During ‘normal’ times, it has been noted that only winds from the 
south-southeast to the south-southwest blow directly against Ormoc. Indeed, 
																																								 																				
426 However, the lack of satellite coverage of the earlier portion of the record resulted in the 
identification of fewer weak tropical cyclones, thereby lowering the number of tropical 
cyclones that hit the Philippines by more than one per year (or 20 percent). Thus, the focus 
of the study in the climatology section was only on a twenty-year period from 1970 to 1989. 
See F. Williams, G. Jung and R. Engelbretson, Forecasters Handbook for the Philippine 
Islands and Surrounding Waters (Monterey, California: Naval Research Laboratory, 
December 1993) (Online).  
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based on thousands of wind direction observations,427 winds that affect 
Ormoc hardly ever follow a southwest to northwest direction. In addition, 
northeasternly winds blow mainly from December to April, while from May to 
November the winds blow mostly from south-southwest. Humidity decreases 
from December to March because north-easternly winds would deposit their 
moisture while passing over Samar and the mountains of Leyte before 
reaching Ormoc. Additionally, May to November winds are southerly moist. 
Relative humidity from April to December is on an increase, with temperature 
from May to September constantly high and rainfall and cloudiness heaviest 
from July to September.  
Nonetheless, while typhoons appear to bring mostly negative 
consequences, its positive consequences are part and parcel of Philippine 
life. They influence temperature, air moisture, rainfall, and wind direction and 
force, which especially for weak typhoons are boons to agriculture. In Ormoc 
specifically, because it is buffeted by mountain ranges to the east, the city 
enjoys a relatively balanced weather and climate. It has been noted, for 
instance, that from 1902 to 1929 there was not one day in any month without 
rain, and of the severe drought of 1914 to 1915 that harshly afflicted Candon 
in western Luzon bringing no rain for 122 days, it appeared in a much milder 
form in Ormoc lasting only twenty-nine (29) days.428  
The Janus face of typhoons as both a beneficial and destructive force 
has been constant realities in the lives of Filipinos. Coronas (1920) puts it 
pithily when he says:  
That typhoons have a great influence on the climate and the weather 
in the Philippines cannot be reasonably doubted. Our rainfall in 
summer and autumn, many of our prevailing winds, particularly in 
summer, the great wind velocity of several months for a good number 
of our stations, etc. etc., are to be attributed to the influence of 
typhoons. Most of the greatest changes of weather experienced in our 
Archipelago as to precipitation, humidity, cloudiness, and winds, are 
																																								 																				
427 Manila Observatory, “Climate Profile of Borongan, Guiuan, Tacloban and Ormoc,” 
Unpublished paper (Ateneo de Manila University Rizal Library, Undated).   
428 Ibid. 
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caused only by typhoons. Hence the importance of this matter in any 
writing on the weather and climate of the Philippines.429  
To the extent that Typhoon Uring had been a ‘normal’ occurrence on 5 
November 1991 may have influenced the ordinary Ormocanon to disregard 
typhoon-warning signals and assume higher risks until it was too late, and 
more disturbingly to understand the seeming absence of social discourse 
beyond the labelling of the 1991 tragedy as kalit (or sudden).  
The unremarkable typhoon 
 In Guam, the Joint Typhoon Warning Center (JTWC) first sighted a 
tropical disturbance in the eastern Caroline Islands on 27 October 1991 that 
was following a west-northwest direction.430 It persisted for four days, after 
which the JWTC, following its protocols, issued a Tropical Cyclone Formation 
Alert four days after sighting, on 31 October, becoming the twenty-seventh 
tropical cyclone of the western North Pacific for 1991.431 The alert was 
upgraded to a Tropical Depression Warning on 1 November following a 
satellite-derived intensity report of twenty-five (25) knots or foty-six (46) 
kph.432  
At the same time, the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) began 
tracking the system as a tropical depression situated roughly 415 kilometers 
north-northeast of Palau.433 JMA would later call it Typhoon No. 25.434 Initial 
forecasts showed the system heading west on a path arcing out to sea. If it 
had followed that track, it would have completely missed the Philippines. But 
in the early morning of 2 November, it shifted course and headed straight for 
the Philippines, carrying maximum sustained winds of fifty-five (55) kph. As a 
																																								 																				
429 J. Coronas, The Climate and Weather of the Philippines, 1903 to 1918 (Manila: Bureau of 
Printing 1920), 165. 
430 D. Rudolph and C. Guard, 1991 Annual Tropical Cyclone Report (Guam, Marianas 
Islands: Joint Typhoon Warning Center, Undated), 132. 
431 F. Williams, G. Jung and R. Englebretson, Forecasters Handbook for the Philippine 
Islands and Surrounding Waters, 3-26.  
432 Ibid. 
433 Kitamoto Asanobu, “Digital typhoon: Typhoon 199125 (Thelma)” (Japan: Research 
Organization of Information and Systems (ROIS)/National Institute of Informatics (NII), 
Undated), accessed 18 December 2013 (Online).  
434 S. Herath, “Floods in Ormoc City, Leyte on November 5, 1991,” in Seisan-Kenkyu Journal 
of Institute of Industrial Science Vol. 45 No. 3 (University of Tokyo, 1993), 193 (Online).  
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result, the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services 
Administration (PAGASA), the country’s weather bureau, began to track it. 
The tropical depression was assigned the local name ‘Uring’ as soon as it 
entered the Philippine Area of Responsibility (PAR), the seventeenth tropical 
cyclone for 1991. Uring appeared to be an ‘ordinary’ typhoon. 
Up until two p.m. of 2 November, Uring had followed a northwest 
direction, where typhoons typically pass upon entry into the Philippine 
islands.435 But by the afternoon of 3 November, Uring changed trajectory to 
follow a west-southwest path towards the island of Samar.436 It was first 
classified as a tropical storm, but quickly dropped to fifty-five (55) kph on 5 
November, corresponding to a tropical depression.437 On that day, Uring 
made landfall in eastern Samar. Storm signal number two was raised over 
Samar, Leyte, Masbate and Sorsogon at four in the morning of 5 November. 
But it was lowered to Signal Number 1 by 11:00 a.m. of the same day.438 
Opposite the track followed by Uring, a separate wind system—the monsoon 
or habagat—was also believed to be brewing in the atmosphere over eastern 
Visayas, possibly converging over the mountain ranges of Alto Peak.439 
Experts call this phenomenon the “orographic lift,” whereby as air masses 
move further upward, water vapor cools and condenses, resulting in more 
rain.440 The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)-
Region VIII believed that there was the “presence of heavy rain in funnel 
form due to [the] whirling pattern of air movement.”441 As Uring slowly 
advanced over Tacloban City, intense rain started at about 7:30 a.m. of 5 
																																								 																				
435 Environmental Research Division, Manila Observatory, The Ormoc City Tragedy of 
November 5, 1991: An Evaluation of the Different Contributing Factors, 2nd Ed. 
(Environmental Science for Social Change, October 1992), 10 (Online). For an early 
discussion on the general conditions of the Philippine climate and exceptional conditions 
from 1903-1918, see J. Coronas, The Climate and Weather of the Philippines, 1903 to 1918.  
436 This recurvature was thought to have been induced by a push from a cold front coming 
from the north, characteristic of some typhoons occurring late in the year. Indeed, the JTWC 
contends in a report that initial track forecasts mistakenly predicted Uring’s (Thelma’s) 
recurvature into the westerlies. See D. Rudolph and C. Guard, 1991 Annual Tropical 
Cyclone Report, 133. 
437 A tropical storm is defined as a moderate tropical cyclone with maximum wind speed of 
64 to 118 kph and with closed isobars. A tropical depression, on the other hand, is a weak 
low pressure disturbance with a definite surface circulation and wind speed of up to 63 kph.   
438 Environmental Research Division, Ibid., 10. 
439 Ibid.,14.  
440 Ibid.,16.  
441 DENR-Region VIII, “Investigation report of the Ormoc City disaster,” 12. 
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November.442 Rainfall recorded in the PAGASA gauging station in Tacloban 
showed discharge of 140.2 millimeters (mm) in a 24-hour period, with the 
most intense rainfall occurring between 7:30 and 10:30 a.m.  
Intense rainfall in Ormoc began at approximately 9:30 a.m. on 5 
November, though it was already steadily raining since the night before.443 
Rainfall recorded from two rain gauges maintained by the Philippine National 
Oil Corporation (PNOC) in Barangay Tongonan in the uplands of Ormoc 
showed rainfall measuring 580 mm and 350 mm within a 24-hour period. 
This record amount of rainfall was way above the normal level for rainfall 
received in Ormoc in past typhoons. In November 1984, for example, 
Typhoon Undang registered rainfall at 153 millimeters, while Typhoon 
Ruping in November 1990 had ninety-eight (98) millimeters, both within a 24-
hour period. Again, the average monthly rainfall for November recorded in 
Valencia, Ormoc City was 143.7 millimeters, which means that on average 
7.18 millimeters rainfall would be deposited within twenty-four hours.444 
Table 4.1 
Typhoon Uring Rainfall Records (4-6 November 1991) 
RAIN GAUGE STATION RAINFALL PERIOD OF MEASUREMENT 
Tacloban PAGASA 140.2 mm 3 hours 
Visayas State college of 






6 hours – 8 a.m. to 2 p.m. of 
November 5, 1991 
 
8 hours – 3:00 a.m. to 11:00 
a.m.* 
PNOC Tongonan Geothermal 
     TG II (near 
     administrative building) 
     Campsite/EDC Hostel 





24 hours – 8 a.m. Nov 4 
 
24 hours – 8 a.m. Nov 6 
																																								 																				
442 M. Pearson and J. Oliver, Reconnaissance Report, 12. 
443 DENR-Region VIII, “Investigation report of the Ormoc City Disaster”, 11. According to 
Jose Rollo, the rain gauge keeper at the PNOC Tongonan, the rain started in Tongonan at 
10:00 p.m. of November 4 and became excessive at 8:00 a.m. to about 11:00 a.m. the next 
day. According to Herath, intermittent heavy rain started at 6:00 a.m. with strong winds. See 
S. Herath, “Floods in Ormoc City, Leyte on November 5, 1991,” 193. These contradict 
statements made by my respondents that while rains were heavy, winds were not, which 
contributed to the complacency among residents that it was an ordinary typhoon.  
444 It is interesting to note here, however, that Eller and Asio observed in a paper that Ormoc 
had no rain gauge in 1991 and thus no precipitation data from 4-5 November 1991. E. Eller 
and V. Asio, “The flash flood-tragedy of Ormoc: A short analysis from a physio-geographical 
view.”  
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Isabel, Leyte (PASAR) 233.3 mm 24 hours 
Casilda, Merida, Leyte 115.0 mm 24 hours 
Sources: Special Task Group (STAG) of the Regional Disaster Coordinating Council of 
Eastern Visayas (Region VIII), “Investigation report of the Ormoc City disaster”, 1991; 
Environmental Research Division, The Ormoc City Tragedy of November 5, 1991; and, E. 
Eller and V. Asio, “The flash flood-tragedy of Ormoc: A short analysis from a physio-
geographical view.”  
Indeed the abnormally strong rain on 5 November prevented Jose 
Rollo, the rain gauge keeper at PNOC Tongonan, from making any recording 
on that fateful day. However, he did note that the rain started in Tongonan at 
ten p.m. on 4 November and became excessive at eight (8) a.m. the next 
day.  
The kalit445 flood 
 November 5 was an ordinary day. Though not everyone in Ormoc 
owned radios or knew there was a storm signal announced that day, there 
was no cause for concern.446 Ormoc was no stranger to typhoons, receiving 
at least four annually.447 As such, most school-age children went to school as 
usual because classes had not been called off that morning. Employees 
went to work. The public market was open and busy. Only Saint Peter’s 
College in the downtown area was still closed for the semester break. The 
Ormoc City High School situated along the Anilao River had classes that 
day, although teachers had later instructed their students to go home at the 
height of the rains. The Philippine National Bank (PNB), like other banks 
downtown, and other local establishments were business as usual. That day, 
students from Cebu and visitors to the city had come to Ormoc for the 
semester break, to celebrate All Soul’s Day on 1 November, and to do 
mundane chores in the city.448 Traffic in the major thoroughfares was for an 
ordinary weekday morning.  
																																								 																				
445 Bisaya, lit. unexpected. 
446 Berto stated it succinctly: “People were complacent because there was no wind, only rain 
thus, when the explosion (lit. of pagbuto) occurred, suddenly there was water that was very 
turbid mixed with mud.” Interview with author, 14 April 2013, in Ormoc City, original in 
Bisaya, transcribed and translated by author. 
447This statement was made in relation to the entire region VIII, where Ormoc belongs. 
DENR-Region VIII, “Investigation Report of the Ormoc City Disaster,” 12. 
448 Coloy and Councilor Jose Alfaro, simultaneous interviews with author, 19 March 2013, at 
the Ormoc City Hall, Ormoc City, original in mixed English and Filipino, transcribed by the 
author. Mr. Alfaro noted that, “According to rough estimates more than 8,000 people died 
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At the Ormoc watershed in the upland barangays, the massive volume 
of water brought by Typhoon Uring measuring 580.5 millimeters fell at a rate 
of 193.5 millimeters per hour.449  Due to historical land use as a 
predominantly grassland and agricultural area, the soils in these areas had 
poor absorption capacity. Thus, rainfall that Tuesday morning, occurring only 
in three hours, led to a massive build-up of surface run-off, which flowed 
quickly down the side of cliffs and mountains, and triggering numerous 
landslips and soil creeps in the upper slopes and steep embankments of the 
rivers and creeks. An hour after the peak of the intense downpour placed at 
about eleven a.m., landslips were occurring in the steep slopes of the 
watershed. According to the Manila Observatory, it was possible to 
extrapolate from meteorological principles that the higher watershed areas 
experienced more intense rainfall than those in lower areas.450 Though 
travelling at a slow speed of eleven (11) kph, Uring’s rain was concentrated 
over the mountain range that included the Ormoc watershed and the 
watersheds of eastern towns like Jaro, Burauen, Dagami and Pastrana, all of 
which had been subsequently flooded.451 DENR-Regional VIII executive 
director, Rosalio Goze, believes this was what had happened in Ormoc, 
where landslides first occurred at the watershed’s forest zone before rushing 





																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 											
during the flood, but not all of those people were from Ormoc. There were so many 
transients. People just passed by, who happened to be at the wrong place at the wrong 
time.” Coloy added, “There were many students here from Cebu, maybe on break, they went 
to their friends. They were also included, because that was still during the semestral break 
[following] November 1 and 2.”  
449 DENR-Region VIII, “Assessment of the causes of the flooding of Ormoc City, Leyte 
Island, Philippines,” consolidated technical findings of the five technical services of DENR 
Region VIII. Eastern Visayas: Forest Management, Mines and Geosciences, Environmental 
Management and Protected Areas, Lands Management, and Ecosystems Research and 
Development (1991), 7. 
450 Environmental Research Division, The Ormoc City Tragedy of November 5, 1991, 14. 
451 Ibid. 
452 Rosalio Goze (former Regional Executive Director, DENR-Region 8), interview with 
author, 1 December 2012, in Baguio City in Filipino, translated and transcribed by author. 
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Figure 4.1 
Longitudinal section showing possible causes of flash flooding vis-à-















Source: Based on the illustrations by Rosalio Goze, Regional Executive Director, in DENR-
Region VIII (Eastern Leyte), “Assessment on the Ormoc City Flood, November 5, 1991.”  
The floodwaters carried great amounts of soil and sand, gravel and 
woody debris, travelling at a velocity of 6.9 to 8.47 meters per second.453 On 
normal days, the time required for water to flow from the most distant point of 
the watershed in Barangay Tongonan to the watershed outlet under ‘normal’ 
precipitation rates and with ‘good’ soil cover was estimated to range from 5.6 
days for the Anilao River and 3.6 days for Malbasag River.454 On 5 
November, however, the flow velocity was so fast in fact that floodwaters 
from the watershed reached Ormoc City within an hour after the peak of the 
																																								 																				
453 Normal stream flows in the Upper Malbasag River was 1.136 meter/sec, Lower Malbasag 
at 0.78 meter/sec, Upper Anilao at 0.65 meter/sec, Middle Anilao at 0.63 meter/sec, and 
Lower Anilao at 0.57 meter/sec. DENR-Region VIII, “Assessment of the Causes of the 
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rainfall between 11 a.m. and 12 noon.455 A prodigious number of trees and 
coconut trunks were swept downstream at great speeds.456 As floodwaters 
hurled past acute natural river bends and man-made constrictions along 
riverbanks, some of the debris formed temporary dams and massive water 
impoundments. Small irrigation diversion structures, overflow bridges, and 
culverts constructed across river channels quickly became clogged. 
Waterline traces at various points in the channels afterwards showed 
floodwaters at heights of six to ten meters (or approximately 19 to 32 feet) 
from the riverbed, indicating where temporary dams and impounding had 
occurred.457 Barangay Nalunopan, where Malinawon Creek passed—a 
tributary of the Anilao River—was estimated to have flooded at a height of 
more than ten to fifteen feet.458 Ironically, the sugarcane fields situated on 
the plateau of the sugarcane plantation in Barangay Nalunopan was not 
damaged at all, but laborers’ houses located in lower elevations were swept 
away, some with entire families inside. The churning waters then hurtled 
towards the flood plains of the Anilao and Malbasag rivers. Just before 
entering the city proper, the Anilao River had an unnatural 90-degree bend. 
As the voluminous floodwaters met the final and last dam at Anilao Bridge, 
the overflow caused by driftwood and other debris inundated Isla Verde, a 
sandbar located just upstream of the bridge.459 Of the estimated 2,500 to 
3,000 residents living in Isla Verde prior to the flood, only 200 to 500 were 
estimated to have survived.460 The bridge collapsed before floodwaters 
rushed on to the city proper, rising to three meters in a span of seven 
																																								 																				
455 The DENR-Region VIII, “Assessment of the Causes of the Flooding” report estimated that 
floodwaters reached Ormoc City by 12:00 noon of November 5. The Manila Observatory 
report, however, believes that massive flooding in Ormoc City occurred at 11:00 a.m.  
456 Along the Malbasag river and its tributaries, a conservative inventory was made of 95 
trees and 357 coconut trunks, while there were 200 trees and 1,031 coconut trunks found 
along the Anilao River and its tributaries. These figures, however, do not include the trees 
and coconut trunks washed into Ormoc City and Ormoc Bay. See DENR-Region VIII, 
“Assessment of the Causes of the Flooding,” 8. 
457 Ibid. 
458 Ronald Boy and Baby, simultaneous interviews with author, 21 April 2013, in Ormoc City, 
original in Bisaya, transcribed and translated by author. 
459 S. Herath, Flood in Ormoc City November 5, 1991 Philippines Preliminary Report. (Camp 
Crame, Quezon City, Philippines: National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management 
Council, Undated), 11. 
460 H. Severino, “Ormoc revisited”; H. Severino, “Ormoc tragedy: Stage set for a repeat,” 
1&2; and, E. Tordesillas, “Ormoc: A year after: lessons learned, lessons ignored,” 1&10. 
However, according to my interviews with former Isla Verde survivors, who had been 
evacuated to Barangay Tambulilid, those who survived numbered only 50 or less.  
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minutes.461 The flooding then moved rapidly towards barangays Cogon, Don 
Felipe Larrazabal and Alegria, three of the biggest barangays in terms of 
population along the Anilao. Parallel to the Anilao River, the Malbasag River 
also overflowed, inundating Barangay Districts 16, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29. 
Bridges were completely destroyed and shanties along the riverbank were 
carried away like so many matchbox toys. Approximately one square 
kilometer of the heavily populated commercial and residential areas of 
downtown Ormoc was flooded, accounting for the heavy loss of lives and 
properties.462 The Panalian River in Barangay Ipil, found a few kilometres 
away from the city center, also submerged the Panalian Bridge, washing 
away some houses along its banks, though the flooding was not as bad as 
that in the city center.463 The total volume of water that flooded the city was 
estimated to have been 22,835,000 cubic meters.464 The total amount of 
sediment carried by the floodwaters was thought to have been equal to the 
total volume of water.465 
Death and destruction 
Typhoon Uring wreaked wide-scale havoc. In Negros Occidental, the 
primary sugar-producing province of the country, four municipalities and 
three cities including Bago, La Carlota and Bacolod were severely 
affected.466 In the province of Leyte, fifteen municipalities were devastated, 
including Albuera, Babatngon, Burauen, Dulag, Jaro, Julita and Pastrana 
which all had more than ten barangays adversely affected. Most of the 
deaths, missing and injured were from Albuera and Burauen, while majority 
																																								 																				
461 According to the Manila Observatory report, average water depth along the city streets 
was from three (3) to five (5) feet, with the water rising to seven (7) feet in 15 minutes at the 
peak of the flood. See Environmental Research Division, The Ormoc City Tragedy of 
November 5, 1991, 17.  
462 DENR-Region VIII, “Update on the Effects of Typhoon Uring that hit Leyte on November 
5, 1991,” 1-2. 
463 Barangay Captain Conrado Delgado, interview with author, 10 June 2013, at Barangay 
Ipil City Hall, Ormoc City.  
464 Environmental Research Division, The Ormoc City Tragedy of November 5, 1991, 17.  
465 Ibid. 
466 Reliefweb, “Report 3: November 8, 1991”; N. Abrematea, “Heavy floods hit Leyte; folk 
fleeing homes,” in Philippine Star, 6 November 1991, 1&8; M. Logan, “Typhoon leaves 2,122 
dead in Leyte, Negros; 1,494 families rendered homeless,” in Philippine Times Journal, 7 
November 1991, 1&6; L. Lacson and N. Abrematea, “’Uring’ kills 2,122 in Leyte, renders 
200,000 homeless,” in Philippine Star, 7 November 1991, 1&6; E. Tordesillas et al., “Leyte 
death toll rises to 6,500,” in Malaya, 8 November 1991, 1&3.  
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of families affected came from Albuera, Burauen, Dagami, Dulag, and Julita. 
But none of these municipalities came near to the devastation experienced 
by Ormoc City, as revealed in the validated disaster damage report compiled 
by the Manila Observatory in 1992: 
Table 4.2 
Validated Disaster Damage Report, as of 7 January 1992 
Municipality No. of 
barangays 
affected 
Casualties Number of Affected Damaged Houses 
Dead Missing Injured Families Persons Totally Partially 
Albuera 16 12 10 55 2,906 17,436 250 2,656 
Babatngon 22 - - 6 829 4,974 25 793 
Baybay 1 2 - - 2 12 2 - 
Burauen 28 42 4 109 2,537 11,289 444 2,093 
Dagami 6 1 - 33 3,730 7,526 82 1,100 
Dulag 23 6 - - 2,041 12,246 356 1,705 
Jaro 16 7 - 5 500 2,100 93 398 
Julita 16 1 - 21 1,000 3,160 113 706 
Mayorga 4 - - - 250 1,500 20 385 
Merida 3 - - - 322 1,932 20 302 
Pastrana 11 7 - - 646 3,876 109 537 
Tabontabon 6 3 - - 584 2,748 7 - 
Tunga 3 - - 8 50 200 10 40 
Tacloban 
City 
5 - - - 6 48 - - 
Ormoc City 110 4,000a 2,500 3,020 22,891 122,363 2,915 11,514 
TOTAL 270 4,081 2,514 3,257 38,294 193,410 4,446 22,229 
Notes: 
a In the report by the Provincial Disaster Coordinating Council (PDCC) as of 3:00 p.m. of 18 
November 1991, submitted by the office of Governor Leopoldo Petilla to Chief Supt. Vicente 
Garcia, Chair of the Regional Disaster Coordinating Council (RDCC), Ormoc’s reported 
deaths had already reached 4,555 by 18 November 1991. 
Source: Based on “Table 1: Validated Disaster Damage Report, Typhoon Uring, as of 
January 7, 1992”, in Environmental Research Division, The Ormoc City Tragedy of 
November 5, 1991, 5.  
 
 In Ormoc alone, where the extent of deaths and infrastructural 
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Table 4.3 
Estimates of dead, injured and missing, number of families and/or 
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4,555 1,202 20 621 
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1991)d 
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Notes and Sources:  
a Cited in C. Velarde et al., “2,000 dead; 3,000 missing in Leyte town,” Malaya, 7 November 
1991, 1&2. 
b Reliefweb also noted that the “[e]xact number [had] to be verified, since people [in Ormoc] 
buried relatives without informing authorities.” Reliefweb, “Report 4: November 11, 1991,” 
in Philippines Floods Nov 1991 UNDRO Situation Reports 1-8 (Online). For the number 
of injured, UNDRO stated that the “relatively low number of injured reflects sudden nature 
and strength of the floods, which reached height up to ten feet.” 
c R. Gloria, Chair in Ormoc Task Force Scientific Study Group Report (1991), Annex 1. 
d Provincial Disaster Coordinating Council, Disaster Report Form II, Progress Report Re 
Typhoon Uring as of 3:00 PM November 18, 1991,” submitted by the Office of Governor 
Leopoldo Petilla, Chair of the Provincial Disaster Coordinating Council (PDCC), to Chief 
Supt. Vicente Garcia, Chair of the Regional Disaster Coordinating Council (RDCC). 
e Cited as official figures by the city government in H. Severino, “Ormoc revisited,” first 
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer (April 21-22, 1992). Also H. Severino, “Ormoc 
tragedy: Stage set for a repeat,” Malaya, 20 April 1992, 1&2.  
f De Leon and Laigo further note that “these statistics are conservative compared to the 
figures given by the media. The number of missing persons and unconfirmed deaths can 
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be very high.” C. De Leon and L. Laigo, “Flood relief and rehabilitation in Ormoc: 
Experiences and Insights of Administrators,” 327-335. 
g Etched onto the monument built on top of the mass grave at the Ormoc Public Cemetery 
inaugurated on November 7, 2011 as part of the 20-year anniversary of the tragedy. The 
inauguration was led by mayor Eric Codilla, who said that lives lost in November 1991 
was nearly 8,000.  
 
 Confusion persists on just how many were killed and still remain 
missing today as a result of that flash flood. Indeed, twenty-two years hence, 
the efficient assessment and recording of disaster casualties is a recurring 
issue in the Philippines, notably highlighted in the aftermath of another 
appalling tragedy in November 2013, when Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) 
caused a storm surge in Leyte and eastern Samar that devastated Tacloban 
City and other municipalities. President Benigno Aquino blamed ‘emotional 
drama’ for an early estimate of 10,000 deaths and consequently lowered it to 
2,000.467 Of course, actual reports would later show the fallacy of Aquino’s 
premature statement,468 but the recent discourse illustrates the recurring 
political nature of estimating casualties in the aftermath of major disasters.469 
In Ormoc in 1991, the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO) 
itself noted in its report that many survivors buried their dead without 
informing authorities, a situation repeated in the November 2013 storm surge 
of Typhoon Yolanda.470 In addition, the local government in Ormoc at that 
time had admitted that no precise accounting of the dead was made due to 
the lack of personnel and “the more pressing need to immediately bury the 
corpses and take care of the survivors,”471 in order to avoid the spread of 
contagious diseases. So how were the estimates arrived at in 1991? 
Barangay officials were crucial in reporting casualties in their own 
																																								 																				
467 See, for example, N. Golgowski, “Typhoon Haiyan death toll closer to 2,000, Philippine 
president says, amid 2 American casualties,” in Daily News, 12 November 2013 (Online).  
468 Reported deaths from Supertyphoon Haiyan (Yolanda) and the resulting storm surge 
were 6,201 individuals as of 6:00 a.m. on January 29, 2014; 28,626 injured and 1,785 
missing. National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), “NDRRMC 
Update, SitRep No. 104 Effects of Typhoon ‘Yolanda’ (Haiyan)’ (January 29, 2014)” (Online).  
469 “After disaster, tallying death toll difficult,” in Philippine Daily Inquirer, 14 November 2013 
(Online).  
470 Reliefweb, “Report 4: November 11, 1991.” Dr. Celso Adolfo, Ormoc City Health Officer, 
said an accurate death count was difficult because many people were finding and burying 
relatives without notifying authorities. See R. Puaben and M.R. Feliciano, “Cory off to Leyte; 
denudation probed,” Malaya, 10 November 1991, 1&2.  
471 M. Duenas, “Tragedy in Ormoc: Killer flood,” Philippine Free Press, 23 November 1991, 
4-5 & 21.  
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barangays.472 The local government—specifically the City Disaster 
Coordinating Council (CDCC), which in November 1991 was observed to 
have been largely non-operational473--then collated the information for further 
verification and collation by the Provincial Disaster Coordinating Council 
(PDCC) and the Regional Disaster Coordinating Council (RDCC). The 
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), which at the time 
had not yet devolved its functions to the local government as part of the 
provisions of the 1991 Local Government Code,474 had its own estimates 
based on its own reporting and operation procedures.475 The Philippine 
National Red Cross (PNRC), meanwhile, issued another set of casualty 
estimates.476 
These widely varying estimates have resulted in a statistical dilemma, 
a situation also experienced after the 2004 Asian tsunami where separate 
government offices in Indonesia gave significantly different figures, and again 
after the November 2013 Typhoon Yolanda storm surge which pitted local 
officials’ estimates with that of the national ‘official’ one. In Ormoc, the death 
toll after the 1991 tragedy has contributed to the mythical ominous aura of 
the flood in various retelling, but also to the allegation that the numbers had 
been deliberately bloated to attract more international aid.477 Nevertheless, 
what is clear is that there had been no attempt, either by the local 
government or private entities and individuals, to systematically list the 
																																								 																				
472 See, for example, N. Abrematea, “Heavy floods hit Leyte; folk fleeing homes,” Philippine 
Star, 6 November 1991, 1&8.  
473C. de Leon and L. Laigo, “Flood relief and rehabilitation in Ormoc: Experiences and 
insights of administrators,” in Philippine Journal of Public Administration (Diliman, Quezon 
City: College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1993), 330.  
474 Republic Act No. 7160, Local Government Code of the Philippines, Devolving Certain 
Functions to LGUs, including the Enforcement of Laws on Cleanliness and Sanitation, and 
Preparation of their Respective Solid Waste Management Programs, Art. 13, “The Social 
Welfare and Development Officer,” effectively transferring public functions in social welfare 
and development to the local government.  
475 See, for example, de Leon and Laigo, “Flood relief and rehabilitation in Ormoc,” 327-335. 
476 See, for example, L. Lacson and N. Abrematea, “’Uring’ kills 2,122 in Leyte, renders 
200,000 homeless,” Philippine Star, 7 November 1991, 1&6; C. Velarde et al., “2,000 dead; 
3,000 missing in Leyte Floods,” Malaya, 7 November 1991, 1&2; and, E. Tordesillas et al., 
“Leyte death toll rises to 6,500,” Malaya, 8 November 1991, 1&3.  
477 Anonymous interview with a former City Administrator by the author, 7 October 2013, in 
Ormoc City Hall. Respondent alleged that he did not believe the number of dead in 1991 
reached more than 1,000 and that it was highly possible this figure had been bloated to 
attract more funding. He insisted it was mind-boggling to imagine 8,000 being washed out to 
sea or even the number of trips a dump truck would make to cart away 5,000 people when a 
truckload of dead bodies would at most carry only about 50 in one trip.  
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names of the dead and missing. Today, they continue to remain faceless and 
nameless in a city that has retained few visible reminders of that fateful day. 
They remain anonymous even in the mass grave where thousands of bodies 
were buried in November 1991. It is also irrefutable that most of those who 
perished came from “highly-populated low-income settlements in an area of 
approximately twenty-five sq. km outside the town center.”478 It is to these 
low-income settlements and those who resided in them that we come to next, 
in an attempt to resurrect lives that had been largely forgotten by a city intent 
on looking forward to further urbanization rather than in a contemplation of its 
past.  
Isla Verde: Isle of death 
 Isla Verde, contrary to its name, was not a real island. It was a 
sandbar created by accretion, “a delta of alluvial deposit along the Anilao 
river.”479 Strategically located just outside the city proper, it was a highly 
congested place in 1991 that should never have been utilized as a residential 
area. But, in reality, it was like a small island with its own codes of conduct, 
culture, and small bridges that regulated entry and exit. One of its most 
prominent structures prior to the flash flood was a hanging bridge that 
connected Isla Verde to the other side of the Anilao River and on to the city 
center. Politically part of Barangay District 26 rather than a separate 
barangay as reported in newspapers in 1991,480 Isla Verde grew out of two 
families leasing some parcels of the land to migrants. These migrants were a 
mix of those who came from the rural areas of Ormoc and from other parts of 
the Visayas, all in search of livelihoods and good fortune. They first called 
themselves EASAM, in recognition of the two families who owned these 
lands, the Eamiguels who had possession of lower lots in the heart of Anilao, 
and the Samsons, whose land was primarily on the upper banks.481 As the 
																																								 																				
478 Reliefweb, Ibid. 
479 DENR-Region VIII, “Investigation report of the Ormoc City disaster,” 14. 
480 See, for example, L. Lacson and N. Abrematea, “’Uring’ kills 2,122 in Leyte, renders 
200,000 homeless”; C. Velarde, et al., “2,000 dead; 3,000 missing in Leyte Floods”; and, N. 
Abrematea, “’Uring’ leaves 6,000 dead, missing in Leyte,” Philippine Star, 8 November 1991, 
1&3;  
481 Dodong (former Catholic youth leader of EASAM, later renamed Isla Verde), interview 
with author, 2 June 2013, in downtown Ormoc City, original in Filipino, transcribed and 
translated by author: “There were two [families] here before. On this side were the Samsons 
133	|	F L O O D W A T E R S 	 O F 	 D E A T H 	
	
population grew from the late 1970s to the early 1980s, so too its reputation 
as a place of trouble. It became a melting pot of all kinds of people in the 
city—the intermittent sex workers, drug addicts and pushers, informal sector 
workers, government and private sector employees who could not afford to 
live elsewhere, and transients whose backgrounds and characters, by virtue 
of being unknowns, were morally suspect. It was an area virtually 
“characterized by an amalgam of dilapidated housing, overcrowding, 
disease, poverty and vice,”482 typical of urban slums around the world. Yet in 
fact, as bad as it had been perceived, Isla Verde was never identified as the 
red light district of Ormoc prior to 1991.483 While Ormoc did not have a “red 
light district” per se and bars that operated in the sex industry were small and 
discreet, the coastal barangay Bat-I rather than Isla Verde was then 
popularly identified as the centre of the local illicit sex trade. It was where the 
Golden Superclub was located, the biggest and most popular disco and 
men’s club in the city that catered specifically to seamen from ships that 
occasionally docked at the port.484 It was remarkable that though Barangay 
Bat-I was directly facing Ormoc Bay, it was not devastated at all. Indeed, the 
water inside the Golden Superclub rose by only about a foot that fateful day 
before it flushed out to sea.  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 											
and at the lower side were the Eamiguels. There came a time when the population grew so it 
became more troublesome. We were the first youth [group] here who went house to house. 
We later thought about making a [Catholic] chapter, with a chapel. We tore down a house 
and made an altar. It started from there when the older residents said it wasn’t a chapel. 
Let’s put an altar with saints. It started there. The houses came, then the chapel and then 
the two leading families began to talk about the fiesta. Then we called this place EASAM, 
Eamiguel-Samson Village. EASAM. Then there were more and more people…the name was 
changed because EASAM meant ‘trouble.’ It was here where people would meet to settle 
scores. So it was changed to Isla Verde because people thought the place was green.” 
[Fedelina, a neighbor: Yes, because in the past trees were abundant, coconut trees]. 
482 M. Davis, Planet of Slums (London, New York: Verso, 2006), 22. 
483 See, for example, L. Jimenea (journalist), interview with author, 12 March 2013, in 
downtown Ormoc City, original in English, transcribed by author. Asked if Isla Verde had 
ever been a red light district, she said: “No. It was not a red light district, but it was where it 
could have been, it was where all things could happen and where all kinds of people lived, 
drug dealers, prostitutes, hardworking people.” 
484 Dindin (daughter of the owners and operators of the Golden Superclub), interview with 
author, 7 October 2013, in Bat1, Ormoc City. Dindin was only nine years old in November 
1991 and was not allowed inside the club by her parents. According to Dindin, the Golden 
Superclub did not operate a brothel. It was a disco and a bar, but nude shows were shown 
on special days of the week. It also did not directly hire the girls. A mamasan, who worked 
outside the Golden Superclub was usually the one who hired the girls mostly from rural 
areas and then managed their trade. Aside from seamen, notable clients were businessmen 
and PNOC employees, who at the time were paid well enough in a small city like Ormoc to 
afford extra expenses like these.   
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 Isla Verde’s infamous notoriety was largely due to its location. It was 
certainly not the only informal settlement in the city, but it was highly visible, 
sprawled just beyond the Anilao Bridge as one entered the city proper. Yet, 
efforts to ‘clean’ the face of the area had been voluntarily undertaken by the 
residents themselves years prior to the November 1991 tragedy.485 First, 
they renamed it Isla Verde to project an image of a ‘green’ environment, 
taking its name from the many trees, mostly coconuts that provided plentiful 
shade to its residents. Then, the elders and youth leaders changed Isla 
Verde’s fiesta from 28-29 June—the feast date of the city’s patron Saints 
Peter and Paul—to 19-20 June in efforts to ensure that the residents could 
properly celebrate their fiesta separate from the city celebrations. It was also 
a pragmatic decision to resolve the occurrence of brawls and other petty 
crimes and unruly behaviors that broke out in the evening of fiestas when 
young men, drunk from a day of drinking in the city, would come home to a 
place where majority of its residents would have also been away to the city. 
However, in the aftermath of the 1991 tragedy, it was commonly referred to 
as the Sodom and Gomorrah of Ormoc, complicit in its own destruction, and 
hastened by its very immorality and amorality, namely its culture of omerta 
that contributed, by ensuring silence, to the perpetuation of legally 
questionable acts occurring within its boundaries.486 It was undoubtedly a 
hive of human activity, its very existence dependent on a city that maintained 
a morally questionable symbiotic relationship with its residents. 
 Flooding prior to 1991 was a fact of life in Isla Verde. When rains 
came, the Anilao River would rise a little, but not enough to unduly worry its 
residents. They coped, as always, but never to the extent of actually 
																																								 																				
485 See Dodong, interview with author, Ibid. 
486 Not everyone shared this stereotypical view. See, for example, L. Jimenea (journalist), 
interview with author, Ibid. On the question why Isla Verde was known as Sodom and 
Gomorrah (original statement in mixed English and Filipino, transcribed by author): “I think 
that is way judgmental…You know these places where you see the bad, but you also see 
the good you can see that. You see Mother Teresas there and you see the most evil of 
people like that. I would not believe that everybody was bad there…a lot of them are 
hardworking people who just don’t have the money to buy their own subdivisions.” On 
omerta: “…when you talk about informal settlers…there are people, you can have people 
who are just minding their own business, just living you know…Sometimes you just don’t 
[tell], omerta, the law of silence. You don’t talk. You don’t say anything bad against your 
neighbour. To each his own, that was Isla Verde. It’s everywhere. It’s in every informal 
settler community.” 
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evacuating to higher grounds. That Tuesday morning in November 1991, 
residents thought it was just another typhoon so most of them simply stayed 
put inside their houses. However, some of the luckier ones who escaped 
sure death, uneasy about the rain, had knocked on neighbors’ doors, 
implored them to leave before it was too late, and evacuated early. Some 
heeded these urgent calls, but the majority did not. When the overflow of the 
floodwaters from the Anilao River came at about 11:30 a.m. and inundated 
Isla Verde, not everyone panicked. The waters were still manageable and, 
though some had been washed out with their houses, many others clung to 
telephone cables, electric wires and trees that provided lifelines in the 
floodwaters.487 There was as yet no sense of panic. A spirit of bayanihan488 
even prevailed, as those who could not swim were passed on by one set of 
helping hands to another to ultimately grab the electric cables that criss-
crossed in the flood waters. Some lashed small children against coconut 
trees, in hopes to save them.489 But when the Anilao Bridge suddenly gave 
way and released a massive volume of water, in seconds the situation 
became deadly. 490 It was like a great force had flushed the water out to sea, 
carrying everything in its path—the flimsy houses, the families that 
desperately clung together, the bridge that could not withstand the immense 
pressure of those waters. The floodwaters were disturbingly turbid, twisting 
																																								 																				
487 L. Jimenea (journalist), interview of author, Ibid., original in mixed English and Filipino, 
transcribed and translated by author: “We saw many friends, that’s when I learned that the 
sibling of one of my friends, the Nazarios, they lost 18 members. Then they told me when 
water rose in Isla Verde it was like it was nothing. Because the bridge got stuck up, like it 
dammed. So it stuck up. They were just swimming across. They were not in a hurry. It was 
like, okay, sure, they weren’t really in a hurry, they were passing one to the other. They had 
this long cable like maybe for electricity and those who could not swim were helped from one 
point to the other.” 
488 Filipino, lit. to help achieve something together as one community. 	
489 See, for example, Solemnisa (former Isla Verde resident), interview with author, 30 May 
2013, in Ormoc City. She lashed her four children against a coconut tree. Two children were 
saved, but two died, along with her husband, who remains missing until today.  
490L. Jimenea (journalist), interview with author, Ibid., original in mixed English and Filipino, 
transcribed and translated by author: “But when the bridge gave in, it was when it gave in 
that it was like a torpedo. We [referring to her husband] had a friend, he’s dead now, we had 
one friend who in just a matter of seconds he was in the middle of Linao Sea, it was there he 
swam and then he swam back. But along the way, it was like he was torpedoed. He was the 
sole survivor of their family. Along the way he said, in the turbulent water, he hung on to a 
log, like that, like he was forced, like he straddled a banana boat, he would go under the 
water, he would go over the water but he did not let go. So in just a matter of seconds, he 
was in the middle of Linao. So he swam back and, I don’t know, he couldn’t understand why 
when he was asking for help why people were fleeing from him when they saw him. It was 
because he was naked already, stripped naked. That was why they were running away.”  
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like a top,491 pulling everything in. Because there was so much debris, it was 
impossible to swim, much less to stay afloat in the churning waters. That 
day, Isla Verde was ‘cleansed’ as the entire community was literally washed 
out to the sea.  
 Discourses that had developed in the aftermath of the 1991 flood, 
centred on the story of a little thirsty boy who, days before 5 November, went 
to Isla Verde and begged for water.492 According to the account, the boy 
knocked on a house near the entrance to Isla Verde,493 and a maid, upon 
consultation with her dismissive mistress, gave him some water in a dirty 
coconut husk, which was typically used as drinking vessel for poultry. The 
boy then remarked ominously that he would give Isla Verde lots of water in 
days to come. In various retelling, this tale, first circulated among the 
survivors housed in the makeshift Tent City a few months after November 
1991, had been interpreted as a story of punishment by the Santo Niño of 
Cebu, a popular religious icon in the Visayas.494 Another version involved not 
a little boy, but an elderly woman asking for food and water.495 The major 
																																								 																				
491 Solemnisa (former resident of Isla Verde), interview with author, Ibid., original in Bisaya, 
transcribed and translated by author: “The water grew, gosh how the water grew!..When we 
went down, the water had reached our roof! So we had a basin, we used it to float. People 
were being pulled in because there was a tornado. It was the first time I saw a tornado. A 
tornado, it spins...” [Victor Arcuino, my interpreter: Like a top]…like a top.”  
492 See, for example, Nenita (resident at GK Rotary, Barangay Tambulilid), interview with 
author, 19 April 2013, in GK Barangay Tambulilid, Ormoc City, original in Bisaya, transcribed 
and translated by author: “I was suspicious that the skies seemed different, I don’t know why 
but my parents said there was something like a comet and when I looked at the heavens I 
saw something like a tornado, now the tornado I saw was shaped like a heart, there was 
something that came out of that tornado and dropped into the sea! That day I did not expect 
that there would be like a typhoon coming, the news said a typhoon was coming, so for me 
just trust in God as at that time there was a child who was rebuffed, that was the start! It was 
the Señor Santo Nino they said then there was an unkempt woman who was the Mother of 
Perpetual Help.” 
493 The house was allegedly owned by a Feliciano family, who provided water very 
grudgingly to the boy. Attempts were made to locate this family during the fieldwork in 2013, 
or even to confirm whether such a family existed. Both endeavors, however, failed as the 
author could not find anyone who could confirm the existence of a Feliciano family.  
494 For a discussion on why the Santo Niño remains a popular icon of Catholic religiosity not 
only in Cebu, but also in other parts of the country, see J. Bautista, “‘Figuring’ Catholicism: 
the Santo Nino and religious discourse in Cebu” (PhD diss. Australian National University 
College of Asia and the Pacific, 2003) (Online).  
495 See, for example, Elizabeth (former resident of Barangay Don Felipe Larrazabal, another 
heavily affected barangay along Anilao river), interview with author, 6 April 2013, GK Rotary, 
Barangay Tambulilid, Ormoc City, original in Filipino, transcribed and translated by author, 
when asked if she had heard any stories of the supernatural (mga kwentong kababalaghan): 
“Yes, do you know Isla Verde? Maybe someone told you the story, right? There was 
someone [I asked if it was the story about the boy or the elderly] a boy. No, in the beginning, 
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difference between these two versions is that the story of the little boy 
referred exclusively to Isla Verde, while the story of the old woman, often 
interpreted as the Virgin Mary, denoted Ormoc City in general without 
targeting a specific place. That these stories, popularly circulated in the city 
proper while being virtually unknown in the rural areas of Ormoc, were 
denunciations of urban suspicion of dangerous classes and the reluctance to 
provide help to needy strangers, attitudes common and natural to city 
residents who practised higher levels of individuality than in rural areas. 
These stories condemned selfish private interests upheld at the expense of 
other people’s basic needs like food and water. Other stories told about the 
1991 Ormoc tragedy, following the pattern of urban legends, emphasized Isla 
Verde’s amoral and immoral behaviors that directly brought this terrible 
katalagman496 upon itself. One story was about young men who had 
sponsored a disco on November 1st in Isla Verde, just a few days before the 
tragedy, an ominous day as it was a day designated for the dead and 
observed as such in the Philippines.497 Yet another story was that Catholics 
who had converted to the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC)498 had in the past buried 
their santos or religious idols underground in observance of their new faith 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 											
it was allegedly an elderly. The other one, it was a filthy child, because there were men 
drinking so they were joking, they teased the child. Where are you from? Please give me 
water. Oh we don’t have water. Even a little, I am very thirsty. Because the child was 
barefoot. It was the Santo Niño of Cebu after all. The next day they saw the Santo Niño of 
Cebu with muddy feet and the hem of his clothes were also muddy. I knew of someone who 
went to the Cebu Cathedral, they really saw the Santo Niño’s feet were muddy. Then when 
they gave water to the child, it was dirty, in a dirty coconut husk, anyway it was dirty. So the 
child said, never mind later I will give you so much water, said the child. Then the next day, 
there was an elderly in the terminal who was asking for food and water. They did not give 
anything.”  
496 Bisaya, lit. danger/disaster/menace/peril. 
497 Ursula and Marilyn (mother and daughter), interview with author, 30 May 2013, in 
Barangay Tambulilid, Ormoc City, original in Bisaya, transcribed and translated by author: 
“November 1 is souls, right? It is All Souls Day, right? The next day November 1 would you 
believe, there was a disco [Author: Who gave a disco?] the child of a Legionary [referring to 
members of the Legion of Mary, a lay apostolic association of Catholics whose main role is 
to serve the Church on a voluntary basis] [Author: Why did the Legionary hold a disco?] the 
child of that Pi who died! What was Pi’s family name? [Marilyn, her daughter: What was her 
family name? Oh Garido] Garido. That Pi Garido was a Legionary, so there I went, I told her 
son, Dong, why are you having a disco when it is the day of the dead? He told me, Nang, it 
is the day of the dead, so the dead will also disco, Nang!”  
498 Iglesia ni Cristo is a Christian denomination religion founded in 1914 by Felix Manalo in 
the Philippines.  
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and that the flood, like a god, had dug up these images, wrathfully and in 
vengeance, and brought them back to light.499 
Other victims, other informal settlements 
 The collapse of the Anilao Bridge in November 1991 further proved 
the limitations of modern scientifically engineered structures like bridges, 
even though these had withstood past hazards and appeared invincible. Of 
the eighty (80) tropical cyclones that crossed the province of Leyte including 
those passing fifty (50) kilometers from its boundaries from 1948 to 1991, 
with most of these occurring in November, twenty-five (25) had passed over 
Leyte province.500 None of these typhoons had adversely affected Ormoc, 
much more caused a flood. Nonetheless, as early as 1862, a story of an 
upcoming flood so big as to sink Leyte island had been preached by a group 
identified as a Dios-Dios (demigod, false god) movement.501 Mariano 
Ricafort, a town leader (cabecilla) from Burauen and a believer of Benedicta, 
who had designated herself as La Santa de Leyte and drew some 4,000 
followers from northeastern Leyte, proclaimed a place called Monte de 
Pobres (Mountain of the Poor) as the “surest and safest place because the 
water height would not reach that far.”502 Interestingly, flood predictions have 
remained popular in Leyte among other more recent millenarian groups.503  
It was this absence of historical precedence, however, that to a large 
extent explained why Ormoc City was so unprepared that day. By 1991, the 
riverbanks of both Anilao and Malbasag teemed with low-income families in 
																																								 																				
499 Ursula and Marilyn, interview with author, Ibid. Mr. Fernando Villanueva (legal officer and 
minister of INC in Ormoc City), in a 7 June 2013 letter, denied this allegation through a 
written statement when asked to comment on this matter, to wit: “It’s not true, that they 
buried the rebultos under the ground. Maybe it is the perception of the non-members 
because we do not worship images or idols. It is according to Exo. 20: 3-5.” 
500 Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration 
(PAGASA), Climate and Agromet Data Section, Climatology and Agrometeorology Division, 
“Information on Tropical Cyclone (1948-2009).”  
501 G. Borrinaga, “The Pulahan movement in Leyte (1902-1907),” in The Journal of History 
54 (Philippine National Historical Society, 2008), 214-215. 
502 Ibid. 
503 One of these groups was called Pilipinas Watawat ng Lahi (Philippines, Flag of Race) or 
Diyos ng Pilipinas (God of the Philippines), a millenarian group headed by ‘Tatay’ a.k.a 
Catalino Pepito of Barangay Naungan in Ormoc. ‘Tatay’ said he predicted the 1991 flood, 
which saved members of his group then. He is predicting another major flood to occur and 
devastate Ormoc. Catalino Pepito, interview with author in Bisaya, 4 October 2013, in 
Barangay Domonar Puting Bato, Ormoc City.   
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houses made of light and scrap materials. It was significant that the Anilao 
River, for example, was only approximately thirty (30) meters wide before the 
flood, as urban zoning had been largely ignored and disregarded by informal 
settlers. After the flood, it widened to fifty (50) meters.504 Meanwhile, the 
Malbasag River in the southern part of the city meandered as it snaked its 
way down to Ormoc City, passing beneath the Malbasag Bridge that had a 
constricted channel. In 1991, therefore, both rivers had major chokepoints, 
and were potential disasters waiting to happen.  
Ormoc’s series of disasters 
 The notion that “a disaster is not a single, discrete event” was 
certainly true in the high propensity of informal settlements in Ormoc to 
“repeated, multiple, mutually reinforcing and sometimes simultaneous shocks 
to their families, their settlements and their livelihoods.”505 A community 
called Badlas in Barangay Don Felipe, for example, experienced a series of 
community and family tragedies prior to 1991. First was a fire that razed 
several houses in the vicinity in January 1990, followed by the damages 
wrought by Typhoon Ruping (Mike) in November 1990 that brought winds of 
up to 230 kilometer per hour, strong enough to knock down houses made of 
light materials. The flash flood in November 1991 completed the massive 
cumulative tragedy experienced by these families, when the new payags 
(thatched houses) erected after the devastation of Typhoon Ruping in 1990 
were completely washed away in 1991.506 Yet, this was not unique to Ormoc 
in 1991. In the neighboring municipality of Dulag in western Leyte, for 
example, a laundrywoman named Norma Cadion, who was thirty-five (35) 
																																								 																				
504 DENR-Region VIII, “Update on the effects of Typhoon Uring that hit Leyte on November 
5, 1991,” 1-2.   
505 B. Wisner, P. Blaikie, T. Cannon and I. Davis (eds), At Risk, Natural Hazards, People’s 
Vulnerability and Natural Disasters, 5. 
506 Eunila and Nezeli (neighbors in GK Tambulilid), simultaneous interviews with author, 19 
April 2013, in Ormoc City, original in Bisaya, transcribed and translated by author: “In 
November was the flood, there was typhoon in 1990 [Nezeli: Yes a typhoon], it was 1990 
when there was a fire I said what a serious tragedy! From the fire there was typhoon Ruping 
followed by the flood in 1991 [Nezeli: Here] by [Nezeli: Uring] Yuring (sic)…They just re-
thatched their houses. Yes after Ruping! It was not that bad because the houses were not 
washed away. In Yuring they were completely washed away! My mother very nearly died 
because she was inside the house when it was washed away, my father was luckier by 
evacuating! He got inside a house and was able to save a child who he held at the height of 
the flood and carried away with him.”  
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years old in 1991, lost all five of her children aged one to seven years when 
a nearby dam burst and destroyed Daguitan Bridge at the height of Typhoon 
Uring. Months earlier in March 1991, her husband, who was a farmer, had 
been gunned down “after resisting their landowner’s attempt to boot them out 
of the land they were tilling.”507 
Like the case of Isla Verde, residents in the informal settlements of 
Barangays Alegria and Don Felipe Larrazabal, which were directly hit by the 
massive water released after the collapse of the Anilao Bridge, were caught 
off-guard. The flash flood had been so quick and so immense that there was 
simply no time to evacuate at the last minute.508 It is instructive that “[a] 
significant number of casualties were children trapped inside homes unable 
to open the doors held by hyper concentrated flood waters.”509 Yet, it was not 
only children, but also old people and babies, who would provide the most 
lasting and horrific images of the flood. Two days after, on 7 November, 
Cebu Governor Emilio Osmeña observed dramatically, “It looked like a Nazi 
(death) camp, with children and old people piled on top of each other.”510 Of 
the babies, another journalist remarked, “A lot of babies [were lined up at the 
City Health Office]…when babies die of drowning they are not like the old 
ones. The older ones you know they struggled…to live. Babies were like they 
were just being lulled to sleep, there were no signs of struggle on their faces, 
like they were only sleeping.”511 A number of those who perished, like Lot’s 
wife in the Bible who turned into a pillar of salt after looking back at a burning 
																																								 																				
507 See D. Petilla, “Widow’s tale of woe: A fate worse than Job’s,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 
10 November 1991, 1&13.  
508 For example, Papenuncia (resident of GK Tambulilid), interview with author, 16 April 
2013, in GK Barangay Tambulilid, Ormoc City, original in Filipino, transcribed and translated 
by author: “First there were three blasts! Bog! Bog! Bog! It was the water apparently! There 
in the mountains! Buhawi! They’re called buhawi! Oh the water! Running! Running away! 
People were drowning! There in the sea. They were asking for help. But how to help them? 
The water was like this. There in the bridge! They couldn’t do anything!”  
509 S. Herath, “Floods in Ormoc City, Leyte on November 5, 1991,” 39-40. 
510 Cited in G. Dumat-ol, “It looked like a Nazi death camp,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 7 
November 1991, 1&9.  
511 L. Jimenea, interview with author, Ibid., original in mixed English and Filipino, transcribed 
and translated by author: “Those babies when they die of drowning they are not like the 
adults. Adults you know they struggled, they struggled to live. The babies maybe okay I am 
being rocked to sleep, like they don’t have any sign of struggle in their faces, like they are 
only sleeping. It was really amazing looking at them, like they are so peaceful. But the old 
people that you see, you see their tortured faces. I said if there’s one thing I wouldn’t like to 
die of, that’s drowning. You lose your poise [laughs].” 
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Sodom and Gomorrah, returned to save pigs, poultry, a sack of rice, meagre 
possessions like clothes and even television sets, and small savings packed 
hastily in bags, seemingly mundane things that for those who had so few 
possessions in the first place meant the entire world.512 Yet for those who 
had escaped death with only taput lawas or just the clothes on their backs, 
the prospect of starting anew from ground zero again was, for many, like 
death itself. In five cases chosen to describe the nature of post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) among the 1991 Ormoc survivors, it was noted that, 
in addition to the loss of family members, the loss of livelihood, savings and 
homes were extreme traumatic events that defined an individual’s ability or 
inability to cope and rebuild a new life.513  
The force of the water from the twin rivers flushing out into Ormoc Bay 
was such that bodies were found all the way to the island of Camotes, forty 
kilometers west of Leyte, and even Bohol, which was 120.82 kilometers 
southeast of Leyte.514 Sharks allegedly had fed off some of the corpses.515 
 The rain stopped at the upper reaches of the Ormoc watershed in the 
Tongonan area immediately after 11:00 a.m. and “no additional rain was 
added to the rain gauge of the PNOC.”516 Flooding in the Ormoc downtown 
area, on the other hand, was over in three hours. After the waters receded, 
																																								 																				
512 For example, Merlita (resident of GK Tambulilid), interview with author, 5 April 2013, in 
Barangay Tambulilid, Ormoc City, whose husband went back to get about 700 pesos, which 
were the day’s income from their sari-sari (merchandise) store. She lost one boy, aged 7. 
Also Shirley, interview with author, 16 April 2013, in Ormoc City, whose mother went back to 
save two pigs. The pigs survived, but her mother and two siblings died, with one remaining 
missing until today.  
513 P. Alix, “Prolonged psychosocial effects of the Ormoc disaster, the role of personal 
variables, stressor characteristics, and coping responses,” in Papers and Proceedings, 
International Symposium on Disasters and Health, organized and hosted by University of the 
Philippines-Manila and the International Center for Medical Research, in Kobe, Japan, 16-18 
October 1996 (Manila, Philippines: IPPAO, 1997), 92-131. 
514 J. Cadacio and C. Pablo, “Cory airs worldwide appeal for Leyte aid,” Malaya, 9 November 
1991, 1&6; V. Batic, “58 bodies of Ormocanons washed ashore in Bohol,” Philippine Daily 
Inquirer, 24 November 1991, 7. 
515 B. Drogin, “Amid devastation, Ormoc buries its dead: Philippines: mass graves are 
prepared for victims of Tuesday’s tropical storm, since there aren’t enough coffins. The toll 
could go to 3,400,” Los Angeles Times, 8 November 1991. http://articles.latimes.com/1991-
11-08/news/mn-947_1_mass-grave ; “Sharks feasting on floating bodies,” Philippine Daily 
Inquirer, 8 November 1991, 1&12; N. Abrematea, “Death is everywhere in Ormoc,” 
Philippine Star, 9 November 1991, 1&2; and, J. Cadacio and C. Pablo, “Cory airs worldwide 
appeal for Leyte aid”. 
516 DENR-Region VIII, “Investigation Report of the Ormoc City Disaster,” 13. 
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there was a two-feet deep sediment along the streets.517 But, outside of 
Ormoc, no one had any inkling of the extent of the tragedy as the day drew 
to a close. In fact, even by the next day, on 6 November, three of the 
country’s biggest news companies—Philippine Star, Malaya, and Philippine 

















517 Environmental Research Division, The Ormoc City Tragedy of November 5, 1991, 17. 
518 See, for example, N. Abrematea, “Heavy floods hit Leyte; folk fleeing homes”; V. Batic, 
“Floods, landslides kill 126 in Leyte,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 6 November 1991, 1; C. 
Pablo, “Rise in illegal logging cases blamed on pols,” Malaya, 6 November 1991, 6.  





 IN THE AFTERMATH 
 
As a final note, the disaster of Ormoc has, unfortunately, been explained (and 
exploited) by some individuals and sectors in terms of speculations, misinformation, 
and statements not backed up by scientific evidence. Even after the evidences have 
been presented the misrepresentation are still being pursued, obviously to serve 
personal ends no longer related to the disaster. Such actuation have caused, and 
are still causing confusion, misdirected anger, witch-hunting, and public 
disinformation. These efforts continue to pin down fall guys in order to cover up for 
the failures (through omission or commission) of certain leaders to look after the 
welfare of their constituents. Under such circumstances, the real reason for the 
disaster could not be fully ventilated, actions to prevent or mitigate similar disasters 
could not be fully discussed in public, and the debate in public fora and media will 
continue until the issue dies a natural death. Then nobody would have made any 
precautionary preparations, nor learned any lesson from this disaster. 
- Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)-Region VIII, “Assessment of 
the causes of the flooding of Ormoc City, Leyte Island, Philppines,” 10-11519 
“When are we going to get our next meal?” wailed Laura Montesclaros, 53, of 
Barangay Malbasag, echoing a common plaint. 
-Cited in D. Petilla, “NGOs launch Operation Noah’s Ark,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 11 
November 1991, 1&10. 
 A full two days passed before the rest of the country awoke to the 
utter devastation wrought by Typhoon Uring in Ormoc. In fact, it was not 
Ormoc, but the municipalities of Jaro, Tabontabon, Dagami, Pastrana, and 
Burauen in Leyte province, and the cities of Bacolod, La Carlota and Bago 
and the towns of Sumbag and Murcia in Negros Occidental that were 
reported to have been worst hit.520 By 7 November, the United Nations 
																																								 																				
519 Post script in the “Consolidated Technical findings of the Five technical services of DENR 
Region VIII (Eastern Visayas): Forest Management, Mines and Geosciences, Environmental 
Management and Protection Areas, Lands Management, and Ecosystems Research and 
Development.”  
520 N. Abrematea, “Heavy floods hit Leyte; folk fleeing homes,” Philippine Star, 6 November 
1991, 1 and 8; V. Batic, “Floods, landslides kill 126 in Leyte,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 6 
November 1991, 1; V. Batic and B. Cabrido, “2,230 die in Leyte floods,” Philippine Daily 
Inquirer, 7 November 1991, 1 and 9; M. Logan, “Typhoon leaves 2,122 dead in Leyte, 
Negros; 1,494 families rendered homeless,” Philippine Times Journal, 7 November 1991, 1 
and 6; R. Requintana, “2,122 feared dead in Leyte, Negros floods,” Manila Bulletin, 7 
November 1991, 1 and 19; L. Lacson and N. Abrematea, “’Uring’ kills 2,122 in Leyte, 
renders 200,000 homeless,” Philippine Star, 7 November 1991, 1 and 6. Malaya and 
Philippine Daily Inquirer ran the first news articles on 7 November 1991 that identified Ormoc 
as the hardest hit, along with Burauen and Julita, as disaster areas. See C. Velarde et al, 
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Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO) noted that Ormoc Port, with 120,000 
inhabitants, was “ravaged by water-borne debris and mud.”521 Isla Verde and 
the barangays of Malbasag, Alegria and Don Felipe in Ormoc were declared 
“ghost towns.”522 Electricity was down in large parts of Leyte and Negros, as 
hundreds of electric posts were destroyed. Numerous bridges in both 
provinces were washed away, rendering many towns and cities unreachable 
in the initial week of relief efforts. Agricultural crops and livestock destroyed 
in the two provinces were estimated to be at least 200 million pesos.523 The 
horrific devastation prompted President Cory Aquino on 7 November to 
declare a state of calamity in the provinces of Leyte and Southern Leyte.524 
 Aside from the number of casualties and physical damages that result 
from such a disaster, which are more explicit and immediate, indirect 
economic and socio-political effects can follow crisis situations or 
emergencies. Destruction to housing and infrastructure creates, in the short 
term, unavoidable and oftentimes onerous costs at the personal, familial, 
local and national levels. These costs can be felt either directly as a result of 
interruption in “the flows of goods, services and information in and around 
the city,” and indirectly as “costs of goods that will not be produced and 
services that will not be provided because of a disaster.”525 At the macro-
economic level, secondary effects from a disaster are felt as negative 
impacts on the gross domestic product (GDP), depleted monetary reserves, 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 											
“2,000 dead; 3,000 missing in Leyte floods,” Malaya, 7 November 1991, 1 and 2; and, G. 
Dumat-ol, “It looked like a Nazi death camp,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 7 November 1991, 1 
and 9.  
521 Reliefweb, “Report 3: November 8, 1991, in Philippine floods Nov 1991 UNDRO Situation 
Reports 1-8 (Online).  
522 C. Velarde et al., “2,000 dead; 3,000 missing in Leyte floods.” 
523 N. Abrematea, “’Uring’ leaves 6,000 dead, missing in Leyte,” Philippine Star, 8 November 
1991, 1 and 3. The National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) report estimates total 
damages affecting all sectors, including agricultural products/facilities and 
infrastructure/utilities at 863.4 million pesos. See S. Herath, “Flood in Ormoc City Nov 5, 
1991 Philippines Preliminary Report,” Annex 1.   
524 “Leyte declared a calamity area,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8 November 1991, 1 and 12. 
See Proclamation No. 828 s. 1991, “Declaring a state of public calamity in the provinces of 
Leyte and Southern Leyte, including the cities of Ormoc and Tacloban, which were 
devastated by Typhoon ‘Uring’ (Online).  
525 M. Pelling, The Vulnerability of Cities, Natural Disasters and Social Resilience (London 
and Sterling VA: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 2003), 39-41; K. Jha Abhas, R. Bloch and J. 
Lamond, Cities and Flooding: A Guide to Integrated Urban Flood Risk Management for the 
21st Century (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / International 
Development Association or the World Bank, 2012), especially 143-169. 
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and increased debt to fund reconstruction and rehabilitation. In the long term, 
socio-political effects can also occur.526 In both instances, government 
institutions may be put at risk by political challenges to authority. As social 
norms and values often collapse after a disaster, a corresponding breakdown 
in social order can expose the tenuous socio-economic and political 
structures that had defined collective life during ‘normal’ periods. On the one 
hand, the local government may be so incapacitated that criminality, or more 
appropriately rumors of crimes, can heighten people’s fear, anxiety and 
sense of helplessness as the government may be increasingly perceived 
unable to provide law and order.527 On the other hand, disaster aftermath 
can open competition and/or conflict between local government vis-à-vis 
national government,528 amongst various stakeholders,529 and within victim-
survivor communities themselves, thereby creating winners and losers in the 
process.530 As victim-survivors attempt to cope in the aftermath of a disaster, 
several scenarios can quickly unfold: new communities and groups emerge 
with new constellations of interests and power; new leadership can result in 
																																								 																				
526 The 1972 earthquake in Managua, Nicaragua was argued to have prompted popular 
revolutionary action against the Somoza dictatorship that eventually led to the overthrow of 
the regime. The 1976 earthquake in Guatemala City in Guatemala, described as a 
‘classquake’ because of its high impact among slum residents, fomented popular 
mobilization and “land invasions.” Cited in Pelling, The Vulnerability of Cities, Natural 
Disasters and Social Resilience, 43. Also E. Allen, “Political responses to flood disaster: The 
example of Rio de Janeiro,” in Disasters, Development and Environment, ed. A. Varley 
(Chichester, New York, Brisbane, Toronto and Singapore: John Wiley and Sons, 1994), 99-
108.  
527 See, for example, D. McCullough, The Johnstown Flood, The Incredible Story Behind 
One of the Most Devastating Disasters America has Ever Known (New York, London, 
Toronto and Sydney: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 1968). McCullough documented how 
the media played up these rumors. Uriel Rosenthal, on the other hand, emphasized the 
“mediazation” of future disasters, where “If the media define a situation as a disaster or a 
crisis, be sure that it will indeed be a disaster or a crisis in all its consequences.” U. 
Rosenthal, “Future disasters, future definitions,” in What is a Disaster? Perspectives on the 
Question, ed. E.L. Quarantelli (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 156. 
528 See, for example, US House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative, Final Report of 
the Select Bipatrisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 
Hurricane Katrina (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 15 February 2006) 
(Online).  
529 Abhas, Bloch and Lamond identify these stakeholders in urban flood management as the 
“communities which are affected by the implementation (or non-implementation) of 
measures, community based organizations (CBOs), non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), the responsible municipal authorities, river basin organizations or authorities, 
regional development authorities, scientific institutions including universities, and the private 
sector.” Cited in Abhas, Bloch and Lamond, Cities and Flooding: A Guide to Integrated 
Urban Flood Risk Management for the 21st Century, 520. 
530 See, for example, K.F. Gotham, “Critical theory and Katrina, Disaster, spectacle and 
immanent critique,” in City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Policy, Action, Vol 11 No. 1, 
81-97 (Routledge, 2007) (Online).  
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new alliances and political changes; and, external institutions and 
organizations can intervene at various levels of the relief and rehabilitation 
processes. At the cultural level, disaster can also affect religious and ritual 
practices, as well as kinship and association. Thus, not only is the disaster 
aftermath rife with tension and conflict, but more importantly it opens space 
for discourses of social change. Of course, the permanence or transience of 
these changes is based on and remains rooted in the interests of those 
groups that eventually consolidate power and leadership.  
This chapter documents the crucial period of recovery in Ormoc in the 
aftermath of 5 November 1991. In disaster emergency parlance, disaster 
recovery is a phase that aims to restore normal community activities 
disrupted by hazard impacts.531 It involves decisions dealing with “rebuilding 
homes, replacing property, resuming employment, restoring businesses, and 
permanently repairing and rebuilding infrastructure.”532 Project construction 
of the two billion pesos flood control project in Ormoc began in 1998 and was 
inaugurated by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in 2001. As such, the 
recovery phase of the 1991 Ormoc flood took ten years.  
As the case of 1991 Ormoc shows, the most vulnerable groups of 
society—those who resided in the riskiest locations along the Anilao and 
Malbasag Rivers—experienced the highest numbers of death and 
destruction of property. Nonetheless, as in every disaster, there are winners 
and losers, with the former including people and institutions that are able to 
reap opportunities that would not otherwise had been open to them. In the 
short term, as the disaster area in Ormoc City overflowed with funding and 
material assistance, even those who had not been adversely affected also 
benefited to some extent in the aftermath. It must be noted that only forty per 
cent of Ormoc City was affected by the floods on 5 November 1991. But 
when financial and material aid came through, stories abounded of those 
who had not been affected at all but received assistance as well. The local 
																																								 																				
531 M. Lindell, “Disaster studies,” in Sociopedia.isa, DOI: 10.1177/205684601111 (2011) 
(Online).  
532 G. Haddow (2008) cited in M. Baird, “The recovery phase of emergency management,” 
background paper prepared for the Intermodal Freight Transportation Institute (IFTI). 
(University of Memphis, Vanderbilt Center for Transportation Research (VECTOR), 2008), 2 
(Online).  
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and national governments also reaped the benefits not only of international 
aid, but also of international attention on issues that the country was able to 
pragmatically utilize for subsequent support, particularly with respect to 
mitigation and disaster management. In addition, victim-survivor communities 
reaped the material benefits of aid, so that for the most vulnerable families, 
they were often able to access medical services and enjoyed regular food 
intake that they had not enjoyed in the past. Relocation to new housing also 
theoretically provided the best opportunities of socio-economic change for 
these communities. Yet, the allocation of these benefits to vulnerable 
communities had not been the same across all affected barangays. Those 
located in the city typically had better access to relief services and goods 
than those in rural areas. Even within urban barangays, those whose 
communities were better organized and led by more politically savvy and 
better-linked leaders got more benefits than those without such leaders. Non-
government organizations (NGOs) were by far the most privileged, as 
international and local funding were often channelled through them rather 
than government agencies, which enabled them to play crucial roles in 
shaping risk management policies and implementing programs related to 
relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction. However, unlike international aid 
funnelled through official government channels, the media did not as 
scrupulously scrutinize funding for NGOs and there was often no public 
demand for an accounting of how these funds were utilized. Nonetheless, the 
dynamics of collaboration between the government and NGOs, as shown in 
the Ormoc case, also indicate that NGOs cannot supplant the integrating role 
of government in these processes, even though the latter may be at times 
incapacitated by trauma, indecision and inefficiency in disaster aftermath. In 
the end, the government remained the most critical stakeholder, with the 
recognized legitimacy and authority to coordinate, manage and ensure that 
no one got left behind, a crucial role that was not always successfully 
implemented in the aftermath of the November 1991 flood.  
Gain and loss, death and life 
The tragedy of 5 November 1991 was, first and foremost, a powerful 
story of flood risk, widespread devastation, death and destruction. In many 
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instances, entire families who had stayed put inside what they believed were 
the sanctuaries of their homes were swept away to their death by the raging 
waters of the Anilao and Malbasag rivers.533 The tragedy also took away in a 
matter of minutes what had taken many poverty-stricken Ormocanons years 
to build: their livelihoods, meagre savings, and what few possessions they 
owned.534 In one day, life as people had known it in Ormoc simply 
disappeared. The flash flood appeared to initially level everyone, rich and 
poor alike, as those in the city center shared similar stories of material 
losses, serious economic setbacks, and emotional and psychological 
trauma.535 Everyone who believed the tragedy had affected each one equally 
appropriated the identity of ‘victim’, regardless of prior economic and social 
circumstances. Dominica Chua of RAFI, for instance, vividly recalls:  
There was this somebody who was in a cowboy suit, well-dressed, 
riding in a jeep, and approached me, and she was asking that she 
wants to get you know some of these relief materials…Because our 
relief materials was okay ah plywood…nipa, shingles, of course 
everything complete, nails, straw, what else? Plywood ha, the marine 
(?) ply for the walling…everything you know it’s complete for one 
house. It’s really complete for a house…There was this woman who 
approached, a very beautiful woman and she was asking, she was so 
arrogant and she was so—she said, “Why aren’t you giving blah blah 
blah?” So my team were trying to explain to her ma’am I’m so sorry 
																																								 																				
533 Primitiva and Nita (mother and daughter), simultaneous interview with author, 18 March 
2013, in Purok II-B, Barangay Luna, Ormoc City, who lost several family members, including 
one adult son who was swept away with his wife and six children in their nipa hut in 
Barangay Nalunopan. Also Elizabeth, interview with author, 6 April 2013, who lost entire 
families of her relatives, original in Filipino, transcribed and translated by author: “…there 
were many who died that time, my God! So I said to myself, I can’t think about it, my 
relatives, they were all killed. That is why I don’t want to remember it.” 
534 See, for example, G. Dumat-ol, “Life goes on for survivors of killer flood,” Philippine Daily 
Inquirer, 11 November 1991, 12. Fisherman Danny Magno, 40, lost his motorized banca and 
a fishing net he had saved up for three years to buy, and Ma. Remedios Ansero, 31, lost her 
sewing machine and all her family’s sparse savings. 
535The identity as ‘victim,’ for example, had been appropriated by everyone. L. Jimenea 
expresses this notion succinctly in an interview with author, 12 March 2013, original in 
English, transcribed by author: “We didn’t even die, we were here, we were beside the river. 
It was just later, how I understood, you know, we did some analysis on what happened to us, 
why we survived, maybe God’s will, maybe it was [laughs] you know nature…But yes, I 
would describe ourselves as a victim because…we also had some food shortage, we had to 
rebuild our homes.”  
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ma’am you’re not on the list ma’am, very polite in telling her…She was 
so mad already, she was so upset, she was so arrogant. And so 
finally I said, “Ma’am, what is your problem?” And she was—you know 
there in Ormoc I was always being accused of favoritism. I was 
always being dragged in the media. People would always tell me they 
would go to the media and I would have to tell them go, no problem, 
it’s your right to go there, no problem…But I’m going to tell you we’re 
also stressed ha at that time…And I had been explaining to her, but 
despite the lengthy explanation that I gave and letting her understand 
about the program, she cannot understand. And so finally I told her 
that ma’am, this I cannot forget, yes ma’am all of you are [victims] 
because she came from a very famous family in Ormoc…Since you 
claim that all of you are victims, all of you including everybody, yah, 
everybody, all the population of Ormoc are victims okay ma’am so I 
already explained to you that we have this process, we have the 
criteria, we only have this much, we cannot really afford to give it to 
everybody because this is only the amount that we raised, okay 
ma’am fine. But since you demanded for it and you said everybody is 
a victim and we just have to give everybody, that everybody deserves 
to be given, fine. Okay no problem…I will give to everyone regardless 
of whether they fall within the criteria or not. I’ll give it to everybody. All 
population in Ormoc. So okay ma’am I’ll just give you one nail. 
Because that’s what the funds can only afford for all of you. Just one 
nail. Or just choose which one. One shingle, fine. But everybody can 
have one. Each one of you will have one…She left.536 
Some pragmatic opportunists also managed to exploit a desperate 
situation that promised to provide personal material gains. In the midst of 
momentary chaos, looters in the city center were reported to “still [ply] their 
trade”537 two days after the tragedy. Indeed, petty looting from corpses and 
establishments were common occurrences, although this had not attracted 
																																								 																				
536 Dominica Chua, Chief Operating Officer (COO) of the Ramon Aboitiz Foundation, Inc. 
(RAFI), interview with the author, 29 July 2013, in Cebu City, original in English, transcribed 
by author. 
537 G. Dumat-ol, “It looked like a Nazi death camp,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 7 November 
1991, 1 and 6. 
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widespread media attention at the time.538 An isolated case of molesting the 
corpse of a woman, who had been washed naked into Barangay Linao, was 
also narrated.539 Opportunists also raised prices of basic commodities, such 
as candles, which sold for seventy-five centavos before the flood but 
afterwards cost 1.50 pesos, while rice that had cost nine pesos was re-priced 
at twelve pesos a kilo.540 But these cases were exceptional. Ormoc after the 
tragedy did not experience any breakdown in law and order as occurred in 
the case of Super Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) and did not see a rise in 
criminality apart from some isolated cases of looting.541 The flash flood did 
not necessarily result in the social chaos characterized by collective panic, a 
popular image of mass disaster.542 Yet why was there no widespread 
																																								 																				
538(1) Buboy, interview with author, 4 April 2013, original in mixed Filipino and English, 
transcribed and translated by author: “Afterwards…for the first time in my life I did the crime 
that I never wanted to do, that is to steal. It’s because you didn’t have money. What 
happened was that others were also doing it I saw that so I also did it. Because we didn’t 
have any, we were still alive and there were the dead who had money on them so there…we 
felt in all pockets and took their money…[Author: How much were you able to get?] I was 
able to get about 500 pesos from the pockets of the dead. Now they were swelling, growing 
bigger because they drowned, so we [gestures with hands as though holding a knife and 
slicing through something tough] destroyed their pants, ah we cut all their pockets off. The 
others were able to get [gestures towards the ring finger] [Author: Ring] rings! Yes…or 
earrings.” (2) Elizabeth, interview with author, 6 April 2013, original in Filipino, transcribed 
and translated by author: “When we were looking for my pamangkin [nephew/niece] at the 
seaside, [people] were collecting watches, earrings. I said how unfortunate were the dead, 
people still do this to them when they are already dead.” (3) Ariel, interview with author, 6 
July 2013, in Ormoc City, original in English, transcribed by author: “There were a lot of what 
do you call it? Maybe because of the panic that people are experiencing that time, they stole 
a lot of materials [Author: Ah so there was looting?] yah there’s looting, there’s stealing of 
food, appliances so you can see the effect of the flood to the people. So we keep on walking 
as a whole, together as a family, we see a lot of bodies appearing from left and right, 
everywhere, even some hang on a branch of a tree. So it was a very very sad time.” 
539 Ronald Boy, interview with author, 21 April 2013, original in Bisaya, transcribed and 
translated by author: “…we only saw one thing, that was our teacher in Nalunopan like she 
was still alive, she was put on something like she was taken advantaged of since we saw 
she wasn’t…she was already clean [Author: She was dead?] she was still complete [?], isn’t 
it in death [a corpse] is stiff but then she was newly [Author: Where was she found?] in Linao 
as though istambays (unemployed; loiterers) [took advantage of her]…istambays in Linao or 
Punta…they did something awful. [Nang Perlita: She was already dead but killed again] Her 
husband was compelled to say that his wife was already dead but they still did something 
awful to her. He saw that someone did something [Nang Perlita: Used].   
540 E. Tordesillas, “Donations aren’t reaching survivors,” Malaya, 10 November 1991, 1&8. 
Also L. Jimenea, interview with author, 12 March 2013, in Ormoc City, original in mixed 
Filipino and English. Prices, however, were reported stabilized two days after on November 
12, according to Undersecretary Ernesto Ordoñez of the Department of Trade and Industry, 
cited in “Epidemic feared in Ormoc,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 November 1991, 1&14.  
541 Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Eduardo Betuin, interview with author, 15 July 2013, in 
Camp Downes, Ormoc City.  
542 On a discussion on the popular images of disaster behavior, see H. Rodriguez, E. 
Quarantelli and R. Dynes (eds), “Editors’ Introduction,” in Handbook of Disaster Research 
(Springer, 2006), xviii. Katz, in documenting the disaster of the 2010 Haiti earthquake, 
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disorder? Perusing the lengthy videos taken by JL Fotorama that day and 
subsequent days543 and supported by interviews among survivors, why was 
there no shared panic or clamor for basic necessities like water and food? 
While the devastation had been horrific in the city center, the flood did not 
adversely affect sixty per cent of Ormoc City.544 Majority of the casualties 
had also been low-income communities that had lived on the margins of the 
city for years prior to the tragedy, already rendered invisible by then. In 
addition, the Philippine Constabulary station in PP1 located in front of Saints 
Peter and Paul Parish Church in the downtown area had been inundated, as 
was the City Jail beside the fire station in the Government Center. But no jail 
inmates were killed because they were immediately evacuated to the roof as 
soon as the floodwaters rose. In fact, only one jailbreak case occurred as a 
result of the tragedy, and this was not picked up at all by the media.545 A 
convict, who had been imprisoned at the Ormoc City jail a few months before 
the November 1991 flood for theft, escaped when he was among fifty jail 
inmates conscripted to shovel corpses from the city streets onto trucks to be 
taken to a mass grave.546 Two or three days later, when the local 
government began to undertake clearing operations along the city streets, 
this man came upon a briefcase547 that was stuffed with money. He casually 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 											
argues that “social disintegration is a myth perpetuated by movies, fiction, and misguided 
journalism.” J. Katz, The Big Truck that Went By, How the World Came to Save Haiti and 
Left Behind a Disaster, 82. 
543 Untitled home videos. (Ormoc City, JL Photorama, 5-9 November 1991), DVD, accessed 
at the audio-visual room, Saint Peter’s College, Ormoc City, on 17 June 2013. 
544 E. Tordesillas et al., “Leyte death toll rises to 6,500,” Malaya, 8 November 1991, 1&3. 
This estimate is based on the figure provided then by the Philippine National Red Cross 
(PNRC), which said that seven barangays including Malbasag, Punta, Alegre, Isla Verde, 
Don Felipe and Mabini were submerged in water, accounting for about forty (40) percent of 
the city population.  
545 Ibid. Another jailbreak in Ormoc City commonly but mistakenly identified as a result of the 
1991 tragedy involved the convicted criminal, Arnold Itang, who was arrested after a hold up 
attempt in Barrio Barangay Airport in Ormoc City. With his escape, Jail Warden SPO4 Celso 
Jementesa was convicted for six (6) years. Itang remains at large today. But this jailbreak 
actually occurred years after the 1991 flash flood.  
546 See, for example, A. Ilagan, “AFP gives up search; dead reach 6,000,” Manila Bulletin, 11 
November 1991, 1 and 22; and, M. Duenas, “Tragedy in Ormoc: Killer flood,” Philippine Free 
Press, 23 November 1991, 4-5 and 21. The conscription of jail inmates was corroborated by 
SPO2 Eduardo Betuin of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Camp Downes, Ormoc City, 
and SPO4 (Ret) Cañete. This unnamed convict was allegedly a driver for a Police 
Constabulary major in Manila prior to incarceration, before being contracted by a gang of 
criminals to drive a jeepney to Leyte carrying stolen goods. 
547 This briefcase was thought to have been owned by a Mr. Baltonado, who was driving his 
red pickup in the morning of 5 November 1991 across a bridge into the city and was swept 
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picked it up, opened it, and without further thought, boarded a passing water 
delivery truck and was never heard of again to this day.548 Most of those who 
had been conscripted to help in the recovery and burial of bodies went back, 
willingly enough, to their jail cells.549 No Police Constabulary officers were 
also killed or injured while on duty, although two officers lost members of 
their families to the flood. Police Constabulary (PC) Bienvenido Udtohan lost 
his wife and two small children, along with his parents-in-law, who all remain 
missing until today, while PC Marguez lost a son, who is also still missing.550 
What was more common were stories of survivors picking up a diverse range 
of things—television sets, bags containing jewellery and money, household 
furniture, live pigs, and santos551—scattered about for the taking. More 
importantly, the norm was kindness and heroism, oftentimes of ordinary 
people doing extraordinary things.552 One such story ran thus:  
He was playing in the yard when suddenly a neighbour who heard the 
onrushing water grabbed my little boy, whom he thought was his son. 
He commanded him to entwine his arms tightly around his neck, as 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 											
away by the flash flood. Mrs Sescon, interview with author, 4 October 2013, at Saint Peter’s 
College, Ormoc City.  
548 SPO4 (Ret) Cañete, interview with author, 7 October 2013, in PNP Retirees Area, 
Barangay San Roque, Ormoc City. 
549 Ibid. 
550 (1) SPO4 (Ret) Cañete, interview with author, 7 October 2013, in PNP Retirees Area, 
Barangay San Roque, Ormoc City; (2) Police Constabulary (Ret) Bienvenido Udtohan, 
interview with author, 15 July 2013, in Barangay San Lorenzo, Ormoc City.    
551 Bisaya, lit. images of saints.  
552 For example, Buboy, interview with author, 4 April 2013, in Ormoc City, original in mixed 
Filipino and English, transcribed and translated by author: “There are actually many…stories 
of heroism. In one site there were many because there were more victims there. But I can 
quote with my own wife, the two of us. Because there was a baby that we saved who was 
floating, wrapped in cellophane [touches a white cellophane bag in a corner of the room], 
with cloth and cellophane, who was just barely alive…Now I think he was only three months 
old. Now…my wife was lactating so it’s between…giving milk to her baby or this baby that 
we found. Now I told my wife, go ahead and share your milk. I knew that the other baby must 
be very hungry, it was unconscious, almost dead, we didn’t know who owned him, who the 
mother was…Now [my wife] nursed him and she was so scared because it was our first 
baby and it was her first time to nurse a baby who was not her own and the other baby’s lips 
were so cold [smiles] because he nearly died. So…to make it short the baby lived and his 
grandmother showed up, she looked for him, she was crying, the baby was alive so we 
turned him over to the grandmother…You know what because my wife became a teacher in 
Prep [Preparatory school prior to elementary]. One time my wife said there was a child who 
always stared at her and she felt very close to the mother. But [my wife] was already 
questioning…she didn’t think about it. She was questioning because she felt close to the 
child and the mother, though she didn’t know it was actually the grandmother. Until one time 
I went there and I was the operator of their sound system for one activity, and there the 
grandmother opened up, sus it was one celebration of tears.”  
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he, the man was climbing up a nearby tree. In a while, feeling, (sic) 
that the little boy at his back was slipping down, loosening his grip, he 
snatched him and held him to his chest. That was when the man 
realized; the little boy was not his son…He saved my son, but not his 
family.553 
Relief, relocation and recovery 
 Mayor Victoria Locsin, whose residence in downtown Ormoc was not 
inundated, called for a meeting immediately after the floods subsided and 
began organizing her staff in the afternoon of 5 November, minus her vice 
mayor Nepomuceno Aparis I, who reported for duty only in the evening of the 
same day.554 Some pockets of the city had already received the first batch of 
relief that same evening.555 Others less fortunate were able to get relief a few 
days after or only a week or two weeks after the flood.556 Barangay 
Nalunopan557, for instance, which was only about five kilometres from the city 
center, received relief aid only after two weeks. 
What had been much publicized, however, was the role in organizing 
and coordinating relief of a relatively unknown family. With power and 
																																								 																				
553 Cited in M. Lotilla-Asencio, “Divine Mercy for two houses in the Ormoc City tragedy,” 
Miracles of the Divine Mercy (Undated) (Online). 
554 Local journalist, anonymous, interview with author, 12 March 2013, in Ormoc City, 
original in mixed Filipino and English.  According to the journalist, Mayor Locsin sent 
someone to look for Vice Mayor Aparis, who was ‘missing in action’ at the height of the 
crisis. When the latter finally came to the City Hall, Mayor Locsin allegedly berated Aparis, 
who in turn replied that he was also a victim of the flood and had to attend to his family first 
before other people. It was this exchange that allegedly later soured the relationship 
between Mayor Locsin and Vice Mayor Aparis, culminating in the latter jumping ship from 
Locsin’s political party to the Codilla’s after 1991.  
555 See, for example, (1) Esterlita, a resident of badly hit barangay Don Felipe, interview with 
author, 16 April 2013, in Ormoc City, original in Bisaya, when asked if she remembers her 
family having something to eat on the night of 5 November 1991, transcribed and translated 
by author: “Of course! We had pusô at the City High [referring to the Ormoc City High 
School, which was used as an evacuation center]. Then candles and matches and small 
lamps as there was no electricity. [Author: That was good because others had to go hungry 
for two, three days] No ma’am. The next day ma’am we were given kaldero ma’am and box 
stove. That was it. We didn’t go hungry during that flood.” (2) Solemnisa, an Isla Verde 
resident, interview with author, 5 April 1991, in Ormoc City, original in Bisaya, when asked 
the same question, transcribed and translated by author: “I always got something…It was 
very immediate. There were a lot given away.” 
556 (1) Ronald Boy, interview with author, 21 April 2013, in Ormoc City, original in Bisaya, 
who claim to have gotten rations a week after; and, (2) Buboy, interview with author, 4 April 
1991, in Ormoc City, original in Filipino, who first got the US combat ration foodstuff five 
days after the flood.   
557 Pseudonym. 
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communication lines down, it was serendipitous that Gwendolyn Garcia, 
daughter of former Cebu Governor Pablo Garcia and Ormoc-born Judge 
Esperanza “Inday” Fiel and married to Eufrocino ‘Winnie’ Codilla, Jr., owned 
a hand-held radio, which she used to call for help to Cebu.558 By 6 
November, the Cebu provincial government responded rapidly, with 
Governor Emilio Osmeña bringing a handsome batch of relief goods by 
helicopter. A little known relief effort was that spearheaded by the 
municipality of Baybay mayor, Carmen Cari, on the afternoon of 5 
November, who brought the first batch of water, pusô559 and roasted chicken 
to the Ormoc City Hall where some employees had already gathered.560 She 
came with a team in a pump boat via Ormoc Bay and left around 8 p.m., 
afraid that a panlimpyo sa Danita561 would sweep through the city again, 
which according to local superstitions commonly occurred to clean up any 
remaining debris brought by a major flood.562 
The next day, the Regional Disaster Coordinating Council (RDCC), in 
consultation with a largely non-operational City Disaster Coordinating 
Council (CDCC), prioritized the recovery of corpses, prevention of further 
casualties, provision of emergency medical services, and the organization of 
food assistance to all victims.563 The first two truckloads of relief supplies 
organized by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) 
left Tacloban City in the afternoon of the same day.564 By 7 November, the 
first batch of DSWD reinforcement staff arrived in Ormoc City consisting of 
fifteen personnel from the Regional Office and neighboring provincial offices, 
a practice that would continue daily until 30 November.565 Relief goods from 
																																								 																				
558 K. Navarro, “Meet Cebu’s defiant governor,” Newsbreak, Rappler, 19 December 2012 
(Online).  
559 Bisaya, lit. steamed rice cooked inside a triangular-shaped woven coconut leaf wrapper.  
560 L. Jimenea, interview with author, 12 March 2013, in Ormoc City, original in Filipino.  
561 Panlimpyo sa dalita, according to Lalaine Jimenea—long-time Ormoc resident, survivor 
of the 1991 Ormoc flood, and the only one who said anything about this term—literally refers 
to a smaller flood that is believed to follow a major one, with the sole purpose of ‘cleansing’ 
the debris left behind by the bigger and more destructive flood. However, no other 
respondent corroborated this term. 
562 Ibid. 
563 C. De Leon and L. Laigo, “Flood relief and rehabilitation in Ormoc: Experience and 
insights of administrators,” Philippine Journal of Public Administration Vol. 37 No. 4 
(University of the Philippines, 1993), 327-335. 
564 Ibid. 
565 Ibid. 
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Cebu also began to arrive. On this day as well, the DSWD, Philippine 
National Red Cross (PNRC), and Office of Civil Defense (OCD) released 
separate estimates of casualties.566 Meanwhile, UNDRO began issuing 
regular monitoring reports, noting that “[n]o international appeal [had] been 
requested by the [Philippine] government at this stage.” This would change 
on 8 November, when the Philippines finally broadcast an international 
appeal for food supplies, especially pre-packed food rations, blankets and 
plastic sheeting, medicines and disinfectant (including antibiotics and anti-
tetanus drugs, as well as the compound formalin for the preservation of 
corpses for burial), water purification tablets, generators and fuel, heavy 
equipment to extract bodies and remove debris, and for the restoration of 
damaged infrastructure, especially roads.567 The Philippine government also 
requested from UNDRO emergency teams with experience in relief 
coordination and flood management “in order to assist with appraisal of 
needs and coordination of response.”568 At this early stage, the scarcity of 
skilled manpower in disaster response was identified as crucially lacking, 
indeed it was an “eye opener” for the DSWD, because though “considerable 
efforts and resources…[had already been] spent over the years to build-up 
the capacity of local communities for disaster management, much still 
remains to be done.”569 Ironically, the DSWD had conducted eighteen 
intensive disaster management workshops at national and regional levels 
from 1987 to 1992 to train an average of 66,000 individuals annually at 
numerous barangay-level workshops.570 
UNDRO’s final aid tally for Typhoon Uring victims amounted to $5.8 
million (or approximately 1.55 billion pesos), excluding contributions in kind 
that had no declared value and those that had not been channelled through 
UNDRO, amounting to at least $250,000 (or approximately 6,667,500 
pesos). This amount also did not include donations made by fellow Filipinos, 
both individuals and corporations, in both cash and kind amounting to at 
																																								 																				
566 See, for instance, L. Lacson and N. Abrematea, “’Uring’ kills 2,122 in Leyte, renders 




569 C. De Leon and L. Laigo, “Flood relief and rehabilitation in Ormoc,” 327-328. 
570 Ibid. 
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least $240,720 (approximately 6,420,000 pesos). Much of the amount 
pledged by countries, however, was directed, not to the government, but to 
non-government organizations (NGOs).571 It is unclear today how much of 
this amount simply remained as pledges. After twenty-two years, there are 
no existing records that documented how this money had been received and 
how exactly it had been used.572 Nonetheless, some international donors in 
November 1991 had expressed donor fatigue in view of the successive 
appeals made by the Philippine government for additional support for the 
rehabilitation of areas stricken by numerous recent disasters.573 In response, 
the national government through Finance Secretary Jesus Estanislao 
announced a so-called shift in focus on aid use from “seeking more financial 
help from donor countries to formulating a concrete program directed 
towards the rehabilitation of areas devastated by recent disasters, 
particularly Mt. Pinatubo’s eruptions and the flash floods in Leyte.”574 
Contrary to the expressed atmosphere of fatigue among donors, however, 
Japan vowed to give more.575 Some newspaper editorials later insisted that 
Japan must “shoulder some blame as the world’s biggest importer of tropical 
timber” and that “70% of timber logged in the Philippines went to Japan, and 
logging was the cause of the [Ormoc] disaster.”576 
Based on news reports, various national government agencies 
released several tranches of aid for typhoon Uring relief operations, namely: 
one million pesos from the DSWD for relief assistance to department offices 
																																								 																				
571 This was also the case observed in Haiti. Katz found that only about nine (9) percent of 
the $683 million given by donors in 2007 to Haiti for development went directly to the Haitian 
government as budget support. The majority, between $307 million and $604 million, went to 
fund non-government organizations and foreign private contractors who “may have delivered 
some of that money to Haiti in the form of local subcontracts, or material, or not at all.” What 
was disturbing was that “large quantities were spent on short-term fixes, such as free food, 
and supplies whose purchase benefited suppliers and corporations in the donors’ home 
countries, not Haiti.” J. Katz, The Big Truck that Went By, How the World Came to Save 
Haiti and Left Behind a Disaster, 10.  
572 Again, Katz observes that, in the case of Haiti, “Donors made it difficult to track where aid 
went and how it got spent.” Ibid., 10.  
573 T. Valderrama, “Gov’t shifts focus on aid use: Estanislao,” Philippine Times Journal, 15 
November 1991, 5. 
574 Ibid. 
575 Ibid.  
576 Cited in “Ormoc floods prick Japan’s conscience,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 22 November 
1991, 6. 
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in Eastern Visayas,577 seven (7) million pesos to Northern Leyte (with 5 
million pesos specifically for the rehabilitation of Ormoc’s waterworks) 
sourced from the Calamity Fund of the President,578 an additional twenty-four 
(24) million pesos from the Calamity Fund (where 20 million pesos went to 
the DSWD, one million pesos to the Department of Health [DOH], two million 
pesos to the Negros Occidental local government, 500,000 pesos to La 
Carlota City, and 500,000 pesos to Bago City),579 fourteen (14) million pesos 
from the President’s Social Fund,580 and eleven (11) million pesos from the 
Philippine Coconut Authority through the Leyte Economic Forum for the 
rehabilitation of affected coconut farmers.581 President Aquino also directed 
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to allocate fifty (50) 
million pesos for an estimated 5,000 families with dead or missing family 
members in Eastern Visayas.582 It is unclear, however, if the government 
fully achieved its promise “to use all of its Php100 million Calamity Fund to 
speed up delivery of relief goods, medicines, emergency shelter materials, 
and other forms of assistance to towns and cities devastated by Uring…to 
avert hunger and epidemics,” an announcement made early on 9 
November.583 In November 1992, exactly a year after, newly elected Vice 
Mayor Benjamin Tugonon stated in a news article that the previous Locsin 
administration received twenty-two (22) million pesos in aid, but that only 1.8 
million pesos was left. “Our main problem,” he noted, “is consolidating all 
																																								 																				
577 “Aquino visits Ormoc today,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10 November 1991, 1&13.   
578 The Calamity Fund totalled 1 billion pesos for a fiscal year, which according to Secretary 
Guillermo Carague, still had a balance of 227.6 million pesos on 15 November 1991. See 
“Identification of victims delaying P10T burial fund,” Malaya, 15 November 1991, 1&2; 
“Aquino visits Ormoc today,” Ibid.; and, V. Batic, “Where’s aid money? Ormoc City Mayor 
asks,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 17 November 1991, 1&13. 
579 “Cory denies diversion of relief goods,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 15 November 1991, 
1&10; and, “Identification of victims delaying P10T burial aid,” Malaya.   
580 “Aquino visits Leyte, vows more government aid,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 11 November 
1991, 1&8; and, V. Batic, “Where’s aid money? Ormoc City Mayor asks,” Ibid. However, 
there were reports that Mrs. Aquino promised 40 million pesos, rather than 14 million pesos 
from her social fund to be made available immediately for the reconstruction of bridges. C. 
Estrella, “Cory hands out P10,000 each to fatalities’ kin,” Malaya, 11 November 1991, 1&2.   
581 V. Batic, “Where’s aid money? Ormoc City Mayor asks,” Ibid. 
582 It is unclear whether this amount funded the President’s Social Fund and/or the Calamity 
Fund released for the relief operations. C. Velarde and C. Estrella, “18 families get burial 
assistance,” Malaya, 16 November 1991, 2. 
583 F. Lobo, “Death toll passes 3,000; still rising,” Manila Bulletin, 9 November 1991, 1&20. 
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records of (disbursements and donations). We are trying to retrieve whatever 
records [exist] before, during, and after the floods.”584 
With Ormoc apparently awash with funding, relief operations 
spearheaded by the government were far from smooth and efficient. The 
major players during the relief and rehabilitation stage were the regional 
DSWD, Ormoc City government, the Catholic church primarily the 
Archdiocese of Palo where Ormoc belonged, the Cebu provincial 
government, foreign donors especially the US and Japan as the most visible, 
print and television media groups, PNRC, and NGOs reported in the media, 
including Ramon Aboitiz Foundation, Inc. (RAFI), World Vision, and 
PhilRads, among others. Unrecorded, the role of the Philippine Constabulary 
(PC) was also fundamental, as soldiers provided the much-needed 
manpower in the clearing up operations and in ensuring that survivors did not 
return to the riverbanks.  
In the first week after the tragedy, relief was focused on the delivery of 
basic needs—food, clothes, blankets and beddings, tents, cooking utensils, 
and medicines.585 Other forms of aid included cash donations specifically to 
families who had lost some of their loved ones, provision of heavy equipment 
like trucks and bulldozers, training of staff on the technical aspects of relief 
operations, disaster management and psychological counselling, and 
provision of medical and other volunteer services.586 The Tent City, the 
biggest project spearheaded by the Ormoc local government under the 
leadership of mayor Victoria Locsin, was immediately established to facilitate 
the transfer and management of evacuees, a project that came with heavy 
funding.587 It was a five-hectare site located in Barangay San Isidro, an area 
still within the city center but at a higher elevation, identified by the local 
government for emergency settlement to house about 700 families at an 
estimated cost of $1 million, so named after the numerous donated white 
tents.  
																																								 																				
584 Cited in E. Tordesillas, “Ormoc: A year after; lessons learned, lessons ignored,” Malaya, 
3 November 1992, 1&10.  
585 Ibid. 
586 Ibid. 
587Reliefweb, Ibid.  
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Dominica Chua, who oversaw relief operations for Ramon Aboitiz 
Foundation, Inc. (RAFI) in Ormoc in 1991, an NGO involved primarily in the 
setting up of starter or relief houses and the conduct of psycho-social 
programs among survivors,588 remembers her frustration in finalizing the 
relocation program in Ormoc. RAFI had received funding from international 
donors for specific relief activities, notably the construction of starter houses, 
the conduct of psychosocial therapy, and repair of the damaged easements 
along Tambulilid, with an implementation timeframe of 120 days.589 
Dominica Chua: In fact I told City Hall, we will handle everything for 
you, just give me the relocation site…Just focus on your job there. We 
will handle it. I only need your City Planning Officer just to help me 
grid the Tambulilid because they pointed it out already, because I will 
tell you it was a swamp ha.  
Author: Yes it’s a basin as well. 
Chua: My Jesus Christ! My God, why are they putting it there? But 
who am I to say no? My job was only to put people in Tent City there. 
My God, what will I do with this, it’s kanipaan,590 you have all the 
palms you know in one part there, and there’s water. What will I do? 
Who’s gonna go to help me fill up the land? And who’s going to help 
me grid it? Because, you know, in my list I have to put all those 
people, the neighborhood, I have to maintain the neighborhood. I have 
to maintain that those coming from Don Felipe has to be together with 
the Don Felipe.  
Author: Ah so it was followed? That kind of policy? 
																																								 																				
588 D. Chua, interview with author, 29 July 2013, in Cebu City, remarks on these starter 
houses, original in English, transcribed by author: “I would like to emphasize it. It was relief 
housing. It was a starter house. Don’t call it low cost housing because it was very 
different...[Author: What is a starting (sic) house, ma’am?] It’s just a very simple one. All you 
have to do is just like the normal nipa hut, like they were given…each one of them will have 
a 30 square meters or 50 square meters and the house which was around 20 plus or 30 
square meters.” 
589 Ibid.  
590 Bisaya, lit. place where palm trees proliferated.  
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Chua: Yah! Yah! You cannot mix them up! They’re coming from 
different places! So you cannot! You have to maintain the 
neighborhood, my dear!...Okay and so you have pa gyud all these 
other institutions that are also doing their own relief, who’s trying to 
mess up with my data, who and some of… these people here would 
say, “Oh no…you’re late, you’re delayed okay so we just go to this 
institution because now they are going to be ready”…When there’s a 
lack of collaboration amongst relief intervenors it is always a 
mess…That should be the role of the LGU591, really has to, should 
surface, and they should be the one coordinating all of these relief.”592 
According to the Ormoc City Social Welfare and Development Office, 
a total of 1,801 beneficiary families were resettled in various areas of Ormoc. 
This was below the figure reported early in 1992 whereby 2,668 Ormoc 
families were planned for relocation in several hectares purchased with 
donations from private organizations and the UN Development Fund 
(UNDP).593 However, discouraging people from returning to the riverbanks 
where their houses used to stand was difficult. “[T]hey have been hard-
hearted,” said Dr. Gregorio Yrastorza, Jr., Ormoc councillor and the chair of 
the City Disaster Coordinating Council (CDCC), “But you also can’t tell them 
to leave if you don’t have an alternative yet for families living in high-risk 
areas.”594 The relocation program itself was bogged down by problems, 
including landowners raising the price of land at the last minute. Another 
issue was the seeming unconcern displayed by survivors themselves who 
tempered their horrific experiences with self-assurance that it was a once-in-
a-lifetime experience. “What happened here was a buhawi (whirlwind),” said 
Jimmy Castillo, a resident of Isla Verde. “It was very rare. It never happened 
here before, and it won’t happen again.”595 Another common complaint was 
that, “The resettlement site is too small and too crowded,” said Alfred 
																																								 																				
591 Local Government Unit.  
592 D. Chua, interview with author, Ibid. 
593 H. Severino, “Ormoc revisited,” Ibid. 
594 Cited in Severino, Ibid. 
595 Cited in Severino, Ibid. 
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Casicas, who went back to reside in the area of Isla Verde with his family 
immediately after the tragedy.596 
Another telling challenge was the aloof personality cultivated by a 
mayor who had since the flood practiced a leadership style not easily 
accessible to the public, preferring instead to allow subordinates to screen 
those who came to see her.597 Many perceived this style of behavior as 
natural to someone borne to wealth and far removed from the daily concerns 
of the ordinary world around her. But, at the crucial moment, in an effort to 
deal with the devastation of the urban flooding, the mayor was unable to 
unify all those disparate organizations and groups to ensure optimal 
utilization of aid resources: 
Whenever the mayor will call for a meeting, I see only one or two 
representative will go there, but they make arrangements with the 
mayor individually, but the mayor seems not…She should have been 
here on top, but she’s not on top.598 
Worse still, she was said to have briefly left Ormoc in the second 
week of December 1991 to attend the graduation of one of her children 
studying in the US.599 Problems in Ormoc multiplied, which included the slow 
receipt of information that hampered planning and decision-making; 
misunderstanding and conflict between the DSWD and the city government; 
logistical concerns over actual distribution of goods, including the lack of 
gasoline and equipment;600 the relative inexperience of DSWD regular and 
replacement staff in the management of large-scale food distribution 
networks in evacuation centers; and, poor coordination with other agencies 
engaged in disaster operations.601 That the local government was so 
incapacitated was an understatement. Indeed, “bureaucracy failure” was 
argued to be the “major impediment to relief work and rehabilitation efforts” in 
																																								 																				
596 Cited in H. Severino, “Ormoc tragedy: Stage set for a repeat.”  
597 Informal conversations with Ormocanons, February-October 2013, in Ormoc City. 
598 NGO worker, name withheld upon request, interview with author, 29 July 2013, in Cebu 
City, original in English. 
599 Ibid. 
600 E. Tordesillas, “No more tears to shed,” Malaya, 8 November 1991, 1 & 3.  
601 C. De Leon and L. Laigo, “Flood relief and rehabilitation in Ormoc,” 330. 
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Ormoc in 1991.602 In a study involving twenty-three key informants 
representing twenty-two government, NGO and church-based organizations 
involved in the relief and rehabilitation in Ormoc after the 1991 flood, 
opinions were split on which agency stood out in the process. Half of the 
respondents remarked that not one particular agency was exceptional while 
another half perceived the Cebu provincial government as a notable 
exception.603 Bureaucracy hampered food distribution at every stage and 
accusations about hoarding and fund diversion were levelled against local 
officials all the way up to the President.604 But stockpiled relief packs were 
confirmed rotting in warehouses, an accusation denied by both local and 
national government officials.605 The national government’s solution was the 
installation of two telecommunications circuits ostensibly to ensure a direct 
communication link between Manila and Ormoc City.606 Malacañang also 
released Memorandum Circular Number 139 on 19 November 1991 
providing guidelines to ensure that the flow of goods and humanitarian 
services was not hampered and should not be suspended by more than 
three days.607 The image that appears was a lack of a strategic approach 
and chaos—not among traumatized survivors fighting amongst themselves 
out of fear and suspicion—but rather among relief responders afflicted by a 
leadership vacuum, as the local government was rendered virtually 
paralysed. Several NGOs, eager to sidestep politics and red tape, decided to 
launch Operation Noah’s Ark. According to Socorro Gasco, dean of the 
Divine Word University School of Nursing in Tacloban City, “This might be 
the only way to make sure that our offer of assistance reaches those who 
																																								 																				
602 M.C. Conaco et al., “Flood relief and rehabilitation in Ormoc: Experiences and insights of 
field workers and beneficiaries,” Philippine Journal of Public Administration Vol. 37 No. 4 
(Quezon City: University of the Philippines 1993), 336-350; and, E. Tordesillas, “Donations 
aren’t reaching survivors,” Malaya, 10 November 1991, 1&8. 
603 This observation was shared by De Leon and Laigo, who note that, “The quick and 
sustained response from Cebu was a notable observation.” C. De Leon and L. Laigo, “Flood 
relief and rehabilitation in Ormoc,” 330. 
604 “No cholera epidemic,” Ibid.; “Cory denies diversion of relief goods,” Ibid.; and, T. Cruz, 
“Palace denies diversion of relief, but admits lack of coordination,” Philippine Times Journal, 
15 November 1991, 1&6.  
605 “Relief food packs rotting in Ormoc,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 16 November 1991, 1.  
606 T. Cruz, “Malacanang issues memo on relief goods delivery,” Philippine Times Journal, 
24 November 1991, 3. 
607 Ibid. 
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really need it most.”608 The Catholic Church was a central player in Operation 
Noah’s Ark, with the distribution center at Saints Peter and Paul Parish. The 
Iglesia Ni Cristo, which had lost twenty-three members to the flood and had 
fourteen homeless families in Isla Verde, Malbasag and along the riverbanks, 
conducted its own relief operations for one month, called Lingap Sa 
Mamamayan (Relief for the People), with estimated beneficiaries reaching 
approximately 3,000 individuals.609 To each its own, this appeared to be how 
relief organizations went about their operations then.  
While assistance was not based on religious affiliation, families and 
communities with links to external groups were more likely to have 
guaranteed assistance. Barangay officials also played a critical role in 
identifying who should receive much-needed aid, as one survivor attests:  
Mrs. Sescon: We were very thankful that many helped us so we were 
able to also spread the relief we got. Her housemate [referring to a 
colleague sitting nearby who was also a survivor] was my assistant. 
She retired about two years ago. She said they did not have anything 
to eat, my God.  
Author: What happened to those who were just boarders? 
Sescon: That’s it. Her housemate was very angry because they did 
not get anything as they were just boarders. I said how are you going 
to eat if you aren’t given anything?  
Author: So how were they able to eat then? 
Sescon: No, it depended on the barangay captain, the barangay 
officials. Because in our district, even if you were only a renter, as 
long as in this house, in here, in one house, how many are you here? 
Who is the head of the family? It wasn’t per person. It was per head of 
the family. We were four families, how many children do you have? 
That was my style in questioning them because at that time I was the 
																																								 																				
608 D. Petilla, “NGOs launch Operation Noah’s Ark,” Ibid. 
609 As cited in a handwritten note from Fernando Villanueva, legal officer and minister of the 
Iglesia ni Cristo in Ormoc City, 7 June 2013.  
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barangay treasurer. How many families are you? How many children 
do you have? Four, you three, you one so we compute that this is 
what you will get. Some of them went to our house. We shared with 
them. Because we got a lot from personal sources. My husband’s 
relatives really came here...When you have so much you have to 
share.610 
In comparison, for example, some 30,000 cultural minorities belonging 
to the Manobo and Bagobo tribes in the hinterlands of Samar and Leyte were 
also badly affected by typhoon Uring. But because they were not as well 
connected to the outside world, aid sent to them was much slower.611 
Creative coping and self-help 
Coping is defined as adaptive actions and mechanisms to solve 
problems brought by “unusual, abnormal and adverse situations.”612 In 
Ormoc amidst the bureaucratic challenges associated with relief operations, 
some enterprising survivors organized themselves into an NGO called 
Pagtinabangay (Help Each Other) Foundation in order to safeguard the 
continuous supply of rice. Headed by Emil Justimbaste613 as executive 
director, Pagtinabangay arranged for the purchase of sacks of rice from 
farmer groups on consignment and sold them for a profit of thirty pesos per 
cavan to Ormoc residents.614  
From the national government, a family of six persons were initially 
provided with one kilo of rice and a can of sardines.615 There were queues 
for everything: food, water, clothes, medicines, and the 10,000 pesos burial 
assistance promised by the President for those who had lost members of 
																																								 																				
610 Mrs. Sescon, interview with author, 4 October 2013, in Ormoc City, original in Filipino.  
611 There was in fact only one news article on this. See “Tribal chieftain seek calamity aid for 
Uring-hit ethnic villages,” Philippine Times Journal, 26 November 1991, 15. 
612 B. Wisner, P. Blaikie, T. Cannon, and I. Davis (eds), At Risk, Natural Hazards, People’s 
Vulnerability and Natural Disasters, 112-114. 
613 Emil Justimbaste is currently known as de facto historian of Ormoc City, having written “A 
brief history of Ormoc” for the Mithi Og Bahandi sa Dakbayan sa Ormoc, a “learning 
resource material” compiled by the Department of Education (DepEd) Region VIII. He was 
also a journalist.  
614 “Ormocanons handle own relief, rehab programs,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 23 November 
1991, 6. Cavan, Filipino, lit. measure of palay, a sack.  
615 G. Dumat-ol, “Leyte death toll reaches 3,700,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 9 November 
1991, 1&12.  
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their family. People lined up for the handouts, even those who were not, in 
reality, victims. In the immediate aftermath of the flood, operations provided 
relief not only to those immediately vulnerable groups, but also to the long-
standing marginalized communities of Ormoc, without exception and 
irrespective of whether they were disaster victims or not.616 For many 
survivors, it was undoubtedly a time that demanded an attitude of wily and 
street-smart self-help, almost a necessity to grab a perceived advantage lest 
they were left behind, an attitude that reflected a deep abiding interest in 
ensuring their own family’s survival that no one else except themselves might 
uphold. It was an attitude of calculated self-interest, prevalent among urban 
poor communities,617 and it was undeniably present in the aftermath of the 
1991 Ormoc tragedy. According to Police Officer (Retired) Pocson, who was 
residing in devastated barangay Don Felipe in 1991, the talk show host Inday 
Badiday came and distributed goods to the neighborhood one day and he 
was shocked at what he saw. He knew that everyone had already amassed 
small piles of canned goods at home because relief goods had been 
regularly distributed, but still they fought over those goods as though they 
were dying of hunger. It shamed him, he said, that he asked Inday Badiday 
to leave with the goods and give to somewhere else.618 
The proliferation of particular disaster stories also showed not only 
what survivors considered as essential values, but also more importantly 
how they viewed the world around them, especially as it fell apart. In Tent 
City where the majority of survivors were initially put up, survival stories 
assumed the character of miracles, indicating a need to believe in the 
powers of an all-powerful God vis-à-vis the impotence of men and women in 
																																								 																				
616 See, for example, Divina and Marife (neighbors), separate interviews with author, 5 April 
2013, both in Barangay Tambulilid, Ormoc City, original in Bisaya. Both of them already 
resided in Tambulilid, which was not affected by the flood in 1991, but both received relief 
food that time.  
617 For a discussion of slum behavior, see, M. Davis, Planet of Slums (London and New 
York: Verso, 2006); also F. Landa Jocano, Slum as a Way of Life: A Study of Coping 
Behavior in an Urban Environment (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1975). 
Racelis, however, criticizes Jocano’s Slum as a Way of Life for its over-emphasis on deviant 
behaviors and the use of a predominantly male perspective, reinforcing many unfavourable 
stereotypes of slum communities, ignoring quantitative methodologies like survey, its failure 
to build on local and foreign literature on slums, and its failure to add to social science theory 
and policy formulation. See M. Racelis Hollnsteiner, “Review of Slum as a Way of Life,” 
Philippine Studies Vol 24 No. 2 (Ateneo de Manila University, 1976), 234-237. 
618 Police Officer (Ret) Pocson, interview with author, 10 October 2013, in Ormoc City.  
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matters of life and death. Children, for example, were seen wearing rosaries 
on their necks,619 while mothers told of how the Santo Niño, the Virgin Mary, 
and Jesus Christ had performed feats that defied logic. In one documented 
story, two small nipa huts located along the Anilao riverbanks and their 
residents were spared, against all odds: 
…Jesus, the Divine Mercy has been very merciful to us. The water 
came rushing, but they spared our houses. We were also flooded but 
up to the knee only.620 
In another account, Papenuncia, a 73-year old widow who now lived 
in one of the resettlement barangays around the city, strongly believed that 
the survival of her pawud621 house located in Barangay Alegria right beside 
the Anilao River could only be explained by divine intervention: 
When the flood rose, our house also rose. When we went back, thank 
God, because the other year we were burnt down near the bridge! Our 
house was burnt down and we were not able to save a single thing. 
Everything was burnt. I said this time Lord please spare us because 
we did not have any more things! Or let our things go with the house if 
it is swept away. We will not have a house.622 
 As a consequence, there was an outpouring of religious fervor and the 
observance of ritual practices after 5 November 1991, in particular the 
prusisyon623 three weeks after the tragedy624 attended by thousands of 
																																								 																				
619 C. Estrella, “Life goes on: Laundry lines riverbanks; bodies float in midstream,” Malaya, 
11 November 1991, 13.  
620 Asencio, however, erroneously identify the “dreadful flash flood [that] destroyed countless 
houses and killed more than eleven thousand people in Ormoc City, in the Province of 
Leyte, Philippines,” as occurring in 1992. M. Lotilla-Asencio, “Divine Mercy for two houses in 
the Ormoc City tragedy,” Miracles of the Divine Mercy (Undated), Unpublished. The story 
was confirmed by Monsignor Jaime Villanueva, in an interview with the author, 30 August 
2013, at the Burauen Parish Church, Municipality of Burauen, Leyte province.  
621 Bisaya,lit. palm-thatched.  
622 Papenuncia, interview with author, 16 April 2013, in Ormoc City, original in Filipino. The 
extraordinary story became so sensational that she and her husband were subsequently 
interviewed by the ABS-CBN, a television network, immediately after the flash flood.   
623 Filipino, lit., procession of saints, commonly observed as a religious activity during the 
Semana Santa or Holy week, and during the fiestas or feast days of patron saints adopted 
by cities or municipalities.  
624 Masses were suspended indefinitely because, according to Monsignor Villanueva, “The 
Church was empty, the Church was full of mud, and the first mass was in the grotto…outside 
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survivor-devotees. Monsignor Jaime Villanueva, who was the parish priest in 
Ormoc in 1991, observed,  
Monsignor Villanueva: They [Ormocanons] became more religious. 
In fact…you will see Ormoc with many people doing this aurora625 this 
long procession, groups of them, they’re meeting [in] the streets by 
their own, and like, for example, in Isla Verde, before the flood, very 
few come to the chapel to mass…so usually the one who goes to 
mass, good if there are five adults, most of them are children. But 
after, the chapel was destroyed. We shared mass under open air. 
There was one under a makeshift…tent…many people came and you 
know what was surprising, before, during the kolekta626 time, we 
would use this platito627 for the collection, but after the flash 
flood…they used this nigo.628  
Author: The nigo was full! 
Villanueva: Yes! That was surprising, they had no more money.629 
 Nonetheless, this extraordinary outward show of piety was only 
momentary, and Church attendance rates eventually declined as months and 
then years passed.630 Indeed, the role of the Church in providing comfort and 
moral strength in the aftermath of the tragedy was critical. While the Parish 
Church of Saints Peter and Paul in the downtown area had been physically 
devastated, it was Monsignor Jaime Villanueva, two priests and a seminarian 
who conducted blessings of the dead before the corpses were brought by 
dump truck to the mass grave.631 It was the Church, and God, that people 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 											
the Church there was a grotto, Our Lady of Lourdes…within the compound…so that’s where 
we had the mass…because the Church was full of mud and there were no pews yet.” 
625 Filipino, lit., a procession of the image/s of the Blessed Virgin Mary, commonly practiced 
in the Philippines with an accompaniment of songs and prayers.   
626 Filipino, lit., collection of alms during the offertory of the mass. 
627 Filipino, lit., small plate. 
628 Filipino, lit., a shallow palm-woven basket for cleaning uncooked rice. 
629 Monsignor Jaime Villanueva, interview with author, 30 August 2013, in the Municipality of 
Burauen, Leyte, original in English.  
630 Ibid. 
631 Arnel Genobiagon, former seminarian at the Saints Peter and Paul Parish Church, 
interview with author, 7 September 2013, in Ormoc City, original in Filipino. Mr. Genobiagon 
and another priest were the only ones in the convent located in the Saints Peter and Paul 
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looked to in their misery and deep uncertainty, to give sense and meaning to 
such horror. For Monsignor Villanueva,  
…the disaster [wa]s a sign that men should be reunited with God as 
they have already forgotten Him as they are engaged in mundane 
activities.632 
In response, for those who survived, the process of understanding the 
arbitrariness of their existence in the midst of thousands who had died led to 
many feeling a need to renew their faith and to commit to become better 
persons. For many, the experience of watching loved ones perish brought 
strong feelings of guilt, powerlessness, self-blaming and depression, 
symptoms indicative of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Yet, while 
there had been teams of psychologists who undertook stress debriefing 
therapy sessions among survivors, many more were left to cope on their 
own.633 In a study undertaken forty-one months after the November 1991 
tragedy involving 296 respondents consisting of 199 adults aged between 
twenty-one and fifty-five years and 97 children aged between eight and 
thirteen years residing in Barangay Tambulilid, the biggest relocation site in 
Ormoc City, it was found that post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
persisted as psychological adjustment issues months after the tragedy.634 
Measures of psychological adjustment included feelings of well-
being/satisfaction, frequency of thinking about the event, vividness of 
memories, reactions to intrusive memories of the trauma, future outlook 
(including worries and plans), perceived changes related to behavior, 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 											
Parish Church on 5 November 1991 because Monsignor Villanueva was in Cebu City for a 
retreat.  
632 A.M. Pamintuan, “Cory visits Ormoc City, allots P21 M for repair,” Philippine Star, 11 
November 1991, 1 and 9. 
633(1) Ronaldo Boy, for example, lost his grandmother in Barangay Nalunopan right before 
his eyes. He remarks, when asked if he went to see a psychologist or a doctor to process his 
experiences: “I was okay. But it took a long while, over several months when I would just be 
stricken dumb when the water would rise.” Ronaldo Boy, interview with author, 21 April 
2013, original in Bisaya, transcribed and translated by author. (2) Merlita, who saw her 
seven-year old son being carried away by the floodwaters, says, “I almost went crazy just 
thinking about it.” Merlita, interview with author, 5 April 2013, in Ormoc City, original in 
Filipino.  
634 P. Alix, “Prolonged psychosocial effects of the Ormoc Disaster, The role of personal 
variables, stressor characteristics, and coping responses,” 92-131. 
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financial, emotional, spiritual and physical aspects of life, and the presence 
and intensity of psychiatric symptoms related to PTSD.635  
Yet twenty-two years after the 1991 tragedy, Ormoc City has moved 
on. There are few reminders around the city of that tragedy except for the 
ubiquitous slit dams in Barangays Anilao, Biliboy and Malbasag, and flood 
control structures provided by the Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) through a 92.7 million-peso grant completed in 2001. For survivors, 
while most admitted to still feeling sakit sa dughan636 when thinking about 
that day, many had re-married, had other children, pursued livelihoods, and 
had generally moved on with normalized lives. Of course, some may claim 
they will never forget that November, but some others insist it was a bitter 
day that should better be left in the past and forgotten. What was truly 
remarkable, however, was the strong sense of acceptance among them after 
twenty-two years, especially from the most economically marginalized, of a 
God who had permitted the tragedy, but no sense of anger, however feeble, 
against this unfathomable God.637 One survivor succinctly notes that,  
…It was only a test from God…The only thing I asked of Him was to 
be light-hearted. That was what I learned...Because though you were 
close to God, you were still tested.638 
Did the survivors generally perceive themselves to be more religious 
after the tragedy? Not necessarily, as those who had been religious before 
the flood remained so, while those who were not did not also fundamentally 
change. Religiosity was not a long-term consequence of the disaster. It was 
																																								 																				
635 Ibid., 102-103. 
636 Bisaya, lit. pain in the heart. See Merlita, interview with author, 5 April 2013, in Ormoc 
City, and Elizabeth, interview with author, 6 Apri 2013, in Ormoc City.  
637 This conclusion obviously takes into consideration the time element explicit in the 
processing of the disaster experience by survivors. Alix, for instance, noted that 47 per cent 
of her respondents (total of 353) studied across three time periods (immediately after the 
Ormoc disaster, two months after, and two years after) attributed the disaster to supernatural 
causes. This included perceptions of either God or the devil as causing the destruction. P. 
Alix, “Ormoc revisited: Initial and long-term reactions and coping responses of disaster 
victims,” Aghamtao Vol. 8 (Anthropological Association of the Philippines, 1996), 29.  
638(1) Amparo, interview with author, 26 April 2013, in Ormoc City, original in Filipino. Also, 
(2) Laura, interview with author, 7June 2013, in Ormoc City, original in Filipino, on the 
question of whether she had ever blamed God: “During the flood I did not blame Him 
[Author: Why? Why not?] not once. Because it’s His way, if it is your time then that’s it. I did 
not blame Him. No.”  
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socio-economic and physical factors that determined regular attendance at 
mass, such as the availability of fare money or if their health permitted, and 
not the fear of another tragedy of this magnitude.639 
The urban poor communities in Ormoc, indeed the most vulnerable, 
were far from silent observers of society. As relief workers and local 
government officials would later experience, they were “hard headed”640 and, 
more importantly, only followed rules when they were convinced of the 
benefit to their lives. One relief officer notes, for example, of one Muslim 
survivor from Don Felipe being relocated to Tambulilid,  
…[T]here’s somebody who’s running amok already you know the 
Muslim because they don’t want to be there…you know I have to grid 
it [referring to Tambulilid] because they have to have a road network 
inside, that’s what I said it has to be block by block and how many 
houses each block? I think around fifty. Block A, Block B, Block C…it 
was very organized…And the Muslim doesn’t want to occupy it, that 
space where I put them there…They started building up their houses 
in the road, in the road! And he was already bringing a bolo!641 My 
people were already running away!”642 
Disaster and the loss of self 
In the beautifully and sensitively rendered book Everything in its Path 
by Kai Erikson, he referred to the loss of the ‘furniture of self’—‘goods [that 
were] more than a form of decoration or a cushion against want; they [were] 
a measure of one’s substance as a person and as a provider”643—as death, 
																																								 																				
639See, for example, (1) Apining, interview with author, 6 April 2013, in Ormoc City, original 
in Filipino, on being asked if she still went to mass once a week as she had done prior to the 
flood (transcribed and translated by author): “Still once and if there is money, on Friday, like 
that. Then on holiday.” (2) Amadeo, interview with author, 6 April 2013, in Ormoc City, 
original in Bisaya, when asked the same question, transcribed and translated by author: 
“Now no more...[Author: Why?] No more because I am sick. It’s abuse of the body. I won’t 
get to the finishing line anymore” [smiles]. Amadeo was incapacitated at home with painful 
gout.  
640 Cited from Dr. Gregorio Yrastorza, Jr. in Severino, “Ormoc revisited,” Ibid.  
641 Filipino, lit. a large cutting tool often identified as a Muslim implement similar to the 
machete.  
642 D. Chua, interview with author, Ibid. 
643 K. Erikson, Everything in its Path, Destruction of Community in the Buffalo Creek Flood 
(New York: Simon and Schuster 1976), 174-177. 
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akin to the “loss of flesh.” 644 Its loss also meant the dispossession of the 
“evidence as to who one is and where one belongs in the world.”645 In Ormoc 
in 1991, the most vulnerable families who had been interviewed in this 
research had very few if any material possessions prior to the flood. Unlike 
the Appalachia families of Buffalo Creek in Erikson’s book, the poorest and 
most vulnerable families in Ormoc in 1991 did not exhibit the same level of 
distress on the loss of the ‘furniture of self’ and even the complete 
destruction of their houses. Urban poor dwellers, for example, resided in 
shanties made from scraps of wood, tarpaulin, corrugated iron sheets, and 
cardboards that were not permanent structures for families to beautify or 
strengthen when money to do so was available. The houses, too, of 
sugarcane workers in the upland barangays of Ormoc were similarly 
constructed, this time with palm roofing and wooden or bamboo planks. 
While the urban poor houses contained more appliances and furniture 
typically considered as essential by city dwellers—such as television set, 
radio, table, chairs, and cabinet—sugarcane worker families had no such 
possessions. Among Ormoc survivors, the extent of the deep trauma brought 
by the loss of everything that had signified their lives so far was 
encapsulated in the simple statement that they had lost even their kaldero 
(rice pot) so that they could not cook rice, which was an integral part of any 
Filipino family meal.646 The loss of the family’s kaldero meant hunger, a grim 
possibility for families who knew well how it was to be hungry. Sugarcane 
worker families, who often owned only one pot in the house and whose loss 
would have certainly been more devastating, felt the loss of the rice pot more 
acutely.  
																																								 																				
644 Ibid., 177.   
645 Ibid. 
646 For example, Perlita, interview with author, 2 April 2013, in Purok II-B,  
, Ormoc City, original in Filipino, transcribed and translated by author: “I arrived to see them 
without anything to eat. We also didn’t have our kaldero (pot), all our things were lost, which 
made me cry. It was good I had money, but though I had money there was nothing to buy. I 
said we will go somewhere the flood did not go. We will buy a kaldero there and banig (palm 
mat for sleeping).” Elizabeth, interview with author, Ibid., original in Filipino, transcribed and 
translated by author: “After that tragedy I don’t know what happened to us, I said where are 
we going when we didn’t even have clothes. We didn’t have food. We didn’t have a kaldero. 
No rice.”  
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 If self-identity is closely defined by material possessions, especially 
inside the family home, the loss of these things that had been hard earned 
over many years truly signifies a loss of self. Among the poorest and most 
vulnerable families in Ormoc, however, material possessions are rare 
because any money that a family acquires automatically goes to the 
satisfaction of basic needs and there is no surplus for the purchase of 
household things that are primarily perceived as luxuries anyway. Most of the 
survivor families in Barangay Tambulilid who own a television set, radio, 
refrigerator, etc., also have to worry about security to ensure that no one 
steals anything from their houses at night or when no one is at home. For 
many families, the lack of possessions had a positive unintended effect 
because they were less likely to be targeted by petty thieving. In addition, 
these families were subjected to less gossip by neighbors, a phenomenon 
unique to crowded urban poor areas where gossip-mongering was a 
common pastime. Among sugarcane worker families, material possessions 
are even scarcer. As such, attachment to these things was not fully 
developed and expressed. Self-identity, however, was defined by 
relationships rather than possessions. One was always described as the 
parent, child, sibling, aunt, uncle, or cousin of person A or B, especially when 
being described to someone else. More interestingly, the ability to eat three 
times a day and send children to school despite poverty also strongly 
determined self-identity and self-worth. For these families therefore, the loss 
of self in disaster aftermath was intimately linked to the destruction of 
relationships, such as in the death of family members, with some still missing 
at present. Several of those who had been interviewed in this research note 
that they came close to losing their mind after the flood of November 1991 
when they fully began to realize that a spouse, or a child, mother, father, 
grandparents, or siblings had been killed, and they had survived, a process 
that typically occurred a few days and weeks after 5 November 1991. The 
lack of a title to the house where survivor families had relocated was also 
strongly perceived by survivors as a continuing loss of self-identity, which 
deepened the feelings of insecurity brought about by the effects of the flood.  
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 Yet, while survivors did experience individual and collective trauma 
after the massive death and destruction of the Ormoc 1991 flood, there were 
no documented cases of suicides in its aftermath. Cases of post-traumatic 
stress syndrome, however, were numerous, but for many survivors, formal 
therapy and counselling had not been institutionalized as part of coping 
programs provided by the local and national governments or even of non-
government aid organizations at that time. It bears noting that mental health 
in the Philippines remains, until now, a taboo issue. As such, aside from a 
National Mental Health Policy (Administrative Order No. 8 s. 2001) signed by 
then Secretary of Health Manuel M. Dayrit, there are no laws that advocate 
for mental health care in the Philippines.647 In addition, Filipino society in 
general does not consider mental health as a primary concern, reflected in 
the lack of legislative and financial support for people with mental illnesses. 
This was not any different in 1991, when relief and rehabilitation efforts did 
not automatically provide counselling to all those who had survived. 
Anecdotal testimonies by survivors point to the existence of individuals and 
families who had suffered from undiagnosed post-traumatic stress disorders 
after the flash flood and eventually died of other heath complications. For 
many survivors, personal trauma was a solitary experience of grief and loss 
that could not be shared even with family members, whose main goal was to 
keep the household focused on moving forward and surviving. Thus, a 
common observation shared by these survivors was that, looking back, they 
could only wonder how they survived when it was easier to give in to the 
despair. As such, for many there was no deep and introspective processing 
of grief that would have helped an individual come to terms with death and 
life, loss and coping, and ultimately finding meaning in the tragedy. Only one 
survivor, a library assistant, had noted that she had personally provided one-
person act soliloquys for several years in the immediate aftermath in several 
school-based and community-based programs to commemorate the Ormoc 
1991 tragedy. Her declamation piece, which she had written and acted in 
herself, depicted her personal experiences during that fateful day. For many, 
the default coping strategy had been to relegate the painful and dark memory 
																																								 																				
647 See WHO and the Department of Health, “WHO-AIMS Report on Mental Health System 
in the Philippines” (Manila, Philippines, 2007).     
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of the Ormoc flood to the past and instead focus on surviving the present. A 
common sentiment was that, though the memory will forever be part of a 
person’s memory patterns, the constant reminiscing of the tragedy was 
anathema to forging a successful future; to move on therefore was divine. 
Ormoc must move on, if it wants to survive. The main lesson of that tragedy 
for many survivors is that disasters made them stronger. The reason why the 
few of them did not perish that day when so many in their families and 
communities had died was no longer important. What was important was to 
keep on surviving, because that November 1991 tragedy was not the last 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDIES: 
DISPLACEMENT AND THE LAND PROBLEM 
 
 In the aftermath of the 1991 disaster in Ormoc, the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)-Region VIII recommended the 
reforestation of “a 50 meter strip along the banks of all live rivers within the 
watershed,” the conversion of “all areas upstream with elevation of 400 
meter sea level” into tree plantations “following all contour lines of 400 
meters as boundary,” and “expan[sion of the remaining forest of the 
watershed] area by reforestation to cover at least 40% on the upper portion 
of the watershed.”648 The Department of Agriculture (DA) went further by 
suggesting the total reforestation of Ormoc’s 4,500-hectare watershed.649 
The problem was that there was a lack of political interest in reforestation. 
“Convincing the landowners is a problem,” said Dr. Gregorio Yrastorza Jr., 
Ormoc councillor and chair of the City Disaster Coordinating Council 
(CDCC), “What we’re trying to come up with is a solution that they will be 
happy with, realizing that it is good for the majority.”650 The national 
government in turn admitted its inability to enforce reforestation, with 
Environment and Natural Resources Secretary Fulgencio Factoran noting 
that the only viable approach is to  
put pressure on them. And how do you put pressure on the rich? By 
getting the poor who are plenty to demonstrate. If there is another 
flood, the poor will be the first to die. This is the agrarian redux. You 
see it again and again and again.651 
The year 1991 for Ormoc closed with the horrific images of mass 
death and destruction. The following year, 1992, was symbolic and 
transitional because relief and rehabilitation programs were slowly creating 
various new landscapes: NGOs and other relief organizations were 
overseeing the establishment of new communities in the wake of the 
relocation process; streets, bridges and other damaged and destroyed 
																																								 																				
648 DENR-Region VIII (1991), “Investigation report of the Ormoc City disaster,” 18. 
649 Cited in H. Severino, “Ormoc tragedy: Gov’t hands tied on reforestation,” 1& 12.  
650 Severino, “Ormoc revisited,” Ibid. 
651 Severino, “Ormoc tragedy: Gov’t hands tied on reforestation,” Ibid.  
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infrastructure were being cleared up; and, there was a sense of purpose of 
rebuilding broken lives. On 1 July 1992, Dodong Codilla assumed local 
power, signalling the end to an era of landowner political leadership and 
ushering in renewed hope for a new brand of governance, one headed by a 
man who had himself emerged triumphant from poverty. Rehabilitation would 
actually further deepen during this new administration, and how the lives of 
the most vulnerable communities in Ormoc would be transformed can only 
be understood within this framework of political change in 1992. Many 
believed that the flood spelled the end of the Larrazabal-Locsin’s political 
careers and the rise of the Codilla political clan as a viable alternative to 
feudal leadership.   
Displacement and Relocation 
From the early to mid-1990s, collaboration between the government 
and non-government organizations (NGOs) and church groups undertaking 
housing projects in Ormoc continued, with the latter given much leeway in 
their operations. Seven housing projects contributed to a ‘mild construction 
boom’ in 1992, establishing new villages for flood survivors.652 These villages 
were the Ramon Aboitiz Foundation, Inc. (RAFI) with 701 beneficiaries, 280 
in the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) Core Shelter, 
190 in PhilRads, and 108 in Holy Wings, all in Barangay Tambulilid; 171 in 
Barangay Alta Vista; 25 in Su-ong in Barangay Curva, and 236 in Barangay 
Bagong Buhay.653 The housing projects did not include those that had been 
funded by NGOs on their own, such as the resettlement villages of World 
Vision in barangays Linao and Ipil, the Benedictine Village project of the 
Benedictine sisters also in Ipil, the Red Cross Village in Bliss, Barangay 
Bagong Buhay, and the San Lorenzo Village comprised of 100 families654 
																																								 																				
652 “Mild housing boom noted in Ormoc,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10 November 1992, 7.   
653 Ormoc City Social Welfare and Development Office (CSWD), “Master list of resettlement 
areas,” Urban Poor Affairs Office, as of 2013. This official tally, however, differs from that 
found in the logbook at the Urban Poor Planning and Development Office of the Ormoc City 
Government, which states: PhilRads-119 flash flood victim-beneficiaries; Holy Wings-108; 
Alta Vista-171; Su-ong-25; and, Bagong Buhay-258. While it was clear in the Urban Poor 
logbook that the list referred only to flash flood victim-beneficiaries, the “Master list of 
resettlement areas” did not specify the beneficiaries as flash flood victims.  
654 E. Benedicto, “Ormoc after 3 years: ‘No other way to go but up,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 
6 November 1994, 1&7.  
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resettled in Barangay San Pablo and subsidized by the Archdiocese of Palo. 
The variety of housing projects headed by these organizations created 
opportunities for survivors to ‘window-shop’ for relocation sites and choose 
where to live, as recounted by a survivor,  
When I looked at all the offers I chose Tambulilid actually because I 
considered all the proposed areas. When I was still connected with 
the Benedictine sisters as a member of faculty I thought that maybe I 
won’t want to stay long here, that I won’t want to be a teacher 
anymore so we decided, my wife, that we will go where it wasn’t 
connected with an employer, like that. True enough, I resigned after 
eight years.655 
These houses cost from 5,300 pesos per unit for houses put up by the 
Ramon Aboitiz Foundation, Inc. (RAFI), to the 25,000 pesos per unit by the 
Archdiocese of Palo.656 The projects were projected in 1992 to accommodate 
only 2,658 families, “less than half of those rendered homeless by the 
flood.”657 The actual number of beneficiaries, however, based on the master 
list of the DSWD, was much lower at 1,801.658 
Resettlement was offered primarily to evacuees residing at Tent City, 
who had once been informal settlers along the Anilao and Malbasag 
riverbanks. Radio announcements around Leyte province had been regularly 
broadcast for up to a year to inform survivors who had left Ormoc to go back 
and be listed for resettlement housing. The DSWD and various NGOs 
obviously defined the most vulnerable communities as those who had earlier 
resided along the two rivers, whose houses in the flood aftermath had been 
hurot tanan.659 These were the families who were given much media 
attention, and as such received the bulk of humanitarian aid. However, much 
																																								 																				
655 Buboy, interview with author, 11 March 2013, in Ormoc City, original in mixed Filipino and 
English, on the question if one could choose where to relocate, transcribed and translated by 
author.  
656 Ibid. However, RAFI, says Chief Operating Officer Dominica Chua, had already exited 
Ormoc in February 1992, and that the houses RAFI had financed could not be compared to 
low cost housing projects such as that funded by the Archdiocese of Palo.  
657 E. Benedicto, “Ormoc after 3 years: ‘No other way to go but up,” Ibid.  
658 Ormoc City Social Development and Welfare Office (CSWD), “Master list of resettlement 
areas,” Ibid. 
659 Bisaya, lit. washed away completely.  
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less was reported about the proliferation of the ‘wise-out’ versus ‘washed-out’ 
families who saw in the disaster aftermath an opportunity to own homelots. 
Physical scars from the disaster became valuable social markers to signify 
who were genuine survivors from those who were not, and, by right, 
beneficiaries of all relief and rehabilitation programs, as one survivor noted: 
It’s because you know every day it was increasing. You know people 
even though they weren’t washed out, [they were] wise out. [Kevin 
Caballero, a GK representative present during the interview: It’s 
because there were already benefits] In the beginning, it was do you 
have an uwat? What is your uwat? [Caballero: A mark]. Do you have 
a mark? [Caballero: Scar] Because that was what we knew if you 
were a survivor, that was it really. It was good that mine was on my 
foot, just my foot. That was it because in the beginning [there was] no 
house if you weren’t a survivor.660 
As some cases in the following three chapters will show, cunning and 
savvy individuals, who should not have been recipients of aid, were still able 
to procure homelots through the use of personal networks and fraud: 
Sometimes if you are just prudent and…you are really aggressive, you 
will really have a house. But if you just wait around, nothing [will 
happen] though there were free [housing]…even there, that was our 
situation [people wanting to be] first and who you know, it was like 
that. And even then there were lots who came in who were…yes 
really wise out, everyone, even implementers. I’m not talking in the 
RAFI but maybe some other co-implementers. Those that were free, 
you just have to pay for so you could get materials out [for housing].661 
 For many poor families, regardless of whether they were direct victims 
or not, the post-disaster situation was obviously an opportunity that could not 
be missed, especially in the procurement of a limited number of homelots. 
																																								 																				
660 Roberto ‘Buboy’ Igot and Kevin Caballero, simultaneous interviews with author, 11 March 
2013, original in mixed Filipino and English, transcribed and translated by author. 
661 Roberto ‘Buboy’ Igot, GK representative and himself a survivor, interview with author, 4 
May 2013, at the Gawad Kalinga Provincial Office, Barangay Tambulilid, Ormoc City, 
original in mixed Filipino and English, transcribed and translated by author.  
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Yet, it cannot be overemphasized that groups of survivors did fall through the 
cracks during the relief and rehabilitation stage and were not able to take 
advantage of the offered benefits for many reasons. For families whose 
houses were only partially damaged, though they had also lived in precarious 
locations along the two rivers, evacuation to the public schools in the short 
term and resettlement in the long term were not high priorities compared with 
those whose houses were totally washed away. Renters and boarders were 
also left out, as were single- and female-headed households without 
extensive social networks, as were the case of recent migrant families. 
Worker families in haciendas, by virtue of being tied to their landlords who 
were assumed to take care of their needs as had been the case historically, 
were often also sidelined in government relief and rehabilitation programs. It 
was only through the initiative of church and non-government organizations 
that the plight of these marginalized groups were recognized and addressed. 
The relief situations of more remote communities that had also been badly 
affected were worse, as a selective media did not provide adequate 
exposure to their disaster experiences and needs, thus affecting the 
immediacy and potency of external assistance.  
Another dimension of disaster aftermath often not given attention is 
that survivors may be put through a bizarre cycle of victimization by well-
meaning individuals and groups who, in the process of asking them to 
recount disaster stories, actually pander to a public fascinated by ‘disaster 
porn.’ In Ormoc after the 1991 flood event, while this had not yet been fully 
developed by media compared with such disasters as the 2013 typhoon 
Yolanda (Haiyan) storm surge in Tacloban City, an indication could already 
be glimpsed, as one survivor mused:662 
…It was good that I had an outlet, the community at that time 
[referring to a Catholic lay organization he was part of], even though I 
thought that…it was like I was being taken advantaged of because 
																																								 																				
662 Disaster porn or disaster pornography, often associated with the media in disaster 
aftermath, is the re-framing of a “public issue” as merely a “private trouble,” using the 
language of sociologist C. Wright Mills. Yet, for all the flaws of disaster porn, Recuber 
argues that it is still a critical political terrain where “publics are at least implicitly asked to 
struggle with the social significance of the suffering of others.” T. Recuber, “Disaster porn!” 
Contexts 2013, SAGE Journals (11 May 2013) (Online).  
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every time there was a gathering it was like my sharing was to add 
spice because the speaker [for an event] would not be very good…So 
it was like I even felt sometimes that I was being abused…my wife 
said I shouldn’t share [my stories] anymore.663 
In many cases, such a disaster opens space and opportunity for a 
government to enforce pre-existing land use laws and, particularly in the 
case of urban areas, slum clearance policies that had not been previously 
enforced.664 One of the most immediate consequences of rehabilitation and 
reconstruction that has received widespread interest among scholars and 
practitioners is the issue of resettlement, in particular involuntary 
resettlement.665 The World Bank defines involuntary resettlement as both 
“displacement triggered by environmental degradation, disasters, conflicts or 
development projects that cause people to lose land or other assets, as well 
as lose access to resources, and the process of assistance for these people 
to improve, or at the least restore, lost incomes and living standards.”666 
In Ormoc after November 1991, the flash flood provided the local 
government with a firmer resolve in imposing the legal easement provision 
that prohibited the building of any structure within three meters from the bank 
of any river in urban areas. It wasn’t easy, as original settlers along the 
																																								 																				
663 Buboy, interview with author, original in Filipino and English, when asked whether he 
experienced symptoms of depression and how long it took him to come to terms with his 
experience. 
664 See also for cases in Sri Lanka and India, J. Shaw and I. Ahmed, Design and Delivery of 
Post-Disaster Housing Resettlement Programs, Case Studies from Sri Lanka and India, 
Report 6. (Monash University and RMIT University (Undated) (Online).  
665 See, for example A. Jha with J. Barenstein, P. Phelps, D. Pittet and S. Sena, “To relocate 
or not to relocate,” Safer Homes, Stronger Communities, A Handbook for Reconstructing 
after Natural Disasters (World Bank, 2010), Chapter 5; J. Shaw and I. Ahmed, Design and 
Delivery of Post-Disaster Housing Resettlement Programs, Case Studies from Sri Lanka and 
India; A. Oliver-Smith, “Successes and failures in post-disaster resettlement,” in Disasters, 
The Journal of Disaster Studies and Management Vol. 15 No. 1 (March 1991), 12-13; B.J. 
Batra and S. Chaudhry, International Human Rights Standards on Post-disaster 
Resettlement and Rehabilitation, Working document (Habitat International Coalition-Housing 
and Land Rights Network and People’s Movement for Human Rights Learning in 
collaboration with the UN Special Raaporteur on Adequate Housing, August 2005); E. 
Correa with F. Ramirez and H. Sanahuja, Populations at Risk of Disaster, A Resettlement 
Guide (World Bank and Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, 2011); and, M. 
Cernea (ed), The Economics of Involuntary Resettlement, Questions and Challenges 
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1999).     
666 World Bank, “Social Development, Involuntary resettlement.” Last updated 28 May 2010 
(Online).  
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riverbanks did not always want to be resettled elsewhere.667 Some families 
indeed went back to their original areas of residence in the aftermath of the 
disaster. But for those who agreed to be resettled, they had to satisfy the 
criteria identified by the DSWD and NGOs and recommended by barangay 
officials.668 The NGOs then, in an effort to discourage dole out, organized 
food-and-house-for-work programs that required beneficiary families to take 
an active involvement in the construction of their own houses, as one 
recipient in a World Vision village explained:  
Here, we were screened ma’am…as beneficiary that time when we 
arrived here we worked and were paid in noodles and rice. That was 
during the flood. We were beneficiaries from the flood who came from 
Malbasag as almost everyone who came here came from Malbasag 
because of World Vision so we came here to work on our houses 
which according to Ma’am Vivian [referring to Vivian Valdesanzo, the 
project director of World Vision in Ormoc] for every one house there 
should be two workers so the payment was three kilos of rice and five 
dried fishes and two [packs of] noodles, but we who had worked, we 
owned the house, this house, that was our recompense.669 
The Ormoc City government pursued a second involuntary 
resettlement program when the Japanese government, through the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), provided a grants-in-aid project 
amounting to 1.2 billion pesos for flood control. The Philippine government 
raised in turn nearly 300 million pesos as counterpart funding. The resulting 
resettlement program entailed the identification of 4,701 dwelling units, 
mostly along the banks of the Anilao and Malbasag Rivers that were 
identified as damageable assets in 1994 and the estimation of a total 
compensation cost of 443.4 million pesos, divided into land acquisition and 
																																								 																				
667 See E. Benedicto, “Ormoc City revisited: Memories of killer flood start to fade,” Philippine 
Daily Inquirer, 5 November 1995, 19. 
668 Beneficiary selection for resettlement in Sri Lanka after the 2001 tsunami was also a 
process highly prone to politics, as the eligibility criteria were very broad and open to 
discretion from local officials. J. Shaw and I. Ahmed, Design and Delivery of Post-Disaster 
Housing Resettlement Programs, Case Studies from Sri Lanka and India, 18-19. 
669 Mila, interview with author, 23 June 2013, in World Vision Village in Barangay Ipil, Ormoc 
City, original in Bisaya, transcribed and translated by author. 
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house evacuation for those who were affected by the project.670 The city 
government also appropriated five million pesos in the 1997 annual budget 
for land development and 2.027 million pesos for water development in the 
resettlement area of Barangay JICA-Lao.671 Only 526 families were finally 
listed as beneficiaries resettled in JICA-Lao, mostly affected by the flood 
control project, but some of whom had also been identified as flood victims 
as well.672 According to the project supervisor, Shuji Kaku of CTI Engineering 
International, the consultant for the JICA grant,  
Land had to be reclaimed in order to widen the rivers, so we had to 
ask the people living there to move elsewhere. The residents were 
told to move elsewhere. The residents were told that the project would 
make life safer for them, but they couldn’t understand why they had to 
leave the place they called home.673 
From 1997 to 2001, four new bridges and three slit dams were 
constructed in Ormoc City to confine the flood discharge of a 50-year return 
period flood.674 In addition, JICA also widened and re-channelled the rivers, 
constructed an impressive dike system, and finished the project on schedule, 
a fact that always brought amazement, as one government personnel noted,  
You can see that the infrastructure now was really done very well. 
Because there was a rumor, it was only a rumor that there were still 
Japanese gold still hidden there [along the riverbanks]. That’s why 
some people would say that’s why the Japanese came to Ormoc to 
build it [referring to the flood control project]. Because Ormoc was one 
of the sites of the fiercest battle of World War II, and it was the last 
stand of the Japanese here in Ormoc. So they say there were lots of 
																																								 																				
670 JICA and Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) of the Republic of the 
Philippines, “Study on the flood control for rivers in the selected urban centers,” Final Report 
Vol 3 Supporting Report. (CTI Engineering Co., Ltd. February 1995), 4-17. 
671 Letter of city mayor Eufrocino Codilla, Sr. addressed to Hirosshi Goto, JICA resident 
representative dated 11 March 1997, in JICA and DPWH, “Basic design study report on 
flood mitigation project in Ormoc City,” Ibid., Annex III.  
672 Office of the City Mayor, “Logbook of the Urban Poor Planning and Development.” Ormoc 
City, accessed 22 March 2013.  
673 Cited in Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), “Support for typhoon-stricken 
Leyte island,” JICA’s World Vol. 5 No. 5.  (Tokyo, Japan April 2014), 4-5 (Online).  
674 S. Jose Vanzi, “P676-M anti-flood projects finished in Ormoc,” Newsflash, Philippine 
Headline News Online, 23 April 1999 (Online).  
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Yamashita treasure here...In fact the Japanese even during the night 
they continued to do the work so people would say, so that the 
Filipinos would not see that [they were looking for the treasure] 
[laughs].675 
The effectiveness of the flood control project was touted widely after 
the minimal damage sustained by the city despite the onslaught of severe 
tropical storm Koni (Gilas) on 15 to 23 July 2003 with maximum winds of 110 
kilometers per hour (kph).676 
The impact of the great flood disaster on the Ormoc population was 
undeniably uneven. Some groups were worse off after the flood than others, 
a measure of how past circumstances had contributed to people’s present 
and future abilities to cope with such an unnatural and destructive hazard. 
Theoretically, while the rescue and relief stages in the immediate disaster 
aftermath provided assistance to a wider affected public, the recovery and 
rehabilitation stage was streamlined to help more vulnerable communities 
and groups get back on their feet. Resettlement, as a popular program often 
adopted in disaster rehabilitation, assumes that it is the best option in 
providing new lives and reducing future risks.677 Yet, as other cases around 
the world have shown, resettlement often pursued as an imposed program in 
disaster aftermath, comes with a variety of social and economic costs. 
Cernea succinctly captures the dilemma,  
Forced displacement epitomizes social exclusion of certain groups of 
people. It cumulates physical exclusion from a geographic territory 
with economic and social exclusion out of a set of functioning social 
networks. The concept of exclusion…adds to the understanding of 
impoverishment.678 
																																								 																				
675 Coloy, government personnel, interview with author, 19 March 2013, in Ormoc City, 
original in Filipino and English, transcribed and translated by author.  
676 See I. Antonio, “Community commitment for sustained efficiency of infrastructures: 
Ormoc City, Philippines.”  
677 See A. Jha with J. Barenstein, P. Phelps, D. Pittet and S. Sena, Safer Homes, Stronger 
Communities, A Handbook for Reconstructing after Natural Disasters. 
678 M. Cernea, “Impoverishment risks, risk management, and reconstruction: A model of 
population displacement and resettlement,” Paper presented at the UN Symposium on 
Hydropower and Sustainable Development, Beijing, China, 27-29 October 2004.  
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Involuntary resettlement programs have been widely documented as 
threatening individual and community identity and wellbeing, and as such 
have fomented various forms of resistance among affected populations.679 
However, in many ways, resettlement in disaster aftermath cannot 
automatically be defined as involuntary. A major disaster can influence 
affected populations, especially the most vulnerable groups, to look at 
relocation as a more viable option to staying so that resistance to such a 
policy can dwindle. In Ormoc, relocation initiatives due to the utter scale of 
destruction of houses and communities because of the flood and the 
subsequent flood control project were generally perceived positively. The 
military was indeed deployed to high-risk areas to prevent stragglers from 
rebuilding on their old lots, but in general, survivors were keen to move. In 
fact, only six people expressed opposition to relocation, which city mayor 
Eufrocino Codilla, Sr. dismissed to JICA as,  
purely an expression of sentiments and the lack of knowledge and 
information of the resettlement program and development of the City 
Government counterpart…[and] that the objection is the only one of its 
kind and is not supported nor initiated by NGOs or any people’s power 
showing opposition and unwillingness to abide and agree to the 
resettlement plan of the city. Hence, we earnestly request your office 
that the opposition letter be disregarded and not be given importance 
because the complaint does not speak for the majority of the affected 
families but purely a product of personal emotions.680 
Of course the situation would change as years passed, as recipients 
sold off their residential rights for tidy sums. Home lots in Barangay JICA-
Lao, for instance, were sold for as low as 25,000 pesos to as high as 
500,000 pesos between the years 1999 to 2000, while rent for lots in the 
same barangay was commonly a low of 1,000 to 2,000 pesos a month.681 
																																								 																				
679 A. Oliver-Smith, “Involuntary resettlement, resistance and political empowerment,” 
Journal of Refugee Studies Vol 4 No 2 (Oxford University Press, 1991), 132-149. 
680 Letter of city mayor Eufrocino Codilla, Sr. addressed to Hirosshi Goto.  
681 Office of the City Mayor, “Logbook of the Urban Poor Planning and Development.” Ormoc 
City, 22 March 2013. When asked where these survivor families went after selling their rights 
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What then were the long-term effects of the 1991 Ormoc tragedy on 
people’s lives, especially those deemed to be the most vulnerable? Twenty-
two years after, were those who had been identified as the most vulnerable 
groups and communities and subsequently resettled in new communities 
able to become more resilient and far less vulnerable? How did other 
vulnerable communities, such as those residing and working in haciendas 
that had also experienced devastation and had fewer entitlements, fare in the 
intervening years? How exactly did the disaster change the lives of these 
various families and communities? These questions form the overarching 
theme in this quest to understand the nature of social transformation in 
disaster aftermath. Vulnerability has been argued to be a “dynamic, 
evolutionary and accretive process,” “a more accurate concept than poverty 
in understanding the processes and impacts of ‘underdevelopment’.”682 The 
causal link between disaster vulnerability and social transformation is argued 
here to be mediated in large measure by resettlement because house and 
land should provide families and communities with the means to move out of 
vulnerability, that “internal risk factor of the subject or system that is exposed 
to a hazard or damage.”683 The distribution of homelots to previously un-
landed families, who had in the past risked residing in environmentally 
unsafe areas, should in theory have allowed them to improve their socio-
economic positions. In Ormoc where the persistent and underlying source of 
vulnerability has been the lack of land tenure, the distribution of land and 
housing should have manifestly reduced vulnerability and poverty, however 
incremental. Much has been written about the argument that “poverty is not 
synonymous with vulnerability,” whereby the former primarily implies a 
relationship with society while the latter is a product of a two-sided 
relationship with society and the physical environment.684 However, in the 
reconstruction and rehabilitation period, and in the decades following a major 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 											
at JICA-Lao and whether they went back to being informal settlers, the officers at the Urban 
Poor Planning and Development Office could only say they don’t know.  
682 G. Bankoff and D. Hilhorst, “Introduction: Mapping vulnerability,” 2-3. 
683 The definition of vulnerability is taken from O. Cardona, “The need for rethinking the 
concepts of vulnerability and risk from a holistic perspective: A necessary review and 
criticism for effective risk management,” in Mapping Vulnerability, Disasters, Development 
and People, edited by Bankoff, Frerks and Hilhorst, 37. 
684 B. Wisner, P. Blaikie, T. Cannon and I. Davis (eds), At Risk, Natural Hazards, People’s 
Vulnerability and Natural Disasters 2nd Ed., 32. 
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disaster like the flood of 1991, the two appear very much linked. As such, 
resettlement, as primarily a solution to vulnerability, cannot resolve the 
problem of social inequality and deprivation due to inadequate family income, 
lack of social security nets, and the persistent lack of land tenure 
notwithstanding the resettlement program. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
the poorest individuals in society continue to be the most vulnerable despite 
the resettlement process. Nonetheless, those who were not resettled 
elsewhere but continued to reside in the same areas that had been 
devastated in 1991 had more difficulty coping and rebuilding their lives, and 
did in effect experience continuing vulnerability and poverty.  
The case studies 
The following three chapters deal with three different case studies of 
communities in Ormoc that had experienced the devastating disaster in 
November 1991. These three cases were chosen to analyse, and compare 
and contrast cases of social transformation. In the context of disaster, social 
transformation has been understood as “large-scale demolition” and urban 
restructuring,685 as figuratively causing the “rich to become poor and the poor 
to become rich,”686 and, utilizing a gender approach, “the transformation of 
power relationships within the household by facilitating the economic and 
social empowerment of women.”687 It has also been largely understood and 
framed in terms of resilience, although there is a different emphasis in terms 
of the depth and scale between the two concepts of resilience vis-à-vis social 
transformation. While resilience is found at the core of transformative 
societies in disaster aftermath, the relationship is best exemplified as “nested 
																																								 																				
685 C. Hein, “Resilient Tokyo, Disaster and transformation in the Japanese city,” in The 
Resilient City: How Modern Cities Recover from Disaster, ed. L. Vale and T. Campanella 
(Oxford University Press, 2005), 213. 
686 Ivarsson proposes an interesting argument in relation to the effects of the tsunami in Sri 
Lanka: “…the tsunami disaster not only destroyed and changed physical habitats and 
livelihoods, but it also interrupted local social, moral and cosmological ‘landscapes’ in ways 
that caused multiple moral crises.” C. Ivarsson, “The give and take of disaster aid, Social 
and moral transformation in the wake of the tsunami in Sri Lanka” (PhD diss. in Social 
Anthropology. Sweden, University of Gothenburg: School of Global Studies, Faculty of 
Social Sciences, 2013), 6 (Online).  
687 P. Delaney and E. Shrader, “Gender and post-disaster reconstruction: The case of 
Hurricane Mitch in Honduras and Nicaragua,” decision review draft. Gender and Disaster 
Network, January 2000 (Online).  
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systems to be infected by or contain change.”688 A frenzy of infrastructure 
work occurred in Ormoc in the second year after the 1991 flood, with the 
local government and the Department of Public Works and Highways 
(DPWH) rebuilding roads, bridges, river dikes and drainage.689 At the most 
superficial level, the transformation of the cityscape was apparent for all to 
see four years after the disaster. There were at least twelve banks that 
regularly operated in Ormoc by 1995, while several shipping lines such as 
Aboitiz International, Socor Shipping Lines and GothongLunes’ MV Dona Lili 
also opened services. A huge sixty million-peso sports complex, named the 
Ormoc Superdome, was constructed in 1996.690 
In the following case studies, social transformation is defined as the 
reduction and, ideally, the elimination of vulnerability, and in the process the 
elimination or, at the least, movement out of poverty. Wisner et al (2004) 
define vulnerability as  
…the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that 
influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover 
from the impact of a natural hazard (an extreme event or process) 
(original emphasis).691 
 Poverty and vulnerability in these three cases are explored together. 
In the Philippines, the lack of access to land is strongly correlated to poverty 
and social inequality.692 The entangled issues that are explored in these 
cases deal with land tenure as a consequence of resettlement or its lack in 
the case of hacienda workers, as well as income, employment, sources of 
emergency funding in times of crises, social networks, social and economic 
mobility, education, and religious beliefs and practices, and the changes that 
did occur as a result of a life-changing event like the 1991 flash flood. This 
																																								 																				
688 M. Pelling and D. Manuel-Navarete, “From resilience to transformation: The adaptive 
cycle in two Mexican urban centers,” Ecology and Society Vol. 16 No. 2. ISSN: 1708-3087 
(The Resilience Alliance, 2011) (Online).  
689 E. Benedicto, “Ormoc after 3 years: ‘No other way to go but up,” Ibid. 
690 E. Benedicto, “Ormoc disaster: A city rising from tragedy,” Ibid. 
691 Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon and Davis (eds), At Risk, 11. 
692 G. Llanto and M. Ballesteros, “Land issues in poverty reduction strategies and the 
development agenda: Philippines,” Philippine Institute for Development Studies discussion 
paper series no. 2003-03 (Makati City, Philippines: National Economic Development Agency 
(NEDA), March 2003) (Online).  
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approach recognizes the inherent links that tie poverty and vulnerability to 
one another as product and fate, and is based on the assumption that those 
who were deemed the most vulnerable were also those who continue to 
experience a basic lack of economic well-being, as well as those with the 
least access to resources. The three cases are similar in that all the 
respondents had experienced the devastating impacts of the 1991 flash 
flood. Through two communities in Barangay Tambulilid, the subject of 
Chapter 6, I explore change and transformation in disaster aftermath within 
the framework of Gawad Kalinga’s community development model. This 
model did not originally target to assist the 1991 flood victims but the urban 
poor in general, as Gawad Kalinga had introduced a new and radical form of 
land tenure system called land occupancy rather than ownership.693 
Barangay Nalunopan, in Chapter 7, is an examination of disaster aftermath 
among survivors in one of the poorest communities in Ormoc, the hacienda 
workers. Finally, Purok Luna II-B in Barangay Luna was funded and 
continues to be managed by the Religious of the Sacred Heart of Jesus 
(RSCJ). This last case study, dealt with in Chapter 8, is a story of change 
and transformation for former Barangay Nalunopan hacienda workers who 
had survived the 1991 tragedy and actively chose to start new lives outside 
the hacienda.  
The identification of these cases began with a list of those barangays 
that had been adversely affected in 1991. These included Barangays Alegria, 
Malbasag, District 26 (in particular Isla Verde), Biliboy, Don Felipe 
Larrazabal, Mabini, Ipil (especially along Panalian River), and Can-adieng, 
the seaside barangay of Punta, and within the city center Barangay Cogon 
and along the major streets of Bonifacio, Rizal and Real. Once the list of 
affected barangays and areas was compiled, a list of resettlement areas was 
also requested from the city Social Welfare and Development office. After 
consultations with local government and barangay officials, from whom 
permission was requested to conduct interviews, coordination with religious 
and grassroots non-government organizations (NGOs) resulted in the 
																																								 																				
693 Gawad Kalinga or GK prefers to call itself a social movement rather than an NGO. 
Roberto Igot, GK representative Ormoc City, Ibid.  
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identification of a pool of respondents who fit the criteria of having personally 
experienced the 1991 flash flood and who were amenable to being 
interviewed. It must be emphasized here that the assistance of these 
religious and non-government organizations and barangay officials was 
crucial, as they provided the basis for the researcher to undertake the study. 
Linkage with these grassroots organizations and individuals also provided 
venues for the prompt validation of findings, as well as for critical discussions 
through which research questions were clarified and re-focused.  
Participant observation and interviews in three sites—Barangays 
Tambulilid, Nalunopan and Luna II-B—and undertaken from February to 
October 2013, in many ways, shaped the direction of the research. The 
decision, for instance, to focus on the poorest and most vulnerable 
communities and families was the result of a self-reflexive cycle of inquiry 
that followed every visit to each of the three sites. On the one hand, the 
rhetoric expressed by representatives of grassroots NGOs and groups 
emphasized the positive changes in the lives of these communities and 
families as a result of their intervention. But on the other hand was the reality 
of families and communities that remained desperately poor despite 
numerous intervention programs. How was this gap to be explained? This 
question increasingly became the central point of inquiry. As these three 
cases will show, there are varying degrees of grinding poverty and persistent 
vulnerability that two decades of city-wide rehabilitation and reconstruction 
















FROM URBAN SQUATTING TO URBAN SQUATTING 
 
In the resettlement site itself, where the 40-sq m houses are only a few feet 
apart, basic amenities of life are often absent. Clean water for drinking and cooking 
is a luxury. The site’s only well yields brackish water, and residents are forced to 
buy potable water at Php 3 for a 4-liter gallon from mobile “water men.” Lack of 
water also besets the five other resettlement sites in Tambulilid and nearby Linao. 
Money is not supposed to be a problem. The city government’s bank account 
includes P5.1 million, the balance of a Php12.8 million aid Malacañang gave to 
Ormoc for its water projects. 
- E. Benedicto, “Scars remain, trauma lingers,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 5 November 
1994, 1& 13 
Land ownership remains a big question as the land title of the Tambulilid 
resettlement site is still in the name of the city government. 
- E. Justimbaste, “Ormoc does little to avert another potential disaster,” Manila Bulletin, 14 
November 1995, 46 
 Survivors of the 1991 disaster were first relocated, generally willingly, 
to the Tent City organized by the Department of Social Welfare and 
Development (DSWD), and after two years to permanent resettlement areas 
around Ormoc. The majority of those who went to Barangay Tambulilid, the 
resettlement site identified by the local government in the aftermath of the 
disaster, had to endure the economic and social costs associated with 
relocation. For most, it meant restricted access to the city where they had 
depended for their livelihoods. It also meant confronting the challenge of 
creating new communities out of sagol-sagol694 families who were linked 
together only by their shared history as squatters and disaster survivors. 
How does resettlement affect and indeed transform such diverse families 
and communities? More importantly, what kinds of communities emerge in 
such disaster resettlement areas?  
This chapter analyses the experience of families and communities in 
Barangay Tambulilid, where the majority of those who had been worst 
																																								 																				
 694 Bisaya,lit. assorted, diverse, of different classes, mixed. This term is often used to 
describe Tambulilid as a melting pot of all kinds of people.  
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affected in November 1991 were resettled, including former Isla Verde 
residents. Isla Verde had been the quintessence of a squatter community in 
Ormoc, occupying a sandbar in the mouth of the Anilao River so that when 
the flood came in November 1991, it was virtually wiped out. Flood survivors 
were initially given homelots during the rehabilitation phase, with the aim of 
transforming them into new self-reliant communities. However, as the case of 
Tambulilid will show—topographically one of the worst sites for relocation—
the persistent problem of land tenure highlights the lack of sustainable 
programs for livelihood development, persistent unemployment and informal 
employment, and poor infrastructure that all contribute to the cyclical problem 
of vulnerability, social inequality and poverty. In fact, resettlement to 
Tambulilid had opened the door to a far more difficult dilemma that revolved 
around the trade-off between proximity to economic opportunities, security of 
tenure and provision of services vis-à-vis protection from extreme events and 
the goal of reducing costs to life and property due to disasters.695 These are 
concerns that still hound those most at risk of disasters in Ormoc twenty-two 
years after the major flood.   
A topographical risk  
 Tambulilid is a contraction of the words “buli” or buri referring to the 
species of palm that proliferated in the area and “tambo” or reed, which had 
been equally abundant. It was formerly a sitio696 of Barangay Linao before its 
inauguration as an independent barangay in 1977.697 The Ablen family, 
generally recognized as having brought the Virgen de la Paz from Antipolo, 
Rizal, is considered as one of three founding families of the barangay.698 The 
Virgen was subsequently adopted as patroness prior to the Japanese 
																																								 																				
695 UN Habitat, “Addressing urban poverty, inequality, and vulnerability in a warming world,” 
Asia Pacific Issue Brief Series on Urbanization and Climate Change No. 1 (Thailand: United 
Nations Development Program, Undated), 8 (Online).  
696 Filipino, lit. settlement forming part of a barangay, typically rural. Sitios are smaller than 
puroks, which are sub-barangays that are more urbanized.  
697 Its barangay captains were: Glecerio Codilla Albaño (1977-1993); Morino Castañeda 
(1993-1997); Crispulo Espina, Jr. (1997-2002); Maximo Jaballa, Jr. (2002-2007); Rodrigo 
Sasing (2007-2010); and, Ronaldo Roca (2010-2013). Barangay Tambulilid City Hall, 
Barangay Integrated Development Plan (BIDP) Comprehensive Multi-Sectoral Development 
Plan (CMDP) 2012-2014, assisted by Liga ng mga Barangay Ormoc City Chapter, in 
coordination with City Government of Ormoc, DILG and BIDANI, VSU, VISCA, Baybay City 
(Ormoc City, Undated), 2.  
698 Ibid. 
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occupation and is now venerated in a fiesta every twentieth of May. 
Geographically speaking, Tambulilid is marshy land prone to flooding. 
Situated between barangays Libertad in the north, Linao in the south, Punta 
in the east, and Naungan in the west, it is classified as a plain and a catch 
basin with an elevation range of 0 to 20 degrees. Categorized as a first class 
barangay, it occupies a total land area of 179 hectares and has a distance of 
3.8 kilometers from the city proper.699 In November 1991, as the deluge 
swept over the Anilao and Malbasag riverbanks, some parts of Tambulilid 
were also inundated from the creek that passed through it. Small agricultural 
and residential lands were devastated, upon which many poor families had 
relied for their living. Though Tambulilid was not officially listed among those 
sites identified by the city government as a disaster area, forty-six year old 
Divina, who had lived in the barangay for several years before 1991, 
identified her family as direct victims: 
Divina: What I…thought about was how we were going to harvest 
our rice [voice wobbling]. Our rice will not ever dry.  
Author: Where did you live? 
Divina: Here, near the outside [of Tambulilid]. Then our house was 
flooded, but it was not swept away, just flooded. We had some 
animals. Our chickens died…I did not know our pig was in its 
pen…already swimming. Our things were floating but they did not 
scatter about because our house was shut though it was only a hut, 
we had secured the downstairs. There our things floated amidst our 
jars. I thought, gosh, maybe we will die. It is our time. I thought Lord 
it is up to you to kill me so long as my children are safe, that was my 
thought, but I never thought about food anymore. Our bananas that 
were with fruit, they were newly with fruit, gone. Sakit kaayo dughan 
(My heart is so painful).700 
																																								 																				
699 Department of Education (DepEd)-Region VIII, Mithi og Bahandi sa Dakbayan sa Ormoc, 
Appendix 1, 176. 
700 Divina, interview with author, 5 April 2013, at GK provincial office, Barangay Tambulilid, 
Ormoc City, original in Bisaya, translated to Filipino by Victor Arcuiño during the interview, 
transcribed and translated to English by author.  
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Floods, however, were ‘normal’ in Tambulilid, as Barangay Captain 
Ronaldo Roca notes:  
Barangay Captain Roca: It is really normal here during high tide, for 
example this month is high tide, there will really be water here.  
Author: At what level is the usual flooding? How high is the water? 
To the waist? 
Roca: To the knee. But when it is low tide it is low. When the high 
tide occurs with continuous rain, rain for two days, it will really…one 
hundred per cent flood here…It was sugarcane here before.701 
It was still sparsely populated in 1991, utilized primarily for rice and 
sugar cultivation. According to another long-time resident:  
Marife: [Tambulilid was]…still small, not like today there are so many 
houses. We were only about twenty houses here ma’am.  
Author: Only twenty? What was Tambulilid, rice fields? 
Marife: Rice and sugar. These were sugar fields nearby.702 
However, the rapid urbanization of Tambulilid after 1991 is 
noteworthy as land use was eventually reclassified as residential and utilized 
about ninety hectares. Agricultural and industrial uses accounted for eighty 
hectares, while the remaining ten hectares were allocated for 
forest/reserve/watershed use.703 As Ormoc increasingly urbanized, however, 
land allocated for agricultural and industrial as well as for other purposes 
continued to decrease, while land for residential uses correspondingly 
increased. Today, Tambulilid is accessible from the city proper by specially 
designated tricycles, which pass through Barangay Linao, but in 1991 it was 
virtually cut off from the city with no regular public transport system in place. 
																																								 																				
701 Barangay Captain Ronaldo Roca, interview with author, 28 May 2013, at GK Barangay 
Tambulilid, original in Filipino, transcribed and translated by author.  
702 Marife, interview with author, 5 April 2013, at GK provincial office, Barangay Tambulilid, 
Ormoc City, original in Bisaya, translated to Filipino by Victor Arcuiño during the interview, 
transcribed and translated to English by author.  
703 Barangay Tambulilid City Hall, Barangay Integrated Development Plan (BIDP) 
Comprehensive Multi-Sectoral Development Plan (CMDP) 2012-2014, 2.  
194	|	F L O O D W A T E R S 	 O F 	 D E A T H 	
	
However, though a small community in 1991, officials from the barangay still 
went around urging the rural folk to be prepared for typhoon Uring and to 
evacuate to someplace safe away from the creek on the morning of 5 
November 1991, as one resident attests:  
What was fortunate in the barangay they went around early in the 
morning to announce, first to be prepared, to evacuate to where it 
was far from the river, that was what they said. So we did, we were 
afraid of being swept away. My in-laws had fortified their house. But 
for us, we just left our house. We left it, and the pig that was already 
big enough to be useful, we dragged behind us.704 
Squatting and the urban poor  
Into this generally small rice- and sugar-farming community, squatters 
from the Anilao and Malbasag areas were inserted in a process of forced 
urbanization as a consequence of the 1991 flood. In the Philippines, the 
terms ‘squatter’ and ‘urban poor’ are used interchangeably,705 with both 
having negative connotations. It is notable for instance that the 1992 law on 
urban development and housing or Republic Act 7279, which provided the 
legal basis for the relocation of disaster survivors, views squatters as 
generally professionals who were, 
…individuals or groups who occupy lands without the express consent 
of the landowner and who have sufficient income for legitimate 
housing. The term shall also apply to persons who have previously 
been awarded homelots or housing units by the Government but who 
sold, leased or transferred the same to settle illegally in the same 
place or in another urban area, and non-bona fide occupants and 
intruders of lands reserved for socialized housing. The term shall not 
																																								 																				
704 Divina, interview with author, 5 April 2013, Ibid.  
705 E. Berner, “Legalizing squatters, excluding the poorest: Urban land transfer programs in 
the Philippines,” Working paper no. 257 (University of Bielefeld, Faculty of Sociology, 
Sociology of Development Research Center, 1996), 1. Manaster defines a squatter as 
“persons who occupy, without consent, land owned by others, with the purpose of occupying 
such lands indefinitely for residential and occupational uses. K. Manaster, “The problem of 
urban squatters in developing countries: Peru,” Faculty publications 1-1-1968 (Santa Clara 
University School of Law, 1968), 23 (Online).  
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apply to individuals or groups who simply rent land and housing from 
professional squatters or squatting syndicates (emphasis added).706 
The law, however, does not clarify what “sufficient income for 
legitimate housing” meant. Often regarded as “physically decrepit slums, 
lacking in basic amenities, chaotic and disorganized,”707 squatter settlements 
were argued to be a consequence of “the unresponsiveness of housing 
supply” and more provocatively, the “possible unwillingness of the private 
sector to respond to the low end of the market.”708 This situation has forced 
the poorest sectors of society to engage in the creation of informal housing, 
including squatting on both public and private lands. Those who were 
originally resettled in Tambulilid from the riverbanks of Anilao and Malbasag 
were the masses that had occupied the lowest rungs of society, where 
proximity to the city had been critical to their livelihoods and paid 
employment. Indeed, in 2011 Barangay Tambulilid was one of the biggest 
barangays in Ormoc, with a population totalling 9,136.709 The majority of its 
residents belonged to the 25-59 age group (forty per cent), followed by the 6 
to 12 (sixteen per cent), the 3 to 5 (seven per cent), and the 19 to 21-age 
range (six per cent).  
Tambulilid’s total population in 2008 was recorded at 8,128, 
comprised of 1,484 households and further broken down into 3,838 males 
and 4,290 females.710 Its residents were predominantly from lower-income 
families, with commonly declared professions as teachers, engineers, 
seamen, policemen, overseas contract workers, nurses, skilled artisans, 
drivers, welders, tailors, mechanics, carpenters, bus conductors, laborers, 
salespersons, maids, security guards, car washers, members of the Citizen 
																																								 																				
706 Republic Act No. 7279, “An act to provide for a comprehensive and continuing urban 
development and housing program, establish the mechanism for its implementation, and for 
other purposes,” Sec 3, Definition of terms (m).  
707 B.J.L. Berry, The Human Consequences of Urbanization (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1973), 83. 
708 J. Brueckner and H. Selod, “A theory of urban squatting and land-tenure formalization in 
developing countries,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy Vol 1 No. 1, 29 
(February 2009) (Online).  
709 Liga ng mga Barangay, “Table 1. Populasyon ng Barangay ayon sa Edad at Kasarian 
(Table 1. Population of the Barangay According to Age and Sex): Barangay Tambulilid as of 
31 December 2011,” Barangay Management Information System (BMIS).  
710 Barangay Tambulilid City Hall, Barangay Integrated Development Plan (BIDP) 
Comprehensive Multi-Sectoral Development Plan (CMDP) 2012-2014, Ibid.  
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Armed Force Geographic Unit (CAFGU), barangay health workers, and 
fishpond caretakers.711 Sixty-five per cent of the total population was 
classified as Roman Catholic, ten per cent as Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC), and 
twenty-five per cent as Protestants (five per cent each as Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, Seventh Day Adventists, and Church of the Latter Day Saints, 
and ten per cent as Church of Christ).712 Men, who were often the 
breadwinners of their families, were commonly teachers, tricycle drivers 
operating on a boundary arrangement,713 contractual government 
employees, market laborers, itinerant fruit vendors, masons, carpenters, 
meat or fish vendors, construction workers, welders, small-time 
entrepreneurs or retailers, tailors and scrap collectors. Some were 
istambays714 or unemployed. Meanwhile, some women were typically sales 
clerks, fish or meat vendors or laundry women, but most were housewives 
left with the care of children and elderly, and often the management of sari-
sari715 stores that proliferated along every street corner.  
The intricate relationships these people had cultivated with the city 
that not only tolerated them, but also demanded their services, contributed to 
the mushrooming of riverbank settlements. Ormoc by 1991 was completely 
mapped and titled. Indeed, there was no more land that was not yet owned 
by anyone, especially the leading families of Ormoc, so that only riverbanks 
provided precarious but viable spaces that a family could live on. Though the 
																																								 																				
711 Ibid., 5. However, this list does not define these “skills” and as such have overlapping 
figures. The verbatim list is as follows: “Professionals – 23 teachers, 12 engineers, 7 
seamen, 5 policemen, 4 OCWs [taken to refer to overseas contract workers], 15 nurse, 3 
marine seaman, 1 skilled artisan – 33 drivers, 11 welder, 5 tailor, 2 mechanics, 16 
carpenters and 3 conductor, 17 laborer – 35 sales persons, 18 maids, 16 security guards, 2 
car washers, 1 CAFGU, 5 BHW [taken to refer to barangay health workers], 45 fishpond 
caretaker”.   
712 Ibid., 2. There is no estimated population of Muslims in this list, although there is a 
sizeable Muslim community in the barangay.  
713 An arrangement commonly used in the Philippines by public transport drivers of 
jeepneys, tricycles, multi-cabs, small buses, and taxis, whereby an amount is paid to the 
operator/owner on a daily basis. Gas is usually the driver’s expense, while maintenance 
expenses of the vehicle are often shouldered by the operator/owner. In 1990, boundary was 
about 60 pesos from 5 p.m. to 6 a.m., according to Amadeo, interview with author, 6 April 
2013, at GK Barangay Tambulilid, Ormoc City.  
714 Filipino, lit. “standby,” someone who is unemployed. However, this term has a negative 
connotation in that an istambay is good-for-nothing, a term usually used in reference to a 
man who does not earn a living.  
715 Filipino, lit. small retail neighbourhood store that usually sells snacks, candies, and basic 
food items. 
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rivers commonly flooded in the past after torrential rain, these overflows were 
considered gamay ra (small/minor). As the communities became larger and 
more people built closer to the rivers, the waterways of the Anilao and 
Malbasag became narrower, more constricted, and increasingly clogged with 
human waste. The two rivers were made practically invisible due to “the 
sheer number of houses, the houses that were narrow there, just crammed 
full with houses.”716 The real peril, however, came from the fact that most of 
the families that resided in these riverbanks earned only minimum daily 
wages, and had no safety nets when inevitable tragedies came about. And 
misfortunes did occur, lending credence to the argument that disasters for 
the poor and vulnerable occur on a regular basis,717 with some events more 
financially and materially devastating than others. There was super Typhoon 
Ruping (Mike) in November 1990 that destroyed some houses and 
livelihoods along the two rivers. In January 1991, just nine months prior to 
the November flash flood, a fire ravaged Badlas in Barangay Don Felipe 
Larrazabal, a notorious pocket of slum houses along the Anilao River. One 
grandmother’s recollection points to the staggered impacts of these series of 
disasters, calling into question the ability of families to repeatedly cope and 
stand on their feet and rebuild their lives: 
Resbeta: We had a fire that time! Including our house!...Our house 
was completely burned down…There were close to 200 houses [that 
were also burned down]… 
Author: So on November 5 (1991) your house was new? 
Resbeta: New! When it was washed away it was new, not even 
finished yet! We wanted to raise it a bit [from the ground], it was not 
																																								 																				
716 Buboy, interview with author, 4 April 2013, at GK provincial office, Barangay Tambulilid, 
Ormoc City, in mixed Filipino and English, transcribed and translated by author.  
717 See, for example, B. Wisner, P. Blaikie, T. Cannon and I. Davis (eds), At Risk, Natural 
Hazards, People’s Vulnerability and Natural Disasters 2nd ed. Also A. Varley, “The 
exceptional and the everyday: Vulnerability analysis in the international decade for natural 
disaster reduction,” in Disasters, Development and Environment, ed. A. Varley (Chichester, 
New York, Brisbane, Toronto and Singapore: John Wiley and Sons, 1994), 1-11. 
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completed yet, we were doing it gradually as the government was 
helping us …so it was not finished yet.718 
 The impacts of personal tragedies were also often considered in the 
same class as destruction caused by natural hazards, in that both had 
devastating economic consequences. Most of the urban poor families living 
along the two rivers prior to 1991 had experienced deaths of fathers and 
mothers that meant the end of primary or secondary schooling, or the illness 
of one or both parents who had been the main source of income, which 
plunged the family into a vicious cycle of debt and poverty. The abrupt break 
in children’s education, the premature entry into the labor market, early co-
habitation with someone equally destitute, the raising of numerous children 
they could scarce afford, and the succession of small jobs that often did not 
pay enough to support a family, these developments characterized kinabuhi 
nga lisod kaayo (an onerous life). Felicidad, a fifty-four year old single mother 
who had quit school after Grade Four to start working at age fourteen, used 
to regularly send home some money in her early life to help tide her family 
over in Barangay Mabini along the Anilao River. When asked why she did 
not finish elementary school, she said matter-of-factly, “It was difficult in 
those days because my mother did not have a job.”719 On how much she 
was earning as palabantay (caretaker) of a family’s apartment in Bulacan 
where she worked, Felicidad said,  
Felicidad: Thirty [pesos]. 
Author: In a month? 
Felicidad: Yes…in 1968.  
																																								 																				
718 Resbeta, interview with author, 24 April 2013, in her own home, Barangay Tambulilid, 
Ormoc City, original in Bisaya, transcribed and translated by author.  
719 Felicidad, interview with author, 19 April 2013, in the multi-purpose hall, Block 7, 
Barangay Tambulilid, Ormoc City, original in Filipino, translated to Filipino by Victor Arcuiño 
during the interview, transcribed and translated to English by author. She was in Bulacan 
when the flash flood in 1991 occurred and immediately came home to look for her family. 
Her mother, Salustiana, who was also interviewed for this research, worked as a 
laundrywoman prior to 1991. At 78, Salustiana was a little deaf and, according to Felicidad, 
was suffering from Alzheimer’s, although during the interview she appeared lucid though a 
bit hard of hearing. She was also very unkempt as though she had not been bathed for 
weeks, very stooped and thin.  
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Author: What can you buy for thirty pesos? Do you give money to 
your mother? 
Felicidad: Yes…My amo720 in Meycauayan [Bulacan] said do not go 
home, we will just send the money and Ma Ling721 ma’am that was 
cheap then.  
Author: How much was it? 
Felicidad: Five centavos!...I send one carton ma’am because my amo 
does not want me to go home to Ormoc so we send it through a 
neighbor.  
Author: When the neighbor goes home? 
Felicidad: Yes, one carton ma’am of Ma Ling, clothes, money, things 
like that.722 
Divina, who had to stop her education after graduating from 
elementary school and the death of her mother, went on to work as a child 
laborer in a katubhan (sugarcane estate) in Camotes Island just across the 
waters from Ormoc.723 She remembers that, after earning 2.50 pesos per 
day, she would go and buy rice for the family:  
Divina: A ganta724 [of rice that time] was two [pesos]…So every day I 
had fifty centavos left.  
Author: Where do you go to spend the fifty centavos? 
Divina: I gave it to my father. Yes, I gave because we were very poor 
then. There were so many children.725 
Yet, those who did not pursue secondary education often had children 
that repeated the same pattern. Rebecca was seventeen in 1991 when she 
																																								 																				
720 Filipino, lit. employer.  
721 Ma Ling is an ubiquitous brand of processed luncheon meat produced in Hong Kong, 
similar to Spam.  
722 Felicidad, interview with author, 19 April 2013, Ibid.  
723 Bisaya,lit. sugarcane field. 
724 Filipino, lit. unit of grain measure equivalent to three (3) liters. 
725 Divina, interview with author, 5 April 2013, Ibid. Divina lost her mother at a very young 
age, which prompted her to leave school early.  
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ran away from Cebu to be with her then twenty-one year old boyfriend in 
Ormoc. The seventh of thirteen children of a mananagat (fisherman) father 
and a fish vendor mother, she eventually had four boys of her own, with the 
three eldest dropping out of high school “because of barkada (gang of 
friends) joining the istambays who are typical here [in Tambulilid].”726 
Amadeo, a forty-six year old man debilitated at home with what appeared to 
be an advanced stage of gout and who had only a high school diploma, had 
four children with ages ranging from five to twenty-one years. Except for the 
five-year old who was still enrolled in day-care and the third child who just 
graduated from high school, the two older children reached only second year 
high school and then went on to do odd jobs. When asked why the eldest 
had dropped out of school, Amadeo replied simply, “…He helps me because 
I can no longer drive [the tricycle].”727 The conscription of children into the 
informal labor market to help augment the family income meant that they 
were doomed to lower wages for the rest of their lives, if no intervention was 
introduced, thereby condemning their future families in the same cycle of 
poverty. 
Makeshift houses along the riverbanks of Anilao and Malbasag 
reflected the urban poor/squatter family’s impoverishment, ubiquitous in the 
practise of the tapak-tapak method that one Tambulilid resident ingenuously 
noted. This technique called for patching a house with whatever scrap 
materials became available, as “when my father finds plywood he would 
patch it over a hole.”728 This gave the houses a semblance of disrepair 
typical of slums.  
Formal identification as squatters, however, was not only an objective 
process signified by a state looking at these communities as a dangerous 
problem of social order and urban planning. It was often also a subjective 
																																								 																				
726 Rebecca, interview with author, 24 April 2013, in her own home, Barangay Tambulilid, 
Ormoc City, in Bisaya, translated to Filipino by Victor Arcuiño during the interview, 
transcribed and translated to English by author, when asked why her three sons aged 21, 19 
and 17 only reached second year high school. 
727 Amadeo, interview with author, 6 April 2013, in his own home, GK Village, Barangay 
Tambulilid, Ormoc City, in Bisaya, translated to Filipino by Victor Arcuiño during the 
interview, transcribed and translated to English by author. Amadeo was a tricycle driver on a 
boundary basis.  
728 Felicidad, interview with author, 19 April 2013, Ibid. 
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dialectic process internalized by residents who had accepted the term to 
refer to themselves and their homes. Buboy, who was newly married in 1991 
with a baby aged a year and two months, lived with his wife’s family in 
Barangay Alegria along the Anilao River. He recounts:  
…We are fine there in that area though it is in what was called the 
squatters area, we were in the suburb part of the city divided by a 
river. It was called the Anilao River. It was before you entered the city 
(emphasis added).729 
Resettlement for urban squatter survivors 
After 1991, priority for resettlement was given to those whose houses 
were hurot tanan (completely destroyed), including surviving Isla Verde 
residents who numbered only about 200 from an original population of 2,500. 
They also included about 200 Muslim residents who had been adversely 
affected along Mabini Nasunugan,730 Mabini Circle, Sabang, and Maraviles 
Compound in Don Felipe, all situated along the Anilao River.731 These 
survivors were mostly resettled in clusters organized by various agencies, 
such as the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) 
through the Core Shelter settlement, Ramon Aboitiz Foundation, Inc. (RAFI), 
PhilRads, Holy Wings, and other non-government organizations, as well as 
private entities and individuals.  
The largest resettlement area was RAFI, with eight hectares divided 
into eight sub-puroks,732 which was originally established for relief or starter 
houses beginning in December 1991 and completed in February 1992. The 
1992 law on housing, or Republic Act No. 7279, defines resettlement areas 
as sites identified by a central government agency to be used for the 
																																								 																				
729 Buboy, interview with author, 4 Aprl 2013, Ibid. 
730 The name “Nasunugan” itself means that this area had been razed by fire in the past.  
731 Salem Pundato, barangay kagawad (councillor), interview with author, 5 June 2013, at 
the Barangay Hall, Barangay Tambulilid, Ormoc City, in Filipino. Imam Mackay, who was 
current imam at Mabini Nasunugan but who was not himself present in November 1991, 
estimates that Muslims in Ormoc in 1991 numbered about 2,000. Imam Mackay, interview 
with author, 28 May 2013, at the Mosque, Barangay Nasunugan, Ormoc City, in Filipino.  
732 Filipino, lit. division within the territory of a barangay. Along with sitios, a purok is 
considered the smallest Philippine political unit.   
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relocation of the underprivileged and homeless.733 It must be noted here that 
RAFI communities comprised the biggest puroks with the most number of 
households in Tambulilid. In a 2008 population count, the DSWD Core 
Shelter community where Muslim families were resettled had 281 
households with 1,586 individuals, while RAFI communities in puroks 11, 12 
and 13 had a collective of 669 households, with a total of 3,633 
individuals.734 These three puroks comprise the bulk of Tambulilid residents. 
However, while the RAFI resettlement area was commonly believed by 
survivor-residents to have been purchased by the organization as part of its 
operations in 1991, Dominica Chua, RAFI’s current Chief Operating Officer 
(COO), clarifies that this was not actually the case:  
Dominica Chua: Actually I had nothing to do with the titling. Our 
organization was just asking for a relocation site from the city 
government. I think for that one, I got some letters from those people 
living in there because they’re asking from us for the title…  
Author: For help? 
Chua: Yes for help and really obtaining the title from the city 
government. But it belongs to the city government. I did not, we did 
not bought the lot.  
Author: But it was just named after RAFI? 
Chua: The title?  
Author: No, the area is just named after RAFI? 
																																								 																				
733 The 1992 law on housing, Republic Act No. 7279, defines resettlement areas as those 
“areas identified by the appropriate national agency or by the local government unit with 
respect to areas within its jurisdiction, which shall be used for the relocation of the 
underprivileged and homeless citizens. On the other hand, underprivileged and homeless 
citizens are defined as “individuals or families residing in urban and urbanizable areas 
whose income or combined household income falls within the poverty threshold as defined 
by the National Economic and Development Authority and who do not own housing facilities. 
This shall include those who live in makeshift dwelling units and do not enjoy security of 
tenure.”  
734 Barangay Tambulilid City Hall, Barangay Integrated Development Plan (BIDP) 
Comprehensive Multi-Sectoral Development Plan (CMDP) 2012-2014, 5.  
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Chua: They were the ones who named it after RAFI! It was not us by 
the way! I was even surprised. The reason why I went back there was 
because they told me that whenever you go there, and then you have 
to ride the tricycle just tell them sitio RAFI, barrio RAFI. So I was like 
ha? It was them who named it after RAFI because it was us who was 
there. But the land, no! We don’t own that. You know for record 
purposes we don’t own the land. It was the city government who 
obtained that lot…It was the government who bought the land.735 
The issue of who owned these lands and in whose name the title was 
ceded in 1992 became ever more critical in relation to the issue of land 
privatization. For the remaining flood survivors who still reside in Tambulilid 
today and who had been cash-strapped before and certainly after the flood, 
titling was an expensive process few could afford, as Barangay Captain 
Roca succinctly explains: 
Barangay Captain Roca: There are more [migrants] now because 
past owners, those who were recipients of house and lots here 
already left, some died, their houses were sold. In my view [the 
percentage of flood survivors vis-à-vis new migrants] is maybe 50-50. 
There are few of the original [survivors] here.  
Author: Most of those I have talked to have no titles because the lots 
were given by the NGOs.736  
Roca: No, the regulation here is that the lot will be transferred in 
twenty-five years if you are not the recipient. But if you were really the 
recipient from the flash flood, automatically you can have it titled.  
Author: Ah so it is theirs, they can already—why is it they do not 
know this? 
																																								 																				
735 Ibid. Chua provided a copy of the title that the city government gave to RAFI for a 57,085 
square meter parcel of land where the organization could build its starter houses. It should 
be noted here, however, that the title refers to land, located not in Barangay Tambulilid, but 
in fact Barangay Linao, which was another relocation site.  
736 This perception was in fact erroneous. While some NGOs had indeed bought parcels of 
land with their own funding, the bulk of Tambulilid that had been utilized as resettlement 
area was bought by the city government.  
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Roca: They do know, others will say they are the owners when they 
are not, they just bought it. It is recorded. When you get a certification 
of ownership, that you want to have it titled, the records will be 
checked at the City Hall, if it is not there you are not the original 
recipient.  
Author: It is because most of those I asked what evidence they had in 
their possession, the evidence they have is only a piece of paper from 
the DSWD stating the release of materials, only that.  
Roca: It is because it is there really identified in the Master List. If you 
are really the owner, even right now you can have it titled.  
Author: This is possible? 
Roca: You can have it titled, yes. But if you just bought it, wait at least 
twenty-five years.  
Author: It is because the way I understood it, they did not know this. 
Roca: They know, they know! They even established an association 
here and contributed some money for titling. Now only those with 
money—most of the original [recipients] did not have money, the new 
migrants that had bought the lots had money. There they contributed. 
At the City Hall, their names did not appear so [the titling] did not push 
through.  
Author: So what happens then if for example you had already put up 
a large house?737  
Roca: It is not a problem because you have a waiver, there is a 
waiver from the original [recipient] that you bought it, you have a 
waiver saying all your rights had already been transferred to them, 
everything, you do not have any claim anymore. Also, for example you 
bought it and built a big house, just wait for twenty-five years.  
																																								 																				
737 The construction of large houses was in fact not the norm in Barangay Tambulilid. For 
original flood survivor-recipients, the houses were smaller and made of more modest 
materials.  
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Author: The twenty-five years started at what year? 
Roca: Starting when it was awarded.  
Author: Which is 1992? 
Roca: Maybe 1993, ‘92. [Twenty-five years] is approaching.738 
The reality of having few economic means to secure land created a 
profound sense of uncertainty for families already struggling with the daily 
concerns of barely making a living. As a consequence, rumors abounded, 
unfounded opinions created more fear and doubt, and in all these types of 
discourses ran a thread of fatalism and hopelessness: 
…what people here were asking where is the title as we may just be 
made unknown here. We are still squatters here! We don’t have 
papers!...When we went to the mayor the mayor said they will give 
papers but the houses must be rebuilt. It’s hard they said if the houses 
are very close to each other. If they give papers when the area is 
small, [the process of titling] will be lengthy! It was Vicky [referring to 
the former mayor, Victoria Locsin] who said when there were still no 
houses there were no papers to hold onto but rebuild the houses 
farther apart about eighty meters, what is it, eighty meters! That was 
what they said but it was not possible anymore, as some had already 
concreted their houses!...If someone else pays we will be removed 
from here! We won’t have a house because we are only squatters 
here! That’s what’s going to happen ma’am when you don’t have any 
papers.739 
A grandmother, whose children had all become professionals, with 
one son she proudly said was sending her money regularly as a seaman 
abroad, when asked if she had a title to her lot, muses:  
																																								 																				
738 Barangay Captain Ronaldo Roca, interview with author, 28 May 2013, in Tambulilid, on 
the question of the percentage of flood survivors vis-à-vis new migrants in Tambulilid and 
what the process was for titling, in Filipino, transcribed and translated by author. 
739 Resbeta, interview with author, 24 April 2013, Ibid. 
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Elizabeth: None, that is it we really do not have. They said you could 
live here till whenever you want. But if they want to drive us away from 
here, they can… 
Author: Do you think you will retire here? 
Elizabeth: Yes I want to if that is possible, if the Rotarians do not 
make us leave.740 
Yet, all resettled families did not collectively share the experience of 
land insecurity. Two puroks, namely Purok 7 organized by the NGO Holy 
Wings and Purok 8 by PhilRads, had already started the transfer of land to 
their recipients. However, the three sites where the majority of households 
belong—Puroks 11, 12 and 13—all RAFI settlements, remained without legal 
titles. 
Not land ownership but land occupancy 
Gawad Kalinga,741 a popular movement run by volunteers primarily 
concerned with building houses for the urban poor in general, entered 
Tambulilid in 2004. It adopted a village formerly established by the Rotary, 
gridded the area according to its model of a community clustered around a 
public open space, and organized residents with volunteers to build and in 
some cases re-construct existing houses following the ubiquitous GK 
prototypical house, as GK representatives describe:  
Roberto Igot: Actually [the house] is about twenty meters only with 
two rooms for kids and for the master, for parents, there is a CR 
[comfort room] and kitchen and living room.  
																																								 																				
740 Elizabeth, interview with author, 6 April 2013, in her own home, GK Barangay Tambulilid, 
Ormoc City, in Filipino, when asked if the family had a title to the house and lot. The Rotary 
Club of Ormoc originally bought the parcel of land in Tambulilid for distribution to the 1991 
survivors/urban poor families. The community was later adopted by Gawad Kalinga.  
741 Gawad Kalinga (lit. to ‘give care’) grew out of the Catholic community Couples for Christ’s 
(CFC) program for the poor. It was conceptualized after a youth camp on 26 December 1995 
involving the delinquent youth in Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, which was then the largest 
slum area in the Philippines. Today, Gawad Kalinga is an independent movement from the 
CFC though members of the two commonly support each other’s activities. Calling itself a 
social movement rather than an NGO, Gawad Kalinga is based on a volunteering program 
aimed at ending poverty in the Philippines for five million families by 2024.    
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Kevin Caballero: Small sala. 
Igot: Yes a small living room with like a porch that is also small. And 
also they have, aside from the house lot, that is the floor area which 
is about fifty…  
Caballero: About fifty to sixty [square meters]. 
Igot: …to sixty, which will differ depending on the availability of land. 
When it is more urban, land is more expensive so the yard is not as 
big. There is a front-, side- and back [yard].  
Caballero: In the urban [area] it is only forty [square meters].742 
In these two villages, the issue of land tenure was circumvented 
through the distribution and signing of certificates of occupancy, rather than 
land titles that assigned rights to beneficiaries except the right to sell. It was 
a program that aimed to effectively cut the cycle of land distribution-reselling-
and re-squatting, a common occurrence among those who had been 
recipients of public and private housing programs in urban areas. In this 
case, Gawad Kalinga mediated between the local government and the 
private land donor to organize a community for the poorest of the poor in a 
basically top-down process of community development: 
Igot: Well in our view the government is also doing its role, what it 
should do. But in our view, in Gawad Kalinga’s view, poverty is a very 
big issue, a very big problem. Poverty is like a monster in our 
country…It’s a big problem which requires a big answer and in GK’s 
view the government cannot act on its own…That is why Gawad 
Kalinga thinks that instead of bashing government, instead of you 
know blaming officials and all, what if we help government. This is 
why Tito Tony said [referring to Antonio Meloto, GK’s Chairman of the 
Board and ‘father’ of Gawad Kalinga] that yes, we see corruption and 
all, but instead of condemning them try to work with them, because we 
																																								 																				
742 Roberto ‘Buboy’ Igot and Kevin Caballero, GK representatives, simultaneous interviews 
with author, 11 March 2013, at SPDOWFI, Purok II-B, Barangay Luna, Ormoc City, in 
Filipino and English. 
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know that there is a certain percentage of goodness in their 
heart…Actually we are about 2600 communities nationwide today in 
Gawad Kalinga. But Gawad Kalinga does not own one square 
meter…What happens is that the donors we inspire to give are told to 
donate the land not to us but directly to the local government or any 
government entity. That is our process. We do not accept land. We 
only facilitate. But we have to ensure that the evidence, the legalities 
will really protect Gawad Kalinga’s interest and also those of people 
we serve…So now what Gawad Kalinga does is tell the mayor…that 
there is someone who wants to donate to Gawad Kalinga, we deem it 
right that the donation is made there, explain the same thing and [the 
mayor will just] accept, but we also have our own Memorandum of 
Agreement (MOA).  
Author: With the government?  
Igot: With the government represented by whoever, the barangay 
chairman, or the mayor or the governor. So…the donor has an 
instrument called a deed of donation, that it will be donated to the 
mayor. But on the condition that your donation, which is stipulated, 
that this particular piece of land, parcel of land can only be 
used…exclusively for Gawad Kalinga Community Development. 
Otherwise…it will revert back to the owner without any court litigation 
if it is used by other than Gawad Kalinga. So that is the protection. 
When it is signed by the mayor, when it is already notarized, anytime, 
there is no court litigation. We also have a MOA, a Memorandum of 
Agreement, [the donor has] the Deed of Donation, we have the 
Memorandum of Agreement that this land, it’s like it is only repeated, 
that this land is for Gawad Kalinga and we are the authorized 
implementer of the program. It’s like we are also the representative of 
the local government and also the interest of the donor. So here, in 
this side, this land that Gawad Kalinga was allowed to use we are the 
caretakers, we oversee it and really manage and follow the provisions 
that are in the Memorandum of Agreement that whoever is the mayor, 
or the [barangay] captain, it is continuous and they are not politicized 
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[referring to the beneficiaries]. They [referring to beneficiaries] could 
not be driven away if you don’t vote for me. There is none of that. It’s 
because every site there are caretaker teams who also know their 
responsibilities…So that is the protection of people who live here. 
Normally, we do not give the lot…we call it the awarding only of a 
certificate of occupancy.743 
The rationale behind Gawad Kalinga’s practice of distributing deeds of 
occupancy is further explained, which has proven effective in its numerous 
urban poor communities all over the country:  
Igot: In the Philippines, in truth the government has not lacked in the 
effort to provide [lots]. But what happens is that the government has 
given 1,000 homes [but] by tomorrow there will be different owners. 
The owner is no longer the poor family because it was already sold. 
Ah you know it saddens us but…this is what truly happens. When you 
go to what we call the relocation site in Tambulilid, the real flash flood 
victims won’t reach twenty per cent anymore. Because they sold 
them. The lands came from the government. Now Gawad Kalinga 
does not like that to happen because we want that when a house is 
awarded it should be…one less squatter family that should happen. 
So now Gawad Kalinga’s strategy that Kevin was talking about when 
there is someone who looks for land, we just encourage those who 
have tracts of land, the landed or organizations or the local 
government, that those who will use their land will partner with Gawad 
Kalinga through a Memorandum of Agreement. So we call that a 
usufruct, usufructory in fifty years and renewable. That is because it’s 
not necessary to donate land to Gawad Kalinga. Because if it is 
donated to us, we are also private, we will be taxed by government 
but we are not into business. For me, this is the main work of 
government. We are just helping. The land can come from private or 
can come from government but just the same instrument. To ensure 
that the people are not politicized, we enter into a Memorandum of 
																																								 																				
743 Ibid.  
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Agreement. So it is under term. For example, this here in Tambulilid, 
this with the government, that is under usufruct. The one in Rotary, a 
civic organization, that was private, that wasn’t donated to us but it 
was put under a Memorandum of Agreement. It is called a MOA…this 
instrument is to ensure that the people will be protected, that is to say 
their stay, their tenure. Just imagine that they are entitled to stay there 
for fifty years and renewable. It is like it was also given to them.  
Author: That means if for example the original owners after forty 
years, forty or fifty years, they want the land back it is possible to 
demand it back? 
Igot: No because it is stipulated there in the instrument that…unless 
Gawad Kalinga does not fulfil the agreement the way we implement 
programs, they have the right. As long as we really implement 
properly and follows those that had been signed into the 
Memorandum of Agreement, Gawad Kalinga will continue its priority in 
case it reaches fifty years. Now maybe Gawad Kalinga also considers 
that perhaps time will come that when the owner wants to subdivide or 
maybe our residents can afford to pay in instalments or pay—look it’s 
fifty years. So what happens is that the stability or security of their 
tenure comes from our instrument and the Gawad Kalinga will never 
start up an area for development without these instruments because 
that’s also our, like, our security and to secure the people whom we 
are serving. You know what it’s like in the Philippines.744  
In truth, however, while the idea behind the concept of distributing 
certificates of occupancy is admirable, the issue of land insecurity has 
continued to prove intractable and is not truly resolved for the benefit of 
those who needed the land the most. Ultimately, it is an indirect way for 
landowning families to continue to claim possession of the land, while 
abrogating their civic duty temporarily by allowing Gawad Kalinga to organize 
and develop new communities, where residents in the end may end up as 
future housing clients when the land is eventually developed. 
																																								 																				
744 Ibid. 
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Indeed, Gawad Kalinga has strong advocates and critics in its work in 
community building and poverty alleviation. Advocates typically exhort its 
extraordinary ability to gather “a massive army of volunteers” from around 
the world against its “war on poverty,” its powerful branding as an indigenous 
and ingenious Filipino development organization, its hip “social 
entrepreneurship” and “social innovation” programs, and its implications to 
governance, among others.745 Critics, however, have questioned the 
fundamental principles of Gawad Kalinga’s work, anchored on its heavily 
patronizing approach to poverty, which it defines as a mindset746 rather than 
as a real economic condition, its strong articulation and evangelization of 
Christian values to its beneficiaries, and its ‘voluntourism’.747 GK’s founder 
himself, Tony Meloto, has been accused of sexism and racism.748  
Nonetheless, GK recipients who belonged to the most destitute of 
urban poor families in the two communities in Ormoc City expressed their 
																																								 																				
745 See, for instance, M.C. Doyo, “The genius of the Filipino poor,” Opinion, Inquirer.net, 20 
November 2014 (Online); T. Graham, The Genius of the Poor: An Englishman’s Life-
Changing Journey in the Philippines (Art Angel Printshop Commercial Quests, Inc., 2014); 
A. Brillantes and M. Fernandez, “Good governance, social quality and active citizenship: 
Gawad Kalinga in the Philippines,” International Journal of Social Quality (1 December 
2011), 1-19 (Online); A. Brillantes, Jr. and M. Fernandez, “Philippine public administration? 
Or better still, for whom is Philippine public administration?” presented at the public 
colloquium, Is there a Philippine Public Administration: A Timeless Issue, University of the 
Philippines National College of Public Administration and Governance, 26-27 June 2008; 
and, R. Habaradas and M.L. Aquino, “Towards innovative, livable, and prosperous Asian 
megacities, Gawag Kalinga: Innovation in the city (And beyond),” AKI Working Paper No. 
10-01C (Manila: Angelo King Institute, De La Salle University, August 2010).  
746 See J.L. Oquiñena, “Ending the poverty mindset,” How We End Poverty, Gawad Kalinga, 
accessed 15 January 2017 (Online). Yet this argument is hardly unique to Gawad Kalinga, 
see for instance, B. Hare, “Viewpoint: Poverty is a state of mind,” Magazine, BBC News, 28 
November 2012 (Online).  
747 See, for example, S. Claudio, “Gawag Kalinga: Time for an independent assessment,” 
Rappler, 1 June 2015 (Online). Claudio, in particular, criticizes Gawad Kalinga’s 
reinforcement of “sexist conceptions about families—namely, that men were to be the final 
decision makers and their wives were supposed to obey them and support them.” In 
addition, in keeping with its Christian principles, unmarried and non-heterosexual couples 
were denied housing and contraceptives were banned in the GK communities. Also Z. Panol 
and M. Sison, “International public relations and the circuit of culture: An analysis of Gawad 
Kalinga (original emphasis),” Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal Vol. 14 Nos. 1 and 2 
(Australia: Public Relations Institute of Australia, 2014), 51-68.   
748 See, for instance, R. Macasero, “Make ‘cappucino’ kids? GK’s Tony Meloto slammed for 
‘sexist’ remarks,” Rappler, 25 May 2015 (Online). Also E. Howard, “Across the Philippines, 
Gawad Kalinga provides shelter from the storms,” The Guardian, 27 May 2016 (Online). 
Howard, in particular, documents a statement made by Meloto: “Our women are motivated 
to study. Our men are not. That is the state of our development. When you’re poor you look 
more at physical strength to develop. You’d rather be into guns, drugs or drinking. So these 
girls will have to marry men with lesser qualifications than them. What kind of future am I 
going to give them if I don’t also motivate the men?” 
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deepest gratitude for the gift of a house. Merlita, who was a beneficiary of 
two land resettlement programs—the first one after 1991 from the city 
government, which she sold after her husband fell ill and eventually died of 
kidney failure, and the second from Gawad Kalinga, considers her current 
house as another lease on life, a gift from God.749 Papenuncia, aged 
seventy-three and now living alone, says being given a house was the 
“arrival of luck.”750 Felicidad, whose parents were first given a house and lot 
at the resettlement area organized by the Red Cross in Bliss, Barangay 
Bagong Buhay in 1992 but which was also later sold, became a recipient 
herself through Gawad Kalinga. She says she wants to grow old in Block 7, 
the poorest sub-purok in Tambulilid:  
Because it is only now that I am residing where I like…I thought I was 
bound for Manila, I was lucky to come here when it was a house I was 
looking for because my mother when she doesn’t want [the house] 
anymore, for example, she sells it. Money you get only once but a 
house is always there.751 
Tambulilid’s recent rapid rise in population—5,798 with 1,176 
households in 2000; 8,227 in 2007; 8,387 with 1,701 households in 2008; 
and 9,136 with 1,711 households or 2,019 families in 2011752—showed a 
burgeoning community comprised predominantly of poor households with 
extended families living together in confined quarters. It is notable that in a 
population count undertaken in 2008, the puroks with the highest population 
densities were resettlement areas. These were Purok 3 (DSWD) with 1,586 
individuals living in 281 households; Purok 11 (Blocks 3, 7 and 8 of RAFI) 
with 1,515 individuals in 269 households; Purok 13 (Blocks 1, 2 and 4 of 
																																								 																				
749 Merlita, interview with author, 5 April 2013, at the GK provincial office, Barangay 
Tambulilid, Ormoc City, in Filipino. 
750 Papenuncia, interview with author, 16 April 2013, in her own home, Barangay Tambulilid, 
Ormoc City, in mixed Filipino and Bisaya, transcribed and translated by author: “We were 
given a house here. A small one because it was mud here beneath. This was mud…Then 
GK came. They asked if we wanted to have a house. I said only one question, yes!...Sus 
Lord how else were we going to have a peaceful house? So luck had arrived.”  
751 Felicidad, interview with author, 19 April 2013, in Filipino. 
752 Department of Education (DepEd)-Region VIII, Mithi og Bahandi sa Dakbayan sa Ormoc, 
Ibid., Appendix 2a; and, Liga ng mga Barangay, Barangay Governance Performance 
Management System, as of 1 April 2013.  
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RAFI) with 1,163 individuals in 219 households; and Purok 12 (Blocks 5 and 
6 of RAFI) with 955 individuals in 181 households.  
Again in a 2011 barangay survey, 600 families or 29.72 per cent out of 
a total 2,019 families753 were found subsisting below the food threshold of 
11,686 pesos.754 Half of these, or 993 comprising 19.47 per cent of the total 
number of families, were above the food threshold but still below the poverty 
threshold pegged at 16,841 pesos.755 Of the total population of 1,711 
households in 2011, 49.7 per cent were classified as squatter households, 
with 33.14 per cent without access to safe drinking water, and 6.84 per cent 
without access to a sanitary toilet. While the barangay has one elementary 
school, the estimated number enrolled from Grades One to Six in school 
year 2010-2011 was only 109.756 In contrast, the total barangay population 
aged six to twelve numbered 1,474.757 
The lack of basic amenities and services like provision of potable 
water in resettlement areas had already been identified as early as 1994, 
when residents had to buy drinking water from “water men” who peddled a 
four-liter gallon for three pesos.758 In the Gawad Kalinga villages, those who 
could afford to pay were able to have water piped directly into their houses. 
																																								 																				
753 Liga ng mga Barangay, Barangay Governance Performance Management System, Table 
11. “Kita kada buwan ng pamilyang barangay,” (Family income per month in the barangay). 
However, it must be noted here that the validity of these figures generated by the Barangay 
Governance Performance Management System cannot be ascertained and guaranteed, as 
there are doubts about the reliability and rigor in terms of survey collection, methodology and 
encoding. 
754 The food threshold (in pesos) refers to “the minimum income required to meet basic food 
needs and satisfy the nutritional requirements set by the Food and Nutrition Research 
Institute (FNRI) to ensure that one remains economically and socially productive. It is used 
to measure extreme or subsistence poverty. Poverty threshold is a similar concept, 
expanded to include basic non-food needs such as clothing, housing, transportation, health 
and education expenses. See Philippine Statistics Authority, “Poverty situation in Eastern 
Visayas, 3 in every 10 families in Eastern Visayas are poor,” Special Release SN-SR-
201611-26 (Regional Statistical Services Office VIII, 6 December 2016) (Online).  
755 Interestingly, in the Tambulilid figures for the Barangay Governance Performance 
Management System, 1,026 households or 50.82 of the sample of 2,019 households were 
above the poverty threshold.  
756 Barangay Tambulilid City Hall, Barangay Integrated Development Plan (BIDP) 
Comprehensive Multi-Sectoral Development Plan (CMDP), 2012-2014, 7. 
757 Liga ng mga Barangay, Barangay Governance Performance Management System, Ibid., 
Table 1, “Populasyon ng barangay ayon sa edad at kasarian” (Population of the barangay 
according to age and sex). This figure points to a substantial number of these children either 
studying in other schools, which implies additional costs to parents who must spend for 
transport, or not going to school at all. 
758 Benedicto, “Scars remain, trauma lingers.” 
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But for those who could not, they relied on artesian wells or bought water 
retailed by peddlers for their daily supply.759 In terms of electricity, a small 
percentage of families remain without electricity, as the GK representative 
pointed out:  
It is because included in the GK development that we made, we make 
sure that electric lines are available but they have to apply on their 
own because that is part of our training to them in order to give them 
back their dignity as persons that they should learn how to exert effort. 
That is included in our provision. So we just make sure that the 
facilities are available so…if [we are talking about the] urban poor we 
are more specific because we want [to target] the poorest of the poor, 
the victims of calamities. So that is what we focus on. Urban and rural 
[poor] so long as they need and want to help us, it will be easier to 
establish a community.760 
 Sustainable livelihoods were also in short supply, a situation that 
persisted since 1995 when it was first raised as an issue for resettled 
communities in Ormoc. According to Teresita Baylon, who was barangay 
kagawad761 in Tambulilid at that time, ‘masiao’ and ‘last-two’ and other forms 
of illegal gambling abounded for lack of jobs.762 In the aftermath of the 
disaster, some groups of men and women, without money with which to 
participate in these illegal games, instead gambled with donated sardines 
and canned goods.763 In fact, people got so fed up with the canned goods 
they got as donations that some of them in Tambulilid would barter these 
																																								 																				
759 Roberto Igot and Kevin Cabellero, simultaneous interviews with author, 11 March 2013, 
Ibid. on the question of water source: “Faucet but not yet everyone. This time it is like they 
have to look for their own to tap into the water system of the city. But at least it’s available in 
the community. [Author: So it means they have to pay on their own?] Yes, they have to. 
[Author: Those who could not pay, those without any means, where do they source?] What 
happens is they have a well. [Kevin: Artesian well] From the well and also they buy. It is 
cheaper when it is in retail. [Author: How much?] Ten pesos per container. [Author: Five 
gallons?] Yes, five gallons. So or sometimes, two families share and pay for one faucet. It is 
their diskarte (own way). That is because we agreed in the partnership with local 
government that not everything will be provided because we saw that it is more of the shelter 
that we directly assist them with.” 
760 Ibid. 
761 Filipino, lit. councillor.  
762 E. Justimbaste, “Ormoc does little to avert another potential disaster,” 46. 
763 L. Jimenea, “Laughter eases pain of flood victims,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 11 
November 1999, 14.  
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with kamote (sweet potato) when farmers from the hinterlands would come 
down to peddle their crops.764 The principal sources of livelihood for 
Tambulilid residents today include farming, fishing, livestock raising, small-
sized enterprises, and paid employment in the government or private 
sector.765 But a large percentage of the population (or 28.463 per cent) are 
classified as unemployed aged fifteen to sixty-five years.766 
Tambulilid today continues to live with a reputation that it is not only a 
hive of small-time illegal gamblers, but also a melting pot of bugoy-bugoy,767 
purse-snatchers, drug addicts, and thieves residing amidst honest folks. 
Barangay Captain Roca strongly notes that the ill repute was based on 
Tambulilid being a melting pot: 
Those who lived here were really not related to each other, they came 
from different places and were placed here. That is why in the 
beginning this place was feared because people had kanya-kanyang 
diskarte (to each his/her own). Years passed, people got along, so 
there was no [trouble] anymore. Today relations are good. It was only 
in the beginning.768 
“Original” versus “Migrant” 
Nevertheless, three key issues residents considered as the most 
persistent and urgent were listed in a barangay report prepared under Roca’s 
leadership. These issues were “land grabbing, illegal gambling and illegal 
																																								 																				
764 Eunila and Nezeli (neighbors), simultaneous interviews with author, 19 April 2013, in 
Eunila’s own home, Barangay Tambulilid, Ormoc City, in Bisaya, transcribed and translated 
by author. Nezeli: “For us we didn’t sell, [but] when someone came to peddle kamote we 
exchanged [Eunila: Exchange] exchanged…sardines, canned goods…exchange with 
kamote…[A female neighbour listening in: Barter]. Eunila: Of course we were so tired of 
sardines [Nezeli: Yes] we exchanged sardines [Nezeli: We exchanged rice] because the 
market was so far away!”  
765 The undated figures generated by the Barangay Hall in this report show that eight (8) 
percent of the population are engaged in farming, 1.5 percent in fishing, 1.5 percent in 
livestock raising, 4.5 percent in business, and those who were employed were further 
classified into 25 percent employed and 40 percent self-employed. However, there are no 
explanations as to what constituted self-employment especially in comparison with those 
engaged in business. Unemployment is estimated at 19.5 percent of the population. 
Barangay Tambulilid City Hall, Barangay Integrated Development Plan (BIDP) 
Comprehensive Multi-Sectoral Development Plan (CMDP), 2012-2014, 4.  
766 Liga ng mga Barangay, Barangay Governance Performance Management System. 
767 Bisaya,lit. scoundrel, bad guy, bully.  
768 Barangay Captain Ronaldo Roca, interview with author, Ibid., in Filipino, when asked 
whether Tambulilid had a negative reputation.  
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drugs”.769 In addition, stories of petty theft, gambling, drug trafficking and 
other crimes contribute to a less than rosy reputation, as two of these 
statements show:  
Elizabeth: …it is not one hundred per cent safe here because there 
are many in Tambulilid, many akyat-bahay.770 We ourselves were 
robbed. Maybe it was about four in the afternoon, my motorcycle’s 
CDI [capacitor discharge ignition] was stolen. Even if it is daytime you 
need to be locked. Someone climbed over so we put padlocks there.  
Author: Did you see who it was? 
Elizabeth: Yes! A neighbor. We saw him. So I told him, what are you 
going to steal from here, I do not have anything. Take the TV!...Here 
on the other side, the next morning, a neighbor’s laundry was stolen, 
all her good laundry.771 
Joan, another resident, muses: 
Joan: Especially when you forget to take your slippers and shoes in at 
night.  
Author: These are still stolen? 
Joan: It was the kaldero (pot) in the beginning [chuckling]…So long 
as they can get money—metal, cans, everything, so long as money 
can be got.772 
 While violence can occur anywhere and is not an exclusive 
characteristic of resettlement areas, it does lend untoward notoriety to these 
places. In a particularly gruesome incident in 2008, for example, vigilantes 
took the law into their own hands against someone suspected to have 
committed rape against a child. The highly congested nature of these areas, 
																																								 																				
769 Barangay Tambulilid City Hall, Barangay Integrated Development Plan (BIDP) 
Comprehensive Multi-Sectoral Development Plan (CMDP), 2012-2014, 9. 
770 Filipino, lit. “go-up-the-house,” a modus operandi of some groups who go over the fence 
past a locked door to rob a house.  
771 Elizabeth, interview with author, Ibid. 
772 Joan, interview with author, 24 April 2013, in her own home with a sari-sari store, 
Barangay Tambulilid, Ormoc City, in Bisaya, translated to Filipino by Victor Arcuiño during 
the interview, transcribed and translated to English by the author. 
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where the walls of one house were already the shared walls of the neighbor, 
meant private and public lives often intermingled in the street. Amparo, a 
forty-eight year old widow, narrates the story below, which also unnervingly 
shows the preconceived notions prevalent about rape:  
Amparo: …he was ganged up on by frats773 here.  
Author: Why?! 
Amparo: They suspected him but I told them to wait if it was true or 
not. They could not wait.  
Author: Suspected of what? 
Amparo: There was an abnormal girl here.774 Then there was a rumor 
that she was molested, raped. I said if raped…why was the child still 
playing about? That was a child only twelve years old…the child was 
not unhappy. The child was just playing about. Of course she was 
already big enough. Of course she would feel something, would be 
fidgety. Then I said wait, if you want you can put him in jail first then 
wait for the medical [exam]. If there is evidence you will not have 
difficulty arresting him. Then those who oppressed him said some 
other time because they did not have any evidence yet. What they did 
when my husband went to our employer, they met him, detained him, 
ran after him through to Coob Sitio. They ran after him, stoning him.  
Author: He died by stoning? 
Amparo: Yes. His neck was injured and his spinal cord was 
broken.775 
																																								 																				
773 Fraternities or groupings of usually young men. 
774 Verbatim was abnormal na babae. The catch-term ‘abnormal’ is commonly used at the 
street level to refer to people with mental disabilities, including those with Down Syndrome.  
775 Amparo, interview with author, 26 April 2013, in her own home, Barangay Tambulilid, 
original in Filipino. Amparo explained her husband’s death: “He was brought [to the hospital]. 
What happened with him occurred around maybe ten o’clock [Author: At night?] no, day. At 
11 o’clock because I asked for help from the [barangay] tanods [barangay peace and 
security officers] we went to the [barangay] captain, they arrested them, brought them to the 
police station. When I went there, he had vomited blood. At that time I did not know that he 
had been stoned…he said Ni, bring papa here because I want to have a massage. He said 
his body was painful. So I came here! It was then that when he was at the police station no, 
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Of course, there were also some residents who testify that for many 
years they had resided there, they had yet to experience being on the 
receiving end of criminality. According to Rebecca, who has lived in 
Tambulilid since 1992 and is a purok leader in Block 4,  
Rebecca: For me like I have become familiar here, it is safe as in the 
past…because I am well-known…Perhaps [those who say Tambulilid 
was not safe] they were not really pure residents here, they are not 
pure but just newly lived here.  
Author: So you have not experienced anything like that? 
Rebecca: Of course yes...No one does crazy things because those 
who had been here in the past already know them, maybe they had 
not been here long, but we have been here since from the flood.776 
The discourse about ‘pure’ residents versus ‘migrants’ reflects the 
shaping of post-disaster identity shared by many that an Ormocanon was a 
survivor, particularly from the great flood.777 The year 1991 was a turning 
point, which helped determine the future Ormoc character. Survivors would 
bear an uwat (scar) to show for it, and this entitled them to newfound respect 
and the material benefits allocated only for them. Migrants were, thus, not 
real Ormocanons even though they had lived there for a long time, so long 
as they had not experienced the horror of that November 1991 tragedy.  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 											
he said that the one who beat him up, six of them beat him up, they beat him up, he said, 
Ser [n.b. Sir], like, was my life only going to be till here? He said I will say who did this to me, 
who beat me. He said this so the police wrote down that there were six of them. I had not yet 
arrived there. Coming back they called here that, that [Author: Dead on arrival?] yes he was 
dead on arrival. But they still brought him to the what was it [Author: Hospital] hospital but he 
was already gone.”  
776 Rebecca (barangay kagawad or councillor and 1991 floodsurvivor), interview with author, 
24 April 2013, in her own home, Barangay Tambulilid, original in Bisaya, transcribed and 
translated by author.  
777 For example, Councilor Jose Alfaro and Coloy Tolibao, simultaneous interviews with 
author, 19 March 2013, in the Ormoc City Hsll, in mixed English and Filipino, transcribed and 
translated by author: “…most of the people who came here before the flood, there were 
many who were not from Ormoc. At the time, they survived here in Ormoc, they made well in 
Ormoc. It is like this is part of the resiliency that they learn how to survive, they learn how to 
live…People here are survivors. [Coloy: Yes by nature. I said but a while ago, according to 
some Ormoc would improve after each tragedy. We said let it not happen then, let us not 
improve (laughs) because after the war the city was totally devastated, after two years it 
became a chartered city. That time in 1991 after the flood, there were more businesses 
here].”  
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Community empowerment and resilience 
 To what extent then were the lives of the most vulnerable and poorest 
sectors of Ormoc society changed because of the flood? For those who were 
forced by circumstances to persist in Tambulilid, upward social mobility was 
not an option. Poor people were often less open and willing to move 
elsewhere in search of better housing and employment opportunities 
because often, “There is no other choice ma’am.”778 Nenita, a sixty-year old 
widow whose married children were still living with her today, says, “We don’t 
have any plans to go far away because where will we go?”779 Shared poverty 
in Tambulilid was certainly better than in other cities like Manila, where rent 
was exorbitant and life was more uncertain. Not surprisingly, ownership of a 
house in Tambulilid was often the deciding factor to staying put:  
…My son in Cebu told me it would be better to go away from Ormoc. 
He said Pa, let us sell this house. Where are we heading to, he 
replied, if we sell our house the money will be gone quickly. Bahalag 
(God willing) that whatever happens we will live right here.780 
 They still could eat rice three times a day, God willing, even without 
any sud-an (viand)781 or even when they were reduced to eating ginamos782 
																																								 																				
778 Ciceron and Camila (husband and wife), simultaneous interviews with author, 26 April 
2013, in their own home, Barangay Tambulilid, Ormoc City, original in Filipino, on the 
question of whether they ever thought about leaving Ormoc especially after the flood, 
transcribed and translated by author. Camila: “When it became difficult in Manila, we came 
back. There is no other choice ma’am. No choice because here there is no rent but in 
Manila, work in Manila was just a small salary, he was only an imprinter [in a t-shirt printing 
shop]. I was a sewer.”  
779 Nenita, interview with author, 2 August 2013, in her own home, Block 7, Barangay 
Tambulilid, Ormoc City, original in Bisaya, transcribed and translated by author.  
780 Ibid.  
781 Esterlita, interview with author, 16 April 2013, in her own home with sari-sair store, Block 
7, Barangay Tambulilid, Ormoc City, original in Bisaya, translated to Filipino by Victor 
Arcuiño during the interview, transcribed and translated to English by author, on the question 
of whether anything changed in the kinds of food they now are able to eat and before the 
flood, transcribed and translated by author: “It is just the same ma’am! [Author: Nothing 
changed?] God willing only rice ma’am without any viand but we are able to eat.”  
782 Bisaya, lit. fermented fish commonly called bagoong. Nezeli and Eunila (neighbors), 
simultaneous interviews with author, 19 April 2013, in Ormoc City, original in Filipino, on the 
same question posed to Esterlita, transcribed and translated by author: Nezeli: Ginamos 
now just like before when there is no budget.” 
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or lugaw,783 which were signs that a family was experiencing especially hard 
times. Amparo remarks:  
We became poor when we first moved here. We really became poor 
because my husband found it very far from Ormoc. Also the road was 
really difficult. It was not yet cemented before. It was also dusty. We 
also did not have pamasahe.784 We were really poor at that time. Now 
we are still poor but we can eat three times a day…Sometimes we eat 
lugaw samporado.785 
 Normal life in post-flood Tambulilid was one of daily struggle similar to 
the way many had been living before, but it was a life that was igo-igo ra, 
with just enough to live by. The little piece of land upon which the house 
stood was the best sign of change for Tambulilid survivor-residents, never 
mind if most of them did not have titles. The flood gave them a house, which 
was always meant to be a source of comfort in a life that had so few. 
Much has been said about “empowered communities” in the wake of 
disasters, which revolve around notions of coping and “access to safety.”786 
Coping is understood to be a repertoire of strategies adopted by 
communities to protect and preserve their ways of life, of ensuring that 
livelihoods and life expectations are not rendered at risk in unusual and 
adverse situations. The normalization of community life in Barangay 
Tambulilid, however, points to the transference of systems of interaction from 
their original urban poor neighborhoods into the resettlement area. 
Consequently, Tambulilid has evolved into a new urban poor community, 
																																								 																				
783 Filipino, lit. porridge.  
784 Filipino, lit. fare for public transport.  
785 Filipino, lit. chocolate porridge. Amparo, interview with author, 26 April 2013, original in 
Filipino, transcribed and translated by author. Amparo further remembers: “I pitied my eldest. 
He said, we don’t have any [food], let’s ask for some rice. There from the neighbor in front. 
But if he asked some rice, their roof was also full of patches [tagpi-tagpi]. So he said, never 
mind, let’s not ask from them because their roof had lots of patches maybe they do not have 
any rice, too!” [chuckling] 
786 Wisner et al define this as a “dynamic framework of socio-economic change, in which 
people of different identities (gender, age, seniority, class, caste, ethnic group) avail 
themselves of the means of securing their livelihoods and maintaining their expectations in 
life.” It is a process that must necessarily be a bottom-up approach because people are “not 
assumed to be passive recipients of a profile of opportunities, hedged about by constraints 
of the political economy of which they are a part.” Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon and Davis, At 
Risk, 112-114. 
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adopting many of its prior characteristics, values and systems of interactions. 
It remains to be seen whether efforts by the barangay and city government to 
transform Tambulilid through the introduction of private subdivisions, by way 
of Camella Homes low-cost housing projects, is successful in removing the 





































THE RURAL LANDLESS 
 
We went to the city to ask for rice. Sus someone gave rice. We were too shy 
to go near so we did not bring anything back. 
- Lorna and Myrna (pseudonyms) (mother and daughter), simultaneous interviews 
with the author, 19 May 2013, in their own home, Barangay Nalunopan, original in Bisaya, 
transcribed and translated by author 
This was where [our parents] worked ma’am, that is to make nigo (basket for 
cleaning rice), to make nigo for our food, to sell for food. They did not have any 
plans to send their children to school. So when we grew up we did not question our 
parents. When we were still small we already knew we were too poor to go to 
school. 
- Berto (pseudonym), interview with author, 14 April 2013, in his own home, 
Barangay Nalunopan, original in Bisaya, transcribed and translated by author 
To get to Barangay Nalunopan787 from downtown Ormoc, one had to 
take a short tricycle ride uphill towards the higher elevation settlements. 
Nalunopan was more than 200 hectares in area with an elevation range of 
120 to140 meters from sea level. Although located only a few kilometers 
from the city, the barangay itself—where the majority of its residents lived—
remained physically isolated and rural, though a road network was being 
finished in 2013 to link it to the outside world. The most straightforward way 
to reach Nalunopan was via a paved road passing several surprisingly well-
to-do houses, with spacious lawns and well-constructed buildings. Upon 
asking who owned these houses, the matter-of-fact reply was they were 
owned by families whose daughters had married foreigners.788 These small 
pockets of affluence were both startling and conspicuous.  
The paved road passing through Barangay Santo Domingo789 en 
route to Nalunopan then led sharply downhill towards a clearing, and ended 
abruptly, signalling the barangay’s boundary. The beginning of the dirt road 
																																								 																				
787 Pseudonym, (lit.) flooded. 
788This perception about ‘marrying,’ or even just co-habiting with a foreigner as a way out of 
poverty was pervasive among urban poor families in Leyte. It is discussed in more depth in 
Chapter 8. 
789 Pseudonym.  
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was the entrance to the hacienda. Beyond, one could see bamboo trees 
swaying over pawod (thatched) houses, a seemingly idyllic rural panorama. 
Malinawon790 creek, a tributary of the Anilao River, snaked placidly across 
the landscape, where young children frolicked and an occasional carabao 
basked under the sun. In good weather, one could cross the creek from 
boulder to boulder without ever getting the feet wet. But during rainy season 
and, worse, slow-moving typhoons, it could turn deadly. It was the same 
creek that rose to such abnormal heights and with deadly velocity in 
November 1991, swept away the pawod houses and killed at least thirty 
individuals, including entire families, in this barangay alone. Yet unlike 
survivor-beneficiaries who had been resettled in Barangay Tambulilid 
discussed in the previous chapter, Nalunopan survivors were not considered 
priorities for government relief and rehabilitation. Because they were deemed 
under the care of a hacendero who was considered their symbolic father, 
these laborers and their families, though they had lived in the barangay for at 
least a generation, were not eligible for resettlement by the government.  
This chapter explores the case of laborers under the direct employ of 
the sugarcane hacienda in Barangay Nalunopan, including those doing a 
variety of jobs in the katubhan (sugarcane fields), as well as those working in 
the Larrazabal family’s various businesses around Ormoc City. It delves into 
the question of how the 1991 flash flood had impacted on their lives, one of 
the poorest and most vulnerable communities in Ormoc City. 
Poverty and vulnerability on a hacienda  
Barangay Nalunopan had been historically identified as part of a 
hacienda barangay both by its residents and by the wider Ormoc society. It 
became independent in 1951 after separating from a neighboring barangay 
with a larger land area of about 500 hectares, but which was also sparsely 
populated. Barangay Nalunopan was divided into five puroks,791 which 
included the barangay proper, or popularly referred to as the “Barrio,” where 
public buildings were situated, such as the barangay hall and elementary 
																																								 																				
790 Bisaya,lit. calm.  
791 Filipino, lit. division within the territory of a barangay. Along with sitios, a purok is 
considered the smallest Philippine political unit.   
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school. According to its barangay captain, when asked which areas were 
part of the hacienda and which were not, he replied:  
Barangay Captain Fruto Velardo: All of it…starting from the low 
[areas] up to the high [areas], it is all hacienda. Even the barangay 
proper, the owner owns it.  
Author: This barangay proper? But these people here have titles? 
(Referring to a cluster of cement houses)  
Velardo: No. No.  
Author: Is there anyone inside Nalunopan who has a title? 
Velardo: No.  
Author: So everything is hacienda? 
Velardo: Hm. Aside from those with niyog (coconut trees), those are 
private, that’s theirs. Here, what happened here was that the original 
owner was Torrevillas, the owner of this land, of other haciendas here. 
Now this [referring to the barrio] was donated to the barangay but 
without papers. No deed of donation.  
Author: When was it donated? In the ‘70s? 
Velardo: It was a long time ago, a long time when I was not yet the 
barangay captain. Now when Torrevillas sold to Sabin Larrazabal, 
everything was sold including this area in the barangay. So that is why 
this is theirs.  
Perlita (a former laborer-resident who had transferred to the new 
community established by the nuns in Barangay Luna, Purok II-B 
discussed in the next chapter): So these can just be demolished.  
Velardo: Yes, of course, at any time.  
Perlita: So there is nothing written down.  
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Velardo: But Sabin Larrazabal is not like that.792 
Eric Wolf and Sidney Mintz defined a hacienda as, 
…an agricultural estate, operated by a dominant land-owner and a 
dependent labor force, organized to supply a small-scale market by 
means of scarce capital, in which the factors of production are 
employed not only for capital accumulation but also to support the 
status aspirations of the owner.793 
A hacienda was characterised mainly by capital scarcity, which 
determined its market (restricted but stable), estate ownership (family, which 
permitted wealth mobilization through kinship ties and personal networks), 
land use (rarely exploiting all land under the estate’s control), labor 
(managed through a hierarchical relationship with the landowner as symbolic 
‘father’ and workers as symbolic ‘children’), technology (minimal, traditional 
and limited), and the existence of a private system of sanctions.794 It was 
markedly different from a plantation, which was defined as having more 
capital at its disposal due to its generally more corporate ownership and 
management. In addition, a plantation supplied a larger scale market than a 
hacienda, invested more heavily in technology, and dealt with a specialized 
produce often exported abroad. As such, land and labor were primarily 
considered inputs for production, indeed commodities, “to be acquired, used 
and discarded for purely economic reasons.”795  
Nalunopan’s population, like in other haciendas, had been controlled 
historically by controlling the entry and exit of migrant labor and their families, 
and as such had remained consistently small. In recent years, it had only 
gradually increased from 685 in year 2000, to 795 in 2007, and 811 in 
																																								 																				
792 Barangay captain Fruto Velardo (pseudonym), interview with author, 28 May 2013, in 
Ormoc City, original in Filipino, transcribed and translated by author. 
793 E. Wolf and S. Mintz, “Haciendas and plantations in Middle America and the Antilles,” 
Social and Economic Studies Vol. 6 No. 3 (September 1957), 381. A discussion of the 
hacienda system as practised in the Philippines is found in M. Mclennan, “Land and tenancy 
in the Central Luzon Plain,” Philippine Studies Vol. 17 No. 4 (Ateneo de Manila University 
Press, 1969), 651-682.  
794 E. Wolf and S. Mintz, “Haciendas and plantations in Middle America and the Antilles,” 
386-395.  
795Ibid.,399. This quote, however, was originally used in relation to land, but may also be 
extended to a view of labor as an input and expense.  
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2008.796 In 2011, the barangay had a population of about 860. The majority 
of residents were in the 25 to 59-age range (33.6 per cent), followed by the 
6-12 years (17.7 per cent), and the 3-5 years (9.9 per cent).797 In that same 
year, eighty-one households out of a total of 199 were found living below the 
subsistence threshold set at 11,686 pesos, while forty-nine households were 
above the food threshold but still below the poverty threshold of 16,841 
pesos.798 Sixty-nine households, however, were noted to be above the 
poverty threshold.799  
According to the barangay captain of Nalunopan, residents who were 
directly employed in the hacienda comprised only thirty per cent of the total 
population, while the majority derived their livelihood from other means, such 
as tuba-making, construction work, etc.800 Hornals or sugarcane laborers 
were paid seventy (70) pesos per day, while those who worked as 
nagkakaret or palm tappers for tuba earned about 200 pesos per day.801 
Other jobs in the hacienda, such as harvesting cane, planting, and 
transporting harvested sugarcane to the mill, were paid on a pakyaw or 
piece-work basis. Pakyaw for harvesting sugarcane, for example, was set at 
thirty (30) pesos per one thousand cane cut, higher than an ordinary hornal’s 
work, as laborers could easily cut more than a thousand stems of cane per 
																																								 																				
796 Department of Education (DepEd)-Region VIII, “Ormoc City population and number of 
households (per barangay), year 2000, 2007 and 2008,” Appendix 2a, in Mithi og Bahandi 
sa Dakbayan sa Ormoc, 178. 
797 Liga ng mga Barangay, Barangay Governance Performance Management 
System,“Populasyon ng Barangay ayon sa edad at kasarian” (Population of the barangay 
according to age and sex), Table 1, as of 3 December 2011. 
798 Ibid. 
799 Ibid.  
800 Barangay captain Fruto Velardo (pseudonym), interview with author, Ibid. 
801 Ibid. 
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day.802 During harvest, driving a truck paid on average 980 pesos per week 
per laborer.803  
It must be noted here that in the barangay, discrimination existed 
between sugar workers and non-sugar workers. The latter were often 
considered ‘original’ residents. Hence they enjoyed more independence 
because even though they, too, did not possess titles to their land, they were 
still considered claimants to small plots within the hacienda. Their houses 
were of more permanent kinds than the laborers’, with materials that were 
stronger against the elements such as cement and galvanized iron. Sugar 
workers, on the other hand, were seen as primarily migrant labor, and as 
such were not entitled to any land rights at all. Their houses reflect their 
destitution, using more flimsy materials such as bamboo and palm roofing 
that were easily disassembled and re-assembled as required, especially if 
they had to move away. This fundamental dichotomy about access to and 
ownership of land remains at the heart of community distrust and apathy 
against laborer families, and to a large part explains their persistent 
vulnerability and poverty even after decades of backbreaking work in the 
hacienda.   
Poverty among workers in sugarcane estates in the Philippines had 
been documented as one of the most resistant to change and intervention. In 
a June 1976 survey conducted in Negros and Iloilo by a Department of Labor 
team to determine the socio-economic and working conditions of sugar 
workers, it was found that eighty (80) per cent of the sample804 did not own 
																																								 																				
802 Lorna and Myrna (pseudonyms, mother and daughter respectively), simultaneous 
interviews with author, 19 May 2013, Ibid.: [Author: But when harvesting sugarcane, that is 
for seven days in one week?] Lorna: Yes. Myrna: Only six. Lorna: Aw six. Nita (former 
Nalunopan resident): Only six. They get paid on Saturdays. When you do magtubo [referring 
to the pakyaw system], you get paid more than if you do work by day. Lorna: Yes, it is more 
advantageous. [Author: Pakyaw?] Lorna: Pakyaw. Perlita: It’s also pakyawan there. Lorna: It 
is pakyaw like before…Nita: So how much per week? Lorna: Thousands! Nita: How much is 
per thousand? Lorna: Thirty per thousand. Nita: Yes, it is higher than if you do hornal! Lorna: 
Big enough.  
803 Ronald Boy (pseudonym), interview with author, 26 April 2013, in his own home, 
Barangay Nalunopan, Ormoc City, original in Bisaya, when asked for an estimate of net 
earnings for the family: “In my case, for seven days about 980 [pesos].” Ronald Boy works 
as a driver in the sugarcane estate.    
804 Actual sample comprised of eight milling districts, namely Ma-ao, Biscom, Victorias, 
Sagay, San Carlos and Bais milling districts in Negros; and New Frontier and Passi milling 
districts in Iloilo. From these milling districts, 102 sugar plantations were drawn, where 75 of 
228	|	F L O O D W A T E R S 	 O F 	 D E A T H 	
	
the land they lived on, and that nine out of ten workers depended directly on 
their employer for shelter. The majority (66 per cent) of these workers lived in 
makeshift houses made of nipa (palm-thatched) and bamboo. Even among 
sugar workers, there were those who were considered the worst off, earning 
less than the minimum wage mandated by the government at that time. This 
group included small-farm workers, migrant and temporary workers, as well 
as female laborers. Even then, the earnings of sugar workers were deemed 
insufficient to meet housing needs, let alone basic requirements such as food 
and clothing. Thus, they supplemented their meagre income by incurring 
debt, which became more acute during the off-milling season when the 
proportion of “poor” workers ballooned up to forty-five (45) per cent of the 
total labor population. The cyclical nature of poverty in this setting was 
exacerbated and explained by the fact that the majority of sugar workers (46 
per cent) had received only primary education, while only thirty-two (32) per 
cent graduated from elementary school. Most of their children, like their 
parents before them, reached only elementary, with half of them already out 
of school by the time of the survey due to financial constraints. Sugar 
workers themselves perceived their problems to include the inadequate and 
sub-minimum wages, lack of education, underemployment, lack of medical 
services, inadequate housing facilities, and large family size, as among the 
most urgent issues confronting them. Yet, not surprisingly, they managed to 
maintain a generally harmonious and paternalistic relationship with their 
employers. The relative weakness of labor unions in the sample areas of 
Negros and Iloilo was noted, as the majority of workers remained 
unorganized. In general, the survey concluded that “[c]hange in the sugar 
plantations indeed may take quite some time,” and that “[m]ost of the sugar 
workers claim that their present situation was the same five years ago.”805 
In Ormoc, the first study about the socio-economic conditions of 
sugarcane workers involving 252 laborers from seventeen sugarcane 
districts was undertaken in 1969. Based on this research, a typical worker in 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 											
these were small farms, 19 medium-sized farms; and 8 large farms. In total, there were 62 
plantations in Negros Occidental, 21 plantation in Negros Oriental, and 19 plantations in 
Iloilo included in the survey. Ministry of Labor and Employment, The Sugar Workers, Two 
Studies (Manila: Institute of Labor and Manpower Studies, Undated), 6-7. 
805Ibid., 10-14. 
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a sugarcane estate was profiled as a married man above eighteen years of 
age, with an average of four children, with limited primary education, and 
earning an average weekly wage between six pesos and fifteen pesos. The 
jobs of sugar workers then included cutting and harvesting cane, weeding, 
planting, preparing the land and applying fertilizer in an average of nine 
hours of work per day.806 A capataz or foreman, on the other hand, earned 
between 16.50 pesos and 25.50 pesos per week.807 It should be noted here 
that in 1965, Republic Act 4180 (Amending R.A. No. 602 otherwise known as 
the Minimum Wage Law) mandated every employer in the sugar industry 
covered by Minimum Wage Order No. 1 to pay agricultural workers four 
pesos minimum wage per day. However, laborers in Ormoc sugar estates 
were actually only paid 2.50 pesos per ton of cane cut. Most estates around 
the country, including those in Ormoc, also preferred the less costly and 
more popular pakyaw method whereby a group of workers were paid a lump 
sum for piecemeal work. Indeed, the pakyaw system had been hailed as 
early as the 1920s as a far more efficient method of labor management on 
sugar haciendas in the Philippines, which had been initially practised with 
much success in Negros and neighboring provinces.808 Due to this 
arrangement, however, wages were drastically reduced and became more 
uncertain, with the capacity to save for laborer families becoming virtually 
impossible, except in instances where wives and children also worked for 
wages to supplement family income.809 As a daily wage earner, the sugar 
laborer and his family were not covered by medical or health benefits or 
insurance, nor did they receive bonuses.810 It was thus imperative that 
additional sources of income were identified. But contrary to the popular 
notion that sugar laborers preferred to work outside the estates, many 
actually chose to persist working on the haciendas and plantations. The 
following statement made by a sugar worker in Ormoc in 1969 illustrated the 
																																								 																				
806 F. Anasco, “A study on the socio-economic conditions of sugar farm laborers in Ormoc 
City,” thesis for Master of Arts in Economics (Cebu City: University of San Carlos, April 
1970). 
807 Ibid., 56. 
808 S. Asuncion, The Growing of Sugar Cane in the Philippines, Circular No. 167, reprint 
from the Philippine Agricultural Review Vol 18 No 3 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1925), 20. 
809 Anasco, “A study on the socio-economic conditions of sugar farm laborers in Ormoc 
City,” 63. 
810 Ibid., 121-122. 
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stark reality posed by the chronic lack of employment and economic 
alternatives for those who did not have viable options for alternative 
employment. The lack of life choices and suitable employment meant forced 
perseverance on these estates despite poor wages and the harsh manual 
nature of the work: 
I cannot even wish to work in a factory or with the government 
because even by wishing I would sound too presumptuous—
especially when I have not even gone to school. Who does not like to 
work in a place where one is not forever under the heat of the sun? 
Nobody would turn away from a better paying job—I am no exception. 
I crave for more income so that I can buy more and better things for 
my family; but, to be left without a choice is a different story. I cannot 
say that I am contented with what I have now. No, I have my own 
dreams, so I hope that my children would fare better than I did.811 
Yet, given this bleak situation, what was the role of the government in 
the sugar estates? Mediating grassroots relations between the landowner 
and workers was the role and responsibility of the barangay, which by law 
was mandated to plan and implement government policies, programs, 
projects and related activities in the community. It was also theoretically “a 
forum wherein the collective views of the people may be expressed, 
crystallized and considered, and where disputes may be amicably settled.”812 
But in reality, government interference in Barangay Nalunopan, like in other 
sugar estates in the Philippines, had traditionally been limited only to road 
construction and other infrastructure, maintenance of law and order, and the 
provision of public primary education and basic health services.  
With the hacendero/landowner all-powerful and the government 
seemingly distant, it was the Catholic Church that filled the void of 
responding to the workers’ welfare, both spiritually and materially.813 The 
																																								 																				
811 Cited in Anasco, Ibid., 75. 
812 Local Government Code of the Philippines, Book III, Local Government Units, “Title One. 
The Barangay,” Section 384, Role of the Barangay. 
813 See, for example, A. Jesena, “The Sacadas of Sugarland: A Report,” Action Now Vol 1 
No. 44 (1969), 4-11. An electronic article is also available online: A. Jesena, “The sacadas of 
sugarland” (Online).  
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Archdiocese of Palo, which exercised jurisdiction over Ormoc, took an active 
interest in the city and its labouring classes early on, as a direct response to 
the liberal theological movement sweeping through most of the Catholic 
world in the 1970s. In 1975, Reverend Olalio Loperando814 was assigned to 
Ormoc specifically to mobilize the labor union of sugar workers, although 
Nalunopan was not included in his mission sites. An extract of Reverend 
Loperando’s interview provides a glimpse of the pastoral perspective of the 
Catholic Church on behalf of the laboring poor at that time:   
Reverend Olalio Loperando: When I was assigned to Ormoc in 
1975, I was made the president of an existing labor union…called 
Christian Association of the Philippines, Christian Workers 
Association, CWA. I was assigned as president by Archbishop 
[Cipriano] Urgel while at the same time I was staying in the convent 
[of] Saint Peter and Paul Parish not necessarily as an assistant but for 
that special mission.  
Author: Would you know Father why there was a special mission? 
Why was there a specific special mission for Ormoc? 
Loperando: The purpose of that labor union organized by the Church, 
by Archbishop Urgel, was simply to help the sugarcane workers.  
Author: Why? 
Loperando: Because that was the real problem there that time.  
Author: So there was a problem that the Church identified? 
Loperando: Yes! We had a lawyer with us, he’s now one of the 
judges in Cebu, he was helping us out run the labor union.  
Author: So this labor union, how many members did it have that 
time? 
Loperando: I would not recall because that time we were still 
recruiting members because there were two kinds, two types of 
																																								 																				
814 Pseudonym. 
232	|	F L O O D W A T E R S 	 O F 	 D E A T H 	
	
hacenderos in Ormoc. The rich hacendero and more or less not rich 
hacenderos. And in the labor union we had a CPA [certified public 
accountant] with the less rich hacenderos. But with the bigger 
organizations of the rich hacenderos, we didn’t have any.  
Author: Why? 
Loperando: They refused.  
Author: They didn’t allow it? 
Loperando: Yeah, refused, they would not.815 
The Church was powerless to force its programs among these needy 
communities in the face of such opposition. But it did not stop it from 
pursuing secret missions to organize laborers. Nonetheless, despite these 
missions by the Church, the plight of the sugar workers remained unchanged 
as shown in another study in 1986 that focused on twenty male and eight 
female ‘landless’ sugarcane workers in Ormoc. The majority (71 per cent) 
had attained only primary education, with fourteen (14) per cent reaching 
secondary school, and the same percentage without any formal education at 
all.816 The majority of these workers (57 per cent) lived in the baraks of the 
landowners, which did not always have sanitary toilets. For those areas 
without toilets, the riverbanks served the purpose, which posed lingering 
health and sanitary issues as the main sources for drinking water were open 
wells, springs, artesian wells or public pumps. Notable was the fact that a 
sizeable number of respondents (32 per cent) worked as hired laborers over 
a span of six to twelve years, with the average length of service in the 
haciendas set at sixteen years. In addition, the majority (57 per cent) were 
																																								 																				
815 Reverend Father Olalio Loperando (pseudonym), interview with author, 30 August 2013, 
in Santo Niño Parish Church, Tacloban City, original in English. The hacenderos’ supreme 
authority in the hacienda, which subsumes both economic and political power, in this case of 
Negros Occidental, is discussed in detail in P. Kreuzer, “Domination in Negros Occidental: 
variants on a ruling oligarchy,” PRIF-Report No. 112 (Peace Research Institute Frankfurt 
(PRIF), 2011) (Online).  
816 E. Barte, “A profile of the landless sugarcane farm workers in Ormoc District” (Bachelor of 
Science thesis in Agriculture (Agricultural Economics). Baybay, Leyte: Visayas State College 
of Agriculture, April 1987), 10. However, the areas of the survey had not been identified. By 
‘landless,’ Barte refers to “sugarcane farm workers who do not own the land they are 
working on and are dependent from (sic) their wages as the main source of their livelihood” 
(8).  
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local, or native to the place where they resided and only seven (7) per cent 
were migrants from other provinces. Both these findings showed that 
workers were not migratory laborers that tended to follow unfolding economic 
opportunities during harvest seasons. Many, in fact, were long-term 
sedentary workers, who had failed to see their socio-economic prospects 
improve over the years.817  
In stark contrast to sugar workers, rice farmers, though they shared 
similar socio-economic conditions, at least owned the lands they tilled. A 
typical rice farmer in Ormoc in 1970 was also married, with three to four 
children, had some elementary education, and owned an average of one to 
two hectares of land.818  
Not surprisingly, therefore, living conditions for sugar workers and 
their families in haciendas even under normal circumstances were 
historically far worse than in non-sugarcane producing communities.819 
Nonetheless, despite the dismal socio-economic conditions on sugar estates 
in Ormoc in the 1970s and ‘80s, it was relatively tension-free between the 
landowning class and the workers. Armed conflict had reached its height in 
the 1960s between hacendero political families feuding over land and the 
conflict spilling over into local and regional politics, notably between the 
Larrazabals and the Tans. But there was relative calm in the next two 
decades despite the calamitous national collapse of the sugar industry in the 
country in the early 1980s. In Negros Occidental, the sugar bust sparked a 
peace and order crisis.820 The downfall of the industry meant that by 1985 
																																								 																				
817 Ibid., 15. 
818 C. Ranolas, “The socio-economic profile of rice farmers in Ormoc City: Its implications to 
countryside development” (Master of Science thesis in Business Administration. Cebu City: 
University of the Visayas, March 1979), Chapter 3.  
819 See, for example, J. de Boer, Sweet Hazards, Child labor on sugarcane plantations in the 
Philippines (Netherlands: Terre des Hommes Netherlands 2005) (Online); R. Rutten, 
Women Workers of Hacienda Milagros, Wage Labor and Household Subsistence on a 
Philippine Sugarcane Plantation 30. (Publickatieseri Zuid- en Zuidoost-Azie, Universiteit van 
Amsterdam, 1982); A. Jesena, “The Sacadas of Sugarland: A Report;” and, I.T. Runes, 
General Standards of Living and Wages of Workers in the Philippine Sugar Industry.  
820 See, for example, M. Billig, Barons, Brokers and Buyers, The Institutions and Cultures of 
Philippine Sugar (Ateneo de Manila University Press and University of Hawaii Press, 2003); 
V. Gonzaga, Crisis in Sugarlandia: The Planters’ Differential Perceptions and Responses 
and their Impact on Sugarcane Workers’ Households, final report to Visayas Research 
Consortium and Philippine Social Science Council (Bacolod City: La Salle Social Research 
Center, 1986).  
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about 250,000 workers in Negros alone were either under- or unemployed, 
triggering a rise in insurgency particularly in Negros Occidental where hunger 
became a real problem for many families.821 In a 1989-1990 study on 
workers at the Victorias-Manapla Sugar Company in Negros Occidental, for 
example, it concluded that support for the communist-inspired New People’s 
Army (NPA) insurgency came from the ranks of “untenured workers” and 
was based on the desire for the “restoration of the patron-client ties” in the 
absence of a welfare system that could respond to basic social needs, 
especially in times of dire economic stress.822  
Ormoc had its share of insurgent activities among politicised factions 
of the laboring classes, but it had not been as pronounced as in Negros. One 
notable incident that had not been reported in the media was when Don 
Potenciano Larrazabal, Sr. was kidnapped in 1986 and brought to the 
mountains of Ormoc. It was originally blamed on the insurgent New People’s 
Army (NPA), but later turned out to have been the work of disgruntled military 
personnel.823 Sporadic NPA sightings and armed encounters with the military 
in Ormoc have continued to occur until today, with several upland barangays 
being persistently labelled as high-risk areas for insurgency.824 
Flood and the disaster in 1991 
Set against this backdrop of dire poverty in Ormoc in general and of 
Barangay Nalunopan in particular, the flash flood occurred on 5 November 
1991. As the waters of the Anilao River rushed downstream towards the city 
plains, the first damming of logs and debris occurred in Nalunopan, following 
																																								 																				
821 M.A. Satake, Sugar Industry Workers and Insurgency: The Case of Victorias-Manapla, 
ed. Violeta Lopez-Gonzaga (Bacolod City: Southeast Asia Centre for Resource Studies, 
Consultancy and Training (SEACREST), 2001), 3. 
822 Lopez-Gonzaga, Crisis in Sugarlandia, 133. 
823 Police Officer (Ret) Pocson (pseudonym), interview with author, 10 October 2013, in 
downtown Ormoc City. He actually backtracked on this story, saying this was an incident not 
known by many even in Ormoc, and stated firmly he did not want to be quoted. According to 
PO Puzon, in response to this incident, however, President Cory Aquino relieved the entire 
military force stationed at Camp Downes and replaced them with a new contingent. 
However, no reference in the news had been found on this and as such could not be 
corroborated.  
824 These barangays were Quezon Jr., Mahayahay, Mabini, Mahayag, and Cabingtan. 
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officers (MARO), anonymous interview with author, 9 October 
2013, in Ormoc City. Also, L. Jimenea, “NPA courier nabbed in Ormoc City,” Philippine Daily 
Inquirer, 7 May 1998, 13; “Five killed in NPA ambush in Ormoc,” Philippine Star, 27 March 
2004), 1&2.  
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the natural river bends. When the Malinawon creek suddenly overflowed, the 
flimsy houses of Purok Uno were all swept away. The flood was kalit nga 
kakusog, so unexpected yet so strong, says Berto, a hornal residing in Purok 
Uno in 1991,  
Berto: It did not take very long. About half an hour from its height, it 
was over! The water subsided…but there were so many houses that 
were swept away.  
Author: Here…all houses were swept away? No house was spared? 
Berto: None was left ma’am, this here near the river. So long as it 
was near the river none was left.825 
 In fact, fourteen houses were swept away and in a matter of minutes 
fourteen families were lost. The bodies of eighteen individuals were never 
recovered. Crispin narrates his memories of Benito’s family who were all 
killed that day:  
Crispin: …they were all swept away, all of them…Eight, they were 
eight, as they were aunt and nephew (magtiyaun) and six children. 
They were eight. All drowned. They were complacent because for 
every typhoon they never evacuated. Sus when the river rose it met 
on that part.  
Tasing (Crispin’s daughter): The water went there (pointing in the 
distance). 
Crispin: …We were just complacent because the rain was not strong. 
There was no strong wind. It was the tornado.826 
 When the sky thundered, many mistakenly believed the rain was over, 
a prevalent superstition lending to the complacency, as Ronald Boy notes:  
Ronald Boy: Now, at about eleven o’clock…there was thunder.  
																																								 																				
825 Berto (pseudonym), interview with author, 14 April 2013, Ibid. 
826 Crispin (pseudonym), interview with author, 21 April 2013, in his own home, Barangay 
Nalunopan, Ormoc City, original in Bisaya, transcribed and translated by author. 
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Perlita: It thundered, yes.  
Ronald Boy: There was thunder here. Now, my grandmother said, 
thank goodness, there was thunder, the rain has stopped. Yes, that 
was it. Unexpectedly, the water grew…It was so strong, so 
strong…This is our roof, our house, it was swept away…I had pulled 
my grandmother out, we were on the roof, later [the water] became so 
strong. Then when the house was swept away, I was brought here. 
My grandmother was immediately swept away with the house.  
Author: So you saw your grandmother being swept away? 
Ronald Boy: I saw. Later I was there by the bamboo [trees], but the 
water was still so strong…I was told to go there. I did not have any 
clothes on! I had no clothes.827 
 Amazingly, the ‘barrio’ where public buildings were located as well as 
the sugarcane fields atop the plateau were not harmed. It was in the fields 
that those who were lucky enough to escape sought shelter. One manunubo, 
remembering that day, says:  
We anticipated ma’am going to the bukid (upland, mountain) where 
the water did not reach because here, everywhere was just water, that 
portion at the first river was cut at the ridge. The water reached there 
until here. There were just so many houses swept away.828 
Most houses in Purok Uno were hurot tanan, completely destroyed. 
Laborer families were not able to save anything and were left with nothing 
but the clothes on their backs. Women-headed households, in particular, that 
were already under extraordinary economic stress even prior to the disaster, 
were made especially vulnerable, as one Purok Uno resident attests, who 
was living in the baraks in 1991 and worked as a dishwasher in a restaurant 
in the city owned by the Larrazabals:  
																																								 																				
827 Ronald Boy (pseudonym), interview with author, 26 April 2013, Ibid.     
828 Berto, interview with author, Ibid. 
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Edna: Our house went like this, swept away! [pantomiming the 
swirling waters with her hands] So a neighbor was able to grab me, as 
I still wanted to get our rice, that was what I wanted to do because it 
was only me who supported my children. So our rice was there, our 
clothes… 
Author: So you went back? 
Edna: I wanted to go back [chuckling]. It was good my neighbor took 
hold of me. Why, she asked, will you climb back in when the house 
very nearly got swept away? The water was so strong! Sus, later 
when the roots of this bamboo tree I saw tumbling over and over 
passed by our house, a portion creaked! Half went that way the other 
half went this way! It was cut in half…[When we later went to stay with 
neighbors] my child said, mama let us go back home! Where would 
we go when we did not have a house anymore?  
Author: So your house was also completely destroyed? 
Edna: That time there, yes completely.  
Author: You were not able to save anything? Not one thing? 
Edna: None at all, none. That was really a miserable time. It was just 
me supporting my five children.  
Author: That time you already had five children? 
Edna: Yes, in 1989 my husband left me when I was eleven months 
pregnant with my youngest son who died. Eleven months when my 
husband left so I had to work.  
Author: Why did your husband leave you?  
Edna: …He wanted to work in Negros! So he never came back! He 
got himself a wife there!... 
Author: How many years had you been here before the flood? 
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Edna: We got here in ’84, July 27 we came. From ’91 how many 
years was that? Seven.  
Author: But you knew it was signal number one? 
Edna: Yes…I was not feeling well but I still worked. I was a 
dishwasher with the Larrazabals at Chito Chow that is still there 
now…Lorna [a friend] said, Edna go work as hornal but how could I 
when Ely, the capataz who is still there married to my relative back 
when he was still single and had offered me a job as hornal…one was 
paid weekly. My monthly pay at Chito Chow’s was only 516 pesos but 
I always got paid as I had five children. So I got 500 every twenty-fifth 
[of the month], which was not enough…so I would not eat any 
breakfast and lunch and dinner.  
Author: So you ate only once a day? 
Edna: Yes, I would only eat at lunchtime, which was still okay. But I 
became thin. I would eat bread. At Chito’s, when I was there I could 
not work without having coffee which was twenty aw five pesos.  
Author: Ah so it was not free at Chito’s [for employees]?  
Edna: Sud-an (viand) was free, rice was free but if the viand was 
chicken you got necks! If it was pig that was butchered it was good 
because they would even fry you some ribs, but if chicken you got 
necks…so now if there is nothing to eat, I have salt!829 
Like other Ormocanons in other parts of the city, those who lived in 
Nalunopan occasionally experienced flooding in the past, but never on the 
scale that occurred that day. Those solitary laborer families who chose to live 
outside Purok Uno in higher elevations within the hacienda and thus were 
spared from the flood, welcomed their destitute fellow laborers and their 
families who had lost homes, and they stayed with them for several weeks.   
 
																																								 																				
829Edna (pseudonym), interview with author, 28 April 2013, in her own home, Purok II-B, 
Barangay Luna, Ormoc City, original in Bisaya, transcribed and translated by author.  
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Disaster relief and the clamor for social justice 
 Relief goods arrived in Nalunopan quite late, only after several weeks. 
The rough roads into the barangay were strewn with logs and mired in muck 
and debris so there was no way to bring in food, water and relief services 
more quickly. But relief goods when they finally came were brought in by 
trucks, and then there was a belated avalanche of canned goods, sardines, 
noodles, rice, used clothes, banig (palm mat), kaldero (pot), and various 
other necessities that helped ease the traumatic effects of the disaster. The 
Catholic Church led by the Archdiocese of Palo and nuns of the Religious of 
the Sacred Heart of Jesus (RSCJ) were most active in undertaking relief 
efforts to Nalunopan. While the agalon, Sabin Larrazabal, did not provide 
material assistance to everyone on the estate who had been badly affected 
at the time, some did receive help in the aftermath of the flood, indicating the 
uneven nature of the reciprocal ties that bound the agalon to his laborers. 
When asked if the agalon gave them anything after the flood in 1991, one 
laborer replies: 	
Ronald Boy: Sabin [Larrazabal]? No. Sabin did not give anything.  
Author: None at all? 
Ronald Boy: Or maybe it was not possible to know where [the relief] 
came from as it was held by the organization, they were the ones who 
gave to the [National Federation of Sugar Workers] NFSW830 because 
they really gave.831 
 Yet another laborer reminisced: 
Rolando: We went to the city because it was the agalon who…  
Nes:832 Ah agalon gave to you? 
																																								 																				
830 The National Federation of Sugar Workers was the organized and militant labor union of 
sugarcane workers in the Philippines. It had now joined the national labor center, Kilusang 
Mayo Uno (KMU).  
831Ronald Boy, interview with the author, Ibid. 
832 Former Nalunopan resident who relocated elsewhere, but who went with me to 
Nalunopan to undertake the interviews. She was the daughter of a sugarcane estate driver 
much loved by the agalon for being a very industrious and loyal man.  
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Rolando: …[he] supported us… 
Author: He assisted you? 
Rolando: Yes. It was my amo.833 After [the flood], there was help.834 
Some sugar workers themselves were recruited to assist other 
victims, while they themselves were victims, when one politically active 
individual among them mobilized a volunteer group. A hornal who had seen 
his grandmother and their payag (hut) taken by the flood, remembers still 
helping out:  
Ronald Boy: So we ran to the NFSW… 
Author: You helped there? 
Ronald Boy: Yes. We were the one. We transferred there. Instead of 
us being helped, we helped those who had been washed out here in 
Nalunopan.  
Author: Why did you help there? Did someone ask you to help? 
Ronald Boy: Yes, here, it was Edna [referring to the de facto leader 
in Nalunopan] who asked help in distributing, so I did.835 
Operations in the katubhan836 (sugar plantation) began again a month 
after the flood. During the intervening weeks, laborers rebuilt their houses 
with valuable material support from the RSCJ nuns, who adopted Nalunopan 
as their mission area. Sister Iraida Sua-an, who was among the second 
batch from her Order sent to Ormoc, remembered seeing hungry sugarcane 
laborers and their families foraging in the mud for root crops to eat, so dire 
was their situation in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. This unfolding 
emergency prompted the RSCJ to pursue a sustained program of assistance 
																																								 																				
833 Filipino, Bisaya, lit. employer.  
834 Rolando (pseudonym), interview with author, 22 April 2013, in Ronald Boy’s home, 
Barangay Nalunopan, Ormoc City, original in Bisaya, transcribed and translated by author.  
835 Ronald Boy (pseudonym), interview with author, Ibid. 
836 Bisaya, lit. sugarcane plantation. Ronald Boy replied when asked if he immediately went 
back to work in November 1991: “It took time. We did not go back to work for a month after 
the flood. We fixed our houses first.”  
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to Nalunopan flood victims.837 Like other devastated areas in Ormoc at that 
time, a food-for-work program was launched to encourage active self-help 
among them. Women hauled gravel and other building materials, while men 
worked on rebuilding their houses. As wages, thirty-six households received 
rice, tinapa (smoked fish), and noodles for six months.  
In the beginning, Sabin Larrazabal allowed the nuns to build houses 
with asbestos roofing and bamboo slat walls, far better houses than the 
families had ever had before. The nuns also began to organize the 
community through Catholic values formation programs. In the course of 
their work in Nalunopan, it was inevitable that issues pertaining to wages 
were raised. However, the plantation management swiftly suppressed them. 
Edna, who was identified as the leader of the group demanding higher 
wages, was driven out in 1998, as she recounts below: 
…We went to Sister [Iraida Sua-an] first because they gave 
[Christmas gifts] early that time…Sister gave 300 [pesos] but said 
before giving, this Sunday, Edna—there was a mass there and I was 
a choir member…this Sunday Edna tell those who want to pay for 
land by instalment, it should be clear that it is payment by instalment 
[and] not given, as these people only watched out for giveaways. It 
should be made clear, that those who want to pay for land by 
instalment can do so, if we can buy [land] should there be enough 
signatures and if we can find some help in buying then we will buy. So 
when the mass ended there was a meeting…Now it was because I 
had been so active that I very nearly got killed because I started going 
house to house to tell people that Saturday…so I told them whoever 
wanted to pay for land by instalment but I made it clear it is payment 
by instalment but that it will take time, about several years, and it will 
not be given for free but it will be cheap.  
																																								 																				
837 Sr. Iraida Sua-an, informal conversations with author, February to October 2013, in 
Ormoc City. She said that one day while walking in a devastated area in the sugar estate 
after the 1991 tragedy, a voice she attributed to God came to her suddenly telling her this 
community was her vocation. An Ilonggo native, she devoted the next twenty years of her 
life to building the community discussed in Chapter 8.  
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Who would not like to have a 100-square meter [lot] that is cheap? So 
they signed. Sus I was not even done with the signatures, this Dencio 
went to the office of the Larrazabal’s, the report…was that I was 
asking people to sign for higher wages. They called me in that 
afternoon…We met that Boy Hapon, his name was Boy Hapon, the 
assistant of this Caloy Larrazabal. He said, Mi [referring to her 
husband] it is good we saw each other, come ride with us because 
agalon, no it is Caloy calling for you at his office. I said, could I go with 
you, Mi? Boy said you want to tag along? What are you, bringing a 
pig? Indeed. It was really lucky, you know why? It was me they 
wanted…it was lucky they took my husband. When my husband came 
home, I said—he was very quick…I said what did they want? He said 
let us talk about it at home. Finish your shopping quickly.  
When we went to the market, [we were so quick] we were like 
thieves…So when we got back home…I put down my purchases, he 
said, what gives you such nerve,838 Day? I said is that so?...Why did I 
have the nerve?...It was that Caloy, our agawon, told him, why are 
you here when it is not you I wanted? It is your wife Edna I want. Why 
is she asking people to sign for higher wages? Now…where is Edna, 
he was asked. At the market, Loy, shopping. He suddenly went out to 
the back of their building! So he said I will not go to Isabel just yet and 
I must go to the office, as I had wanted to go to Isabel that Tuesday 
morning. I had to go to the office.  
That was the beginning sus! But it was very lucky of me because [my 
husband] was very close to Caloy…My husband, the old one,839 when 
he was still small his parents already served the Larrazabals….For 
example, if he did not want to drive for them? They could not do 
anything because they came from way back. So that was why that 
evening he asked me what gave me the nerve. I told him why not, 
when working with the…non-government [organization] mandated 
																																								 																				
838 The term used was kaisog, which in Bisaya can mean bravery, courage, guts or nerve. In 
this instance, it was meant as an irony, so the appropriate translation would be ‘nerve.’ 
839 Edna constantly refers to her third husband as tiguwang, old, to differentiate him with her 
two other husbands. 
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it…I organized, I gave lectures…So that was when he said work was 
so difficult now. I had to go to Caloy on Tuesday morning. You work 
for a living with the Larrazabals, we are poor, it only takes one flick of 
the hand [and] you can just be [killed].840 
There were no killings in Nalunopan, fortunately, but at least three 
families were expelled from the hacienda for fomenting dissatisfaction among 
the laborers about their wages.841 
Inherent vulnerability and poverty as norms 
Twenty-two years after the flash flood of 1991, by 2013, life for victim-
survivors in the hacienda had stabilized. There were still no footbridges 
inside the estate, so one had to cross the Malinawon Creek twice, balancing 
unsteadily on rocks. The creek in this area is muddy from years of use by 
Purok Uno residents who typically still did not have sanitary toilets. Purok 
Uno itself is a small settlement of ten houses located on a plateau next to the 
Malinawon Creek. The other laborer houses were scattered throughout the 
barangay. In the middle of this narrow plateau is an open space used by 
teenage boys for volleyball and arrayed around it were houses made of nipa, 
bamboo, and occasionally hollow blocks. Commonly, the houses’ floors were 
dirt, and children of all ages would run in and out barefoot. There were two 
sari-sari842 stores, which were also the source of the community’s music, ear-
splittingly blared from loud speakers. The stores had pawod lean-tos where 
groups of men and women sometimes whiled away time drinking tuba 
(fermented palm sap) and/or playing bingo. Gambling was a prevalent 
pastime, as was drinking tuba, popular among both men and women. Tuba 
was not cheap. It was about 100 pesos per gallon,843 but according to many, 
																																								 																				
840 Edna (pseudonym), interview with author, 28 April 2013, Ibid.  
841 Caloy Larrazabal, a son of the patriarch Sabin Larrazabal, who had a reputation for being 
harsh with his workers, was killed in 1996, shot at close range in one of the estates that the 
family owned. Allegations were that the NPA did it, but rumours abounded it was a personal 
business deal gone wrong. The case remains open until today.  
842 Filipino, lit. a small merchandise store often operating on loan from its customers and 
selling a variety of snacks and other foodstuff.  
843 This price was valid in 2013. But after the devastation of Super Typhoon Yolanda 
(Haiyan) in November 2013, where numerous coconut trees were uprooted, the price 
skyrocketed to 200 pesos per gallon.  
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its consumption lightened the hardship of the day and was considered a 
good way to unwind with friends.  
There was a popular illegal gambling game called Swetres, which 
operated similarly to the illegal numbers game called jueteng.844 There were 
some households with television sets, but not everyone had electricity. At 
night, it was more common to use rudimentary gaseras, or gas lamps. 
Wandering about were gaggles of ducks, geese and chickens left to roam 
free. An occasional piglet would be tied under a tree, but raising hogs was 
forbidden for sanitary reasons. A few yards away was a communal poso 
(artesian well), where residents took baths in plain view of anyone passing 
by, did laundry, and gathered water for drinking and cooking. Nearby was the 
baraks where four families lived, a long rectangular structure hugging the 
side of a cliff, with cemented piles and pillars, a corrugated iron roof and 
bamboo slats for walls. The baraks is only meant for seasonal workers, who 
theoretically left after harvest time. But in reality most of the families stay 
indefinitely, as the plantation offered more or less permanent work. While the 
baraks was housing owned by the hacienda, the majority of workers lived in 
houses they had built themselves. Like the urban poor resettlement areas in 
Barangay Tambulilid, living on the estate is rent-free. But unlike Tambulilid, 
most Nalunopan residents had access to free and abundant flowing water 
and, for workers, one could choose where to build a house.  
The workers’ community gathered in Purok Uno was small and close-
knit, one that knew everyone’s business. It was an open secret, for example, 
that Berto, a thirty-nine year old manunubo845 who was burnt brown by the 
sun, had contracted hepatitis B years after the flood, most probably from sex 
workers. Or that one of Berto’s sisters had foolishly dropped her American 
boyfriend who had provided her with an apartment in the city only to elope 
with her penniless Filipino lover. Everyone knew that some women in the 
past worked here as burikat (sex worker), charging low fees affordable to the 
daily wage earner. Everyone also was aware which families were customarily 
																																								 																				
844 Jueteng is an illegal numbers game in the provinces, where a kubrador (“banker”) 
collects bets from bettors who choose two numbers from 1 to 37.  
845 Filipino and Bisaya, generic lit. sugarcane worker.  
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so poor they did not often have anything to eat with their rice except salt. 
Typical of these small communities, drunken brawls, too, were common, 
which were blamed on “outsiders.” According to the barangay captain,    
Barangay Captain Fruto Velardo: In Purok Uno, they are not really 
from here. But the others had already registered here.  
Author: As voters? 
Velardo: Yes. They are from [Barangays] Villaba, Matag-ob…most of 
them are illiterate. When they get drunk, they go amok.846 
 It was this stigma of ill repute that not only delineated laborer families 
as outsiders in the barangay, but also discouraged some hornals from 
building their houses in the vicinity. Some of them instead opted to live 
further inland, where it was not samok or gubot (disorderly or unruly).847 But 
the decision to live away from Purok Uno meant partial isolation from the 
only community that shared laborers’ values, social situation, and 
aspirations. Workers were mostly free to live on the estate wherever they 
liked, which was not physically demarcated by a fence and gave the 
impression of vast open space and freedom. There was no manor house for 
the landowner family and no armed patrols to keep laborers confined on the 
estate and outsiders out of it. One could move about freely, and outsiders did 
visit friends and relatives often, without fear of being accosted. There was 
just the land, hundreds of hectares of it, fertile and verdant, planted with a 
variety of fruit trees and where rows of sugarcane had been cultivated on the 
topmost plateau for decades. In fact, it was common practice for former 
residents to go back to Nalunopan occasionally to harvest bananas and 
other fruits from trees they had planted years ago with their own hands. 
These, they reasoned, were their trees, and not owned by the plantation 
estate.  
																																								 																				
846 Barangay Captain Fruto Velardo (pseudonym), interview with author, 28 May 2013, in his 
own home, Barangay Nalunopan, Ormoc City, original in Filipino, transcribed and translated 
by author.  
847 Bisaya, lit. both samok and gubot mean disorderly, unruly. Roman, Bebeng and Tenang 
(pseudonyms), simultaneous interviews with author, 19 May 2013, in Ormoc City, original in 
Bisaya, on why they decided to live at the other side of the hacienda where there was no 
electricity and not in Purok Uno, transcribed and translated by author: Tenang: “There’s no 
unruliness here.” Bebeng: There it is disorderly, topsy-turvy.”   
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The daily wage in the plantation estate in 2013 for a hornal was 
seventy pesos per day for six days of work a week. The Department of Labor 
and Employment (DOLE) had mandated, as of 16 October 2012, that the 
minimum daily wage in Region VIII, where Ormoc was politically part, was 
235 pesos to 241 pesos for plantations and 220.50 pesos for non-
plantations.848 But despite the legislation, the regulation of agricultural 
estates like sugarcane haciendas had not been strongly enforced by the 
government. In Ormoc, current daily wages in haciendas remained below the 
minimum rate authorized by the government, with wages in Nalunopan the 
most dismal compared with other haciendas that paid between eighty to 120 
pesos per day.  
In 1991, the daily wage of hornals in Nalunopan was fifteen pesos, 
which was, even then, not enough for food, as some narrate:  
Bebeng: Commodities were expensive… 
Author: Yes before the flood (in 1991) how many times in a day did 
you eat? 
Bebeng: Oh we ate twice (a day).  
Author: So it is better now, your life is better now because you are 
able to eat three times a day? 
Tenang: Twice, with breakfast at eleven o’clock.  
Author: Yes that is right, then the next meal is at four o’clock? 
Tenang: Four o’clock, six o’clock for dinner! Only two meals!  
Author: What if you became hungry? 
Tenang: We eat guava leaves!  
Bebeng: We do not get hungry anymore because it will only get 
worse.  
																																								 																				
848 Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), “Summary of current regional daily 
minimum wage rates, Agriculture, Non-Agriculture (in pesos),” as of April 2014, National 
Wages and Productivity Commission (Online).  
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Tenang: We could not change anything. We would be very hungry as 
it is.  
Author: And you, Mang Roman? Before the flood, how many times 
did you have meals? 
Roman: Only twice… 
Tenang: Around seven o’clock because there is nothing to eat, only 
water. Hunger only comes early the next morning!  
Nita: Coffee. 
Tenang: Yes we have coffee.849 
Another hornal argues:  
Berto: …Before when the flood did not yet occur, [wages were] 
enough though we were miserably poor, the wages were paltry, they 
were so small! Wage in ’91, wage in the hacienda, was fifteen pesos.  
Perlita: Per day. 
Berto: Per day in the hacienda, now wage is seventy pesos but you 
cannot say that it is better because it is below the per kilo of our 
commodities as wage is seventy pesos. When per week, one kilo of 
rice is thirty-two pesos! It is the same as before! [The prices of] 
commodities continue to increase!850 
Yet hornal work was a sure way of earning a steady income of 
seventy pesos a day. A sugar plantation estate thus absorbed labor at a 
steady rate over the years from among the poorest families without other 
options for employment. Work on the hacienda was open to children and 
adults, men and women alike, who were all paid seventy pesos without 
exception. In fact, child labor was prevalent in Nalunopan, as in other 
																																								 																				
849 Roman, Bebeng and Tenang (pseudonyms), simultaneous interviews with author, 19 
May 2013, in front of a sari-sari store, Barangay Nalunopan, Ormoc City, original in Bisaya, 
translated by Ate Nita and Nang Perlita during the interview, when asked how many times in 
a day they ate before the 1991 flood.  
850 Berto (pseudonym), interview with author, Ibid.  
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sugarcane districts in Ormoc, because children, “do not want to study 
anymore! They already want to work.”851 The additional income that children 
earn helped supplement their family needs, and in many cases, documented 
to be strongly influenced by the children’s desire to use their earnings to 
save for educational purposes.852 The pakyaw system, on the other hand, 
provided slightly higher wages for laborers, and as such was the preferred 
manner of work by laborers themselves.853 During harvest season, money 
was abundant and thus, was a time of real celebration for the laborer 
community with drinking binges and engagement in gambling activities. 
Indeed, the prevalence of vices among estate laborers was a recognized 
drain on family finances, as this statement from a former hornal shows:  
Four hundred ninety for one week! You want to bet, what about if 
there were children and accompanied by drink, [the costs are] just too 
much. What are you going to eat in a week? Four hundred ninety, my 
God!854 
The lack of savings and avenues for credit resulted in a persistent 
critical level of vulnerability for laborers in Barangay Nalunopan. Their 
																																								 																				
851 Nita (pseudonym), informal conversation with author, 19 May 2013, in Ormoc City, 
original in Filipino. Also see de Boer, Sweet Hazards, Child labor on sugarcane plantations 
in the Philippines.  
852 De Boer, Ibid. 
853 Lorna, Myrna, Nita and Perlita (pseudonyms), simultaneous interviews with author, 19 
May 2013, in Lorna’s home, Barangay Nslunopan, Ormoc City, original in mixed Bisaya and 
Filipino, on the different piecework jobs paid for in the sugarcane estate: [Author: When you 
harvest tubo (sugarcane) the wages are higher?] Myrna: It depends. Lorna: It depends. 
More than a thousand. Nita: For the others, it will reach thousands. Lorna: More. Ate Nita: 
Yes, that’s big.[Author: Because it’s pakyaw?] Lorna: Yes pakyaw. [Author: So how much?] 
Myrna: Per truck. Lorna: Per tonnage similar to pakyaw before because if now you cannot 
load you do not have anything! [Author: How much is that?] Myrna: If you are industrious it’s-  
Nita: It depends on the truck. If there are many that can be loaded in the sugarcane truck, 
your pay is big! Myrna: The lowest for tubo [Nita: I would know that because that was my 
father’s work] maybe the lowest for tubo is 500. [Author: 500 per day?] Nita: Their wage in a 
week. That’s the lowest…Perlita: For ten of them. [Author: The 500 is per person?] Ate Nita: 
That’s net [malinis na yun]…[Author: That is only for the harvest, right? What about if not 
harvest, you go back to guna? (referring to clearing land)] Lorna: Ohm! Nita: Yes! That is the 
70 pesos. Myrna: 70 per day and the others pakyawan [Lorna: It is even (tabla)] one camp. 
Tabla (it is even), there is twenty, there is ten. It is not the same. Myrna: One camp they 
pakyaw it. [Author: Who decides what will be done through pakyaw or per day?] Woman 
neighbor: The inspector.     
854 Myrna (pseudonym), interview with author, 19 May 2013, in her mother Lorna’s home, 
Barangay Nalunopan, Ormoc City, original in Filipino, transcribed and translated by author. 
She had moved to Manila to marry and work, but was in Barangay Nalunopan at the time of 
the interview to visit her mother.  
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families were not prepared, economically speaking, for major disasters, a 
situation aggravated by the lack of medical and health benefits, as well as 
the lack of credit. A hornal responded, for example, when asked what they 
could do and where they could procure funds during emergency situations:  
Berto: If someone gets sick, no one will extend credit to us but if we 
get a large sum of money from our wages it is just enough for our 
food.  
Author: So what happens then? 
Berto: That is it ma’am. Usually if someone gets sick we use only 
herbal [medicines], what we traditionally used.  
Delia (his wife): Medicol.855 
Berto: Because even if we run to the hospital we would not be 
accepted as we do not have any money.856 
It was somewhat better for drivers on the estate because they at least 
could go to the agalon for an advance, which the management “deducted 
[from their wages] every week, for every 1000 [pesos] they deduct 200 
[pesos] every week.”857 
In this socio-economic system where chronic vulnerability was the 
norm, the power of the hacendero in Nalunopan continued to be absolute. 
The barangay sanggunian,858 for example, cannot be elected without the 
blessing of the landowner. In fact, in the last midterm general elections in 
May 2013, the Larrazabal family, who explicitly supported a group of political 
aspirants, dictated the votes of Barangay Nalunopan residents. The 
government’s legitimacy signified through the role of the barangay 
sanggunian, despite its clear legal mandate to side with the people was 
																																								 																				
855 A local brand of paracetamol. 
856 Berto and Delia, interview with author, 14 April 2013, in their own home, original in 
Bisaya, translated to Filipino by Sr. Iraida Sua-an during the interview, transcribed and 
translated to English by author.  
857Ronald Boy (pseudonym), interview with author, 21 April 2013, Ibid. 
858 Barangay advisory council, which is the lowest elected government in the Philippines. It is 
composed of the punong barangay or the chief executive of the barangay government as 
presiding officer and seven regular sangguniang barangay members and a youth 
representative, who is called the sangguniang barangay chair, as members.  
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always greatly diminished and subordinated to the interests of the 
landowner. The Larrazabals had historically controlled the land, labor and 
lives of many ordinary individuals who depended on them for their livelihoods 
and subsistence.  
The government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), 
had attempted to break the power of such landowners through the 
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), an 
ambitious redistribution program of public and private agricultural lands to 
landless farmers and farmworkers, “irrespective of tenurial arrangement.”859 
Nonetheless, most of the disputes between farmers and landowners in 
Ormoc had been fought in court, with the former often on the losing side for 
lack of legal title for possession of land.860 Isolated cases of forcible 
occupation of estates by tenant farmers in Ormoc had also occurred,861 while 
agrarian reform had been pursued to a certain degree.862 From 1991 after 
the flood disaster to 2013, for example, 171 agrarian reform beneficiaries 
(ARBs) in Ormoc had been awarded emancipation patents or titles to rice 
and corn land863 covering 307.5 square meters, while 4,566 ARBs had been 
awarded certificates of land ownership (CLOAs) covering 8,217 square 
																																								 																				
859 Department of Agrarian Reform, “What is CARP (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform 
Program), or RA 6657?” (Online)  
860 For example in 1996, in Barangay Milagro, an upland barangay in Ormoc City, some sixty 
families petitioned the City Environment and Natural Resources office (CENRO) to 
determine why an alleged public land they had been tilling was being claimed by Melchor 
Larrazabal. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) upheld 
Larrazabal’s claim as legal, even though the disputed land was part of the 4,000-hectare 
Anilao watershed. E. Justimbaste, “Farmers, landowners fight over hilly Ormoc farms,” 
Philippine News and Features Vol 12 No 32, 27 January 1996, 14.   
861 See, for example, L. Jimenea, “41 beneficiaries of CARP forcibly occupy Ormoc farm,” 
Philippine Daily Inquirer, 26 December 1999, 10; L. Jimenea, “War of beneficiaries: Tension 
grips Ormoc land put under CARP,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 26 February 2000, 12. 
862 See, for example, L. Jimenea, “41 beneficiaries of CARP forcibly occupy Ormoc farm.” In 
other parts of the Philippines, the issue of agrarian reform has been extensively covered in 
past studies. See J. Putzel, Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines 
(Ateneo de Manila University Press, co-published by Catholic Institute for International 
Relations (London) and Monthly Review Press (New York), 1992). 
863 An emancipation title is issued following the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 27 
dated 21 October 1972, “Decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the 
soil, transferring to them the ownership of the land they till and providing the instruments and 
mechanism therefor.” The awarding of the emancipation patent to a tenant farmer was for a 
“portion constituting a family-size farm of five hectares if not irrigated and three hectares if 
irrigated.” The landowner, on the other hand, “may retain an area of not more than seven 
hectares if such landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it.”  
251	|	F L O O D W A T E R S 	 O F 	 D E A T H 	
	
meters.864 In Nalunopan, twenty-two ARBs have been awarded CLOAs from 
1991 to 2013 covering thirty-nine hectares.865 None of these land awards, 
however, were sugarlands. Certainly, like other sugarcane landowners in 
other parts of the country who had “employed every means available to them 
to prevent the implementation of agrarian reform,”866 large sugar landowners 
in Ormoc like the Larrazabals, Seraficas, and Tans had resisted attempts at 
dividing large tracts of their sugarlands, arguing in 1996 that, 
(1)…it is not economically feasible and sound to divide sugarlands 
into small farmlots for distribution to supposed beneficiaries; (2) that 
DAR must respect the status quo existing between the farmworkers 
and the landowners-planters and the contract of agreement which 
they have executed which proved to be effective in establishing and 
maintaining a peaceful and harmonious existence between them; and 
(3) that DAR create the support service offices and facilities for the 
benefit of the supposed beneficiaries and the landowners-planters.867 
The land of barangay Nalunopan, which had been predominantly used 
for sugarcane cultivation but which had never been placed under agrarian 
																																								 																				
864 Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)-Region VIII, “Summary of Land Acquisition and 
Distribution (LAD) Accomplishment in Ormoc City, after November 15, 1991,” as of 2013.   
865 Ibid. 
866 “CARP no threat to sugar industry, says DAR,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 18 February 
2000, 16. In two case studies undertaken on land reform and changes in land ownership 
concentration in Nueva Ecija Province on two villages with two different rice farming 
environments, the conclusion is reflective of the difficulties to enforce reform: “Land reform 
has provided to tenants and succeeded in breaking up huge estates but the program has 
failed to effectively address land ownership concentration. The original landowners with their 
relatives still own a significant portion of the agricultural area in these villagegs. This 
occurred not because of transfer actions of beneficiaries in the land market but because of a 
flawed land redistribution program. In particular, the evasion tactics of landlords have been 
ignored and in several cases have been recorded as accomplishment of the program. The 
various schemes of landlords to evade land reform have prevented real land redistribution to 
take place in the country” (emphasis supplied), in M. Ballesteros and A. dela Cruz, “Land 
reform and changes in land ownership concentration: Evidence from rice-growing villages in 
the Philippines,” Discussion Paper Series No. 2006-21 (Makati City: Philippine Institute for 
Development Studies, December 2006), 16 (Online).  
867 Letter from Lorenzo Reyes (OIC-Undersecretary, LAFMA) addressed to Adelberto 
Banigued (DAR Region VIII Director), on “Position paper on the CARP coverage of 
sugarlands within the Ormoc Sugar Mill District,” DAR Opinion No. 127-96, dated 13 
December 1996 (Online).  
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reform, was recently scheduled for conversion to industrial/residential lots, 
making it legally ineligible for DAR land acquisition and reform.868 
Changes since 1991 
 The flood disaster in 1991 did not radically change the socio-
economic conditions of sugar workers in Nalunopan. What it did, however, 
was focus attention on the grim plight of laborer survivors in the barangay, to 
which the Catholic Church and the RSCJ responded to by pursuing a 
recovery program of resettlement. To what extent change occurred in the 
lives of those who chose to leave the sugar estate and relocate elsewhere is 
explored in the next chapter. But for those who opted to remain on the estate 
as laborers, including those who briefly left but returned when lack of 
employment outside the estate became acute, the disaster did not result in 
any meaningful change in their socio-economic circumstances. The 
discussion below reveals the rather hopeless view typical among these sugar 
workers who were victims of the 1991 flood and continued to endure severe 
practical problems and deprivation in their daily lives:  
Berto: For me Sister [referring to Sister Iraida Sua-an, who was also 
present during this interview] in my opinion we tilled the field like 
before.  
Author: Nothing changed? 
Delia (his wife): None.  
Author: Why is that? 
Berto: What is it that would change here ma’am when the quality of 
life here is not good for us?...For me what is good now is to have our 
own land because…it is not the same as before when we were still 
small we were limited to work. Better to work than go to school so we 
could help our parents…I have not seen anyone improve, I have not 
																																								 																				
868 Informal conversation with municipal agrarian reform officers (MAROs), 9 October 2013, 
in Ormoc City. 
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seen anyone crawl out of poverty. Maybe it depends on oneself, one 
must endeavor now if one is not yet working hard.869 
Yet, today, Barangay Nalunopan is increasingly adopting a plantation-
type operation, becoming a hybrid-like hacienda, keeping only those 
elements beneficial to the landowner and his family, while also adopting the 
more commercial and less personalistic qualities typical of plantations and 
agribusiness. The issue of credit during emergency situations, for example, 
which had been historically a responsibility assumed by the hacendero as 
agalon to his workers, is the most glaring shift in the manner of operations in 
haciendas today. According to one hornal, 
[We have to] work to have money…I got sick before but if there is no 
work there is no one else to help us. I at least have the support of my 
son. If he gets sick I will work but I do all the work. My situation is very 
difficult, if I get sick I will not be able to work at all.870 
Living in the hacienda was also a privilege that could be withdrawn by 
the agalon. If a family did not contribute at least one able-bodied man, 
woman or child to work in the katubhan, a bulldozer was dispatched to raze 
the house, sending a stern message to the rest of the labor community that, 
“The land is theirs but if you don’t work on the land they will drive you 
away.”871 The barangay captain of Nalunopan, however, denied this policy of 
forcibly evicting families who don’t work in the katubhan: 
Barangay Captain Fruto Velardo: No that is not true at all.  
Author: That was what people in Purok Uno said. That is not true? 
Velardo: No…if you live in their baraks, of course. If it was your house 
and land and they live there but go to another to work, of course 
anyone will get angry…Why then in our case here in the barangay 
																																								 																				
869 Berto and Delia (pseudonyms, husband and wife), simultaneous interviews with author, 
14 April 2013, Ibid. 
870 Roy (pseudonym), interview with author, 21 April 2014, in his own home, Barangay 
Nalunopan, Ormoc City, original in mixed Filipino and Bisaya, when asked if he had ever 
experienced being ill and unable to work, transcribed and translated by author. 
871 Tasing (pseudonym), interview with author, 21 April 2013, in her father Crispin’s own 
home, Barangay Nalunopan, Ormoc City, original in mixed Filipino and Bisaya, transcribed 
and translated by author.  
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proper this is also the Larrazabals? No one here is forced to work in 
the hacienda.  
Author: Perhaps that is the case in the barrio.  
Velardo: In Purok Uno, majority of those in Purok Uno, the houses 
are the hacienda’s and they live there. The land is also the 
hacienda’s. Of course whoever it is, if you need people and those 
people who live in your house, in your land, go to someone else to 
work, it is not good.  
Author: So how are newcomers controlled—for example I am a 
newcomer and I want to live in Nalunopan, will I be able to enter just 
like that? 
Velardo: Yes of course, but we have already dealt with this because 
you can know how a person acts. In Purok Uno if there is someone 
who does not act appropriately of course I call him to come to the 
barangay…or I get a barangay clearance for him to know where he 
came from and a certification to know if he is all right.  
Author: Okay. So you are the one who controls this?  
Velardo: Of course that is my responsibility.  
Author: It is because I was thinking…how is it controlled that 
someone cannot just come in and build a house? It is because if a 
house is already erected it would be difficult to evict him, right? 
Velardo: Oh yes.  
Author: So if you were the hacendero how will you control this? 
Velardo: They ask permission…from the owner and I have them 
investigated from where they came from, what…their purpose is why 
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they were erecting a house. And then we ask permission from the 
owner of the land.872 
Yet, during the fieldwork period in February to October 2013, Tasing’s 
house was bulldozed one afternoon in July 2013. Her family did not live in 
the baraks but in a house they had built on their own. Neighbors had pitched 
in to save her meagre possessions, as the family was not present that fateful 
afternoon, while another neighbor, who worked as a sugarcane driver, 
operated the bulldozer under instructions from the hacienda management. 
Tasing came home after doing laundry work in the city to find her school-age 
children standing shell-shocked in front of the rubble where their house had 
been just that morning. No one in Tasing’s family had worked in the 
katubhan for the past two years, including her husband who had suffered a 
stroke and could no longer work. They had been warned the previous year to 
leave, or send someone to work in the estate to ensure continued residence 
in the vicinity. 
Sugarcane was the sole agricultural produce in Nalunopan, but 
cultivated on such a small scale that it did not entail huge investments in 
technology. Here, the laborers still manually cleared the land for planting and 
harvesting, while drivers who were paid on a pakyaw or piecework basis 
operated rudimentary modes of transport and equipment. The hornals, 
however, were paid a daily wage, which they received every Saturday at the 
agalon’s office in the city. The shift towards a less personalistic relationship 
between the estate and its workers occur as the old hacienda system is 
increasingly relinquished to a younger generation of the Larrazabal family, 
who were not inclined to cultivate the same personal ties with workers as 
their aging family patriarch, who was buotan,873 had once done. The next 
generation landowner was considered more and more an absentee 
agalon,874 and the estate was no longer willing to respond to the immediate 
social needs of laborers, especially in terms of extending credit. Indeed, the 
																																								 																				
872 Barangay captain Fruto Velardo (pseudonym), interview with author, Ibid., original in 
Filipino, when asked to comment on the statement that a resident in Barangay Nalunopan 
had to also work in the katubhan, transcribed and translated by author. 
873 Bisaya,lit. a good fellow. 
874 Bisaya,lit. boss, master.  
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provision of loans to laborers had been shown to be notoriously costly as far 
back as the 1920s, with some landowners reporting annual losses ranging 
from fifteen to twenty per cent of the money advanced to laborers.875 
Sugarcane laborers simply failed to comply with their agreements and the 
government provided no means for landowners to obtain redress. Thus, in 
efforts to ensure continued operations, and coinciding with the gradual 
relinquishing of daily responsibilities by the original agalon, the hacienda in 
Nalunopan had been transformed into a far more impersonal agricultural 
corporation. Direct operations were slowly assumed by members of the 
landowning family assigned to supervise capatazes or inspectors, persons 
among the workers handpicked by management to organize labor, especially 
during the harvest and planting seasons. This shift in style and governance, 
however, did not come about because of the flood. It was market-driven, 
responding to the economic need to rationalize and streamline production 
costs. In the end, the consequence was to remove the past aura of 
paternalism that had characterized traditional relationship between the 
laborer and landowner. What was replaced in its stead was the harsher view 
of labor strictly as a commodity with limited rights. However, the control of 
labor mobility continued to be feudal in many respects, in particular in 
preventing laborers from moving from one hacienda to another in search of 
better wages and benefits, as one hornal explained:  
Berto: It is the same as before ma’am in transferring for work. When 
you do not have any other abilities, the regulations are the same.  
Delia (his wife): It is the same work in the katubhan as before, right?  
Berto: The story here is the same wherever you transfer… 
Author: So for example at Serafica876 the regulations are the same?  
Berto: It is more advantageous at Serafica’s because they have SS 
[referring to the Social Security System] Sister, yes. They are obliged 
																																								 																				
875 Handbook of the Philippine Sugar Industry 2nd Edition (Philippines: Sugar News Press 
Company 1929), 15 
876 A hacendero in Ormoc City. See Chapter 3. 
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to medicate workers because they have workers’ health benefits, here 
there is no SS [social security].  
Author: You do not have SSS, but in Serafica they have? 
Sister Iraida Sua-an: Oh yes.  
Berto: The Seraficas, Tans.  
Sister Iraida: That is why it is only…they are not permanent… 
Author: Pakyaw.  
Sister Iraida: Yes they are pakyaw.  
Author: But for example you learned that at Serafica’s there is SSS, 
can you transfer there? 
Delia: Oh if they accept us!  
Berto: There is no benefit to it ma’am. It is not possible to transfer 
haciendas so often because we even left but it was in the past and 
nothing happened…Once you live here and did no work, you will be 
expelled!  
Author: Why? 
Berto: …Even if the work is tiring and enormous, I will just work.877 
 Landowners typically did not accept transferees from other haciendas 
in the vicinity, as a mutually beneficial tactic to preserve collective order and 
discipline, and to discourage just the situation of laborers demanding more 
and better wages and benefits.  
Recently, plans are allegedly underway to establish a large fighting 
cock farm in Barangay Nalunopan, which will affect a substantial portion of 
Purok Uno. Residents there will have their houses bulldozed, those they had 
built using their own money, to make way for grasslands and housing for 
																																								 																				
877 Berto and Delia (pseudonyms), interview with author, Ibid., original in Bisaya, when 
asked if it was possible to transfer to another tubuhan (sugarcane estate). Sister Ayds Sua-
an was present during this interview. 
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fighting cocks.878 The sugarcane fields will also be eventually converted into 
a private housing subdivision, as the Larrazabals enter the more profitable 
business sector of real estate development. However, the sugar workers of 
Nalunopan and their families will still be able to work for seventy pesos per 
day, so long as their health allows them to do so. They will still be able to live 
rent-free in other uninhabited areas of the estate, but they will have to start 
all over again. They will have to construct yet another batch of makeshift 
houses and recover from yet another tragedy, this time the increasing 
problem of economic uncertainty as market forces continue to fluctuate with 
respect to sugar and the surplus value of their labor must be continually 
rationalized. In the end, when the hacienda finally decides to shut down, and 
it will close down to make way for lucrative private housing projects, the 
laborers and their families will have to move yet again and put up their house 
on a piece of land that will become ever smaller, until the hacienda will not 






















878 Informal conversations with Purok Uno residents, 2013.  





A CATHOLIC CHURCH RESPONSE  
 
Maybe it was God’s will that we came here as we would not have been able to find 
another job if we had stayed there. My children would not have been able to go to 
school; they would have started working. 
- Teresita (pseudonym), interview with author, 29 May 2013, in her own home, Purok II-B, 
Barangay Luna, original in mixed Bisaya and Filipino, transcribed and translated by the 
author 
This is home. 
- Informal conversations with Sr. Iraida Sua-an, RSCJ, in Purok II-B, Barangay 
Luna 2013, original in Filipino, translated by author. 
 
 In the Philippines, Catholic Churches have played a crucial role in the 
aftermath of disasters. In times of major calamities such as floods, volcanic 
eruptions and earthquakes, Churches have historically provided not only 
material, but also more importantly spiritual and psychological assistance to 
affected communities. Yet, despite this rich history, there persists a lack of 
knowledge about how exactly they have helped communities recover from 
catastrophic events brought about by natural hazards. It also remains 
unclear how communities themselves, as well as local and national 
governments have harnessed such help in the past. Nonetheless, this lack in 
systematic studies on the role of religions and religious organizations—in 
particular the Catholic Church—in the aftermath of catastrophic floods, 
earthquakes and the like is not unique to the Philippines. 
Disaster studies in general have tended to disregard the influence of 
religion, largely due to the inherent secular bias of Western scholarly 
thought.879 However, increasing media coverage of the active involvement of 
																																								 																				
879 T. Chen, “Religious NGO approaches to post-disaster housing reconstruction in Sri 
Lanka,” Abstract for PhD diss. Faculty of Architecture, Building and Planning, University of 
Melbourne (2014); “Introduction,” Hazard Risk Resilience Vol. 1 No. 2 (Institute of Hazard, 
Risk and Resilience, Durham University, Spring 2013), 11-17; “Salvage and salvation: 
religion, disaster relief and reconstruction in Asia,” Abstracts, 22-23 November 2012, Asia 
Research Institute, National University of Singapore; M. Ensor, “Disaster evangelism: 
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various religious organizations after disaster events has placed these 
institutions under closer public scrutiny in recent decades. At the core of 
scholarly and policy concerns is the question of how religion and religious 
organizations espousing particular beliefs influence how people cope with 
disasters, both in the short- and long-term periods. A common view is that 
religious beliefs do impose specific value systems that determine how 
affected communities act. For example, in post-tsunami Aceh in 2004, the 
imposition of stricter Shariah law was due in part to the belief that the 
tsunami was punishment for Aceh’s moral transgressions, particularly its 
womenfolk.880 In a study of post-Hurricane Mitch in Honduras in 1998, it was 
argued that religion not only shaped how people interpreted and coped with 
disasters, but also how it influenced disaster preparedness, mitigation and 
recovery.881 Again in Fiji after Hurricane Nigel in 1997, Christians reported 
receiving higher levels of spiritual, physical and financial assistance 
compared with Muslims and Hindus, with more Christians rating this 
assistance as adequate.882 Finally, in discourses on vulnerability, mitigation 
and adaptation, a study involving communities with multi-religious affiliations 
in Indonesia (i.e., Catholic, Muslim, Protestant, Hindu, and Buddhist) 
concluded that the more religious these individuals were in a community, the 
less likely that adaptive measures will be implemented.883 This inverse 
relationship between religiosity and disaster adaptation was argued to be 
due to fatalistic attitudes and beliefs about disasters as propounded by 
religious teachings.884 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 											
Religion as a catalyst for change in post-Mitch Honduras,” International Journal of Mass 
Emergencies and Disasters Vol. 21 No. 2 (August 2003), 31-49; and, A. Reale, “Acts of 
God(s): the role of religion in disaster risk reduction,” Humanitarian Exchange Magazine 48 
(October 2010) (Online).  
880For example, M.T. Milallos, “Muslim veil as politics: political autonomy, women, and 
Syariah Islam in Aceh,” in Contemporary Islam Vol 1 No. 3. (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila 
University Press, December 2007), 289-301.  
881 M. Ensor, “Disaster evangelism: Religion as a catalyst for change in post-Mitch 
Honduras.” 
882 M. Gillard and D. Paton, “Disaster stress following a hurricane: The role of religious 
differences in the Fijian Islands,” The Australasian Journal of Disaster and Trauma Studies 
1999-2. ISSN: 1174-4707 (1999) (Online).  
883 C. Call, “Viewing a world of disaster through the eyes of faith: The influence of religious 
worldviews on community adaptation in the context of disaster-related vulnerability in 
Indonesia” (Master of Science thesis, Iowa State University Digital Repository, 2012).  
884 Ibid. 
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The role of religion in disaster thus appears two-fold. First, at a more 
practical level, it provides impetus among groups and individuals to mobilize 
efforts primarily to benefit affiliated survivors. As such, disaster mitigation 
and rehabilitation programs become processes of inclusion into a larger 
community.885 Assistance provided by religions and their affiliated 
organizations often escape the negative media attention that characterizes 
government relief and rehabilitation. As a result, allegations of corruption, 
inefficiency and incompetence in programs led by monks, nuns and priests 
are rare. Efforts also often continue so long as funds and other donations 
from sources directly tapped by them continue to sustain these programs. 
Second, religion in the Philippines underpins the cultural basis for coping, 
which influences what people do and not do in disasrer aftermath. 
Immediately after a catastrophic event, for instance, outward acts of 
religiosity become more visible acts among survivor communities, regardless 
of religious affiliation, as a way of understanding and coping with a hazard 
event. For example, it is notable that the Muslims in Ormoc, similar to 
Christian survivors, considered the 1991 flood as “a challenge from God if 
the people will believe in God.”886 Consequently, the faithful were often 
exhorted above all else to become more pious. Because disasters were 
viewed primarily as punishment from God, disaster mitigation mechanisms—
in particular programs that aimed to relocate communities to safer sites—
were often not emphasized.887 
These two issues are explored in greater length in this chapter, 
focusing in particular on a small community established by a Catholic order 
of nuns from among families who survived the 1991 Ormoc floods in the 
sugar hacienda barangay discussed in the previous chapter. These were 
families who had been largely left out of government recovery programs. To 
what extent in this case had religion helped build long-term resilience among 
them, taking into consideration their persistent vulnerability to disaster 
events?  
																																								 																				
885 Ensor calls the process of offering material benefits to disaster victims as “disaster 
evangelism.” Ibid., 35-36.  
886 Imam Mackay Amatunding, conversation with author, 28 May 2013, in the Mosque, 
Barangay Nasunugan, Ormoc City, in mixed Filipino and Bisaya, translated by author.  
887 Also see A. Reale, “Acts of God(s): the role of religion in disaster risk reduction.” 
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Resilience is the capacity to recover and cope with disaster. It is 
closely linked with vulnerability, or “the characteristics of the person or group 
and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist 
and recover from the impact of a natural hazard (an extreme natural event or 
process).”888 Following this definition, a resilient community is one that 
manages to reduce its collective and individual risk to life, livelihoods, 
properties and other assets from disasters through collaborative efforts that 
encompass the physical, financial and psychological aspects of disaster 
preparedness. In this last case study, the process of coping and building 
resilience remained primarily an externally driven initiative wholly funded and 
implemented by a Church-affiliated organization, and driven in particular by 
the spirit and vision of one Catholic nun.  
“Church” versus “church” 
The term “Catholic church” in this chapter follows its common 
meaning of ecclesia, referring to the larger community of believers in the 
tenets of the Catholic faith. On the other hand, “Catholic Church” means both 
of two things. First, it is the structure or building where believers practice 
their religious activities. Second, it also refers to the hierarchy of the 
institution itself, composed of the college of bishops, cardinals and the pope. 
The official face of the episcopacy in the country is the Catholic Bishops’ 
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), preceded by the Catholic Welfare 
Organization. Established in 1946, the CBCP is mandated to promote 
solidarity and unity in the Filipino Catholic community. Yet, the link between 
the CBCP and the variety of Church-affiliated organizations that have 
proliferated in Philippine society since its inception is commonly limited only 
to theological and ideological direction. More importantly, financial, legal and 
institutional linkages between the CBCP and religious orders and 
organizations are often minimal, unless directly funded and supported by the 
Church. Legally identified as non-profit groups, these orders and 
organizations often act independently of each other.  
																																								 																				
888 B. Wisner, P. Blaikie, T. Cannon and I. Davis (2004), At Risk, Natural Hazards, People’s 
Vulnerability and Disasters 2nd Edition, 11. 
263	|	F L O O D W A T E R S 	 O F 	 D E A T H 	
	
 In the case of Ormoc in 1991, the Catholic Church, led by Monsignor 
Jaime Villanueva, who was then parish priest of Saints Peter and Paul 
Church, was perceived as among the first responders after the flood event, 
although at a far lesser degree than the Cebu and local city governments.889 
Within the Church itself, three groups undertook three programs in relief and 
rehabilitation separately and independently. These were the Archdiocese of 
Palo, which exercised jurisdiction over Ormoc; the Order of the Benedictine 
Sisters (OSB), which managed elementary, secondary and tertiary schools at 
Saint Peter’s College (SPC) in downtown Ormoc; and the Religious of the 
Sacred Heart of Jesus (RSCJ), an order of nuns based in Cebu City. 
 Other religious organizations also pursued operations in Ormoc in 
1991. The Iglesia Ni Cristo conducted a relief program called Lingap Sa 
Mamamayan890 for almost a month after November 1991, which distributed 
food, clothing, mats, medicines, medical assistance and blankets to 
approximately 3,000 beneficiaries, both members and non-members.891 
Islamic groups, on the other hand, were not as visible in relief and 
rehabilitation, as there were only a handful of Muslim residents and fewer 
who had been adversely affected by the flash flood.892 
Liberation theology and radicalism in the Philippines 
 It is important to situate the Church’s involvement in Ormoc in relation 
to its theological core values, its historical political elitism in the Philippines 
prior to the liberation theology of the 1960s, and its subsequent political 
advocacy for the preferential treatment for the poor, particularly in rural 
agricultural areas where the highest rates of poverty existed. In fact, the 
social action focus of the Church in the country in general characterized most 
of its programs even prior to the 1960s. But it was only after the Second 
																																								 																				
889 M.C. Gastardo-Conaco et. al., “Flood relief and rehabilitation in Ormoc: Experiences and 
insights of field workers and beneficiaries,” 336-350.   
890 Lingap sa Mamamayan (Filipino) roughly translates to “Compassionate Care for 
Citizens.” 
891 As stated in the handwritten letter from Fernando Villanueva, legal officer and minister of 
the Iglesia ni Cristo, in Ormoc City, 7 April 2013, in response to questions raised by the 
author in a letter.  
892 Interview with Imam Amatunding, Ibid. 
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Vatican Council when such efforts were systematized and emphasized.893 
The center-right Federation of Free Farmers (FFF), established in 1953 with 
the support of the Catholic Church, and the National Secretariat for Social 
Action (NASSA), formed in 1966 as the Church’s official social action arm 
with particular emphasis on rural society development, began as apolitical 
associations geared towards helping peasant communities through small and 
localized self-help programs.894 Church-supported projects included the 
provision of small credit to rural agricultural unions, cottage industries, 
medical clinics, farmers’ associations, piggeries, and housing projects.895 
By the late 1960s, however, as Vatican II and liberation theology 
swept through the Catholic developing world, the CBCP issued a pastoral 
letter that “stressed the plight of the poor (especially farmers, agricultural 
workers, and fishermen), the need for land reform, and the educational role 
of the church in teaching social justice, and at the same time that called on 
the rich to continue supporting charitable works.”896 However, the local clergy 
did not unanimously support this call for greater social involvement among 
marginalized sectors of society.897 There was fear within the Philippine 
Church hierarchy that revolutionary social movements like communism were 
antireligious and inherently god-less.  
As the imposition of martial law deepened in the 1970s and resistance 
against established landed families gained ideological ground in the 
provinces, the New People’s Army (NPA)—the armed wing of the 
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)—though still feeble in the early 
1970s, began to gain numerical strength.898 The issue of land reform 
																																								 																				
893 See G. Clarke, The Politics of NGOs in South-east Asia, Participation and Protest in the 
Philippines (Routledge, 1998).  
894 See J. Franco, “Elections and democratization in the Philippines,” in Comparative Studies 
in Democratization, ed. A. Appleton (New York: Routledge, 2001), 82-84. 
895 Clarke, The Politics of NGOs in South-east Asia. 
896 Quoted in J. Franco, “Elections and democratization in the Philippines,” 82. 
897 H. Wooster, “Faith at the ramparts: The Philippine Catholic Church and the 1986 
revolution,” in Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft, ed. D. Johnston and C. 
Sampson. (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 165-166. 
898 Wurfel argued that the threat of a peasant-based revolution was greatest, not during the 
martial law years of the Marcos dictatorship, but during President Aquino’s administration, 
when the NPA had approximately 20,000 members. D. Wurfel, “Land reform: Contexts, 
accomplishments and prospects under Marcos and Aquino,” in Pilipinas 12  (March 1989) 
(Online). On land and tenancy reforms, S. Borras, Jr., Pro-poor Land Reform, A Critique 
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increasingly assumed political significance throughout this period, and it was 
inevitable that the Church would become involved in its political discourse.899 
Land reform was a contentious term, even at the United Nations, which 
preferred the use of the broader and less precise “agrarian reform.”900 While 
among the Philippine bishops there were certainly differences in opinion on 
the position of the Catholic Church on this issue, the CBCP offered cautious 
support through the issuance of a pastoral letter: 
We are for as comprehensive a program of agrarian reform as 
possible—one that will make it possible for all, the 70% who live below 
the poverty line especially, to have more in order to be more (original 
emphasis).901   
Some priests would later join the ranks of the CPP, notably Luis 
Jalandoni, who eventually became a central figure in the armed struggle. By 
the late 1980s, the Philippines was in a state of political, often violent, flux. 
The Mendiola Bridge became the site of one of the bloodiest demonstrations 
in the country on 22 January 1987, when the Philippine Constabulary fired 
upon members of the Kilusang Mangbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP or the 
Association of Farmers in the Philippines). In the aftermath, eighteen KMP 
demonstrators were killed and over 100 were wounded. In March 1988, 
when land reform was being debated in the House of Congress, Bishop 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 											
(Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2007); and, S. Borras, Jr., The Bibingka Strategy in 
Land Reform Implementation: Autonomous Peasant Movements and State Reformists in the 
Philippines (Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 1999). 
899 For Wurfel, agrarian reform is a “pre-requisite—and to some degree a product—of 
genuine democracy.” Wurfel, “Land reform: Contexts, accomplishments and prospects under 
Marcos and Aquino.” 
900 In an early United Nations document, land reform was defined as “an integrated 
programme of measures designed to eliminate obstacles to economic and social 
development arising out of defects in agrarian structure.” This less politically demanding 
term was commonly termed “agrarian reform,” in contradiction to the “redistribution of 
property or rights in land for the benefit of small farmers and agricultural labourers.” The last 
definition is from D. Warriner, Land Reform in Principle and Practice (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1969), xiv. Warriner’s oversimplistic conceptualization of land reform, 
however, had been criticized. See for instance, E. Tuma, “Reviewed work: Land Reform in 
Principle and Practice by Doreen Warriner,” in Agricultural History Vol. 44 No. 4 (October 
1970), 413-415 (Online). Also Hung-chao Tsai, Land Reform and Politics: A Comparative 
Analysis (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1974), especially 
Chapter II, Concept of Land Reform. 
901 Cf Paul VI, Populorum Progressio, 6, quoted in J. Riedinger, Agrarian Reform in the 
Philippines, Democratic Transitions and Redistributive Reform (Stanford, California: Board of 
Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University, Stanford University Press, 1995), 151.  
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Teodoro Bacani led the first pro-land reform rally organized by the Catholic 
Church.902 
In Ormoc, however, there was relative peace throughout the 1970s 
and 80s, unlike in other parts of the country where social unrest became real 
problems of insurgency. While poverty was acute among sugarcane workers, 
the lack of large sugar centrals and extensive plantations in Ormoc, as well 
as the absence of an oppressive monopoly of a small number of hacendero 
families, contributed to the relative calm on the few haciendas that existed 
during this time. In addition, while the Archdiocese of Palo did send 
clandestine missions to Ormoc to investigate the plight of hacienda laborers, 
nothing concrete came out of these missions.903 The history of the Church’s 
involvement in Ormoc society since 1850—when Ormoc was formally 
separated from being a visita of Palompon and recognized as an 
independent parish904—had been one of accommodation with leading 
hacendero families and, thus, contributed to a generally peaceful 
relationship.  
It is notable that from the 1870s till 1904, Ormoc had produced at 
least eight native priests. The most notable of these was Reverend Father 
Ismael Cataag, who founded and established the Colegio de Nuestra Señora 
de Guadalupe, a pioneer Catholic school in Leyte and forerunner of Saint 
Peter’s College (SPC) under the management of the Compania de Jesus.905 
Some of the priests who served in Ormoc were linked to prominent families, 
who remained notable names in politics: 
Prospero Esmero - Ordained on 28 September 1873 
Enrique Carillo - Ordained on 13 August 1876 
																																								 																				
902 Wurfel, ““Land reform: Contexts, accomplishments and prospects under Marcos and 
Aquino” (online). 
903 Reverend Olalio Loperando (pseudonym), interview with author, 30 August 2013, in 
Tacloban City, in English.  
904 Emil Justimbaste, Ormoc’s de facto historian, argues that Ormoc was never a barrio of 
Palompon, but was only temporarily a visita of that municipality. In fact, according to him, 
Ormoc was already a pueblo as early as 1768 when the Jesuits left Ormoc and turned over 
the town to the Augustinians. E. Justimbaste, Ugmok, A Brief Historical Account. Accessed 2 
June 2015, 4 (Online).  
905 R. Rosal, “Briefing Folder on Ormoc City,” Unpublished (Ormoc City Public Library, 
1989); St. Peter’s College History, Unpublished; and, E. Justimbaste, Ugmok, A Brief 
Historical Account, 30-31.  
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Gregorio Ortiz  - Ordained on 3 June 1882 
Juan Miroy  - Ordained on 21 December 1889 
Flaviano Daffon - Ordained on 17 December 1897 
Pelagio Aviles  - Ordained on 1 November 1898 
Ismael Cataag  - Ordained on 13 August 1899 
Sergio Eamiguel - Ordained on 5 June 1904906 
Today, a common perception among residents is that an assignment in 
Ormoc, especially at the Saints Peter and Paul Parish Church, was a highly 
coveted post for any priest, as hacendero families were known to be 
generous patrons and benefactors of the Church.907 
Programs undertaken by the Palo Archdiocese immediately after 
November 1991, including those by parish churches in Ormoc, encompassed 
both the provision of basic necessities and longer-term housing project for 
survivors. Donations allowed the Archdiocese to purchase a tract of land in 
1992, which was later named the San Lorenzo Village. According to 
Monsignor Jaime Villanueva,  
Monsignor Villanueva: The collection rose drastically. I could not 
remember the amount, but the donations came. Many people became 
generous because of the domino effect of the donations that flowed in. 
There were many donations that came in. In fact we were able to put 
up a village from donations.  
Author: San Lorenzo? 
Villanueva: Yah. We bought that land and we provided the houses.  
																																								 																				
906 E. Justimbaste, Ibid. This list, however, does not correspond with the list compiled by the 
Ormoc Public Library, which shows the following: Bebiano Luciano (1834-49); Catalino 
Cabada (1849-67); Ceferino Montecillo (1867-73); Juan Seno (1873-92); Lino Codilla (1892-
1910); Ismael Cataag (1910-1914); Senon Ocampo (1945-47); Felix Sabenicio (1947-54); 
Federico Lopuaco (1954-59); Francisco Santiago (1959-71); Filemon Quianzon (1971-81); 
Pastor Cotiangco (1981-1989); Jaime Villanueva (1989-1997); Benjamin Sabillo (1997-
2001); Benjamin Bacierra (2001-2004); Isabelo Abrquez (2004-2005); Bernardo Pantin 
(2005-2009); and, Gilbert Urbina (2010). R. Rosal, “Briefing Folder on Ormoc City.”  
907 Informal conversations with Ormoc parishioners during the author’s fieldwork in 2013, in 
downtown Ormoc.  
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Author: Ah so it is both land and houses? 
Villanueva: Yes, both came from the donations… 
Author: How big is the lot, Monsignor? 
Villanueva: I think it is 2.5 [hectares].  
Author: And how were the beneficiaries chosen, from among a list? 
Villanueva: Ah it was the Social Action and under it was the 
Rehabilitation Group. First you have to…be a victim of the flash flood 
and you have no house…and then you are really poor…At that time 
[you] had no means to have your house. There were many teachers, 
many employees who had no houses. It was also what you call a 
revelation that there were many people who had no land, no houses 
of their own. Plenty of them. That was a revelation. Because all the 
time I did not know that such huge number of people have no houses. 
They were living along the riverbanks and along the seashore.908 
Lot titles in San Lorenzo were to be transferred to individual owners 
after three to five years. But, like the case of Barangay Tambulilid, some 
original beneficiaries sold these lots to new migrants for easy cash. 
Monsignor Villanueva observed, “They [referring to the beneficiaries] did not 
follow the agreement. We had an agreement that…if you did not like 
anymore the house you had to return it to the diocese.”909 The plan for San 
Lorenzo Village was to be a showcase of the Basic Ecclesial Community 
(BEC), one that promoted Catholic virtues and values. This plan, however, 
did not materialize. When asked if San Lorenzo was a failure, Monsignor 
Villanueva replied rather wistfully,  
Monsignor Villanueva: Comparing to our plan, it is somewhat a 
failure because there’s a lot [to do] to become a solid Christian 
community. We had an intervention. We bought a jeepney for their 
																																								 																				
908 Monsignor Jaime Villanueva, interview with author, 30 August 2013, in Our Lady of 
Immaculate Conception, Municipality of Burauen, Leyte, original in English, transcribed by 
author.  
909 Ibid. 
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transportation, all the deacons there…were brought there, they had 
their pastoral, putting up the basic ecclesial community. But ah it did 
not… 
Author: Why do you think it failed? 
Villanueva: Maybe the education component was not so strong and 
the other thing is that the people have…this short memory. They went 
back to their old lives.910 
Legal ownership of the house and lot was the primary problem, 
according to a recipient in San Lorenzo Village: 
Mrs. Armina Santiago: That is one of our questions. After five years 
they said, the house and lot will be given for free…We were given a 
certificate of occupancy, which shows the measurement of the house, 
what it was made of whether thatched or plywood and with bamboo 
floor.  
Author: How big was it? 
Santiago: There was 200 square meters, there was ninety-five, there 
was ninety.  
Author: And yours? 
Santiago: For ours, it said ninety-six. They said the title will be given 
to us after five years but it wasn’t given to us at all because we were 
told we had to pay. Why should we pay? It was said that Caritas911 in 
Manila wanted us to pay so we can help others. Some of my 
neighbors reasoned, why should we pay when these were from 
donations?  
Author: The Church bought the lot. 
																																								 																				
910 Ibid. 
911 Caritas is a confederation of religious organizations linked to the Catholic Church. 
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Santiago: Before, they said they will give it within five years and now 
we should pay? It was because some [beneficiaries] weren’t married, 
they said. Some already had good houses… 
Author: So right now you still do not have a title? 
Santiago: No not yet but we had not paid anything.912 
On the other hand, the Benedictine Sisters at Saint Peter’s College 
(SPC) in downtown Ormoc also organized a relief and rehabilitation program, 
the latter involving a housing project primarily for employees who had lost 
homes to the flood. The SPC itself had suffered tremendous damages to its 
buildings and lost three elementary students, with many other students and 
employees also losing their homes. The nuns had carefully compiled a list of 
all these, which was used to keep track of what assistance had been 
provided.913 According to a beneficiary, who was also an employee at SPC,  
Mrs. Nita Estevez: The materials were given…though we had to 
apply. You cannot choose where to go. It was through raffle draw. Our 
house was number 85 Block 4 because there were four blocks. We 
were in Block 4.  
Author: So all those ninety (lots) were all working for Saint Peter’s 
College…? 
Estevez: No. We were only fourteen employees here. Right now the 
only ones who remained are…three, only three because the fourth 
had just moved there. That fourth one just recently moved in 2000…  
Author: Do you have the title? 
Estevez: Yes.  
Author: When did you get your title? 
Estevez: 2011.  
																																								 																				
912 Armina Santiago (pseudonym), interview with author, 4 October 2013, in downtown 
Ormoc City, original in Filipino, transcribed and translated by author. 
913 The Order of Saint Benedict (OSB) sisters had been in Ormoc since 1930 when they took 
over the management of the school.  
271	|	F L O O D W A T E R S 	 O F 	 D E A T H 	
	
Author: Ah so it is recent. Did you have to spend for everything? 
Estevez: No. The nuns had a counterpart…but it should have been 
that after fifteen years everyone should have fully paid. The others 
promised to pay but until now had not yet paid. According to Sister 
Remedios…our treasurer who is kind, she said, Nita go and make a 
loan. For what, Sister? Pay for your lot because it is already the 
deadline. I said Sister I had already paid a long time ago because I 
didn’t want any debt… 
Author: So can I ask you how much you paid in total since ’93, was 
it? 
Estevez: No. It was through salary deduction...it was about 100 plus 
(pesos) per month. That was it, I said, Sister I cannot agree to a salary 
deduction because I had children going to school. I said I could only 
give voluntarily… 
Author: So how much did you pay in total? 
Estevez: Twenty-five thousand [pesos].  
Author: So the Benedictine counterpart is also twenty-five thousand? 
Estevez: I don’t know because the payments were not the same, it 
depends upon your income…The others only paid eight thousand…It 
depends on your income. The others did not have any income.  
Author: Ah so the others were subsidized by the nuns? 
Estevez: We were asked to submit our income minus our 
expenses.914 
Like the Palo Archdiocese’s housing project in San Lorenzo Village, 
however, the Benedictine nuns later left Saint Benedictine Village in 
Barangay Ipil to manage community building on its own.  
																																								 																				
914 Nita Estevez moved to St. Benedictine Village on 3 May 1993. Estevez, interview with 
author, 3 September 2013, in downtown Ormoc City, original in Filipino, transcribed and 
translated by author. 
272	|	F L O O D W A T E R S 	 O F 	 D E A T H 	
	
The third relief and rehabilitation program was undertaken by an order 
of nuns based in Cebu. Compared with the villages in San Lorenzo and Saint 
Benedictine, both of which had patrons that had physically, financially and 
logistically withdrawn from these projects just a few years after distributing 
the lots, the community established by the Religious of the Sacred Heart of 
Jesus (RSCJ), a small congregation of nuns with no prior experience in 
managing a housing project, came closest to the development of the ideal 
Basic Ecclesial Community (BEC) envisioned by the Church. 
A vocation to serve the “little ones”915 
It must be noted that Catholic women religious congregations had 
begun to operate in the Philippines as early as the latter part of the 
nineteenth century. Some of these were cloistered orders, while others 
established hospitals and schools for young women, particularly for 
daughters of the new elite.916 Since then, the social component of their work 
typically spanned the range of providing feeding programs for poor children, 
housing for abandoned children and caring for the elderly. However, much of 
the social and political work undertaken by these women religious had not 
attracted much scholarly attention. Very little, for example, is known of the 
role the RSCJ nuns had played in actively shaping the socio-economic and 
political landscape of the country.  
The Foundation of the Sacred Heart of the RSCJ was established in 
the Philippines on 22 August 1969. During the 1970s, the RSCJ nuns had 
begun actively working against Martial Law. They joined rallies, heeded the 
call of the Justice and Peace Commission of the Association of Major 
Religious Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP) to provide political education 
to the religious sector, and was active in the fledgling Task Force Detainees, 
an organization established by the AMRSP to assist political prisoners during 
the Martial Law era. Three RSCJ nuns eventually got themselves inside 
																																								 																				
915 Sister Carceller noted of her work in the 1970s: “In my daily interactions with the blind, 
the deaf, the lame, negative hansenites, and other persons with disabilities, I felt blessed to 
be among those “little ones” belonging to the kingdom of God.” M. Carceller, “Religious of 
the Sacred Heart of Jesus, Profiles.” Society of the Sacred Heart, 2014 (Online).  
916 C. Barry, ‘“Our prayers were all in Latin to avoid conflict” Women religious and 
sociopolitical change in the Philippines, 1930s-1970s,” in Philippine Studies, Historical and 
Ethnographic Viewpoints 62: 3-4 (Ateneo de Manila University, 2014), 377-397.  
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Camp Aguinaldo, the only religious sisters to do so, to hold a vigil with 
breakaway soldiers on that historic night in February 1986.917 After the 
People Power Revolution of 1986, the RSCJ led by Sister Maribel Carceller 
then shifted its focus to community building in rural areas. Its first community 
was built in Northern Samar, which was “then the third poorest province in 
the country, suffering from recurrent typhoons, centuries of government 
neglect, hunger and underdevelopment, and the resulting insurgency.”918 
The focus of these programs had always been the “little ones,” the 
marginalized sectors of society, as Sister Maribel noted in a personal 
vignette: 
I joined the Samar Mission in 1991 and for the next ten years, 
continued the organizing of Basic Ecclesial Communities for the 
Diocese of Catarman. After learning much from this experience, I 
headed the Diocesan Political Education Desk and supervised the 
three Diocesan Social Action Commissions of the three Dioceses of 
the Island of Samar. There were issues of ideological differences, 
illegal logging, mining, human rights violation and environmental 
destruction. 
With the inspiration of Chapter 2000’s call for an education that 
transforms in the spirit of reciprocity, the community took a definitive 
step in committing ourselves to the people of Northern Samar. We 
settled into a piece of property which we called Sophie’s Farm and 
established the SHIFT Foundation (Sacred Heart Institute for 
Transformative Education). We contributed our presence in youth 
ministry especially at the University of Eastern Philippines, the 
management of St. Anthony Academy, the diocesan mission school 
for poor students, and the running of the Sacred Heart Learning 
Center for pre-school children. I became executive director of the 
foundation, and explored ways of contributing to projects in pursuit of 
the millennium development goals: partnering with the ILO919 for the 
																																								 																				
917 M. Carceller, “Religious of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, Profiles” (online). 
918 Ibid. 
919 International Labor Organization. 
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elimination of child labor in Northern Samar; with the [Department] of 
Social Welfare and Development on conditional cash transfers for 
families in poverty; with the National Anti-Poverty Commission in 
monitoring pro-poor projects.920 
The RSCJ today remains active in several projects in the Dioceses of 
Antipolo, Catarman, Cebu, Cubao, and Palo. In Ormoc, under the Palo 
Diocese, the project was called Saint Philippine Duchesne Ormoc Worker’s 
Foundation, Inc. (SPDOWFI) located at a steep embankment along the 
Anilao River in Barangay Luna. 
A people with no future 
Though they did not have a mission house in Ormoc, the RSCJ—then 
based in Cebu—was one of the first Catholic congregations that responded 
immediately after the November 1991 flood. Together with Monsignor 
Villanueva, a small group of RSCJ nuns went to Barangay Nalunopan to 
provide basic relief services. Government assistance, focused as it was at 
the city center, was scarce in the hacienda barangay of Nalunopan. Ten 
days after the flash flood, food there was still in alarmingly short supply, 
when survivors in the city center at this time were already receiving regular 
batches of rations. A hacienda laborer, who promptly went home to 
Barangay Nalunopan on 15 November 1991 from Manila where she had 
sought prior medical treatment for her goiter, said of her family’s experience: 
I arrived to see them with nothing to eat. We also lost our kaldero 
[pot]. All our things were lost which made me cry. It was good I had 
money, but though I had money there was nothing to buy. I said we 
will go somewhere the flood did not go. We will buy a kaldero there 
and banig [palm mat for sleeping]…It was Monsignor [Villanueva] the 
priest [who helped] because he passed by us while we were gathering 
root crops in the field, that was what we were eating. So we were 
																																								 																				
920 M. Carceller, “Religious of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, Profiles” (Online). 
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doing this [pantomimes digging] and if there were tubers then it was 
okay for us to eat.921 
So dire was the predicament of families in Barangay Nalunopan that 
Sister Iraida Sua-an, an energetic nun hailing from Iloilo, was at once struck 
by a powerful image: 
I was walking this way [referring to an area in Purok Uno in 
Nalunopan], and the devastation from the flood was still utterly visible. 
The people were so hungry that they were scrabbling in the dirt for 
root crops to eat. It was then that I had a vision of a suffering Christ. In 
this vision He told me, this is my sheep, my flock, tend to them. It was 
here I found my vocation.922 
Monsignor Villanueva and the nuns not only provided basic relief, but 
also spiritual comfort through the celebration of masses and some 
psychosocial activities, such as games for children and community 
gatherings for survivors. In addition, Monsignor Villanueva performed a 
kasalang bayan, a communal wedding ceremony, to solemnize the union of 
couples who had been living together without the benefit of marriage. 
After several months of relief provision, the RSCJ sisters and 
Monsignor Villanueva were ready to look for a more committed socio-
economic program that would respond not only to the short-term needs of 
the community, but more importantly to uplifting the lives of these laborers 
who remained among the poorest of the poor. The RSCJ donated shelters 
with asbestos roofing, and began providing catechetical seminars aimed at 
increasing awareness of Catholic values. Informal reading and writing 
classes were also offered, which proved popular among illiterate laborers 
who came to the communal chapel for a few hours each night. A community 
organizer named Dinah was employed and dispatched to oversee these 
programs.  
																																								 																				
921 Perlita, interview with author, 2 April 2013, in SPDOWFI garden while she worked, Purok 
II-B, Barangay Luna, Ormoc City, original in Filipino, transcribed and translated by author.  
922 Sister Iraida Sua-an, RSCJ, interview with author, 21 April 2013, in Barangay Nalunopan, 
original in English.  
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A non-stock foundation was later incorporated on 29 September 1994 
with a validity of thirty years. It was officially named Saint Philippine 
Duchesne Ormoc Worker’s Foundation, Inc. (SPDOWFI), as a tribute to the 
memory of a Catholic saint sanctified as an intrepid missionary to the 
Americas. Its incorporators included Monsignor Villanueva, RSCJ nuns 
(namely, Sisters Amelia Vasquez, Iraida Sua-an, Sonia Aldeguer, and 
Mirasol Navidad), and eight sugarcane workers.923 Seven from among these 
became the association’s Board of Trustees. Membership in the association 
entailed a financial obligation of between 7,125 pesos to 7,500 pesos each 
for Monsignor Villanueva and the RSCJ sisters and 1,750 pesos each for the 
workers, which the RSCJ subsidized.  
SPDOWFI’s objectives were clearly identified, which were lofty ideals 
but highly radical considering that these families were also laborers 
dependent on the self-interests of a hacendero. Sister Iraida Sua-an, or 
Sister Ayds, in conversations in 2013, denied inciting unrest.924 But even a 
cursory reading of SPDOWFI’s objectives, as enumerated in its Articles of 
Incorporation, shows a revisionist agenda, which went well beyond the mere 
establishment of a Basic Ecclesial Community (BEC) among the victims of 
the 1991 flash flood: 
1. “To help within the limits of our capacity some families who were 
victims of the flash flood in Ormoc on November 5, 1991, beginning 
with the families who are already RSCJ beneficiaries at Barangay 
Nalunopan, Ormoc; 
2. To give them some formation towards maturation of their Christian 
faith;  
3. To help them become a basic ecclesial community;  
4. To help them get organized into a cooperative;  
5. To buy land to be parcelled out to each family who were flashflood 
victims;  
																																								 																				
923 Articles of Incorporation of the RSCJ Association, based on Form No. 1-NS (Ordinary 
Non-Stock) Form No. 053725, signed on 29 September 1994, in Cebu City. 
924 Informal conversations with Sister Sua-an, 2013. 
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6. To help them in their self-help and other socio-economic development 
projects;  
7. To help raise funds for their continuing formation and other income-
generating projects towards economic self-reliance;  
8. To build linkages with cause-oriented individuals and/or groups 
committed to the empowerment of people towards social 
transformation to a just and equitable society;  
9. To network with existing NGOs / POs which share the same vision 
and strategy;  
10. To do whatever is necessary for the growth and development of these 
families” (with emphasis).925 
Objective numbers 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 allude to the formation of a new 
community that was meant to be self-reliant and resilient through collective 
self-help. The underlying assumption that guided the incorporators was clear: 
these families were seen as “people with no future” who had no entitlements 
and needed help.926 
Unsurprisingly, by 1998, trouble was brewing with the Larrazabals. 
Sister Ayds by this time had been tirelessly working and living with the 
laborers, totally immersing herself in the community, and travelling via ferry 
to Cebu on a monthly basis, as the RSCJ did not yet have a permanent 
mission house in Ormoc. She rapidly gained a reputation in the community 
as a tibak, slang for an activist commonly linked to the left, with her 
characteristic uncovered head and civilian clothes. The only thing that 
marked her as a nun was a small ubiquitous cross that hung on a chain from 
her neck. Tibak priests and nuns were well known in rural poor areas, with 
those who had been politicized also shedding their habits and joining the 
communist movement in far-flung provinces where the agricultural problem 
was acute. Some even had taken up arms with the NPA.  
Unbeknownst to Sister Ayds, the community organizer Dinah was in 
fact provoking the laborers to mobilize for an increase in their wages, a 
																																								 																				
925Articles of Incorporation of the RSCJ Association. NGOs are non-government 
organizations, while POs are people’s organizations.  
926 Informal conversations with Sister Sua-an, 2013. 
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development closely watched by the Larrazabals. Because Dinah was under 
RSCJ employ, Sister Ayds was suspected of actually fomenting the dissent. 
Sabin Larrazabal, who owned the sugarcane plantation barangay of 
Nalunopan, reacted swiftly on these suspicions. Within days, he had Sister 
Ayds, Dinah and the suspected three laborer-insurgents and their families 
expelled. He also had the neat row of wooden houses donated by the RSCJ 
bulldozed to the ground. Sister Ayds was banned from Barangay Nalunopan.  
The persistence of vulnerability and poverty 
The SPDOWFI, prior to 1998, was already scouting for a piece of land 
that its members could eventually own. With the expulsion of three laborer 
families from Barangay Nalunopan, SPDOWFI was galvanized to welcome 
sugar worker families to a one-hectare plot of land it had purchased from the 
Tan family just two barangays upland from Barangay Nalunopan. The 
purchase was fully funded by the RSCJ Mother House in Rome. Not prime 
location, it stretched downhill from the national highway to a craggy 
embankment along the Anilao River. In the early 1990s, this piece of land 
was classified as idle, the soil too wet and rocky for agriculture. It was 
overgrown with grasses, various trees and bamboo along the riverbanks and 
was populated by snakes. Moving to this new home, small tragedies 
continued to hound the laborers, as one recounted:  
Inday: It was difficult because it was still forest here at the start since 
we were the first ones here. We cleaned it…We were three families 
who were banished by the Larrazabals. Our house was padlocked.  
Author: Ah so a case was filed against you? 
Inday: Yes a case was filed against us.  
Author: What happened to the case? 
Inday: We were given only food, money for food.  
Tonyang (Inday’s wife): How much was it they gave you Pa, two 
thousand?  
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Inday: Only four thousand for me.  
Author: Are you the only one given the money? What was the four 
thousand for? 
Inday: It was only for financial, only for food. We weren’t paid for the 
length of service in their hacienda.  
Author: What happened? So you left your house there? 
Inday: Yes.  
Author: Who lived there then? 
Inday: We settled it with DOLE.927 They talked to us. We were 
supposed to get eighteen thousand that was what we signed when we 
agreed at Pongos [Hotel]…but we got only four thousand per person 
and in the contract it said our houses will be demolished but it will be 
their truck to deliver the materials, that was it. So they gave us only 
four thousand.  
Author: Did they give it to you in cash? 
Inday: Yes cash…They padlocked our houses.  
Author: The owner padlocked them? 
Inday: Yes!  
Author: So you couldn’t go back? 
Inday: If we went back there they said we would be killed. The owner 
was kaisog [strict, hard].  
Author: But you were able to get your things? 
Inday:…Oh no, we didn’t even have our clothes.  
Author: Even your clothes? 
																																								 																				
927 DOLE is the Department of Labor and Employment.  
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Inday: None.928 
At the start, only forty families including the three suspected 
“insurgents” heeded the invitation to form a new community at the edge of 
Barangay Luna, a 210-hectare sugar-producing barangay dominated by the 
haciendas of the Torres, Serafica and Tan families. More laborer families 
would have moved, except for several superstitious stories that told of how 
SPDOWFI’s topography was a “kawa” or giant wok, which attracted death, 
disease and other unlucky events.929 In addition, though Purok II-B was not 
too far away from Nalunopan, for many the move also meant severing ties to 
families and friends, as some would have to leave behind brothers and 
sisters, elderly parents, aunts and uncles, cousins and neighbors.  
The original dream for SPDOWFI was for one hectare to be equally 
divided into forty lots for allocation to sugar laborer families. Seven of these 
lots were to be used as an organic garden initially planned for common use, 
the construction of the main RSCJ house and center, a staff house, a 
daycare center, a chapel, and a multi-purpose building, all to be fully funded 
by the RSCJ. By this time, Monsignor Villanueva, though an original 
incorporator, had moved away from Ormoc. Consequently, membership in 
the Board of Trustees became fully RSCJ, with the result that interaction with 
the Saints Peter and Paul Parish, and by extension the Archdiocese of Palo, 
decreased significantly.  
SPDOWFI’s first few years in Purok II-B in Barangay Luna were 
idyllic, as there was no electricity and the community came together every 
night for some singing, guitar playing, and story telling.930 Water, too, was 
untapped so washing clothes and taking baths in the riverbanks of Anilao 
became a community get-together. One recipient recounted how it was in the 
beginning, 
																																								 																				
928 Inday and Tonyang (pseudonyms, husband and wife), simultaneous interviews with 
author, in their own home, Purok II-B, Barangay Luna, 8 March 2013, original in Bisaya, 
transcribed and translated by author.  
929 Lorna and Myrna (pseudonyms, mother and daughter), simultaneous interviews with 
author, 19 May 2013, Ibid. This was confirmed in informal conversations with residents of 
Nalunopan who had relocated to Barangay Luna II-B, as well as with Sister Ayds Sua-an.  
930 Conversations with Sister Sua-an, 2013. 
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Nita: Before when we were not here yet, they said, around this hour 
there were aswangs931 [chuckling]…They were already noisy…here in 
Barangay Luna. It was scary here they said.  
Author: Because there were not any houses yet? 
Nita: Hm there were not any houses yet, very few.  
Author: But you really had experiences with aswangs? 
Nita: Here? Gosh, many! [chuckling]…the wakwak932…especially 
when the moon is brightest.  
Author: When did you have electricity here? 
Nita: I do not know. Ma, when did we have electricity here?  
Primitiva (her mother): When the house was finished, ’98 perhaps, 
‘99.933 
In the morning, everyone was busy with clearing the area, 
constructing houses, tending to the communal garden, and building the 
structures that would become RSCJ’s home. Several attempts were made 
during this period by suspicious individuals wishing to make contact with 
Sister Ayds, the lone nun living amongst the poorest of the poor. The bids for 
contact may have been “feelers” sent by the insurgent NPA, who were said 
to live in the surrounding hills and mountains. However, Sister Ayds 
disregarded all these, exclaiming, “I am not a communist!”934 
Yet in this new haven, life began to unravel. Within three to four years 
from relocating, a majority decided to take down their houses and return to 
Barangay Nalunopan. The common reason was the lack of livelihood in 
Barangay Luna. Sabin Larrazabal, who was known as a fair though strict 
																																								 																				
931 An aswang is a popular mythical creature in the Philippines that has vampire and 
ghoulish characteristics. 
932 The wakwak, on the other hand, is also a form of aswang, but is characterized as a 
creature that flies with bat wings and leaves the lower half of the body behind. 
933 Primitiva and Nita (pseudonyms, mother and daughter), simultaneous interviews with 
author, 18 March 2013, in their own home, Purok II-B, Barangay Luna, Ormoc City, original 
in mixed Filipino and Bisaya, transcribed and translated by author.  
934 Conversations with Sister Ayds Sua-an, 2013. 
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man, allowed the returnees to come back to work and they picked up their 
lives as laborers, as though they had never left.  
For those who stayed in Barangay Luna, the lack of sources of income 
was simply a matter of substituting one problem in Barangay Nalunopan for 
another, as one original recipient succinctly observed: 
It is different here because over there [referring to Barangay 
Nalunopan] we never had to pay for water. Here you pay for 
everything, anything. Though it is cheap here, over there I did not 
even have to buy malunggay [moringa oleifera] because I had planted 
a lot of them…Here you cannot plant anything because it is just the 
house. You will have to plant at the sides of the house.935 
Though the original housing project was intended for flood laborer-
survivors from Nalunopan, the exodus of recipient families out of Luna and 
the resulting empty lots forced RSCJ to open the community to other urban 
poor families in and around Ormoc. Only eight original families remain today, 
while thirty-one were new migrants.  
An informal survey, conducted by the RSCJ in the late 2000s, showed 
that only three out of thirty-nine families were female-headed households, 
while majority was male-dominated. Most of them claimed that the reason 
they wanted to become part of the community was because of the chance to 
own land where to raise their families. Based on this survey, a typical family 
was headed by a man aged forty-two years, had an average of three 
children, with both him and his wife at least elementary graduates. A man’s 
common employment was in the informal sector as driver, gardener, 
technician, electrician, mechanic, carpenter, mason, and waiter, while his 
wife was typically a housewife or, like her husband, worked in the informal 
sector as a beautician, vendor or housekeeper.936 The average income of an 
original recipient family, who dealt in manual labor, was about 200 to 250 
																																								 																				
935 Soling, interview with author, 30 May 2013, in her own home, Purok II-B, Barangay Luna, 
original in Bisaya and Filipino, when asked about whether life at present in Luna was better 
or worse than in Nalunopan, transcribed and translated by author.  
936 “Profile of resident-beneficiaries of the St. Philippine Duchesne’s Ormoc Workers 
Foundation, Inc. (SPDOWFI),” RSCJ files, as of 2013.  
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pesos per day for a family of five, but work was irregular. On the other hand, 
the newer migrant families had more diverse sources of income, with some 
working as tricycle drivers with a take-home pay of about 250 pesos per day 
after deducting the boundary paid to the owner as well as gas. Others were 
salesmen and technicians with higher daily incomes.  
With the influx of new migrants in Purok II-B, the profile of the 
community changed drastically from the original hacienda laborers of 
Nalunopan, who were either illiterate or with only some elementary 
education. As a result, laborer families became the minority, and while their 
lives became poorer for lack of more sustainable sources of income, their 
new neighbors—though themselves still living below the official poverty 
line—began to flourish. Some of the migrant families could afford to have 
electricity and tapped water, own television, cell phones, radios and DVD 
players, and were able to go to the city for some recreation. Like in Barangay 
Tambulilid, the most obvious symbol of rising incomes was the construction 
of cemented houses with corrugated iron roofs. One migrant family for 
instance, who had a daughter who was pregnant by an elderly Canadian 
man in 2013 and another daughter who was pushed to have only foreigner 
boyfriends, was able to put up a painted and cemented house from the 
regular remittances sent by the Canadian boyfriend, the envy of many in the 
community. As such, all families with daughters in Purok II-B—though they 
were not yet of marriageable age—dreamed of having a foreigner son-in-law, 
who would rescue them from the grinding poverty of everyday life.937 
The morality and coping strategies of the poorest of the poor 
The SPDOWFI community was nominally Catholic, which meant that 
every family sent representatives to join meetings, processions and other 
religious activities regularly organized by Sister Ayds Sua-an. But other than 
these outward shows of religiosity, Catholic virtues were non-existent. It was 
notable that the norm among couples was not to be wed at all, but simply to 
live together as husband and wife. Marriage, too, was not a pre-requisite for 
																																								 																				
937 Informal conversations with SPDOWFI residents, in February to October 2013, in 
Barangay Luna, Ormoc City.  
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availing a lot in the community. One woman, who has had three husbands 
and supported a household of twenty-one individuals on her husband’s 
salary as a security guard in downtown Ormoc and from remittances sent 
occasionally by a daughter living in Makati City as a kept woman of a Danish 
man, had this to say when asked how many were living in her house: 
Teresita: Many, there are many families.  
Author: How many families? 
Roland (her adult son): There are many, almost twenty persons… 
Teresita: We are four families here [laughter in the background] Ay…it 
is the truth!  
Author: How many children did you have in all? 
Teresita: Ours were only four, for the first, there were many, eight?  
Author: What first? Is this your second husband, with four (children)? 
Teresita: Yes.  
Roland: This is the third.  
Teresita: I was widowed in the first… 
Roland: This is going to be a long story.  
Author: You were first widowed, no children? 
Teresita: We had two.  
Author: Where are they living? 
Teresita: One is here. The other is in Manila. We should be ashamed 
to tell lies, we should tell the truth.  
Roland (teasing his mother): You are a holy mother… 
Author: And with your second husband? 
Teresita: Six.  
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Roland: That’s now eight.  
Author: …Did he also die? 
Teresita: No! He was crazy! [laughter in the background] He 
abandoned us.  
Author: But you still see him? He gives you money? 
Teresita: No! When he leaves you and you get another husband, will 
he still give you money? [chuckling]  
Author: So when he left you, you were already here? 
Teresita: No when he left Nalunopan there were only five of them. He 
left when I was five months pregnant…So he didn’t send any money 
even when I had given birth, nothing until the baby grew. So I went to 
see him at his father’s house, because I had such difficulty raising my 
children. If he had only pitied me. He was living a bachelor’s life. Should 
he not have raised his six children? This is the truth so we had to save 
on our own [chuckling].  
Author: Where are your six children with your second husband? 
Teresita: Here, the others are in Manila…aw the sixth one died…I have 
adopted one recently.  
Author: Why did you adopt? Who did you adopt? 
Roland: (A baby) six days old… 
Teresita: The baby of my father-in-law who is 74 years old and who is 
with the daughter of Edna Tamayo.938 I adopted the baby because I 
pitied him as he might die because their first baby did die… 
Author: Ah so you are relatives with Aling Edna? 
Teresita: Yes we are mares939… 
																																								 																				
938 The story was that Edna Tamayo’s mentally challenged daughter was betrothed to a 
man, who brought her home to his father’s house. The father fancied this girl and took her 
for his own wife. 
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Author: Why was the baby left with you? Isn’t the father still alive? 
Teresita: He is old so he could no longer provide for the baby. Because 
he is 74 years old and his wife is useless, she is mentally disabled… 
Author: The baby is newly born, right? 
Teresita:…On the twenty-second [of May 2013].  
Author: So who feeds him? 
Teresita: We do.  
Angie (an adult daughter): Only through a bottle… 
Author: It’s more expenses. 
Teresita: It’s all right. God will have pity… 
Author: If you did not adopt this baby, where will he go? 
Teresita: He will be given away ma’am, she [the mother] was already 
contacting someone there…so I had to get him. It would be up to God if 
we eat only ginamos.940 
Author: So you are 21 here in the house including the baby? 
Teresita: Yes.941 
The twist in this story came just a few months after the interview above, 
when her second husband was brought back to live with her and her large 
family—alone, paralyzed from a stroke, and desperate for help.  
The backgrounds of other Purok II-B residents were no less fascinating, 
if only to emphasize how Catholicism was ever practiced and how poverty 
continually shaped the choices people made, their lifestyles and values, 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 											
939 Mare (Filipino): two women joined by the marriage of their children or other non-related 
people. 
940 Ginamos (Bisaya): small fermented shrimps commonly cooked with vegetables. In very 
poor provinces of the Visayas, eating ginamos with rice is the ultimate symbol of poverty.  
941 Teresita, Roland and Angie (pseudonyms, mother, son and daughter), simultaneous 
interviews with author, 29 May 2013, in their own home, Purok II-B, Barangay Luna, Ormoc 
City, original in Bisaya and Filipino, transcribed and translated by author.  
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sometimes with total disregard for Catholic virtues that were not personally 
beneficial. Edna Tamayo942, for instance, who was one of the original 
accused ‘insurgents’ at Barangay Nalunopan, flagrantly pursued a 
relationship with a lesbian, who did the chores around her house commonly 
undertaken by a man. She stopped going to Church soon after transferring to 
Purok II-B and suffered from hypertension, and had a reputation as an 
amateur dabbler in kulam.943 Another resident, a man named Abner 
Cosomo,944 was a well-known drug dealer in Ormoc, who in the past had 
occasionally bullied and challenged Sister Ayd’s authority. Yet another 
couple, the husband and wife Inday and Tonyang Jumat-ol—also laborers 
from Nalunopan who remained among the poorest in Purok II-B because of 
several tragedies—like deaths and illnesses in the family that constantly 
wiped out savings—were not flood survivors at all because they were not in 
Ormoc in 1991. But Inday and Tonyang continued to keep up the lie because 
of the promise of owning land.945 A previous common-law husband with 
whom she had borne six children had repeatedly raped Perlita,946 another 
former hacienda laborer. She later ran away, abandoning her children and 
husband in Mindanao, and got married to a man with whom she had two 
more children, but who also physically abused her, was an alcoholic and 
flaunted his women. Perlita’s situation changed, not because of any 
intervention from SPDOWFI or even the RSCJ, but because her husband 
had become paralyzed after two strokes and could no longer hit her. Perlita 
herself was a tambal, a faith healer, who occasionally smoked and had a 
penchant for tuba (fermented palm), vices that further depleted the family 
income.  
																																								 																				
942 Pseudonym.  
943 Kulam (Filipino): folkloric magic using herbs, earth, fire, spices, candles, oils and the like 
to perform rituals, charms and spells.  
944 Pseudonym. 
945 Edna Tamayo (pseudonym), interview with author, 28 May 2013, in a hut in front of her 
own home where she was selling barbequed pork, in Barangay Luna, Ormoc City, original in 
Bisaya, transcribed and translated by author. Some parts of the interview had been difficult 
to understand because Edna was whispering and the background noise of passing tricycles 
and crowing roosters drowned out her voice. Edna stated that Tonyang and Inday were in 
fact in Cebu on 5 November 1991 and it was Tonyang’s father (Tonya was in fact Edna’s 
sister-in-law) who was the one who had been “washed out” during that flood. But Inday and 
Tonyang came to Ormoc after the flood. I followed this rumor up with Sister Ayds later on, 
but she did not want to discuss this at length, and instead referred me to Nita, who was 
Sister Sua-an’s assistant. Ate Nita, too, claimed not to know anything about this matter.  
946 Perlita, informal conversations with author, 2013. 
288	|	F L O O D W A T E R S 	 O F 	 D E A T H 	
	
In the beginning, it was Sister Ayds who was unwittingly pushed into 
the role of agalon, the father figure for a community morally underdeveloped 
like children. As “boss” and father, she was seen to hold the veto power in 
matters concerning the community. For all intents and purposes, she was the 
agalon, who knew everything about everyone, and as such, was feared, 
respected and oftentimes resented. A small community like SPDOWFI was a 
hotbed of gossip, and Sister Ayds was the repository of all kinds of 
information about any of the residents. She knew that one family had a bout 
with leprosy, even though they had kept it secret to avoid the shame and 
discrimination that usually accompanied the disease. She was suspicious 
that the husband of a woman in SPDOWFI might have climbed over the wall 
of a house next to the community one night and raped the daughter of the 
house, though a case was never filed and the family simply moved away. 
She knew that the Canadian man who was benefactor to one family was also 
“married” to two other girls in Cebu and Mindanao. She was aware that a son 
of another resident might be gay, despite the obvious denial of his mother. 
She was the one who sent some of the residents’ children to university 
through scholarships. At Christmas, she also distributed groceries as gifts, 
much like a responsible agalon. She organized masses for the community 
and regular pintakasi programs, clean-up activities in shared areas in the 
community every Sunday. She actively sought networking activities with the 
larger RSCJ community around the world so that French, German and 
American volunteers regularly came to SPDOWFI for immersion of at least 
three months.  
Most importantly, Sister Ayds was the one people ran to for help, when 
all else failed. This frequently occurred when it came to credit. When the 
mother of Tonyang Jumat-ol died, for example, the family ran to Sister Ayds, 
who provided the money for burial. When Inday was struck with hypertension 
and could no longer find work, it was Sister Ayds who extended help through 
scholarships for some of the children to continue going to school, as he 
noted:  
Inday: I still have a lot of debt to Sister.  
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Tonyang (his wife): We run to Sister…when his mother died we ran to 
Sister. We owe a lot to Sister.  
Inday: That time when I had to stop work we ran to Sister.  
Tonyang: He couldn’t work anymore because he had bleeding.947 
But a steady source of credit from RSCJ was not sustainable. Sabin 
Larrazabal, as agalon in the hacienda, had dispensed loans that could be 
considered as salary advance and thus were deducted from the wages of the 
following weeks. Sister Ayds, however, did not have any way to ensure that a 
loan was repaid.  
It was notable that in 2006, the RSCJ opened a day-care center in 
Purok II-B—the Sacred Heart Children’s Educational Center (SHCEC)—
originally meant to educate the SPDOWFI children. As such, funds for other 
purposes such as small credit dried up. When ready credit stopped, 
resentment from residents began. The SHCEC building was erected in 2008, 
and a feeding program for pupils, in conjunction with day-care instruction, 
was fully subsidized for the first three to six years by the RSCJ Mother 
House. By 2013, most of the thirty enrolled pupils were not SPDOWFI 
residents, as most children in the community were no longer of day-care age. 
Two volunteer teachers were paid honoraria equivalent to two hours of work 
per day amounting to 3,500 pesos per month. It was through the personal 
pledge of a German civilian who had heard of SHCEC’s work, Mr. Peter 
Pluckebaüm of the Knights of Rizal Bonne Chapter, that the day-care center 
was able to guarantee continued operation, at least for several more years. 
But the school remained in the hands of Sister Ayds, who single-handedly 
recruited pupils and teachers, managed daily operations, and paid the 
salaries and other monetary benefits of the volunteer teachers and 
assistants, who came from among the residents. It was the same situation 
with the backyard garden, which had been originally planned for communal 
use. But because the community did not take good care of the garden, Sister 
																																								 																				
947 Inday and Tonyang, interview with the author, 8 March 2013, in front of their own home, 
Purok II-B, Barangay Luna, where Tonyang was doing the laundry, original in Bisaya, 
transcribed and translated by author. 
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Ayds eventually closed it and tended the garden herself. There were indeed 
many reasons for the residents to resent the authority exercised by one 
petite nun.  
SPDOWFI, since its establishment in 1998 in Purok II-B in Barangay 
Luna, was also—whether consciously or not—a closed community, which 
meant that it did not encourage collaboration with the barangay to which it 
was part. Politically, it was classified as Purok II-B, as a former barangay 
captain explained: 
Former barangay captain: We divided Purok II into two, Purok II-A 
over there and Purok II-B. It was because there were already so many 
houses…so Purok II-B should be included. We wanted Purok II-B to be 
recognized… 
Author: What does being Purok II-B mean, that during [barangay] 
meetings it should also have a vote? 
Former barangay captain: There is no councilor, no kagawad948 so 
[Purok II-B] could not be involved… 
Author: What does it mean being a purok, that it has a budget in the 
barangay? 
Former barangay captain: None. It doesn’t have a budget but it 
depends on the [barangay] captain. So there isn’t a budget, right? Then 
the captain should undertake steps [to pursue programs] like those for 
health.949 
As it was, institutional relations with Purok II-B were non-existent, as 
the former barangay captain elaborated:  
…Our objective in the barangay was to have rough roads cemented. 
But Sister won’t agree!...so what can we do when the houses were 
																																								 																				
948 A barangay councilor, an elected barangay official. 
949 Interview with a former barangay captain of Barangay Luna, 15 May 2013, in his own 
home, Barangay Luna, Ormoc City, original in Bisaya, accompanied by Ate Nita, transcribed 
and translated by author. Transcription includes background sounds of passing traffic, 
crowing roosters and murmur of the television. 
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there and you wanted to ride a motorcycle? It is rough road. It is 
difficult. So relations between SPDOWFI and the barangay may not be 
so good. But Sister is [a] good [person]. Though in general she follows 
whatever had been decided at the top. But Sister relates well, though it 
seems that SPDOWFI is so distant from the barangay.950 
 Sister Ayds confirmed a distrust of political institutions and elected 
officials in general, including for those at the barangay level. At the 
ideological level, she was afraid that given a chance, politics would corrupt 
the community when it was still so fragile and defeat the purpose set out at 
the very beginning of building a sustainable, resilient and self-reliant 
community. On the critical issue of cementing the road inside SPDOWFI, she 
believed that once the barangay had cemented it with government funds, 
SPDOWFI would become powerless in controlling entry into and exit from 
the community. As such, she urged residents to contribute equally to have 
the road built on their own, a suggestion that the community resisted. There 
was disagreement over how much each household should contribute, with 
the poorer households insisting that those with automobiles should shoulder 
a higher amount than those without jeepneys or motorcycles. After several 
meetings over several years that brought no satisfactory solutions, the issue 
was sidelined and the paths were allowed to deteriorate. During the rainy 
season, SPDOWFI became dangerous trails of slippery mud and rocks. Still 
the community refused to budge, and Sister Ayds remained implacable, first 
about subsidizing this particular project and second, about asking the 
barangay to shoulder the costs. The issue of the road had thus become an 
impasse. But the problem won’t disappear, as there were plans to begin 
subdividing the lot and transferring titles to residents, which will occur in the 
lead-up to the closing of SPDOWFI by 2024.  
The intractable problem of vulnerability  
Measuring success rates in reconstruction and community building after 
a disaster remains a challenging task, as there is really no one formula in 
																																								 																				
950 Ibid. 
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determining success or failure.951 What appears crucial to success are the 
levels of community participation and community empowerment especially in 
improving access to information and services, and therefore decision-
making.952 Nonetheless, the recovery of a community “as a whole” after a 
disaster does not automatically mean that “specific neighborhoods or 
households within those neighborhoods recover at the same rate or even at 
all.”953 As such, to evaluate a community as a unit in the aftermath of a 
disaster can be misleading.  
This was certainly true in the case of SPDOWFI, which has seen the 
original laborer families replaced by migrants over the years. These migrants 
were economically better off than the original residents even at the start. For 
those who came from Nalunopan, the most notable change experienced in 
Luna II-B had been the freedom to work where they wished, if there was 
work. But hunger was the same, as there was also hunger in Barangay Luna 
when there was no work, as this resident attested: 
Perlita: Well we are used to eating three times a day...  
Author: So you have never experienced hunger, for example in one 
week you ate less than three times a day? Have you had any 
experience like that? 
Perlita: Majority of the time.  
Author: Why was that? 
Perlita: We would just have porridge [lugaw].  
Author: It depended on what? 
																																								 																				
951 C. Davidson, C. Johnson, G. Lizarralde, N. Dikmen, and A. Sliwinski, “Truths and myths 
about community participation in post-disaster housing projects,” in Habitat International 
(Elsevier Ltd, 2006). DOI:10.1016/j.habitatint.2006.08.003.  
952 Aside from these two factors, three other factors were identified: quality of communication 
and information dissemination that increase people’s awareness of existing opportunities for 
participation; respect and consideration of community culture and beliefs; and, the support of 
local governments. Z. Sadiqi “Wardak,” V. Coffey and B. Trigunarsyah, “Critical factors for 
successful housing reconstruction projects following a major disaster,” in Proceedings of the 
19th Triennial CIB World Building Congress, ed. S. Kajewski, K. Manley & K. Hampson 
(Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, QLD, 2013), 2. 
953 M. Lindell, “Recovery and reconstruction after disaster,” in Encyclopedia of Natural 
Hazards, ed. P.T. Bobrowsky (Springer, 2013), 812 (Online).  
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Perlita: Especially that time when he [referring to her husband] got 
sick…he was sick six months and I could not work, could not do 
anything except take care of him. I could not heal others.954 I could not 
leave him.  
Author: Because you could not leave him with anyone? 
Perlita: No one at all.  
Author: You could not leave him with other people, for example? 
Perlita: No.  
Author: With your children? 
Perlita:  Especially not with my daughter because she has a baby. We 
were eating only donated dole-outs. It is because his illness was 
difficult. What if he became contagious?  
Author: What is his illness that is contagious? 
Perlita: He was vomiting blood. When his blood [pressure] goes up, he 
vomits blood. The doctor said so long as we do not become 
complacent, he would not be contagious. We were told there should be 
only one person taking care of him. That is only me. So [we were 
eating] only dole-outs… 
Author: So you were like that for six months? 
Perlita: Six months. It is only now I could work.  
Author: So when you were still in Nalunopan how many times do you 
eat in a day? 
Perlita: Before the flood?  
Author: Yes even before the flood. 
																																								 																				
954 Perlita was a tambal, or faith healer of sorts, and a manghihilot. Her two children were all 
over twenty, with families of their own.  
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Perlita: Sometimes there was nothing to eat. We ate a lot of niyog 
[coconuts]. It was difficult for us over there [referring to Nalunopan]… 
Author: So now what do you usually eat? There is always rice, right? 
Perlita: Yes rice.  
Author: And then? 
Perlita: We do not really have anything else to eat.  
Author: Vegetables? 
Perlita: We will buy vegetables when we have money. When we do not 
have any, then there is nothing.  
Author: So how would you cook the rice? 
Perlita: Sometimes as porridge. Sometimes when there is nothing, just 
rice with water and salt. It was possible to survive.  
Author: So in your opinion did you eat better since you transferred here 
or when you were still in Nalunopan? 
Perlita: Here…it was difficult over there.  
Author: Life was more difficult over there? 
Perlita: You would not eat if you do not work…because you had to buy 
rice everyday.955 
For these former hacienda workers, deaths and frequent illnesses 
exacerbated vulnerability, driving them deeper into a spiral of precarious 
financial uncertainties, with ramifications in terms of poorer health, inability to 
save anything at all, lesser finances that could be allocated for food and 
medicines, and even stopping children’s education. This situation was not 
any different for former hacienda workers who elected to stay in Purok II-B 
compared with those who returned to Nalunopan to resume life as laborers. 
																																								 																				
955 Perlita, interview with author, 2 April 2013, original in Filipino, when asked about eating 
patterns, how many times in a day the family ate, transcribed and translated by author. 
Transcription includes sounds of passing traffic in the background.  
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Those who returned also experienced the same kinds of economic 
uncertainties, but at least they could look forward to earning seventy pesos 
per day of work so long as they could work. The SPDOWFI former laborers 
did not have this confidence, but instead had to rely on new skills to survive, 
such as being a carpenter, mason, security guard, or selling various things in 
the market downtown.  
For those who came from other parts of the city other than Barangay 
Nalunopan, the main change was the fact that money freed from rent—as 
they no longer needed to pay rent or residential taxes956—could be used for 
something else, such as food, health, education, savings, small businesses, 
etc. In fact one family had been successful in doing just this by expanding its 
business from retailing only several kilos of pork a day to owning and 
operating a large piggery in the town of Merida in Leyte in the short time they 
had transferred to SPDOWFI. The family originally came from Merida, a fifth 
class municipality next to Ormoc with about 27,000 residents based on a 
2010 census. Although not exactly classified as rural or urban poor, Sister 
Ayds granted permission for the family to join the community in the early 
2000s because they were earning only an average of about 5,000 pesos a 
month from their retail business. The family’s economic status rapidly 
improved, with the most visible change seen in the house. According to 
Sister Ayds, this family, along with others like them, sustained the community 
as they funded activities when asked or required.957 They also influenced 
consultation processes with the rest of the community residents through 
strategic voting and sharing of opinions, which usually mirrored Sister Ayds’ 
own positions. Interestingly, during a community meeting to which I was able 
to attend and which Sister Ayds convened to discuss the titling and 
distribution of individual lots, the most vocal and active were new migrant 
families. The original settlers, numbering only eight in 2013, were more quiet, 
shy and hesitant to express their own thoughts especially about financial 
																																								 																				
956 As SPDOWFI was a foundation, land tax was charged at a minimum, which the 
foundation first paid and was then passed on to residents equally. Annual tax was 
approximately 52 pesos per lot.   
957 Informal conversations with Sister Ayds Sua-an, 2013. 
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matters.958 The issue during the meeting was primarily the costs involved in 
having their lots titled.  
Nonetheless, the main source of uncertainty for all residents stemmed 
from the fact that they did not yet have the title to their lot, which meant that 
they could still be expelled from the community. According to one female 
resident, aged forty-nine years, when asked whether she planned to retire in 
SPDOWFI: 
Daning: Maybe [laughing]...we do not have any place else to go to, to 
move to.  
Author: Why, would you still want to move? 
Daning: I do not know, I do not think I do, I think I like it here.959 
 What was left unsaid of course was that staying in the community was 
ultimately Sister Ayds’ decision, so long as the mother title was still 
undivided. Upon further informal conversations among residents, an 
underlying fear of Sister Ayds could be discerned, as she was seen as 
increasingly distant and aloof from the community.   
In this chapter, vulnerability features many fascinating characteristics. 
First, though a community is classified as generally poor, vulnerability varies 
per family based on a combination of factors, which include economic status, 
occupation, gender, disability and health status, age, number of dependents, 
nutrition, and educational attainment. All these determine the degree to 
which a family is put at risk after subsequent hazard events. As such, 
resilience in a community is logically uneven, as other families will be found 
to be more at risk than others. Second, vulnerability is more persistent 
among families found at the lower end of the risk spectrum, with some 
experiencing a spiraling cause and effect of less income resulting in less 
nutrition and poorer health, which in turn leads to the inability to work and so 
on. The poorest families had the worst health, with many of them afflicted 
																																								 																				
958 The community meeting was held on 23 June 2013, 7:30 p.m. at the Sacred Heart 
garden.  
959 Daning (pseudonym), interview with author, 29 May 2013, in her own home, Purok II-B, 
Barangay Luna, Ormoc City, original in Filipino, transcribed and translated by author.  
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with a variety of illnesses that hindered their ability to earn consistent 
livelihoods. What often occurred as a result was that children were pulled out 
of school to compensate for the loss of income, thereby severely curtailing 
the youth’s ability to earn more if they had been allowed to finish their 
schooling. Third, vulnerability as shown in this chapter appears not only 
“time-bound”960, but more importantly place-bound, which means that the 
area of residence greatly determines the level of vulnerability that a family 
can experience. Areas that lack opportunities for livelihoods and sources of 
employment were far from the city center, and which entailed more cost in 
travelling to the city. These influence a family’s ability to cope and get back 
up on its feet after a disaster. This is especially true of hacienda laborers 
who had both stayed in Luna II-B and those who returned to Nalunopan. 
Finally, families with sons and daughters who work elsewhere and regularly 
send home remittances to their families were less vulnerable than those 
without children who helped augment family income. In times of disaster 
events, these remittances became lifelines to family members who stay 
behind. What these cases of families have shown is that it is not only that the 
“poor suffer more from hazards than do the rich.”961 More importantly, the 
poor themselves do not suffer vulnerability equally, with some bearing more 
of the burden than others. It is these families who need assistance the most, 
but who were also left out of long-term programs of risk mitigation, sacrificed 
for the sake of a majority who are able to cope with minimum help.  
The role of the Catholic Church and Church-affiliated groups and 
organizations is crucial in identifying the poorest of these poor families and in 
providing valuable interventions to stop the cycle of vulnerability and poverty. 
Yet based on the SPDOWFI case, donor fatigue and a lack of systematic 
programs designed to uplift these families’ situations in a pro-active manner 
and not just unwittingly engender dependency among them must be 
addressed, if any long-term program of risk management can be achieved.  
***** 
																																								 																				
960 Wisner, Blaikie et al., Ibid., p. 12. 
961 Wisner et al, Op.Cit. Wisner et al define the ‘time-bound’ element of vulnerability as what 
“can be measured in terms of the damage to future livelihoods, and not just what happens to 
life and property at the time of the hazard event.” 






VULNERABILITY IN DISASTER AFTERMATH 
 
That’s the question that has always been asked to me as Chairman of the 
Committee on Public Safety. Are you ready? The answer I always give is we are not 
ready. 
- Jose Alfaro, interview with the author, 19 March 2013, in Ormoc City Hall, original in mixed 
Filipino and English, transcribed and translated by author   
We will never forget! A child who had experienced a flood will carry the memory to 
his old age. 
- Rico, interview with the author, 21 April 2013, in Barangay Nalunopan, original in Bisaya, 
transcribed and translated by author 
 The Ormoc disaster of 1991 was not natural. It did not come about 
because of a capricious nature. While it was triggered by a weak but slow-
moving typhoon, which had caused the Anilao and Malbasag rivers to quickly 
swell up and rush towards the city settlements, the massive death and 
destruction that resulted was very much caused by human activities. Many of 
these activities had been institutionalized as government policies over many 
decades and even over a century. That the 1991 Ormoc disaster was a 
consequence of urbanization and socio-economic development cannot be 
overemphasized. These twin processes had continuously rationalized the 
existence of a growing society, which also was increasingly characterized by 
unequal access to wealth and resources, the marginalization of pockets of 
poor communities, and the creation of uneven levels of vulnerability among 
specific groups of people. Bankoff’s conception of disaster not as an event, 
but a historical process that “normalizes risk”, is certainly true in the case of 
Ormoc in 1991.962 
 What is most glaring in the assessment of the 1991 Ormoc tragedy is 
the continuing lack of wide-ranging accountability at all levels of society. 
Despite the series of investigative reports written about the flood and its 
																																								 																				
962 G. Bankoff, “Vulnerability as a measure of change in society,” in International Journal of 
Mass Emergencies and Disasters Vol. 21 No. 2 (2003), 5-30 (Online). 
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horrific consequences, with some clearly laying the blame on the doors of 
elite sugar families in Ormoc, no sustained collective discourse had 
occurred. Yet it is not only elite families, but also local and national 
governments and communities themselves that require introspection as a 
collective process of moving forward. The public horror in the disaster 
aftermath in 1991 unfortunately did not lead to societal transformation. Yet 
what is social transformation in a city where economic and political power 
remains concentrated in an elite few, where government is by practice 
compromised by elite interests, and where the conditions of vulnerability and 
poverty for many communities and families are constant realities because 
intervention programs, including the provision of land through resettlement 
programs, have continued to fail in eradicating economic and social 
dependency?  
 This research has shown several realities. First, elite families had 
been allowed to insulate themselves from any public discourse of that 
disaster. The historical processes that allowed these elite families to prosper 
are the same processes that created economic and social development for 
the city, and vulnerability and poverty for many communities. This after all is 
the paradox of development. Yet until now, no accounting of their 
responsibilities for the disaster had ever been pursued. Second, the 
government—more so at the local level—continues to be unable to provide 
the check and balance that would ensure that the developmental paradox is 
managed and reduced especially for the most vulnerable and poorest 
communities and families. It remains captive to the interests of the elite few, 
which sustains the livelihood of both urban and rural communities and as 
such, are also the interests of these communities. Third, because majority of 
Ormoc society remain economically dependent on elite families until today, 
there is no real social transformation from 1991. However, it cannot be 
overemphasized that elite families are key to the solution, and any initiative 
in long-term recovery must have their cooperation. Fourth, poverty and 
vulnerability are inseparable conditions for many communities and families 
despite numerous intervention programs by non-government and religious 
organizations. Fifth, the problem of socio-economic dependency among the 
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poorest and most vulnerable communities and families persist even as they 
are relocated where new forms of dependency develop. Well-meaning NGOs 
and religious organizations often supplant (in the case of rural communities 
that previously depended on elite families for livelihood) or assume (in the 
case of urban communities) critical economic roles in these communities. 
Finally, there is a general reluctance among Ormocanons, especially the 
poorest and most vulnerable communities and families, to dwell on past 
disasters, explicit in the waning public interest to commemorate the 1991 
flood. However, the need to establish a social memory of disasters is vital in 
community building and long-term recovery.   
The challenge of accountability 
Political and economic actors in Ormoc City continue to adopt a 
rhetoric that refuses to recognize the historical bases of disasters. Yet, as 
this research has shown, the 1991 Ormoc disaster had clear historical 
precedents. The exploitation of forests in the upland areas of Ormoc 
primarily for agricultural purposes, a process starting at the turn of the 
twentieth century, had resulted in an environment with a high susceptibility to 
flooding downstream to the city. It is true that flooding is a natural 
phenomenon that occurs fairly frequently. In a geographically and 
topographically risky area like Ormoc characterized by the regular passage 
of typhoons, soils with low absorptive capacities, and elevations rising higher 
than eighteen degrees in many areas, indeed all these undeniably 
predispose Ormoc to flooding. However, that communities had been allowed 
to build their homes along the Anilao and Malbasag Rivers, given the high 
risks already known and accepted as part of the immutable characteristics of 
the city, is also irrefutable. These communities had nowhere else to go 
because much of Ormoc had been titled by 1991, primarily by a few land-
owning families. While the 1991 flood was one-of-a-kind, a phenomenon that 
occurs with a 50-year return period, and as such was could not have been 
prepared for, vulnerability and persistent poverty are not created overnight.   
The reality of poverty and vulnerability is accepted as a normal 
condition for many communities and families, without necessarily asking why 
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it exists and persists. There is an assumption in the definition of vulnerability 
itself that the characteristics defining a person or group and their situation 
are innate, as though they float above space and time. A person is born into 
poverty and vulnerability, and therefore accepts these conditions as part of 
his/her self. Catholic teachings further reinforce the notion that one has to 
accept his/her lot in life and carry his/her own cross. At many levels, 
therefore, poverty and vulnerability are simply accepted conditions that are 
not fully resolved. The national and local governments—juggling to balance 
growth and development—look at these two conditions as problems that 
require ameliorative solutions. As for elite families, they are not included in 
the analysis at all. As such, programs that are commonly recommended 
encompass the construction of infrastructure, resettlement, provision of basic 
health and employment services, etc. On the other hand, non-government 
and religious organizations—desiring to fill the gaps in government 
services—pursue similar programs without undertaking the more crucial 
analysis of why these conditions continue to afflict communities. It is only the 
media that had been able to make the link between the economic pursuits of 
elite families and the resulting vulnerability and poverty of affected 
communities. Yet the media was unable to sustain its interest in pursuing this 
link, especially in the face of other urgent and more current political and 
socio-economic concerns faced by the rest of the country.  
In the twenty-two years that passed from 1991, no introspection on 
the Ormoc disaster had ever been undertaken, a process that would have by 
necessity identified the root causes of that tragedy. In the minds of many—
including the poorest and most vulnerable communities and families 
themselves—it was nature gone awry. In addition, the inability of Ormoc City 
to fully respond to the most difficult questions of why twenty-two years of 
recovery have failed to resolve poverty and vulnerability will have 
consequences to how it will face future catastrophes. While it will continue to 
construct flood control infrastructure and resettle communities and families in 
the aftermath of disasters, it is bound to repeat the tragedies that have taken 
so many lives and destroyed much hard-earned possessions. Meanwhile, 
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the poorest and most vulnerable communities and families will continue to be 
expendable.  
On 6 November 2013, the worst typhoon in the history of the 
Philippines resulted in the deaths of at least 6,300, injuries of at least 28,689, 
and 1,061 missing.963 It affected a total of 3,424,593 families in nine regions 
of the country of which 890,895 families (4,095,280 individuals) were 
reportedly displaced.964 It also left total damages amounting to 
89,598,068,634.88 pesos.965 Like Typhoon Uring in 1991 that caused the 
massive floods in Ormoc, Super Typhoon Yolanda caused the most deaths 
and damages in Region VIII—Eastern Visayas—specifically Tacloban City. 
Ninety-three (93) per cent of the total estimated deaths of 6,300 came from 
Region VIII, mostly due to drowning and trauma. Yet while the bulk of the 
deaths and destruction was in Tacloban City, Ormoc City was also adversely 
affected in a seeming case of déjà vu. A state of calamity was declared on 
11 November 2013 after ninety (90) per cent of Ormoc was devastated by 
powerful winds and a storm surge that reached 300 meters.966 In an eerie 
repeat of the November 1991 disaster, the representative from Ormoc City, a 
scion of one of Ormoc’s elite families—the Torreses—noted about the plight 
of the city in the aftermath of Super Typhoon Yolanda:  
																																								 																				
963 This is according to the Philippine National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management 
Council (NDRRMC), “Final report re effects of Typhoon “Yolanda” (Haiyan),” NDRRMC 
Update, 06-09 November 2013, 1-65 (Online). 
964 “Updates re the effects of Typhoon ‘Yolanda’ (Haiyan),” NDRRMC Update dated 14 April 
2014, National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) (Online).  
965 The NDRRMC defines these damages as infrastructure damages to transport, including 
national and provincial/local roads and bridges, seaports and airports, flood control, utilities 
(water, power, drainage and telecommunications systems), school buildings, health facilities, 
government buildings, and agricultural and irrigation facilities. Social sectoral damages refer 
to effects on school buildings and school materials, health structures, and medical supplies 
and equipment, as well as the dwelling units of affected communities. Damages to the 
productive sector include agricultural and fisheries, mining and quarrying, trade, industries 
and services, and tourism. Cross-sectoral damages refer to governance and social impact 
assessed damages. The last, however, is not defined. See “Final report re effects of 
Typhoon ‘Yolanda’ (Haiyan), Ibid., 8.  
966 L. Jimenea, “State of calamity in Ormoc City,” Philstar, 11 November 2013 (Online).  
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The situation there is very bad…The entire city is devastated. Homes 
are damaged and it doesn’t matter whether they’re sturdy. Entire 
roads are gone, shanties across coastal areas are totally damaged.967  
She went on to draw parallels with the 1991 Ormoc disaster, but it is 
notable that the discourse on vulnerability had not changed at all since then, 
reflecting the fact that members of elite families themselves, specifically 
those elected to positions of authority, continue to remain oblivious to the 
differential impacts of hazards:  
I was speaking to my sister…She said this is even worse than 1991 in 
terms of property damage. In this case, it doesn’t matter whether you 
are rich or poor. Your house is as badly damaged as the next person 
(emphasis supplied).968  
Observations of the aftermath of Super Typhoon Yolanda hark back to 
the 1991 tragedy, notable in these statements made by Ormoc residents:  
Raining started around 4 in the morning of November 8. Then at 6 
a.m., we felt the strong wind. But it was around 10 a.m. that we felt the 
strongest winds. It lasted for one hour. After that it was quiet and the 
sun shone like nothing had happened.969  
It looks like a wasteland here with crumpled houses and trees 
down.970 
[Around] 5 in the morning [the wind was weak and] we thought there 
was no typhoon. [But] exactly 6 am, the wind started getting stronger 
and stronger and the trees started falling and roofs [were] flying 
everywhere…[Rain] kept coming into the house, I thought it was the 
end. We tried to stop the water but we can’t so we stayed in a corner 
and just watched everything. It was really scary…[When the typhoon 
																																								 																				
967 Representative Lucy Torres Gomez cited in A. Casauay, “Ormoc still isolated; Gomez 
appeals for help,” in Rappler, 10 November 2013 (Online).  
968 Ibid. 
969 Elizabeth cited in “People of Ormoc cope with Yolanda’s aftermath,” World Vision, 
accessed 5 January 2016 (Online).  
970 Jed Cortes cited in “Yolanda survivors recount onslaught, fury of the storm,” Rappler, 9 
November 2013 (Online).  
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had passed] everybody came out, looked around, and everything was 
devastated, and I thought that was the end for my son and myself, 
and of course my family. I was so scared.971 
 Supertyphoon Yolanda is beyond the scope of this research, but it is 
mentioned here to emphasize the persistent lack of inherent introspection, 
not only among the elite and those occupying positions of power and 
authority not only about vulnerability, but also of the general public. More 
importantly, among local and regional government officials, the elimination of 
vulnerability has not been a policy for longer-term disaster management. The 
prevalent mindframe among these officials had been to look at these 
incidents as ‘natural,’ borne of environmental causes that are beyond human 
control or knowledge. As it is today, the effects of disasters are still primarily 
managed through technical solutions. In Ormoc immediately after 1991, 
reconstruction of damaged bridges and dikes was undertaken. A massive 
flood control and mitigation project was pursued through a grant aid from 
Japan in 1995,972 which paved the way for re-aligning the Anilao and 
Malbasag rivers to “confine the flood discharge of a fifty-year return period.” 
The program also meant the construction of slit dams and the reconstruction 
of bridges designed to prevent the clogging of floating logs and to fit into the 
new river alignment.973 Indeed, these infrastructural programs had been 
hailed as effective countermeasures against the recurrence of the deadly 
1991 floods. A major test for the structures had been the waters brought 
about by the similarly severe tropical storm Gilas (international codename 
Koni) in 2003, which the Ormoc City Engineering Office touted as not 
resulting in any flooding. However, though the effects of Typhoon Gilas were 
not as destructive as Typhoon Uring in 1991, it still left Ormoc flooded.974 
Floods were reportedly breast-deep in Uwak (Barangay San Isidro) and 
																																								 																				
971 Grace cited in M. Santos, “After ‘Yolanda,’ American expat remains positive about Ormoc 
City,” Inquirer.net, 13 November 2013 (Online). 
972 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Department of Public Works and 
Highways, Basic Design Study Report on Flood Mitigation Project in Ormoc City (CTI 
Engineering Co., Ltd. And Central Consultants Co., Ltd., March 1997).  
973 I. Antonio, “Community commitment for sustained efficiency of infrastructures: Ormoc 
City, Philippines.”  
974 A. Abarcar (June-August 2003), “Typhoon Gilas Flooded Ormoc,” The Observer 1:1. 
Leyte Institute of Technology-Ormoc City School of Arts and Trades, 17.   
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knee-deep in Barangay Toog, while Barangays Alegria, Punta, Linao and 
Naungan were similarly flooded. But technical solutions such as these are 
limited, and do not eliminate the root causes of disaster. While technical 
solutions to disaster are indeed the most visible assurance to the public of a 
government that is working to respond to future threats, they provide at best 
a false sense of security and invincibility. Indeed, the devastation wrought by 
Supertyphoon Yolanda in 2013 is testament to the weakness of primarily 
depending on the infallibility of infrastructures as a solution to disasters. 
Faced by strong winds and a storm surge—hazards that had not originally 
been foreseen as threats to the city—expensive infrastructure had been a 
useless barrier against the devastation of private and public properties.  
Vulnerability and disaster 
The same historical processes that predisposed societies to disasters 
also created vulnerability. While all Ormoc residents in 1991 had suffered 
death and destruction to varying degrees regardless of socio-economic 
status, the economic burden was highest for the poorest families living along 
the riverbanks. Yet while all poor families who had been direct victims of the 
flash flood equally suffered economic and physical losses, a smaller sub-set 
of families were reduced to more precarious situations than other poor 
families. Indeed, the poor cannot be seen as a homogeneous group. Urban 
poor families crowding on strips of public land along the riverbanks of the 
Anilao and Malbasag, for example, were economically better off than 
sugarcane worker families even before the flood, although both these groups 
were subsistence families who depended entirely on their manual labor. 
Urban poor families had enjoyed better access to information and resources 
due to their proximity to the city. They were also the direct recipients of 
resources made available immediately after the flood by local and barangay 
officials, NGOs and other donors, as they were the most visible victims. In 
comparison, sugarcane worker families fared worse because their areas 
were harder to reach by relief groups, information about assistance was 
scarce as it had to be filtered through the agalon—the landowner, the boss, 
the father figure—who had to approve of such interventions, and haciendas 
typically had poorer infrastructure such as roads even before the flood, 
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thereby rendering aid programs extremely difficult. Sugarcane worker 
families were the ‘hidden’ faces of suffering before and during the 1991 
disaster in Ormoc. As such, the flood only exacerbated the gap between the 
urban poor and the sugarcane workers. But the worse tragedy is that 
sugarcane worker families continue to be among the most vulnerable and 
marginalized in Ormoc society, especially those who persisted in the 
hacienda of Barangay Nalunopan after 1991.   
Poverty, as the case of the 1991 Ormoc flood had showed, is not 
similar to or synonymous with vulnerability. The deeper nuance in the 
concept of vulnerability compared with poverty in disaster discourse provided 
a magnifying lens through which disaster impacts can be better understood 
in disaster relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Thus, while poverty 
determines vulnerability, poor families do not experience vulnerability at 
similar levels. Within urban poor communities, women-headed households 
were particularly vulnerable because informal job opportunities in and around 
the city after the flood were more numerous for men than women. In addition, 
women were more socially oriented than men to care for families, which 
curtailed the time and opportunity to seek alternative livelihoods outside the 
home. However, such a constraint was not necessarily true for women-
headed households in sugarcane worker communities where manual labor 
did not discriminate based on sex. Women were employed on a daily wage, 
similar to men, regardless of age. Meanwhile, urban poor and sugarcane 
worker households alike, with elderly, disabled and small children, had to 
deal with additional economic burdens of healthcare that were not 
immediately available after a disaster, adding a layer of vulnerability to their 
life situations.   
Vulnerability in poverty-stricken communities is thus best understood 
as a continuum, determined by the unique characteristics that make up a 
household. At one end of the spectrum are households that, by virtue of 
possessing personal and socio-economic characteristics that provide them 
with a bundle of security nets against crises, are better able to cope with 
those crises. At the other end of the spectrum are those households that do 
not have similar security nets, and are thus far more easily affected 
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economically, psychologically and materially. In between these two 
spectrums are all the other households that make up a community. The 
characteristics that influence vulnerability include the age of a household’s 
members at the time of a hazard event, the location of their residence, 
occupation, educational attainment, sex, level of savings, number of children, 
and whether the members of the household are able to immediately access 
external help.975  
Vulnerability, viewed as a continuum, is also not static, as households 
are theoretically able to move out of vulnerable life situations through various 
means. At the personal level, they can physically transfer to safer locations, 
build stronger houses, and generally pursue activities that increase their 
resilience and lessen their vulnerability to disaster effects. At the community 
level, barangay and local governments can spearhead initiatives designed 
both to prevent disasters and to mitigate them. These initiatives include 
increasing campaigns for disaster awareness and preparedness, 
strengthening infrastructure development through the construction of better 
designed dams, bridges and roads, and allotting an appropriate budget for 
disaster relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation. However, the issue of 
overreliance on technical solutions to disaster, a common but short-sighted 
approach of governments, will be discussed in more depth later, but it bears 
noting here that to look at disasters as natural often leads to policies that 
merely attempt to predict the hazard and modify its impact,976 without 
necessarily changing the underlying source of systemic vulnerability. Such 
policies, including those that ostensibly manage the effects of future natural 
hazards such as the construction of better designed dams and breakwaters, 
generate a deeper level of marginalization, as communities are disrupted 
once again for relocation to areas far from their sources of livelihoods. More 
disturbingly, issues of land rights and land grabbing had been observed in 
the aftermath of recent disasters in the Philippines, often in the guise of 
																																								 																				
975 B. Wisner, P. Blaikie, T. Cannon and I. Davis, At Risk, Natural Hazards, People’s 
Vulnerability and Disasters, 11-13. 
976 T. Cannon, “Vulnerability analysis and the explanation of ‘natural’ disasters,” in Disasters, 
Development and Environment, ed. A. Varley (Chichester, New York, Brisbane, Toronto and 
Singapore: John Wiley and Sons, 2004), 13. 
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disaster reconstruction programs spearheaded by the government.977 In 
1991, the flood in Ormoc resulted in the clearing of riverbanks of illegal 
settlers and as such, led to an easier implementation by the local 
government of the easement policy in rivers. Clearly, government program or 
policy is never politically and socio-economically neutral.978  
Nonetheless, while vulnerability is theoretically an elastic concept, 
which accounts for families being able to move in and out of socio-
economically precarious situations after a relevant program of intervention, in 
reality it is a more permanent situation for many families. Emphasis must be 
given to the case of sugarcane worker families in Barangay Nalunopan 
(discussed in Chapter 7), which showed that they remained the most 
destitute even after twenty years from November 1991, in comparison with 
the urban poor disaster survivors. The reasons for the persistence of 
vulnerability and poverty in these areas are necessarily complex, but at its 
core is the weak role of government.  
The hand of government within haciendas in the Philippines is 
historically limited. In the barangay hacienda of Nalunopan, for instance, the 
government did construct one of the Japanese-designed and funded slit 
dams that benefited the entire city downstream. But roads, bridges and other 
infrastructure within the barangay remain non-existent, as these were costs 
that must accrue to the hacienda owner. While it is beyond the scope of this 
research to assess the impact of the highly touted developmental program 
called 4Ps (Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program or Bridging Program for 
the Filipino Family)979 of the Department of Social Welfare and Development 
																																								 																				
977 See, for instance, “Understanding land grabbing, land rights in the 21st century,” in 
particular M.A. Manahan, “When disasters clear the land: Narratives of post-Yolanda land 
contestations,” in Focus on the Global South Policy Review Vol 1 No 6, ed. M.A. Manahan 
and C. Militante (Diliman, Quezon City: Focus on the Global South Philippines, January-
June 2015). ISSN 2094-7089, 10-16 (Online). Also M.A. Uson, “Grabbing the ‘Clean Slate’: 
The politics of the intersection of land grabbing, disasters and climate change—insights from 
a local Philippine community in the aftermath of super typhoon Haiyan,” ISS Working Paper 
Series/General Series Vol. 603 (The Hague, The Netherlands: International Institute of 
Social Studies, February 2015), 1-50. ISSN 0921-0210 (Online).  
978 Cannon, “Vulnerability analysis and the explanation of ‘natural’ disasters,” 14. 
979 The 4Ps was launched in 2008 and implemented by the DSWD. It is patterned after the 
conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs in Latin America and African countries. 
Developmental partners include the Asian Development Bank (ADB), World Bank, and 
bilateral partners such as the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). It 
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(DSWD) in rural and urban areas of the country, including in haciendas in 
Ormoc, it is notable that several sugarcane worker survivor families in 
Nalunopan profess not to have yet been enrolled in the program. The 4Ps is 
a conditional cash transfer program that aims to eradicate extreme poverty 
by directly investing in health and education, particularly in children aged 
zero to fourteen years.980 The failure of some of the poorest families in 
Barangay Nalunopan to enrol in the 4Ps precludes the opportunity for their 
children to receive government support to enable them to continue their 
primary schooling. Yet some families were indeed not enrolled because they 
did not remain in one location inside the hacienda and did not reside 
permanently in one area. It was also these families whose children were not 
continuously in school, who would rather work as day laborers in the 
hacienda, and who often married young.  
The most glaring weakness in Nalunopan of course remains the 
government’s continued inability to impose the minimum wage for manual 
labor. Day laborers were paid the minimum of seventy pesos per day, 
without other social security benefits like the universal Social Security 
System (SSS) or PhilHealth. For the most vulnerable households, like 
sugarcane workers, the inability to earn the minimum wage per day forces 
them to supplement their income with other sources, such as selling 
backyard produce or doing odd jobs around the city. The real challenge 
occurs when the breadwinner in the household becomes sick and is unable 
to earn his daily wage. In the hacienda, if a laborer becomes sick, he gets no 
wage and there are also no social security nets for him or his family. Yet, 
sugarcane worker families in Nalunopan were remarkably offhand about their 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 											
aims to target 4.3 million poor households by 2016. Approximately 120 billion pesos have 
been allocated to date, with approximately 3,086,427 beneficiaries in 1,400 cities and 
municipalities in 79 provinces in all 17 regions nationwide.  
980 For a discussion on research on the impact of the 4Ps on school enrollment, see N. 
Chaudhury and Y. Okamura, “Conditional cash transfers and school enrollment: Impact of 
the conditional cash transfer program in the Philippines,” in Philippine Social Protection Note 
No. 6 (World Bank Group and Australian Aid, July 2012) (Online). Reyes and Tabuga note 
targeting concerns, whereby 171,947 households (or 7.5% of total 2.3 million household 
beneficiaries that had been served by the program so far) had been delisted because they 
were found to be non-poor and non-compliant. For Reyes and Tabuga, this indicates 
leakages in the program.  C. Reyes and A. Tabuga, “Conditional cash transfer program in 
the Philippines: Is it reaching the extremely poor?” Discussion Paper Series No. 2012-42 
(Makati City: Philippine Institute for Development Studies, December 2012) (Online).  
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health. The lack of economic resources results in these families depending 
on ‘herbal’ remedies for common illnesses, with most not seeing a medical 
practitioner for most of their lives. Health is a luxury that these families could 
scarce afford. At the same time, their attitude towards death is fatalistic, 
practical and no-nonsense. Everybody dies one way or another, and to die 
when one was old did not make so much difference as when one died when 
one was young. There were stories of sugarcane workers in Nalunopan who 
contracted serious illnesses, but were never treated in any hospital setting. A 
woman worker, for example, may have suffered what could have been 
cancer based on the symptoms described, but she was never brought to the 
doctor and she died in her own house after a few years with only herbs to 
help her manage her pain. Yet her family took care of her the best they could 
for the few years prior to her death.  
As the case of the 1991 Ormoc disaster shows, the delineation 
between poverty and vulnerability is counterproductive in the longer-term 
process of recovery. Poverty is indeed different from vulnerability. But the 
poorest families will always be the most vulnerable, and vice versa. 
Sugarcane laborer families, considered as among the poorest sectors in the 
country, remain the most at risk from disasters, whether they reside and work 
in the hacienda or move to new locations, and even after intervention 
programs such as resettlement to new locales. Yet, they continue to be 
‘hidden’ despite this reality.    
It is not surprising that though poverty and vulnerability are 
persistently higher in rural than urban areas in the Philippines, public interest 
is more focused on urban affairs. Death and destruction in cities always 
command more intense attention and concern than those that occur in rural 
locations.      
In the Philippines where the media is often perceived as a more 
credible source of information than the government, the public’s 
understanding of events is largely influenced by what people see on the 
news. In the case of the Ormoc 1991 flood, national media outfits circulated 
numerous images of the massive and utter destruction in the city center that 
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quickly created the disaster discourse. These images focused on the urban 
squatters as the face of the Ormoc tragedy. On the other hand, sugarcane 
worker families who were also devastated by the floods, residing almost in 
isolation in rural upland areas, did not capture public attention. Perceived as 
temporary or seasonal migrant workers from different parts of Leyte and 
working anonymously in haciendas all over Ormoc, never mind that majority 
of them had resided in the haciendas for at least ten years, they were 
considered outsiders even prior to the flood event. In the eyes of the local 
government, burdened as it was by competing demands on its finite 
resources, it was rational in the aftermath of the 1991 tragedy to shift the 
responsibility of hacienda workers back to the agalon, who was after all the 
only source of these workers’ economic and social wellbeing. If not for 
Catholic church groups that had persisted in their active interest in the plight 
of sugarcane worker families since the 1970s, these marginalized groups 
would have completely fallen through the cracks of economic neglect. 
Similarly, other hinterland groups around Leyte island and Negros province 
that had also been adversely affected by Typhoon Uring in 1991 did not 
invite the same level of media attention as the small community in Ormoc 
City called Isla Verde that was completely wiped out by the flash flood. 
Consequently, aid was not as numerous in these areas unidentified by the 
media, as compared with those that had received consistent public attention.   
Ormoc in 2013, twenty-two years after 1991, is a bustling city. It 
boasts of major thoroughfares with popular fast food chains such as Jollibee, 
Andok’s, McDonald’s and Greenwich competing with local restaurants. There 
were Gaisano malls in two separate but prime locations, several large and 
small grocery stores, banks, universities, schools and small entrepreneurial 
shops. Everywhere there were signs of socio-economic progress. Only a 
small sculpture existed that served as memorial to the 6,000 or so victims of 
the Ormoc flood in 1991, but that one was found in the cemetery grounds far 
from the city center. In many ways, it appeared that the 1991 tragedy was 
forgotten in the collective consciousness of Ormoc.  
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Natural hazards that quickly unravel into a deeper social problem very 
often result in some form of social change.981 The effects of a hazard on the 
social, political and economic aspects of a society represent a break from 
“business as usual,” which is especially true for hazards that occur suddenly 
and on a massive scale. These events are thus opportunities to right past 
wrongs through the formulation and implementation of policies with better 
consideration of the built and natural environment. At the collective level, the 
lives of poor families in Ormoc after 1991 had indeed changed after the 
deluge of assistance that the city received. For many, especially those in the 
city center, relocation to ‘safer’ areas, facilitated both by local and national 
governments as well as by NGOs, provided them with a jumpstart to new 
lives. Of course who determined what ‘safer’ areas were was a political 
decision, certainly a decision often based on expediency to a short term 
problem of providing a solution to the issue of homelessness rather than as a 
long term solution of eliminating vulnerability among the most marginalized 
groups. Recipient families agreed to be relocated because of the promise of 
free housing, never mind that the area set aside for the purpose was not 
necessarily safer or less risky than the riverbanks where they originally came 
from. Barangay Tambulilid, the site for the local government’s resettlement 
program in 1993, was in fact an area also historically prone to flooding. 
Nonetheless, relocation often solved the problem of repeated vulnerability 
because, at the short term, it created an opportunity for the poorest families 
to leave high-risk areas and rebuild new lives elsewhere.  
Yet natural hazards such as typhoons, floods and landslides are 
‘normal’ occurrences in the Philippines where geographic location and its 
topographic character regularly influence the lives of communities. As such, 
resettled families continue to contend with the effects of new hazards even in 
their new living areas. The question is how these families are able to cope 
with new threats to their fragile livelihoods brought about by new hazards 
when they are only just starting to recover from the effects of a previous 
																																								 																				
981 See H. Vollmer, The Sociology of Disruption, Disaster and Social Change, Punctuated 
Cooperation (Cambridge University Press; A. Prelog, 2010). Vollmer, in particular, defines 
disruption in a tautological sense: “as any actual occasion which at least one participant 
marks as being disruptive” (42) in an attempt to “frame” it within the context of everyday life.  
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hazard. Indeed, a scholar had argued that, in the case of Guatemala, for 
example, a history of political violence and injustice contributed to the 
existence of ‘permanent disaster’ among the poorest segments of its 
society.982 For Ormoc, a history that privileged environmental exploitation for 
the sake of economic growth and development, coupled with the unique 
realities of geography and topography, have resulted in the creation of 
‘permanent disaster’ for the poorest families. Disaster for these families is 
experienced not as a single event, but as a sustained series of threats to 
livelihoods and meager incomes.  
Non-government organizations undoubtedly undertake important work 
in areas that the national and local governments are unable to do so, 
especially in disaster aftermath. In Barangay Tambulilid, for example, where 
the civil society organization Gawad Kalinga (GK) had adopted several of the 
poorest urban poor communities (discussed in Chapter 6), including 
resettled survivor families, majority of the houses provided to beneficiaries in 
the past was destroyed after Supertyphoon Yolanda struck Ormoc City in 
November 2013. Recipient families were rendered homeless yet again. An 
Ormoc-based GK worker, who had been a 1991 flood survivor himself, noted 
in the aftermath of Super Typhoon Yolanda:  
We did not know where help would come from, but we knew God 
would not let us down.983      
 Alluding to the 1991 Ormoc tragedy, he added, “It is like we are 
brought together and made even stronger by storms.”984  
It is fortunate that the GK communities in Barangay Tambulilid, like 
other GK projects all over the Philippines, are linked together with external 
networks of volunteers and donors, which provided the much-needed 
support for rehabilitation and reconstruction. Gandang Kalikasan, Inc., a 
social enterprise established by the daughters of Gawad Kalinga founder 
																																								 																				
982 R. Plant in Wisner et al (2004), 9.  
983 Buboy Igot cited in T. Castillo, “Thank you, Tambulilid,” in Human Nature, accessed 19 
January 2015 (Online).  
984 Ibid. 
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Antonio Meloto985 in 2008 and selling organic personal care products, funded 
the rehabilitation of the GK communities in Barangay Tambulilid, with more 
than 100 houses constructed immediately after the devastation of Super 
Typhoon Yolanda. The GK itself had been touted as “an innovative approach 
that could be the key to solving poverty and homelessness in the 
Philippines.”986 It was in fact its aggressive “grassroots approach” of 
mobilizing volunteers, alongside family recipients, and tapping local 
governments and donors for logistical and financial support that made it so 
popular in the country and abroad. In the process, GK was honored with 
several awards since it first began to operate as an offshoot of the popular 
Catholic lay community called Couples for Christ in the early 2000s. Indeed, 
without the power of a public who believed in GK’s programs, comprised of 
both individuals and organizations in the Philippines and abroad who 
continually support its work through volunteerism and donations, there would 
be no chance at all for any kind of sustainable community building for any of 
the affected families in its adopted communities all over the Philippines, 
including the GK villages in Barangay Tambulilid. Community resilience in 
GK communities is undoubtedly strongly dependent on external support, 
without which these communities will wither. However, because Gawad 
Kalinga has prioritized collaboration with the government and as a result has 
followed a strategy of silence over political issues in order to protect its 
generally harmonious relationship (otherwise how could it accept donations 
of land from the government?), it has done a great disservice to the Ormoc 
people. By choosing alliance with the government above all else, it condones 
social injustice by its refusal to recognize the inherent flaws and 
shortcomings of government actions and the lessons of history in relation to 
elite families.  
This failure, however, is not solely for Gawad Kalinga. Again, while the 
work that Catholic priests and nuns in disaster response is crucial, they had 
																																								 																				
985 Gandang Kalikasan, Inc. was established by Anna Meloto-Wilk, Dylan Wilk, and Camille 
Meloto. See L. Cristobal, “Entrepreneur Anna Meloto-Wilk on women and the business of 
changing the world,” GMA News Online, 15 March 2015 (Online).  
986 R. Habaradas and M. L. Aquino, “Towards innovative, livable, and prosperous Asian 
megacities, Gawad Kalinga: Innovation in the city (and beyond),” AKI Working Paper No. 10-
01C (Manila: Angelo King Institute, De La Salle University, August 2010).   
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been unable to promote public debate within their own communities about 
the real causes of the continuing persistence of poverty and vulnerability. A 
difficult issue to deal with, the Catholic church instead preferred to focus on 
providing care to the poorest and most vulnerable communities and families. 
In the Saint Philippine Duchesne Ormoc Workers Foundation, Inc. 
(SPDOWFI), the community established by the intrepid nuns of the Religious 
of the Sacred Heart of Jesus (RSCJ) in Barangay Luna among former sugar 
hacienda worker families, the disaster in 2013 led one nun to observe:  
In our community, there were houses standing, but roofs had all been 
blown away, including the roof of our center, day care center and 
chapel…It was a pitiful sight, I wanted to cry, but the people were so 
happy to see that I made it there. So I told them I would get there by 
hook or by crook.”987 
Another priest noted: 
We want to respond right away to the need for food in remote areas 
because government and other agencies are focused on the Tacloban 
area. Some of the people had not eaten for days…Many people are 
depressed and fearful and we are thinking of how we can help them 
with that (emphasis supplied).988 
Incidentally, SPDOWFI celebrated its twentieth anniversary on 18 
November 2013, just a few days after the devastation of Supertyphoon 
Yolanda. According to the RSCJ, “[n]ow, more than ever, the community 
feels the need to come together in shared suffering, but also combined hope 
and trust in the God who saves” (emphasis supplied).989 Like Gawad 
Kalinga, the SPDOWFI continues to be a viable community because of 
valuable support from the nuns. It remains to be seen, however, whether the 
planned turnover of the community to its residents and the eventual retreat of 
the RSCJ from community decision-making will stimulate grassroots 
																																								 																				
987 Sr. Sandra Clemente, RSCJ, cited in N.J. Viehland, Ibid.  
988 Carmelite Father Ernesto Ombrog III cited in N.J. Viehland, “Religious orders in 
Philippines rush to help typhoon victims,” National Catholic Reporter, 15 November 2013 
(Online).  
989 Sr. Joy Luz, RSCJ, “Update: November 14, 2013, in News from the Philippines, Network 
of Sacred Heart Schools (Online).  
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initiative. In both the cases of the GK communities in Barangay Tambulilid 
and the SPDOWFI in Barangay Luna, stimulus for collective resilience and 
community building came from outside sources, even after more than twenty 
years from the 1991 tragedy. These two cases show that external support 
from non-government organizations and other groups is crucial in ensuring 
the sustainability of resettled communities. At least with these two cases, it is 
clear that the communities in general have remained dependent on external 
support. In the case of the GK villages in Tambulilid, Gawad Kalinga 
provided continuous logistical and moral support as there is a permanent GK 
structure within the community through which GK volunteers and workers 
regularly interacted with community members. In SPDOWFI, Sister Iraida 
Sua-an, RSCJ, had continuously resided in a house built in the heart of the 
community and funded by the RSCJ Mother House, providing a stabilizing 
presence and vital leadership over community affairs. Nonetheless, it is clear 
that the process of community building adopted in GK and SPDOWFI—
controlled and directed by external actors—assume that these communities 
are inherently fragile, weak and, therefore, unable to stand on their own 
devices. Unfortunately, nothing is known about the plight of Barangay 
Nalunopan (discussed in Chapter 7) after Supertyphoon Yolanda in 2013. At 
least until October 2013, a month before the devastation occurred due to 
Supertyphoon Yolanda, the community that remained there reported they 
experienced continued vulnerability after the 1991 Ormoc flood, with 
sugarcane worker survivors noting that their lives had not substantially 
changed since then.  
Yet, why was it that given similar types of assistance through 
rehabilitation programs designed to help disaster survivors get back on their 
feet, some families are simply not able to do so? What accounts for families 
being able to cope from the effects of disaster and those who could not? 
Indeed, why does vulnerability persist for some families and not for others, 
even after similar programs of intervention for relief and rehabilitation?  The 
answer is that, based on the cases discussed in previous chapters, the 
combination of personal circumstances and the lack of strong social safety 
nets available to poor families in disaster aftermath, especially ready sources 
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of low-interest credit, result in economic uncertainty, deepening the already 
alarming situation for many families. Ormoc City, like the rest of the country, 
is characterized by a self-help socio-economic environment that privileges 
profit. Credit options are thus often closed to poor households, who have 
nothing to offer as collateral. In communities with established external 
support systems in disaster aftermath, the poorest families are able to utilize 
resources—both material and financial—that may not be readily available at 
‘normal’ times because access is facilitated by non-government 
organizations. In such adopted communities as GK villages and the 
SPDOWFI, for example, where benefactors are ever present, there is no 
need to compete for scarce resources. Such a situation is most visible in GK 
communities, as the organization is able to quickly mobilize volunteers and 
donations in disaster aftermath, and as such to emphasize the organization’s 
culture of ‘bayanihan’ or communitarian unity and cooperation even in the 
midst of chaos brought about by a natural hazard. One GK village survivor 
captures this sense succinctly after the Yolanda tragedy of 2013:  
The GK motto “Walang Iwanan” (leave no one behind) became real to 
us. Because had it not been for the values of Gawad Kalinga, it would 
have been every man for himself.990  
Thus, coping in disaster aftermath is taught as a collective project, 
where the value of ‘bayanihan’ is emphasized among beneficiary 
households, thereby shifting the focus of coping and resilience from personal 
interests, a common mindset of the urban poor, to community interest. To a 
lesser extent, SPDOWFI—vastly under-resourced in comparison with Gawad 
Kalinga—is also able to link the community with outside organizations and 
individuals who could provide valuable material and financial assistance in 
disaster aftermath. Communities without such established institutional 
support are obviously at a marked disadvantage because members can only 
rely on individual resources and initiatives to cope with the effects of massive 
tragedies.   
																																								 																				
990 Santiago Penaso cited in G. Luga, “Ormoc: Rising above tragedy, over and over again,” 
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318	|	F L O O D W A T E R S 	 O F 	 D E A T H 	
	
 Unique circumstances also explain the persistence of vulnerability in 
several cases of families observed in this research. The range of personal 
tragedies that poor families experience is vast—illnesses brought about by 
lifelong poor health and hygiene, deaths and disabilities resulting from 
pursuits of risky livelihoods, early marriages of teenage daughters and sons, 
unplanned pregnancies, drug addiction, alcoholism, smoking, and gambling, 
among a few. All these life events greatly affect a family’s ability to not only 
adequately recover from natural hazards that regularly occur, but also 
systematically curtail opportunities to pursue uninterrupted productive lives.  
The lives of the poor are undoubtedly played out as a series of minor 
disasters that, over time, result in the creation and subsequent deepening of 
vulnerability. Once a natural hazard occurs, it wipes out all the incremental 
gains the family had achieved thus far, and plunges the household in further 
economic and social despair, which takes years to achieve pre-hazard 
levels. Thus, while it is possible for a household to cope with a new ‘normal’ 
in the months following a hazard through the erection of a new house 
somewhere safer and making the most of the material and financial 
donations, resources are logically diverted to the satisfaction of ever basic 
needs—food, potable water, health, housing, etc., with savings becoming 
virtually impossible. It is a dismal cycle of poverty and vulnerability. It is also 
undeniable that an intervention is required to cut the cycle, and it is precisely 
this role of government that is vital in disaster aftermath. NGOs and other 
groups fill the gaps in government action by focusing on the marginalized 
sectors.  
Vulnerability in disaster aftermath 
 Vulnerability in disaster research is defined as the 
…characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence 
their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the 
impact of a natural hazard (an extreme natural event or process). It 
involves a combination of factors that determine the degree to which 
someone’s life, livelihood, property or other assets are put at risk by a 
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discrete and identifiable event (or series or ‘cascade’ of such events) 
in nature and in society (original emphasis).991 
 The above definition is markedly simpler and more direct than a 
previous description used in an earlier edition of Blaikie et al (1994), wherein 
an attempt is made to delineate social vulnerability from susceptibility of the 
built environment. Social vulnerability is the 
…characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to 
anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural 
hazard. It involves a combination of factors that determine the degree 
to which someone’s life or livelihood are put at risk by a discrete and 
identifiable event in nature or in society.”992  
The transition from the latter definition to the former bears noting 
because of the emphasis on people’s situations, implying the transitory 
nature of vulnerability. The inherent negative character of vulnerability, which 
assumes a passive and weak perspective to those who are seen primarily as 
victims of natural hazards, precludes a creative and realistic approach to 
individual and community survivors in disaster aftermath. By focusing on 
people’s situations, the vulnerability approach concedes that people are 
vulnerable based on their particular circumstances. The situations that 
people find themselves in contribute to their vulnerability, and thus may be a 
temporary condition. Several points are also relevant in both definitions:  
• Attributes within societies are different. Thus, vulnerable individuals 
and groups exist in an otherwise resilient society; 
• The entire disaster management cycle—Prevention and Mitigation, 
Preparedness, Response and Recovery—is encompassed in the 
determination of vulnerability;  
																																								 																				
991 B. Wisner et al (2004), At Risk, Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability and Disasters, 2nd 
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• Everyone has some level of capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist 
and recover from a hazard. Thus, vulnerability is “a matter of degree, 
and not an absolute quality;”993 
• Vulnerability is a result of a combination of several factors; 
• Livelihoods and other assets are at risk in disaster aftermath, not just 
life. As such, “fatalities” is not the single dominant measure of disaster 
impact; 994 and  
• The recognition that an event may not only be a one-time occurrence, 
but a series—and indeed a cascade—of incidents reflects the reality 
for the poorest families in a society.    
The notion that vulnerability is temporary presents a positive and 
proactive approach to a problem that is primarily seen as a governance 
issue. By focusing on people’s situations, the implicit assumption is that a 
targeted intervention is possible, indeed required, to move them out of 
vulnerable situations.  
Closely linked to the concept of vulnerability as a governance issue is 
the notion of risk. At the individual level, vulnerability has been traditionally 
conceptualized as risk, with consideration to the following core issues: To 
what extent is an individual exposed to a specific hazard? What is the 
probability he/she will be adversely affected? Why is an individual particularly 
vulnerable to that hazard? What are the proper indicators to measure his/her 
vulnerability? What can be done to avoid his/her risk due to this hazard? 
These questions are central to traditional risk assessment, expressed in the 
following formula: 
 Risk = Hazard x Vulnerability995        
 The above pseudo-equation is advocated by Blaikie et al (2004), and 
is relevant in the use of the Pressure and Release model (PAR) that the 
book recommends to show how disasters occur when natural hazards affect 
																																								 																				
993 C. Bara. “Factsheet, Social Vulnerability to Disasters,” CRN Report commissioned by the 
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994 Ibid. 
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vulnerable populations. Traditional risk assessment, however, is usually 
limited to the identification of dangers, defined as the probability of 
occurrence and likely damage, expressed in the following equation:  
 Risk = Probability x impact (Damage)996 
In the above equation, risk is measured by the probability of the 
hazard occurrence multiplied by the perceived effects or damage resulting 
from the hazard, in terms of life, property and other considerations such as 
future incomes. Vulnerability is hidden in the ‘impact’ dimension of the risk 
because the calculation of impact or damages is based on the unique 
combinations of personal characteristics, such as age, sex, family 
background, education, etc. Nonetheless, vulnerability in the above equation 
is not disaggregated to account for very different impacts within society.997 
Studies, for example, have shown that the risk of drowning was higher for 
women during the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami than for men in many villages 
in Indonesia.998 The socially differentiated risks to drowning of more women 
during floods had been observed to be due to cultural and social factors that 
restrict mobility, limit education and training, prescribe responsibilities for the 
care of children and elderly, and undertaking occupations that increase 
risk.999 The calculation of risk of course assumes that individuals are able to 
correctly identify the probability of an adverse effect and as such take 
rational steps to choose to avoid those risks. Indeed, the conceptualization of 
risk assumes that individuals (and groups) have a level of choice on whether 
to further engage in behaviors that may be characterized as risk taking or 
risk avoiding. However, in many cases where the sources of vulnerability are 
socio-economic and political inequalities, choice becomes irrelevant. The 
decision to relocate to less risky areas, for example, is influenced by financial 
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(Is it affordable?), cultural (Is it appropriate?), and political considerations (Is 
it secure?).1000  
Human agency remains a key factor in vulnerability discourses 
because survivors themselves, including the most vulnerable families, 
actively and consciously make decisions prior to, during and after a disaster. 
Wisner et al (2004) differentiate between “individually generated access to 
safety (self-protection)” (in contradistinction to individually generated 
vulnerability) and other aspects of safety, which include social protection.1001 
Individually generated safety includes actions such as strengthening houses, 
locating on land considered safe from floods, and using drought-resistant 
seeds during farming, among others. Social protection encompasses both 
non-monetary social relations and the provision by the government and other 
institutional organizations of preventive measures.1002 In the cases discussed 
in previous chapters, survivor families maximize self-protection and social 
protection when these clearly benefit them. However, self-protection often 
entails extra cost, e.g. reinforcing housing structures to ensure the non-
recurrence of flooding, which some families cannot afford. In such cases, 
social protection or social capital, or the ways that families are able to tap the 
community, NGOs, the government and other groups, bridges the shortage 
in their own self-protection initiatives. It is notable, for example, that in 
Barangay Nalunopan, those areas that had claimed many lives had been re-
populated by some families that survived the 1991 flood and chose not to 
relocate outside the hacienda barangay. A typical Barangay Nalunopan 
family’s decision to persist in areas that had been previously flooded was 
based on several factors: proximity to the sugarcane fields where family 
members work, proximity to immediate family and friends in particular and 
the community in general, and accessibility to the entrance and exit of the 
barangay. Proximity to the community becomes a source of social protection, 
especially in situations where external sources of assistance, such as NGOs, 
are non-existent, as in the case of Barangay Nalunopan. In communities 
where NGOs are active, however, these NGOs provide valuable social 
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protection for the community as a whole through external linkages and 
networks.  
In general, local and national government agencies fail to identify the 
needs of the most vulnerable groups in a community in the planning of local 
response and relief organization.1003 The reasons cited for this failure include 
local authorities commonly being understaffed, underfunded and stretched 
thin during emergencies, while state authorities lack the systems in place to 
allocate resources as needed.1004 As such, tools for identifying vulnerable 
populations are increasingly recognized in developed countries such as the 
United States as vital for emergency response planning. Social vulnerability 
indices (SVI) are one such tool increasingly advocated for use by 
government agencies to identify the location of the most vulnerable 
populations in a society, using the following factors: 
• Socioeconomic variables such as poverty, employment and 
education;  
• Household composition/disability comprising age, parenting 
(whether single parenting) and disability variables;  
• Minority status/language comprising race, ethnicity; 
• Housing and transportation comprising housing structure, 
crowding and vehicle access variable.1005 
 Local governments and locally based non-governmental 
organizations are logically the most knowledgeable about their communities. 
However, the conduct of SVIs entails organizational costs, which many 
governments and agencies cannot cover due to financial constraints. In post-
1991 Ormoc City, the local government did not have programs that 
specifically targeted the identification and mitigation of vulnerable 
populations, separate from the generally poor communities. Local 
government officials were generally aware of where the poorest communities 
lived, but were not knowledgeable about the general wellbeing of these 
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individual families due to a lack of programs that specifically targeted them. It 
was notable that only in the Gawad Kalinga and SPDOWFI villages were 
vulnerable families individually identified, but this was due to the fact that the 
communities were spatially defined in terms of area of residence and the 
communities were smaller in number. As such, it was easier to get to know 
the specific circumstances of each family and to provide targeted intervention 
programs that aim to mitigate these dire circumstances. However, in the 
general Ormoc society where the urban and rural poor reside, such as in the 
sugarcane haciendas and the pockets of illegal and temporary settler 
communities around the city center, including Barangay Tambulilid, families 
often live without particular notice by the officials and agencies of the local 
government. For many of these urban and rural poor Ormocanons, the face 
of government is the barangay social and/or health worker, who administer 
and implement crucial and basic health and education services for their 
children through various barangay programs.  For the most part of their lives, 
these households are left to survive on their own initiatives and devices.   
Social memory of disaster 
Major disasters in many societies evolve to become critical markers of 
social identity. In many instances, the shared experience of a massive 
tragedy brought about by a natural hazard results in the creation of a sense 
of solidarity and community especially in its immediate aftermath. In the case 
of Ormoc City, survivors of the 1991 flood, particularly those posessing the 
evidence of an ‘uwat’ (scar), delineated the ‘pure’ from the ‘migrant’ 
residents. Nonetheless, the memorialization of the flood tragedy in Ormoc 
had not been sustained until the present times, ostensibly due to the waning 
interest of the people themselves. In the years after 1991, the local 
government had allowed a day of mourning in observance of 5 November 
1991. Proclamation No. 92, signed by then President Fidel Ramos, marked 
the first year death anniversary as a special non-working day and a day of 
mourning as “a reminder that this tragic event would not have happened if 
our forests had been accorded due protection.” Proclamation Nos. 287 in 
1993 and 911 in 1996, also signed by President Ramos, designated 5 
November as a special day in Ormoc City. By 2001, Republic Act No. 9068 
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had declared 5 November of every year as “remembrance day in Ormoc 
City,” a regular working holiday. The most tangible memorial to the 1991 
flood was erected at the public cemetery, with a sculpture and the following 
words:  
In loving memory of our brothers and sisters who perished during the 
November 5, 1991 flashflood, whose lives had been lost by the 
dreadful wrath of nature, a painful event, but a crucial reminder of our 
obligations in the care of the environment.  
For when nature is disturbed, it strikes back in fury and spares no one 
(emphasis supplied).  
The process of creating social memory in disaster aftermath, when 
sanctioned and promoted by local and/or national authorities, is the ultimate 
example of how dominant history is shaped. In the case of Ormoc, the local 
government in 1991—led by then Ormoc mayor Victoria Locsin—supported 
and promoted a disaster story that placed the blame squarely on illegal 
logging. As logging was already a sensitive issue in a country that was only 
beginning to recover in the 1990s from two decades of massive government 
corruption under the Marcos regime, it was not difficult for Ormocanons in 
particular and Filipinos in general to believe this reasoning. Massive logging 
activities—both legal and illegal—in the decades prior to 1991 were well 
known in the entire archipelago, with many politicians and government 
officials involved either directly as loggers themselves or tagged as coddlers 
of illegal loggers.  
But why must disasters be remembered? What do disaster narratives 
say about a society? Why is a well balanced disaster narrative imperative? 
What is the role of myths vis-à-vis factual narratives in disaster? 
Remembering and analyzing why something happened increases awareness 
and strengthens learning, which in turn improves resilience and coping 
mechanisms. In the case of Ormoc City, the myths that proliferated after the 
1991 flood have two dimensions. First, miracle stories not only emphasize 
the piety of the Ormoc community. More importantly, they underscore the 
fatalism of a people constantly subjected to forces—both natural and man-
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made—seemingly beyond ordinary human control. In a society where 
government is distant and generally perceived as far removed from the daily 
cycle of life, people have no other recourse but to depend on their own 
initiative and if this was not enough, to surrender to God. The fatalism 
inherent in the Ormoc people’s psyche reflects a centuries-old conditioning of 
distrust and, to a large extent, disregard for government institutions that do 
not greatly impact on people’s concerns. It also highlights the futility of 
directly challenging the power of nature that constantly shows the 
impermanence and imperfectness of infrastructure, systems, policies and 
laws, and as such demands that people are flexible above all. It is this 
fatalism that, I believe, is at the core of the Ormoc people’s remarkable ability 
to cope under extreme and repetitive destructive natural hazards that breed 
disasters. The second dimension inherent in the Ormoc myth stories—
particularly the popular story of the little thirsty boy who had been deprived of 
clean drinking water by an uncaring household—was the complicity of 
families and communities in bringing about the disaster, they who were 
economically better off. At the core of these stories is the moral lesson that 
selfishness, disregard, greed and unconcern for others especially of the 
more vulnerable do affect and, indeed, destroy an entire society. It is notable 
that though there were a few clubs and bars that catered to the sex industry 
in 1991, there were no myth stories surrounding sexual morality. In Ormoc in 
1991, therefore, greed and selfishness were worse sins than sexual 
promiscuity. Yet these tropes were not fully allowed to surface as a collective 
project of social unity, and as such could only be expressed as personal 
stories of despair.  
The role of government in the creation of an ‘official’ narrative of 
disaster is enormous, as it had in its disposal the political clout and financial 
wherewithal to support the activities required to engender the collective 
interest in keeping disaster memories alive. Yet, it is also possible that the 
government is not keen to support the creation of a social memory of 
disaster. It is notable, for example, that there was no common knowledge 
about the 1953 North Sea flood (watersnoodramp or flood disaster) in the 
Netherlands, even though it was considered one of the worst and most 
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traumatizing events in that country, resulting in the death of 1836 people, 
72,000 lost homes and flooding to an area measuring almost 500,000 
acres.1006 In a post-World War II Europe trying to rise from the horrors of war, 
the Dutch media focused on the idealistic image of unity, heroism and 
determination, rather than the realities of trauma, sorrow, death and loss. Of 
course the Dutch people and government later successfully mitigated future 
similar disasters through the ambitious “Deltaplan” and the extensive 
technological marvel called Delta Works. But it was only forty years after the 
North Sea Flood when the watersnoodramp’s narrative, which till then had 
been predominantly a story of fraternity and cohesion, was allowed to reflect 
survivors’ accounts, documented for the first time.1007 The inclusion of 
survivors’ ethnographies enriched the narrative of the 1953 North Sea Flood 
by surfacing new cultural themes such as regret, guilt, and despair.  
At the city level, collective commemoration primarily highlighted 
change and growth of Ormoc, rather than the individual chaos experienced 
by the survivors, or even the root causes of the disaster. The news reports 
that also proliferated at the time, particularly from national news outfits, 
focused on investigating illegal disaster, but failed to include in any 
meaningful way the culpability of elite families. A groundbreaking 
investigative book was published two years after the Ormoc tragedy that 
would uncover the intricate links between politics and the environment, and 
would become the first book to delve into the murky world of logging in the 
Philippines before, during and immediately after the authoritarian regime of 
Ferdinand Marcos. Power from the Forest by Marites Vitug was also the first 
time to put the blame squarely on deforestation, not illegal logging, as the 
primary cause of the devastation in the wake of the Ormoc floods.1008 As 
such, the culpability of government agencies—and politicians, especially 
those that came from elite bloodlines—through the implementation of land 
use policies and the massive conversion of forestlands into agricultural and 
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commercial logging areas was highlighted for the first time in Philippine 
history. Yet while the book paved the way for increased awareness of the 
devastating impact of deforestation in the country, no one among those who 
had been identified was ever charged until today. More disturbingly, the 1991 
Ormoc flood presaged a series of massive disasters that rivaled it in the 
number of deaths and properties destroyed. The Ormoc tragedy became 
only one among many disasters, and the powerful message of Power from 
the Forest was eventually superseded by more urgent concerns of relief and 
rehabilitation from subsequent disasters. In the face of these realities, 
however, ordinary Filipinos—including those who were the most vulnerable 
in every community that experienced the devastation of recent volcanic 
eruptions, flooding and earthquakes—were able to cope again and again, 
even without corresponding changes in laws that are direct consequences of 
these disasters. So long as elite families are allowed to insulate themselves 
from public discourse in disaster aftermath, there can be no lasting learning 
from catastrophes. As such, Philippine society is bound to repeat the same 
cycles of poverty and vulnerability.  
In the case of the 1991 Ormoc flood, the local government was 
instrumental in initiating commemoration activities apart from declaring 5 
November as a day of mourning, such as the celebration of Holy Mass and 
candle-lighting activities along Ormoc Bay. If in the early years after 1991 
more people participated in these activities, attendance subsequently 
dwindled until only the occasional Eucharistic masses and the ubiquitous 
tarpaulin survived, the latter of which was erected prominently in the city 
square with photos of the flood effects and the reconstruction period. Aside 
from the sculpture in the Ormoc City Public Cemetery, another infrastructural 
monument to the 1991 flood is the Japanese-designed, -built and -funded slit 
dams and dikes. However, the low interest among Ormoc residents in the 
social memory of the 1991 flood reflected in the current scarcity in cultural 
and literary work such as plays, poems, essays, etc. In fact, this 
ethnographic study is the first known collection of personal narratives of that 
disaster.  
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The ethnographic process, which entailed hours of open interviews 
using a set of questions to provide general framework, allowed flood 
survivors to explore feelings that had not ever been discussed outside the 
confines of the family and surprisingly did not wane after twenty or so years. 
These emotions—guilt for being alive while loved ones had died, despair, 
meaninglessness, regret, anger at God—remained strong in personal 
psyches so that when asked to relive the events of 5 November 1991, many 
of the respondents still cried. What was notable was that most of them had 
not had any trauma counseling after the 1991 disaster. In a survey 
conducted three years and five months after November 1991, survivor 
respondents were found to exhibit either of two sub-categories of emotion-
focused coping: escapism (e.g., I tried not to think about it. I distract myself 
so that I won’t remember) and seeking meaning (e.g., I tried to see it as the 
will of God and accept it as such). In 2013 during the ethnographic research 
among Ormoc survivors, these two coping strategies were very much 
evident. Escapism was a default mechanism for many families who had been 
affected by the death and destruction of the 1991 flood, preferring instead to 
act on the daily demands of life rather than processing the emotional and 
psychological effects of a horrific life event. The second strategy—seeking 
meaning—resulted in heightened expressions of religiosity immediately after 
the flood, but did not necessarily translate to sustained religiosity over the 
years. Nonetheless, among Ormocanons themselves there was no sense of 
outrage over the historical processes that had created the poverty and 
vulnerability that afflicted the majority of Ormoc society and that led to the 
massive deaths and destruction in 1991. For many, that disaster was an act 
of God.  
At the very start of this research, I argued that the 1991 Ormoc 
disaster cannot be natural. Historical precedents had predisposed Ormoc 
City to a massive flood that rendered the most vulnerable and poorest 
families and communities ever vulnerable to succeeding economic and 
physical disruptions brought about by natural hazards. However, while 
history forms the basis for disaster, how it is remembered reflects the 
relationships that characterize society with the various groups within it and 
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with the built and natural environment that surrounds it. It is notable that 
based on how the 1991 flood is remembered, Ormoc society in general do 
not perceive the causal links between the effects of that disaster especially 
among the poorest and most vulnerable communities and the economic 
activities of its wealthiest families. While this is not unique to Ormoc, and in 
fact is a common weakness in the rest of the country, social responsibility is 
predictably low among the wealthy families whose fortunes had been built on 
the maximization and utilization of the vast human and environmental 
resources that characterize the Philippines. The government (both at the 
national and local levels), the Catholic Church, the NGOs and media have 
not systematically demanded a sustained accounting of the elite families’ 
roles and responsibilities in the larger society of which they are part, 
especially in the face of threats to its existence, such as a massive disaster. 
Further, the most vulnerable and poorest communities and families are not 
considered—and in fact do not consider themselves—as full members of 
society, with the capacity to contribute to the long term growth and 
development of Ormoc. It is not surprising, therefore, that disasters do not 
result in social transformation, but merely revert back to business as usual 
before another disaster comes to again threaten the status quo. The 
continued inability to promote a collective memory of the 1991 Ormoc flood—
one that reflects as wide a perspective as possible from all sectors of 
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